BACK TO BUSINESS AS USUAL

PRESIDENT BIDEN’S FIRST FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

— SEPTEMBER 2021 —

Seth Binder

with contributions from
April Brady, Louisa Keeler, Arwa Shobaki, Merve Tahiroğlu, and Clare Ulmer
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ABOUT THE PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY (POMED)

The Project on Middle East Democracy is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to examining how genuine democracies can develop in the Middle East and how the United States can best support that process. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, we aim to strengthen the constituency for U.S. policies that peacefully support democratic reform in the Middle East.
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<td>Congressional Budget Justification</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>GJD</td>
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<td>House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs</td>
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<td>Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Relief and Recovery Fund</td>
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<td>SACFO</td>
<td>Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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**Democracy Fund**: A budget account established in Fiscal Year 2006. The fund is typically administered by either the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) or USAID’s Bureau for Development, Democracy, and Innovation (DDI).

**Earmark**: A congressional directive that a specific denomination of funds be used for a particular objective, project, or recipient.

**Explanatory Statement**: The report that accompanies an appropriations bill to explain congressional intent, emphasize or clarify legislative text, and include additional reporting requirements.

**Obligate**: When the State Department or USAID sets aside funds appropriated by Congress for disbursement.

**Fiscal Year**: Runs from October 1 through September 30 (e.g., Fiscal Year 2022 runs from October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Joseph R. Biden’s first international affairs budget is a dramatic reversal from the previous four requests under President Donald Trump. President Biden’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 request of $63.9 billion would significantly increase the foreign affairs budget not only from Trump’s paltry FY21 request of $44.1 billion, but also from the $55.5 billion appropriated by Congress in FY21. Similarly, for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) President Biden’s request of $7.6 billion boosts foreign aid by 17 percent compared to Trump’s FY21 request.

True to his word, President Biden’s request would also increase funding for democracy and human rights programs around the world. The FY22 request of $2.8 billion for programming that falls within the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) objective is 65 percent higher than the FY21 request by President Trump, 18.3 percent more than Congress’s FY21 appropriation, and 26.8 percent more than the FY20 allocation. In the MENA region, this trend continues. The FY22 request for democracy programs is more than double the FY21 request and 34 percent more than the U.S. government spent in FY20.

The budget request is an opportunity for the administration to demonstrate its foreign policy priorities, and it is clear that the administration is committed to increasing funding for foreign aid and democracy programs in particular. Yet while the Biden administration’s request increases support in key areas, it ultimately perpetuates the long-standing trend of securitizing U.S. aid to the MENA region, which despite the funding increases continues to relegate U.S. democracy programs to the margins of policy.

KEY FINDINGS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA):

- **President Biden’s FY22 request for the MENA region would more than double support for democracy and governance programs.** The $453.6 million request for the GJD objective is 140 percent more than President Trump’s FY21 request of $189.2 million, the largest democracy and governance funding increase of any region in the world. The total FY22 GJD request for MENA is also, importantly, 34 percent more than the actual allocation of $337.8 million for MENA in FY20, the most recent year data is available.

- **The president’s foreign aid budget request for MENA, despite his stated commitment to democracy programming, does not reflect a significant priority shift from previous administrations, instead perpetuating the preponderance of security assistance to the region.** The $5.8 billion requested for security assistance represents 76 percent of the total requested for MENA. In comparison, democracy and human rights programs represent less than 6 percent of the requested funding for the region. In addition, the FY22 request for security assistance for MENA is $340 million (6 percent) more than the Trump administration’s FY21 request of $5.5 billion, which is a larger increase in actual dollars than for democracy assistance.
• Despite President Biden’s declaration that he would end the “blank checks” for Egypt’s authoritarian regime, the FY22 request seeks the same $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing that Egypt has received since 1987. The administration has also explicitly and repeatedly expressed opposition to Congress including human rights conditions on military aid to Egypt in the FY22 appropriations bill. The administration also used a loophole in the FY20 law to obligate $300 million of the $1.3 billion in military aid conditioned on human rights.

• The FY22 bilateral requests for Iraq, Jordan, and Morocco remained static relative to recent years’ appropriations laws even though citizens in all three countries are increasingly concerned about government corruption and repression. By choosing not to request further funding for democracy programs in these countries, the administration misses an opportunity to reprioritize U.S. assistance to better meet new U.S. objectives and the concerns of the countries’ citizens.

• While the administration’s request would increase bilateral aid for Lebanon by 22 percent compared to the FY21 appropriations law, all of that increase is for military aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United States has provided more than $370 million in humanitarian assistance in FY21, but the need and demand for additional aid among the Lebanese people is just as great as among the LAF.

• The FY22 request of $219 million in bilateral assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and re-engagement with the Palestinian Authority is part of a reversal from the Trump administration’s policy toward the Palestinians. In addition, the Biden administration has announced that it would provide more than $360 million in economic, development, security, and humanitarian assistance for Palestinians from held-up prior year funds, including more than $150 million for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 foreign affairs budget request represents one of the foundational documents of President Biden’s foreign policy agenda and an early indication of his administration’s global priorities and approach. The White House released the FY22 request in May, several months later than the executive branch typically sends it to Congress. The Biden administration blamed the delay on the lack of cooperation from the Trump administration during the transition and on the Senate’s failure to confirm top appointees to the Office of Management and Budget. More than its lateness, the FY22 request will likely be remembered for its clear reversal from former President Donald Trump’s budget requests, which proposed draconian cuts to foreign assistance. President Biden even abandoned President Trump’s attempt, repeatedly rejected by Congress, to consolidate numerous budget accounts into new accounts such as the Economic Support and Development Fund.

President Biden’s overall FY22 request of $63.9 billion is not only a remarkable 45 percent larger than President Trump’s FY21 request of $44.1 billion, but it is also $5 billion more than President Barack Obama’s largest nominal request for FY11. Importantly, Biden’s foreign affairs budget is also 15 percent more than the $55.5 billion Congress appropriated for FY21, making it the largest requested increase since FY07.

During the 2020 presidential campaign, Biden’s advisor Antony Blinken, now the secretary of state, promised that a Biden administration would “bring aid back to the center of our foreign policy.” Despite boosting funding for diplomacy and foreign aid, however, the Defense Department’s budget remains more than 10 times larger than that of the State Department. In fact, the president requested an increase for the Defense Department’s FY22 budget that is 26 percent larger in actual dollars than the State Department increase.

Biden’s foreign aid request reflects his administration’s stated commitment to “centering” support for democracy and human rights in its foreign policy. In April 2021, the administration explained that in order to “ensure the United States plays a lead role in defending democracy, freedom, and the rule of law,” the FY22 foreign affairs request would include “a significant increase in resources to strengthen...
and defend democracies throughout the world, advance human rights, fight corruption, and counter authoritarianism.” 11

Indeed, according to the State Department’s Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), the administration’s FY22 request of $2.8 billion for programming that falls within the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) objective—the category for aid related to democracy and human rights—is 26.8 percent higher than the FY20 allocation of $2.2 billion, the most recent year for which such data is available. It is also 18.3 percent higher than the $2.4 billion that Congress appropriated for democracy programs in FY21. Yet, the FY22 request for GJD-related

programming is still only 6.8 percent of the total requested foreign assistance.

Both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill regularly rejected the Trump administration’s large proposed cuts to foreign aid, a rare place of bipartisan convergence. It appears that this year, despite continued political polarization, appropriators generally support Biden’s request for an increase. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), the top Republican on the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SACFO), indicated his support for the FY22 request during a June 2021 hearing with Secretary Blinken, explaining that the administration “plussed-up in areas I appreciate.”12 Among Republicans on the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees, only Hal Rogers (R-KY), ranking member on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (HACFO), has publicly expressed concern over the “magnitude of the increase.”13

In the second year of a resurgent and resilient pandemic—in part fueled by a slow or stalled vaccine rollout in developing countries and amid economic crises, conflicts, and climate disasters around the world—a report focused on foreign aid to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and democracy and governance assistance in particular, may not seem pressing. If the past year and a half has taught us anything, however, it is that these crises are linked inextricably to governance and rights. Governments that are responsive and accountable to their citizens—who work with them rather than repressing them—are undoubtedly better able to address these challenges and the ones ahead.

Governments in MENA, unfortunately, have responded to the pandemic by increasing repression and by cracking down on individuals and organizations who dare to criticize rulers and their policies. MENA regimes have suppressed protests, arrested activists, and denied prisoners access to and communication with their families or lawyers, all supposedly in the name of battling COVID-19. The inability of many governments in MENA to adequately respond to the pandemic has further eroded their legitimacy, exacerbating underlying problems and making countries less stable. Even in Tunisia, where the initial outbreak of the pandemic was handled relatively well, the government’s subsequent failures in managing the situation was a major reason for Tunisians’ widespread support for President Kais Saïed’s July 25, 2021 power grab, which risks derailing Tunisia’s significant democratic progress over the last decade.14

Recognizing these connections, the Biden administration has indicated that U.S. foreign policy will emphasize diplomacy, democracy, and development, and that the FY22 foreign affairs request would increase support to help achieve these goals. The administration’s budget request, however, ultimately demonstrates that it is unwilling to break with decades-long foreign policy trends. For example, while Secretary Blinken has rightly argued that “strong

democracies are more stable, more open, better partners,” funding for democracy and governance programs continues to be the smallest objective within the administration’s foreign aid request.15

This report describes the portion of President Biden’s FY22 international affairs budget request that pertains to security and economic assistance for the MENA region. Regarding security assistance, the report focuses on Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR). For economic assistance, we discuss the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Development Assistance (DA), and occasionally the Democracy Fund (DF) for MENA, which includes aid both for economic development and for governance, human rights, and democracy building. The report also discusses, to a lesser degree, humanitarian assistance provided through multilateral accounts, which does not include country-specific requests as a matter of policy to allow U.S. officials the flexibility to respond to shifting humanitarian needs around the world.

The information and analysis presented here is drawn from a variety of sources, including analysis of all relevant budget documents and legislation, interviews with current and former executive branch officials and congressional staff, and discussions with a wide range of other relevant actors, such as regional experts and representatives of development and democracy-promotion organizations involved with U.S. aid to the region. The following sections provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of U.S. foreign assistance in MENA in recent years, with an emphasis on U.S. aid intended to support human rights and democracy.

A NOTE ON TERMS

Since the FY20 request, the administration has divided the Investing in People objective between a Health objective and an Education and Social Services objective. The administration also renamed the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) objective to Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. For this report we have kept the original names to make comparisons to previous years easier.

The Trump administration’s FY17–21 budget requests included an Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account, which Congress never accepted. Nearly all ESDF requested for MENA would fall under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. For this report we use ESF instead of ESDF to make comparisons to appropriations previous years easier.

In keeping with his commitment to increase foreign aid globally, President Biden’s FY22 budget request of $7.6 billion for the MENA region is nearly 20 percent more than President Trump’s FY21 request of $6.5 billion. While Biden’s request provides a significant increase in funding for democracy and governance programs, it would actually increase security assistance to the MENA region even more.

Biden’s request includes $453.6 million for the GJD objective, which is more than double Trump’s FY21 request of $189.2 million and represents the largest proposed democracy and governance funding increase of any region in the world. Importantly, the FY22 GJD is 34 percent more than the Trump administration spent ($337.8 million) on GJD for MENA in FY20, the most recent year for which data is available. Nearly all of Biden’s proposed increase would support GJD programs in Jordan, Libya, Syria, and West Bank/Gaza.

For a region largely ruled by autocratic leaders, these resources could help citizens of MENA create more rights-respecting and accountable governments. If the administration truly wants to counter authoritarianism and promote democratic values, however, how it uses such aid is arguably more important. Will the Biden administration focus on supporting genuine, citizen-led initiatives to fight corruption, to counter human rights violations by abusive regimes, and to promote peaceful democratic reform, or will it instead resort to funding window-dressing democracy programs controlled by repressive MENA leaders?

In fact, democracy and governance programs represent only a tiny fraction of Biden’s budget request. Of Biden’s $7.6 billion total request for MENA aid, a mere 6 percent would go toward supporting democracy and human rights, the very issues that the administration claims are at the “center” of its foreign policy. Some of the funds would go toward supporting economic growth, health, and education programs. But the overwhelming majority, 76 percent ($5.8 billion), is for the Peace and Security objective, the administration’s category for military and security aid. In comparison, no other region in the request has more than 41 percent of its funding dedicated to security assistance.

In Biden’s proposed budget, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan would continue to receive a disproportionate amount of the assistance (79 percent), similar to previous years. Yet, even excluding these large security partners, more than 50 percent of Biden’s requested aid to the region would still be for security assistance. In addition, the $340 million more in security aid compared to the FY21 request ($5.5 billion) that the Biden administration is requesting—which is mostly weapons, equipment, and training for Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—would be a larger increase than any other objective.

The following sections describe a few programs in more detail that demonstrate further how the Biden administration has continued the securitization of U.S. policy to MENA.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING LOANS

In a somewhat surprising decision, the Biden administration has, like the Trump administration before it, asked for a broad FMF loan authority to give U.S. officials an additional option in how they sell arms to foreign countries. The authority would allow the U.S. government to provide a loan directly to a foreign country or, alternatively, extend a guarantee to lenders that the U.S. government would cover the loan should the foreign country be unable to pay. The FY22 request of $8 billion for a direct loan and loan guarantee authority is the same request that the Trump administration made in FY20 and FY21.

Each year, however, Congress rejected the request, in part concerned at the Trump administration’s inability to demonstrate how it would avoid the failures of the 1980s, when the loan program resulted in $26.4 billion in outstanding-
MENA TOTAL ASSISTANCE BY OBJECTIVE in millions of dollars

FY22 Request

- Peace and Security
- Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD)
- Investing in People
- Economic Growth
- Humanitarian Assistance

MENA GJD REQUEST BY SUB-OBJECTIVE in millions of dollars

FY20 Actual*

- Rule of Law and Human Rights
- Good Governance
- Political Competition and Consensus Building
- Civil Society

FY22 Request

- Rule of Law and Human Rights
- Good Governance
- Political Competition and Consensus Building
- Civil Society

*Actual refers to the level of funding the administration obligated for that fiscal year.
TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE BY REGION in billions of dollars

- Near East: FY20 Actual = 7.8, FY22 Requested = 7.6
- Africa: FY20 Actual = 8.5, FY22 Requested = 7.4
- Western Hemisphere: FY20 Actual = 1.7, FY22 Requested = 2.1
- South and Central Asia: FY20 Actual = 11, FY22 Requested = 12
- East Asia and Pacific: FY20 Actual = 10, FY22 Requested = 10
- Europe and Eurasia: FY20 Actual = 1.2, FY22 Requested = 1.2

TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE BY MENA COUNTRY in millions of dollars

- Israel: FY20 Actual = 3300, FY22 Requested = 2600
- Jordan: FY20 Actual = 770, FY22 Requested = 1418
- Egypt: FY20 Actual = 436, FY22 Requested = 430
- Iraq: FY20 Actual = 214, FY22 Requested = 171
- Lebanon and W. Bank & Gaza: FY20 Actual = 900, FY22 Requested = 770
- Syria: FY20 Actual = 400, FY22 Requested = 460
- Morocco: FY20 Actual = 120, FY22 Requested = 160
- Yemen: FY20 Actual = 10, FY22 Requested = 9
- Libya: FY20 Actual = 28, FY22 Requested = 50
- Algeria: FY20 Actual = 3, FY22 Requested = 5
- Bahrain: FY20 Actual = 0, FY22 Requested = 10
- Oman: FY20 Actual = 0, FY22 Requested = 10
ing payments for which the U.S. government ultimately assumed responsibility, wrecking the credit ratings of the recipient countries in the process. Nevertheless, despite an unwillingness to endorse a broad loan authority, the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act included a provision allowing Jordan to exercise up to $8 billion in an FMF direct loan and FMF loan guarantee, which is discussed in more detail in the Jordan country section.

The CBJ explains that the FY22 loan authority request will enable the United States “to provide more competitive financing terms relative to foreign competitors” and to incentivize “the private sector to provide financing for defense sales by providing a partial guarantee backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government.” In addition, an administration official interviewed for this report justified this year’s request by suggesting that there is an “inherent goodness” in the flexibility that a loan authority would provide the U.S. government.

While the Biden administration would like the additional flexibility, the United States is already the world’s largest arms exporter, responsible for 52 percent of the total arms transferred into the Middle East between 2016 and 2020. Over that time, the United States also saw its share of global arms exports increase by 15 percent compared to the previous four years, even without the loan authority.

Some in Congress may be more inclined to support the loan authority this year, believing that the Biden administration will be more responsible than the Trump administration and that more options to sell arms would be a valuable additional tool, but the risks continue to outweigh the benefits. The new authority would provide arms manufacturers and foreign governments an additional point of pressure on the Biden administration to authorize more sales with questionable benefits to U.S. national security interests. Furthermore, no compelling explanation has yet been provided on how the government would avoid the debt failures of the past.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

This report focuses on the provision of assistance administered by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Department of Defense (DOD), however, continues to provide significant foreign aid in the form of military equipment and training to partner militaries. The Biden administration’s FY22 request of $6.5 billion for DOD aid accounts is a 14 percent reduction from the FY21 request ($7.6 billion) and a 29 percent reduction from the FY20 request ($9.2 billion).

Unfortunately, as in previous years, the FY22 request indicates neither which countries will be receiving DOD assistance nor how much they will be receiving. U.S. law recommends that DOD provide assistance levels by country “to the extent practicable.” The FY22 Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding notes that DOD’s goal is to include budgetary information by country in the future, but it claims that such specification is “not currently feasible due to the data collection timeline and the available systems for analyzing and processing the security coop-

19. POMED interview with an administration official, August 2021.
eration data.” In the absence of such detailed information, however, members of Congress have been appropriating billions of dollars in lethal equipment and training without a thorough understanding of the intent behind the administration’s request. But, as has been the case for decades, Congress is likely to approve the Pentagon’s request.

Within the administration’s FY22 request, $522 million is for the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). Since CTEF and its predecessor program began in 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces and U.S.-aligned Syrian groups have received more than $6.4 billion and $2.3 billion, respectively, from DOD-funded accounts, making them two of the largest recipients of military aid during that span.

One of the other programs that provides significant funds to militaries in the MENA region is the Section 333 authority. The Biden administration incorporated Section 333 into the International Security Cooperation Programs (ISCP) account and requested $1.1 billion in ISCP for FY22. Since the creation of the Section 333 authority in FY17, Lebanon and Jordan have been two of its largest recipients, receiving more than $346 million and $188 million respectively. In addition, DOD provides reimbursements to partner countries that increase security along their borders adjacent to conflict areas. The administration’s FY22 request of $370 million for this border security account would be 48 percent more than the FY21 appropriation of $250 million. The FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act authorizes the border security account to provide reimbursements for Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, and Oman, as well as a minimum of $150 million for Jordan.


23. Ibid.


MAJOR INITIATIVES:
MULTI-COUNTRY ACCOUNTS AND PROGRAMS

MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE (MEPI).................................14
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR (DRL) ..................................18
NEAR EAST REGIONAL DEMOCRACY (NERD) .................................21
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED) ...........................25
Established in 2002 as part of the George W. Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda” for the Middle East, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a regional assistance program funded and managed by the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Bureau of the State Department. The Bush administration envisioned MEPI as a forward-leaning, reform-oriented initiative, based in the NEA Bureau for policy clout, to supplement the more traditional, cautious government-to-government development approach of USAID. That administration gave MEPI a policy mandate to build partnerships with citizens and to pursue edgier democracy-promotion projects, including through supporting independent civil society groups, even over the objections of regional governments.

This mandate weakened during the latter years of the Obama administration as U.S. interest in promoting human rights and democracy in MENA waned, leading MEPI to adopt a more cautious and less democracy-oriented approach. Originally a standalone office in NEA, in 2014 MEPI was subsumed into the Bureau’s Office of Assistance Coordination (NEA/AC).
MEPI's website, which as of this writing did not appear to be updated from the Trump administration's version, describes the program's mission as “fostering partnerships among citizens, civil society, the private sector, and government institutions to generate shared solutions that promote stability and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa,” with the two core objectives of “participatory governance” and “economic opportunity.”

MEPI funds U.S. organizations to implement single-country, multi-country, and region-wide programs and gives small grants to local civil society organizations. MEPI also manages three longstanding U.S. scholarship and leadership programs in the MENA region: Student Leaders, Leaders for Democracy, and Tomorrow's Leaders.

Over the last four years, Congress has appropriated an average of $50 million per year for MEPI, including an annual earmark of $20 million for the scholarship/leadership programs mentioned above. According to the Congressional Research Service, about $1.1 billion has been allocated to MEPI since its inception.

For FY22, the Biden administration requested $27.2 million for MEPI, an 88 percent increase from the Trump administration's FY21 request. Biden's request, however, would be a 46 percent reduction from the FY21 appropriation and is well below the Obama administration's smallest request ($60 million for FY17).

According to the FY22 CBJ, the Biden administration seeks to use $119 million for civil society projects, $93 million for private-sector productivity, $3.3 million for political competition and consensus-building, $1.6 million for good governance, and $1.2 million for workforce development.

Reflecting the new administration's broader foreign policy goals, the FY22 CBJ also states that MEPI programming would conduct “regional polling to identify the prevalence of [China’s] influence in the region,” support “youth and women's participation in economic activities,” and implement projects that “create job opportunities while reducing vulnerability to external shocks.”

The CBJ notes that MEPI “[builds] upon proven approaches by moving quickly and flexibly to advance U.S. government policy priorities, including in countries where the U.S. is not present [such as] higher-income and non-traditional development countries.”

According to the FY22 CBJ, to align with Biden administration priorities, MEPI plans to shift its programming away from an emphasis on “stability” and toward activities to “counter the malign influence of the People’s Republic of China in the region, advance women’s empowerment, address the climate crisis, and bolster diversity, equity, and inclusion.” Similar to the Trump administration's rhetoric about MEPI, these themes suggest a distinctive shift, at least rhetorically, away from support for democracy and democratic change.

Expressing disappointment that MEPI continues to move away from its original focus, one congressional staffer interviewed for this report complained that MEPI is “spread so thin across the region” and can only provide so much value with limited funds.

MEPI's website emphasizes that it offers a distinctive assistance approach by “[supporting] partnerships . . . that have the agility to respond to emerging opportunities through field-driven, evidence-based, and results-oriented projects.”

According to one former U.S. official, USAID, DRL, and MEPI previously had “fights over resources” that led to a “bureaucratic chokepoint.” A current administration official, however, indicated in an interview that despite occasional “working-level tensions,” the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), MEPI, and USAID “have been able to deconflict” activities at the strategic level.
MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE

**FY21 APPROPRIATION**

- In FY21, Congress overwhelmingly rejected the Trump administration’s $14.5 million request, instead appropriating $50 million for MEPI, the same level since FY19.
- Appropriators included an earmark in the law’s explanatory statement of $20 million for MEPI-run scholarship programs, the same amount since FY18.
- In addition, as in previous years, HACFO expressed support for MEPI’s scholarship programs and emphasized in its explanatory statement that the program “should be made available for institutions that meet standards comparable to those required for American accreditation and should be awarded in a manner consistent with prior fiscal years, including on an open and competitive basis.”

**HOW AID IS SPENT**

- Due to a congressional earmark, MEPI is required to spend 40 percent ($20 million) on scholarship/leadership programs, leaving $30 million in FY21 for its two core objectives: participatory governance and economic opportunity.
- Over the course of the past fiscal year, MEPI continued its support for the Open Government Partnership (OGP), created in 2011, which promotes new technologies to increase transparency, including in budgeting, human resources management, and public procurement. OGP-related projects are being implemented in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia.
- MEPI programming has also sought to address Chinese penetration into MENA—particularly since China has become the largest external investor in the region. MEPI has worked with MENA governments and businesses to enhance their legal, regulatory, and administrative capabilities. Relatedly, according to one congressional staffer interviewed for this report, the State Department hopes that MEPI’s programming serves as a reminder to countries in the region of the “value of the United States as a preferred development partner.”

**EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION**

- Consistent with recent years, and in line with the House FY22 bill, Congress is likely to keep MEPI funding at $50 million with an earmark of $20 million for scholarship/leadership programs.
- One congressional staffer suggested that MEPI, and particularly the scholarship program, retains strong support on the Hill.

**POMED RECOMMENDATIONS**

- We recommend that Congress continue funding MEPI at the FY21 level of $50 million and encourage the Biden administration to return MEPI to its original focus on democracy promotion.
- MEPI could be a useful tool for furthering the administration’s expressed commitment to “centering” democracy and human rights in its MENA policy, but to be effective MEPI must be emboldened and supported by the administration.
2. MEPI refers to these programs as “leadership” programs because they include leadership development along with academic scholarships. For details, see MEPI website, "Leadership Programs," https://mepi.state.gov/leadership/
5. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
7. POMED interview with a former government official, April 2021.
8. POMED interview with an administration official, July 2021.
10. Ibid.
13. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
14. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
WHAT IS DRL?

- Created in 1977, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) leads the State Department’s efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Well known for its annual reports, including on human rights, child soldiers, and international religious freedom, DRL also carries out its mission through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, foreign assistance, and economic sanctions.1

- DRL also is the key implementer of the Leahy Law, which prohibits the U.S. government from providing assistance “to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” DRL conducts required vetting of potential recipients of U.S. security assistance.2

- DRL funds and manages a variety of aid programs around the world, including in the MENA region. DRL prioritizes programs that focus on anti-corruption, freedom of expression, human rights, internet freedom, justice and accountability, political participation, religious freedom, labor, and the rule of law.3

POLICY CONTEXT

- According to one administration official interviewed for this report, DRL received “sympathy” from others within the State Department during the Trump administration because the bureau was “so pushed aside” by a president and secretary of state who demonstrated little concern for rights and freedoms, apart from abuses committed by U.S. adversaries such as Iran.4

- In some respects, the new administration, with its stated commitment to some of the bureau’s core objec-
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR

For the seventh year in a row, in FY21 Congress increased funding for DRL, appropriating $190.5 million for its aid programs. This is 6.7 percent more than it appropriated in FY20 ($178.5 million), which demonstrates continued strong support for global DRL programming.

Within the $190.5 million, Congress earmarked the same funding levels for Syria and Yemen as the previous year: $11 million and $3 million, respectively. The FY21 appropriation also earmarked $11.5 million for the Human Rights Defenders Fund and $15 million for DRL to implement Near East Regional Democracy programs.

Congress also appropriated $11 million in FY21 for DRL to carry out Leahy Law vetting, an increase of $1 million from the previous year.

HOW AID IS SPENT

During the last administration, DRL regularly had difficulty acquiring approval for country-specific programming in MENA from U.S. embassies concerned about antagonizing host governments—an issue one representative from a U.S. democracy-promotion organization says DRL did not face in other regions. An official interviewed for the report noted that while some MENA governments claim that they want to work with the new administration on human rights, such commitments are likely empty promises meant to “curry favor” with the Biden team.

Another official interviewed for the report noted that while some MENA governments claim that they want to work with the new administration on human rights, such commitments are likely empty promises meant to “curry favor” with the Biden team.

Another official interviewed for the report noted that this has led to a “more confrontational” relationship with NEA, which may fear losing some influence on policy decisions. NEA has traditionally favored maintaining smooth relationships with governments in the region rather than risking the friction that can occur with the promotion of democracy and human rights.

The State Department’s CBJ defended this significant increase in funds by quoting President Biden’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which states, “Authoritarianism is on the global march, and we must join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over.”

Referencing Secretary Blinken’s March 3, 2021 speech identifying the administration’s foreign policy priorities, the CBJ also notes that DRL would use FY22 funds to fight corruption, incentivize democratic behavior, support internet freedom, and champion “inclusion and equity for all.”

FY22 REQUEST

For FY22, the Biden administration requested $250.7 million for DRL assistance programs, which is more than double the Trump administration’s last request ($115 million) and 31.6 percent more than Congress appropriated ($190.5 million) in FY21. The total request is divided between the Democracy Fund ($190.7 million) and ESF ($60 million) accounts.

The FY22 request includes $11.5 million for the Human Rights Defenders Fund and $15 million for DRL to implement Near East Regional Democracy programs. During the last administration, DRL regularly had difficulty acquiring approval for country-specific programming in MENA from U.S. embassies concerned about antagonizing host governments—an issue one representative from a U.S. democracy-promotion organization says DRL did not face in other regions. The same representative remarked, “Many democracy programs [in MENA] are postponed, modified, or canceled because [DRL] can’t get concurrence” from U.S. embassies.

Months into the new administration, another representative from a U.S. democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report indicated that it is not
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR

clear yet whether this problem of securing concurrence for programming will persist.12

- In light of this challenge, over the past year the bureau has relied on region-wide programs that have promoted the rule of law, community reconciliation and transitional justice, and civic engagement. These programs still require embassy approval but are seen as less controversial because they often take place in a third country and only involve a few individuals from any specific country.

- The rare instances in which DRL has implemented country-specific programs have been in countries experiencing or trying to overcome conflict, such as Yemen and Libya, or in countries that are U.S. adversaries, such as Iran and Syria. This programming has included support for both civil society and accountability for human rights violations.

- The bureau has also invested heavily in programs in MENA focused on religious freedom, internet freedom, and labor rights, as well as in rapid response programs such as Lifeline, which helps civil society organizations and individual activists at risk of repression by providing emergency assistance and financial support.

EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- In HACFO’s FY22 bill, appropriators earmarked $190.5 million for DRL through the Democracy Fund, almost exactly what the administration requested for that account.

- According to one congressional staffer interviewed for this report, Congress will likely leave the administration flexibility on whether to allocate the additional requested funds from the ESF account rather than mandate it through an earmark.13

POMED RECOMMENDATIONS

- POMED supports funding for DRL programs at the administration’s request of $250.7 million. As authoritarian regimes in the MENA continue to crack down on human rights defenders, civil society organizations, journalists, and activists, it is particularly important that DRL receive robust funding for its rapid response programs such as Lifeline.

- Senior administration officials should ensure that DRL can execute the administration’s policy commitment to promoting democracy and human rights regardless of NEA’s discomfort.

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4. POMED interview with an administration official, April 2021.
5. Ibid.
6. POMED interview with an administration official, July 2021.
8. Ibid.
9. The Human Rights Defenders Fund (HRDF) was created by the George W. Bush administration in 2006 in order to “enable the U.S. government to respond to human rights defenders’ emergency needs quickly by providing assistance to activists who are facing extraordinary financial, legal or medical needs as a result of government repression.” The Fund is managed by DRL and was initially allocated $1 million. For more information see: https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/77837.htm
11. Ibid.
13. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
NEAR EAST REGIONAL DEMOCRACY snapshot

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NERD FUNDS: REQUESTED VS. APPROPRIATED, FY12–22

WHAT IS NERD?

- The Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) program, which is funded through ESF and managed by the State Department, was created in March 2009 to promote human rights and democracy in Iran. The program replaced the George W. Bush administration’s controversial Iran Democracy Fund. Though funding for NERD is not legally restricted to Iran, it is broadly and historically understood that the account is to be used for that purpose.

- NERD is overseen by the State Department’s NEA Bureau, with DRL managing a portion of the funds. In the past, USAID also managed some NERD grants.

- NERD’s “primary goal,” according to the CBJ, is “to foster a vibrant civil society, increase the free flow of information, and promote the exercise of human rights.” NERD programming is used to achieve outcomes such as “the deployment of circumvention tools for enhanced internet access, increased ability of civil society to advocate for citizen priorities, documentation about human rights violations, and the training of investigative journalists to research and report on issues of concern to citizens.”

- The U.S. government does not publicize NERD activities, grantees, or beneficiaries due to the security risks.
posed by the Iranian government’s deep suspicion that Western-funded democracy promotion programs and other civil society and academic initiatives are “regime change” plots. For this reason, NERD funding is used for activities that take place online and outside of Iran.

Since FY04, Congress has appropriated more than $618 million for State Department democracy programs for Iran, including for NERD and its predecessor initiatives during the Bush administration. NERD’s appropriation has averaged $39.3 million annually since FY10.

POLICY CONTEXT

U.S. funding of democracy and human rights promotion for Iran has been controversial from the outset because of its close association with the policies of the Bush administration, which many Iranians suspected of supporting regime change.

This perception was reinforced by the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions on the Iranian government and by its interest in the NERD program. Amid massive cuts to the foreign assistance budget, NERD was one of the few foreign aid programs for which the Trump administration sought a funding increase in FY20 compared to its FY19 request, which it then sustained in FY21.

In a reversal of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Biden administration indicated that it would rejoin the accord if Iran also returned to compliance. So far, however, indirect negotiations have failed to produce a resolution, and U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley has expressed concern that Iran may take a more hardline approach to future talks, particularly in light of conservatives sweeping to power in Iran’s heavily engineered 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections. Engagement with Iran is further complicated by the fact that the United States has no formal diplomatic relations with the country.

In Congress, where many lawmakers have been very vocal in supporting democracy and human rights in Iran, NERD has enjoyed bipartisan support since the program’s inception, with lawmakers steadily increasing its funding over the past decade above the amount requested by the executive branch.

Within the last year, Iranian authorities have become even more repressive, clamping down violently on peaceful protesters, repeatedly throttling internet connectivity, and accelerating the push to develop a highly constrained domestic internet. Iran’s parliament is now considering an internet “protection” bill that would dramatically reduce the already-limited access to the internet and infringe on the privacy of its users.

The Biden administration’s FY22 request of $55 million for NERD matches appropriation levels for FY20 and FY21 and is a 37.5 percent increase over the Trump administration’s FY21 request of $40 million.

Biden’s request includes earmarks of $20 million for programs that support the rule of law, $18.3 million for civil society, and $16.8 million for internet freedom.

The FY22 CBJ states that proposed NERD funding “will meet urgent priorities resulting from recent political events, such as internet shutdown events, threats to the free flow of information, human rights abuses, and suppression of the freedoms of association and expression.” Consistent with past years, Iran is not mentioned in the CBJ’s language on NERD but is understood to be the target of the proposed activities.
FY21 APPROPRIATION

- For FY21, Congress appropriated $55 million for NERD, $15 million above the Trump administration’s FY21 request. The FY21 appropriation was the same as the appropriation for FY20.

- Of the $55 million included in the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress earmarked $15 million for DRL and $16.8 million for internet freedom programs, which fund a wide range of initiatives to support civil society and to counter restrictions on internet access.

HOW AID IS SPENT

- The FY22 CBJ describes NERD activities as providing citizens with “uncensored information, through a range of internet freedom programs, and civic skills to hold their government accountable to citizen demands and to their country’s international obligations and commitments. Implementation occurs through third-country trainings, the creation and provision of online training and media content, the promotion of digital freedom, and grants and sub-grants to nongovernmental organizations.”

- According to a representative of a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report, NERD grants are awarded to NGOs working on democracy and human rights promotion globally as well as those focused exclusively on Iran, but as noted, the U.S. government does not make NERD grantees or project details public.

EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- As NERD has enjoyed strong bipartisan support from Congress, POMED anticipates that NERD is likely to receive the Biden administration’s request of $55 million for FY22, and Congress may appropriate more than the request.

- There has been a degree of discomfort about NERD among Democratic congressional staffers in the past, but according to one representative from a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report, members of Congress increasingly see the program as an important tool to support access to information for Iranians.

POMED RECOMMENDATION

- POMED supports funding for NERD at the administration’s request of $55 million in order to help mitigate the adverse effects of the Iranian authorities’ growing restrictions on the internet and other communications.


6. See, for example, numerous Iran-focused bills and resolutions in the 117th Congress alone: https://www.congress.gov/search?q=%7B%22source%22%3A%22legislation%22%2C%22search%22%3A%22Iran%22%2C%22co


WHAT IS THE NED?

- Founded in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is an “independent, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world.” It receives funding from Congress, where it has traditionally enjoyed strong bipartisan support.

- In total, the NED finances more than 2,000 grants every year in more than 100 countries in order to support “the growth of a wide range of democratic institutions abroad, including political parties, trade unions, free markets and business organizations, as well as the many elements of a vibrant civil society that ensure human rights, an independent media, and the rule of law.”

- The NED provides grants to NGOs around the world as well as to four “core grantees”: the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Center for International Private Enterprise, and the Solidarity Center.

POLICY CONTEXT

- The importance of the NED, as demonstrated over the past four years, is its independence from the U.S. government. Although it receives the majority of its support from Congress, the NED does not seek or require approval from the executive branch for its programs, allowing it to provide support in countries where an administration is skeptical of or opposed to such work.

- While NED’s autonomy riled the previous administration, the Biden administration’s commitment to supporting democracy and human rights has led to “an improved relationship,” according to one representative from a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report.

FY22 REQUEST

- In a dramatic break from the last few years, which saw the Trump administration request large cuts in funding for the NED, the Biden administration’s FY22 request of $300 million is the same amount Congress has appropriated since FY20.

- The FY22 request demonstrates the Biden administration’s commitment to democracy and human rights promotion even when the implementation of that programming is outside the administration’s control.

FY21 APPROPRIATION

- Congress emphatically rejected the Trump administration’s requests each of the previous four years. In FY21, Congress matched the prior year’s unprecedented $300 million appropriation for the NED, which was not only 346 percent more than Trump’s FY21 request of $67.3 million but also 66.7 percent more than the FY19 congressional appropriation of $180 million.

- Congress’s continued strong, bipartisan support for the NED demonstrates its commitment to the endowment, regardless of executive branch priorities.
The FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act earmarks $195.8 million of the $300 million appropriation for the core institutes, with the remaining $104.2 million for the NED to provide to other grantees.

The NED regularly conducts “donor mapping” to evaluate where the administration’s shortfalls and gaps are in the MENA region, allowing the endowment to strategically fill those holes. One democracy-promotion representative interviewed for this report said this is a “constant backdrop” as the endowment is thinking about grants.6

NED funding has also responded to the growing influence of MENA’s authoritarian leaders, such as in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with programs focused on media, freedom of expression, and protection for human rights defenders and civil society. This marks a more “defensive stance” than previously, according to one democracy-promotion representative interviewed for this report.7

Although the NED is concerned about rising global authoritarianism, one democracy-promotion representative interviewed for this report indicated that regional partners felt that there were “more important things” than countering China; as a result, that has not been a focus of programming.8

Congress likely will continue robust funding for the NED, with an expectation that it will maintain funding at $300 million. Already, the House FY22 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) bill has matched President Biden’s request, and senators have traditionally been some of the strongest supporters of the NED and its work.

2. Ibid.
4. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, August 2021.
6. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, August 2021.
7. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, August 2021.
8. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, August 2021.
Most U.S. democracy and governance programs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are funded through bilateral assistance accounts and are administered by USAID, which also oversees most bilateral aid to support economic development. USAID currently counts ten active programs in MENA: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen.

The forthcoming sections describe U.S. assistance—including for GJD, economic reform and development, security assistance, and humanitarian aid—to these locations, along with assistance for Algeria, which does not have a USAID presence. Prior to the civil war, Syria was not a focus of U.S. assistance, but the United States now spends significant resources to address issues arising from the ongoing conflict.

* Consistent with past reports, this edition does not include a section on Israel, which only receives security assistance.
Nearly three years after a mass protest movement emerged in opposition to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s intention to seek a fifth term, many protesters’ hopes for systemic political reform have not come to fruition. Though Bouteflika stepped down, the military leadership—the ruling power center within the country—has instead responded to protesters’ demands with increasingly repressive tactics and political initiatives, such as the November 2020 constitutional referendum, designed to buy time to find compromises among the various factions of the political elite.1

Algeria’s constitutional referendum, seen by many as an illegitimate attempt to counteract the Hirak movement, saw less than one-quarter of registered voters cast a ballot, the country’s lowest-ever voter turnout.2 It nevertheless passed and thus approved a list of reforms, including presidential term limits and new powers for the legislative and judiciary branches.

Bouteflika’s successor, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune—elected in a December 2019 vote also boycotted by the Hirak3—was hospitalized in Germany in October 2020 after contracting COVID-19 and spent the better part of three months in recovery, reminiscent of Bouteflika’s own health issues and consequent government paralysis.4
Algerian authorities took advantage of the pandemic to curtail weekly protests led by the Hirak. The large-scale protests that re-emerged in the spring of 2021 were met with excessive force and mass arrests by the Algerian security services. International organizations highlighted the disproportionate state response and worsening human rights situation in the country, including the authorities’ assault on press freedom, use of arbitrary arrests and torture, and harassment of human rights defenders.

POLICY CONTEXT

- U.S. bilateral assistance to Algeria centers on three objectives: “expanding [the] security and military partnership, growing economic and commercial links, and building educational and cultural ties between Algerians and Americans.” U.S.-funded programs have thus helped the Algerian government in its efforts to thwart ongoing threats to Algerian and Western interests and address security issues arising from its borders. In particular, U.S. officials in the Biden administration have stressed the importance of cooperating with Algeria to ensure stability in Libya.

- Algeria is one of three North African countries that participates in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, a “State Department-led, interagency initiative funded through multiple foreign assistance accounts” that is aimed at “improving the capacity of countries in North and West Africa to counter terrorism and prevent Islamist radicalization.”

- In addition to bilateral assistance aimed at reinforcing the North African country’s capacity to counter terrorist groups, Algeria benefits from regional programs centered around education, civil society advocacy, youth entrepreneurship, women’s empowerment, and media engagement.

- The United States has also pledged medical aid and support to Algeria, including vaccine donations through the COVAX program, $4 million in direct emergency assistance, and a field hospital.

BASICS OF U.S. AID

- The United States has provided more than $12.5 million total in bilateral aid for Algeria since FY15, all of which has been for IMET and NADR funding. In addition, MEPI funding has been used to support Algerian civil society through programming that “provides training to journalists, businesspeople, female entrepreneurs and parliamentarians, legal professionals, and the heads of leading non-governmental organizations.”

- Since FY11, Algeria has received approximately $150 million total in U.S. assistance from both bilateral and multilateral accounts, including funds from the Defense Department. Most of this assistance came in the form of humanitarian assistance, including aid for Sahrawi refugee camps in southwest Algeria.

- U.S. policymakers have tended to view large-scale assistance programs as unwelcome from the Algerian government’s perspective, which helps to explain the relatively small amount of aid provided to the country in past years.
ALGERIA

FY22 REQUEST

- The Biden administration's FY22 request repeats the Trump administration's first-in-a-decade FY21 request of $2 million in ESF for Algeria. According to the CBJ, President Tebboune's declaration of support for diversifying Algeria's economy offers "an unprecedented opportunity for U.S. engagement on economic and governance initiatives."15

- ESF would fund programs that "promote a business-enabling environment . . . that will enhance the competitiveness of U.S. companies wishing to enter this lucrative market and help to counter Chinese, Russian, and other economic influences," according to the CBJ.16

- Every administration since FY12 has requested at least $1 million in IMET, with the Biden administration requesting $1.3 million for FY22.

FY21 APPROPRIATION

- Despite the Trump administration's request for ESF, the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act did not earmark any ESF funds for Algeria. (The absence of earmarked money, however, does not preclude the administration from providing assistance to Algeria using funds not earmarked for other countries, something the NEA Bureau has occasionally done in Algeria in recent years.)17

- In FY21, SACFO's Explanatory Statement included $1.3 million in IMET for Algeria, $100,000 less than the FY20 appropriation.18

HOW AID IS SPENT

- IMET programs provide the foundation for the U.S. security partnership with Algeria and are supposed to support the professionalization of Algeria's military. Using NADR funds, the U.S. government also partners with Algerian law enforcement and security agencies "to help interdict and investigate a wide variety of crimes and terrorist activities."19

- In addition, MEPI, a regional initiative funded by ESF, provides local grants for programs that increase youth employability and for civil society organizations "in order to increase citizen participation in decision making processes and governance."20 According to one representative from a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report, DRL has provided some support to combat misinformation about COVID-19 and helped develop the capacity of civil society and political parties.21

- Although the government has requested bilateral ESF assistance for the past two years, both USAID and the State Department have approached this "cautiously" to date. No programming has been implemented by USAID in FY21, according to one administration official interviewed for this report.22

EXPECTATION FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- For the second year in a row, Congress is unlikely to include an earmark for $2 million in ESF for Algeria, nor will it object to the administration using non-earmarked ESF funds for this purpose.
We support funding through MEPI and DRL that helps civil society organizations build capacity. We also recommend that Congress appropriate the $2 million in ESF requested by the administration, as this assistance could strengthen cooperation with the Algerian people. At the same time, we appreciate the risks of expanded U.S. programming in Algeria and encourage the State Department and USAID to operate with all due sensitivity.

4. Francisco Serrano, “Two years after the start of Algeria’s popular uprising, the regime is far from stable,” MEI, February 17, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/two-years-after-start-algerias-popular-uprising-regime-far-stable
11. “U.S. Relations With Algeria.”
13. “U.S. Relations With Algeria.”
16. Ibid.
17. “Foreign Assistance Data Query.”
19. “U.S. Relations With Algeria.”
22. POMED interview with an administration official, June 2021.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- The Egyptian government under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi remains the most repressive in Egypt’s modern history and continues to draw international criticism. In March 2021, for example, a joint statement signed by 31 countries at the UN Human Rights Council expressed concern about Egypt’s limits on free expression and use of anti-terrorism legislation to silence critics.\(^1\)

- Buoyed by more than $8 billion in financial support from the International Monetary Fund since May 2020, Egypt is one of the few developing countries to maintain positive economic growth despite the pandemic’s devastating effect on industries such as tourism.\(^2\) But living conditions for Egyptians continue to deteriorate as prices steadily rise and subsidies and social spending are cut.\(^3\)

- Meanwhile, al-Sisi’s response to the pandemic has been one of obfuscation and repression, demonstrating the chronic weaknesses of the public health system.\(^4\)
Instead of addressing the pandemic head-on, the government has misled the public about the true number of deaths related to COVID-19, failed to provide proper personal protective equipment and thus contributed to the deaths of hundreds of doctors and nurses, and arrested people, including frontline health workers, who criticized the government’s response.

**POLICY CONTEXT**

- In stark contrast to his predecessor Donald Trump, President Biden entered office having declared that his administration would no longer provide “blank checks for Trump’s ‘favorite dictator,’” in reference to President al-Sisi. Secretary Blinken echoed this campaign promise in his first call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, during which Blinken emphasized that human rights “would be central to the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship.”

- Days after Biden won the 2020 election, the Egyptian government hired a high-powered lobbying firm with former members of Congress and former senior congressional staff to lobby on its behalf.

- Despite the Biden team’s initial strong rhetoric about a commitment to human rights, many of the administration’s policies—as demonstrated in a February arms sale announcement, a request to Congress for the removal of human rights conditions on military aid, and a recommendation to grant immunity to former Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi in a torture lawsuit involving a U.S. citizen—are not a departure from the Trump administration.

- Epitomizing the hypocrisy of its Egypt policy, in September 2021 the Biden administration used loopholes in the FY20 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act that bypassed congressional intent to obligate $300 million in military aid conditioned on human rights. The administration’s maneuver will release $170 million immediately for weapons for Egypt and withhold the remaining $130 million on new human rights conditions. The conditions are reportedly for Egypt to drop charges against or release 16 individuals identified by the administration and to close the infamous NGO foreign funding case. This decision, as 19 human rights groups including POMED noted following the decision, is “a notably weaker position than that taken by the Trump administration in the same situation in August 2017.”

- A bipartisan group within Congress continues to raise objections about repression in Egypt, including the crackdown on human rights defenders, peaceful activists, civil society, and the Coptic Christian community. These efforts are exemplified by the formation of the Egypt Human Rights Caucus, co-chaired by Representatives Tom Malinowki (D-NJ) and Don Beyer (D-VA).

**BASICS OF U.S. AID**

- Long one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance per year, Egypt has received more than $84 billion since 1946. Significant U.S. aid began after Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel. It is a common misconception that the treaty obligates the United States to provide assistance (especially FMF) to Egypt in perpetuity, in fact the peace agreement makes no such commitment.

- Egypt’s FMF package has remained constant at $1.3 billion (in grants) annually since 1987. For decades, annual U.S. economic assistance was roughly on par with military aid. Since the George W. Bush administration, however, U.S. policy has been to reduce economic aid; since FY20 it has been at $125 million, compared to a peak of $1.3 billion in FY 1986.
FY22 REQUEST

- For FY22, the administration requested $1.3 billion in FMF and $125 million in ESF. It also requested that Congress not include human rights conditions for FMF. While asking Congress not to include conditions on assistance is common, including the Trump administration the last four years, the Obama administration did not explicitly request that for Egypt in FY15 and FY16.

- The ESF request would support $30.9 million in governance and rights programs focused on “transparency and the respect for the rule of law, civil liberties, participatory governance, and human rights,” according to the CBJ. The remaining $94.1 million would support economic growth, health programs including the implementation of an Egyptian government-run health management system, and scholarships and education initiatives.

- The FY22 request also includes $3.5 million for NADR and $1.8 million for IMET, the same amount requested each year since FY20, although the administration has not requested any INCLE funding for the first time in more than a decade. According to the CBJ, NADR funds will help bolster Egypt’s border security and the Ministry of Interior’s counterterrorism capabilities.

- While defending the request in front of HACFO in June 2021, Secretary Blinken erroneously claimed that “we’ve seen some progress in some areas” of human rights in Egypt. Blinken’s statement conflicts with the State Department’s own assessment of Egypt’s human rights record, including within its 2020 Country Report on Human Rights that lays out continued—and in some cases escalating—violations.

FY21 APPROPRIATION

- In FY21, Congress appropriated $1.4 billion in aid to Egypt, all of it conditioned on the State Department certifying that Egypt is “sustaining its strategic relationship with the United States and upholding its peace treaty with Israel,” a condition that has appeared in legislation for a decade.

- As it has since FY18, Congress conditioned $300 million of the $1.3 billion in FMF on human rights improvements. The FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act says that the secretary of state can waive the conditions on $225 million of the $300 million if he determines that doing so would be in the national security interest of the United States. The remaining $75 million, which does not include a national security waiver, is conditioned on the government of Egypt “making clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due process of law.”

- Congress’s decision to not include a national security waiver on a portion of the military aid—the first time it has done so since 2014—was in part a response to the arrest of several staff members of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, one of Egypt’s most prominent human rights organizations. The arrests took place in November 2020, shortly before Congress finalized the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Importantly, neither the House nor Senate SFOPS bills included such a human rights condition; appropriators added the condition during reconciliation discussions.

- Congress also earmarked $125 million in ESF for Egypt for FY21, requiring that $40 million be spent on higher education programs, $15 million of which should be spent on scholarships for Egyptian students “with high financial need to attend not-for-profit institutions of higher education in Egypt.” The law also requires that some of the ESF go toward development programs in the Sinai Peninsula and democracy programs.

- The FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act also instructs the secretary of state to “encourage good-faith negotiations” between the government of Egypt and American citizen April Corley, who was badly injured in an Egyptian airstrike on a tourist convoy in 2015, and to report to Congress on the status of those negotiations every 90 days. In addition, the law renews a previous reporting requirement in which Congress must be updated every 60 days on the status of the cases of Ola al-Qaradawi and her husband Hosam Khalaf, as well as those of other political prisoners.
HOW AID IS SPENT

- The country’s military aid package, as defined by the FY18–23 Five-Year Security Assistance Roadmap, continues to follow the “four pillars” established under President Obama. The four pillars restrict Egypt’s use of FMF to acquire new weapons and equipment for counterterrorism, border security, maritime security, and “Sinai security.”

- The U.S. government continues to allow Egypt to use its FMF funds to maintain old U.S. equipment even when this maintenance falls outside of the four pillars. For instance, in the past year, Egypt spent roughly half of its FMF sustaining and refurbishing armored personnel carriers, tanks, fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and frigates and other maritime vessels, among other equipment.

- As mentioned in last year’s report, Egypt has prioritized upgrading its AH-60 Apache attack helicopters, including a possible $2.3 billion deal to refurbish 43 of them. In July 2021, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dana Stroul testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism that in order to finalize this deal Egypt will use its own national funds to pay for a portion of the sale, something it does not typically do. According to one U.S. official interviewed for this report, however, the administration has not agreed yet to allow Egypt to use FMF to cover a portion of the cost of the helicopters.

- Before disbursing FMF, Congress allows the U.S. government to transfer Egypt’s funds to an interest-bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a privilege shared only with Israel. The Egyptian government is allowed to spend accrued interest for U.S.-approved military procurements. According to one congressional staffer interviewed for this report, in 2021 Egypt used interest earnings to procure a maritime domain awareness surveillance system, initially notified to Congress in October 2020, valued at $390 million.

- In February 2021, just weeks into the new administration’s tenure, the State Department notified Congress of a potential arms sale to Egypt valued at $197 million. The State Department justified the sale by calling it a “routine replenishment of naval defense surface-to-air missiles.” But according to one congressional staffer briefed on the sale, the new arms—which Egypt will use its FMF funds to procure—are an “upgrade” of older equipment that does not match Egypt’s threat environment and are therefore not compliant with the four pillars policy.

- In addition to the congressionally mandated spending on higher education, ESF has focused in recent years on family planning and reproductive health, technical assistance to the Ministry of Education, the agricultural and financial sectors, and vocational training, among other activities.

- Due to the challenges of implementing democracy and human rights programs in Egypt, one representative of a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report indicated that the U.S. government remains relatively “uninterested” in democracy programs in the country. Even programs that USAID identifies as related to “governance” emphasize “economic stability and inclusive development” and improving Egypt’s “investment climate.”

- Tellingly, USAID’s 2020–2025 Country Development Cooperation Strategy does not mention democracy or human rights. Instead, its stated assistance goal is a “more inclusive and globally competitive economy” in Egypt with three sub-objectives: to directly support the government of Egypt to increase economic participation; to improve access to and quality of basic services; and to develop an inclusive business environment, focused on women and youth.
EGYPT

EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- HACFO’s FY22 bill maintains the same $1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt. According to one congressional staffer interviewed for the report, this was in part out of respect for the administration’s request and in part a compromise between congressional Republicans opposed to any cuts or human rights conditions and some Democrats who wanted to reduce FMF and to condition all of it.39

- The House bill, however, proposes doubling the amount of funding conditioned on human rights that cannot be waived for national security reasons, from $75 million in FY21 to $150 million in FY22. Specifically, $135 million is conditioned on the release of political prisoners and $15 million on fair compensation for April Corley.40 According to one congressional staffer interviewed for this report, the House language removed direct reference to April Corley in the FY22 bill compared to the previous year’s bill due to concerns by other members that Congress should not single out individuals and their cases in aid conditions.41

- Following up on its initial FY22 request which asked Congress not to include human rights conditions on military aid for Egypt, the Biden administration expressed strong opposition to HACFO’s FY22 bill including rights conditions in a four-page Statement of Administration Policy that brazenly claims the conditions would “[undermine] its leverage.”42

- In the Senate, the new chair of the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Subcommittee, Chris Coons (D-DE), has consistently raised concerns about Egypt’s human rights abuses and is expected to be supportive of continued restrictions on U.S. military aid to Egypt, in line with his predecessor, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who remains the chair of the full appropriations committee.43

- On the other side of the aisle, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) remains a wild card. He may push back on increased conditionality, similarly to his colleagues in the House who have cited Egypt’s role in securing a recent ceasefire in Gaza.44 Or he may be concerned that Egypt continues to pursue the “Foreign Funding” case, which he suggested years ago could affect the country’s aid package.45

POMED RECOMMENDATIONS

- POMED strongly supports the Biden administration’s stated commitment to put human rights at the center of its relationship with Egypt, but we are disappointed that it has so far failed to live up to this commitment. We urge the administration to take concrete steps—beyond occasional public expressions of concern—to hold the al-Sisi regime accountable for its human rights abuses.

- We believe that Egypt’s atrocious human rights record renders the country ineligible to receive U.S. security aid according to numerous U.S. laws, including Section 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act. Therefore we believe that U.S. security assistance should be suspended.

- If the administration is unwilling to suspend assistance, Congress should reduce Egypt’s FMF appropriation to no more than $800 million to better align with Egypt’s security needs and U.S. interests, as the beginning of a systematic decrease in military aid. Such a reduction would also help to restore U.S. leverage by demonstrating to the Egyptian government that U.S. assistance is not an entitlement and is contingent on real human rights reforms.

- Congress also should include robust human rights conditions on at least $300 million in FMF, but the secretary of state should not be granted the option of waiving the conditions. The last two U.S. administrations exercised the waiver each time it was available despite failing to substantiate the national security grounds for this action.

- POMED strongly encourages Congress to remove the loopholes in the appropriations law that the Biden administration used to obligate $300 million conditioned on human rights benchmarks without exercising the waiver. This recent decision, along with previous administrations’ abuse of the national security waiver, suggests that unless Congress steps up the United States will not hold Egypt to account for severe human rights violations.


5. Amy Kallid, “Deaths in Egypt up by 31.3% in first half of 2021 compared to H1 2019,” Ahram Online, July 5, 2021, https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/416591/Egypt/Politics/-Deaths-in-Egypt-up-by--in-first-half-of--compared-aspx


18. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.


29. POMED interview with an administration official, August 2021.


33. POMED interview with congressional staffer, July 2021.


35. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, April 2021.


38.

39. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.


41. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.


**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

- Mustafa al-Kadhimi was confirmed as prime minister in May 2020 following large-scale protests that prompted the resignation of his predecessor, Adel Abdul Mahdi. Al-Kadhimi took office amid severe security, political, economic, and humanitarian challenges that have continued to embroil the country. Fires in hospitals treating COVID-19 patients in April and July 2021 left more than 170 dead and tragically exemplified the frustrations of protesters who have complained for years of government mismanagement and corruption.

- Since the protest movement erupted in October 2019, more than 560 protesters have been killed by Iraqi security forces and by a powerful network of militias, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The militias have attacked journalists, activists, and political opponents with impunity. This has included at least 81 assassination attempts, one-third of which have occurred since al-Kadhimi took office.

- Parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 2021. A number of opposition groups that arose...
during the 2019 protests have declared their intention to boycott the vote out of concern that it will “lack integrity, fairness, and equal opportunities.”

- Hurt by the pandemic and by a sharp decline in oil exports, Iraq’s GDP fell by almost 11 percent in 2020 and is expected to grow by only 1.2 percent in 2021. More than 4 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, and according to UNICEF 40 percent of children are at risk of falling into poverty. In August 2021, Finance Minister Ali Allawi said that Iraq was restarting negotiations with the IMF for a loan of up to $4 billion to help cover the government’s budget deficit.

- Prime Minister al-Kadhimi has attempted to increase Iraq’s influence by fostering better relationships among its neighbors. Within the last year and a half, Iraq has taken an active role in facilitating discussions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and reportedly between Egypt and Turkey, as well as between Turkey and the UAE. In August 2021, the Baghdad Summit brought together heads of state and high-ranking officials from countries throughout the region.

POLICY CONTEXT

- Following President Trump’s decision in his final days in office to decrease the number of U.S. troops in Iraq to 2,500, President Biden agreed during a July 2021 White House meeting with Prime Minister al-Kadhimi to end U.S. combat operations by the end of 2021. After this, the United States will focus on training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

- Following the end of combat operations, the Biden administration is likely to maintain “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism capabilities in Iraq to conduct strikes against Islamic State affiliates or Iran-aligned militias, as the administration has already done twice.

- The final session of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue took place in July 2021 as part of the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement. Among other issues highlighted in a joint statement, the two countries emphasized their “commitment to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” and the importance of Iraq’s upcoming elections.

- Also in July, Secretary Blinken announced an additional $155 million in humanitarian assistance for “critical shelter, essential healthcare, emergency food assistance, protection services such as gender-based violence response, and water, sanitation, and hygiene services,” bringing U.S. humanitarian assistance in FY21 to more than $200 million.

- The State Department in May released a rare public statement expressing “outrage” after Iraqi security forces killed a protester and injured several others during anti-government demonstrations demanding accountability for earlier killings. The statement encouraged the Iraqi government to “hold accountable the militias, thugs, and vigilante groups for their attacks against Iraqis exercising their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly as well as for their assault on the rule of law.”

BASICS OF U.S. AID

- Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, the majority of U.S. assistance for Iraq has been security aid, totalling more than $32 billion. The United States has provided $8 billion of this since 2014 in an effort to rebuild the ISF after its collapse at the hands of the Islamic State.

- Most non-security aid from the United States is humanitarian support from multilateral accounts that are not reflected in the bilateral top line. The United States is the leading humanitarian donor for Iraq, having provided more than $3 billion since FY14. Concurrently, the United States has provided approximately $1 billion in bilateral ESF to support economic development, democracy and governance, and other goals.
The Biden administration requested $448.5 million in bilateral assistance for Iraq, a whopping 260 percent increase from the Trump administration's FY21 request of $124.5 million but on par with Congress's FY21 appropriation of $454.1 million.

According to the CBJ, the $150 million requested for ESF would be used to preserve Iraqi sovereignty against Iranian-backed militias, ensure the defeat of the Islamic State, enhance the government’s ability to provide services to its citizens, promote respect for human rights, support private sector growth, and address climate change.

The Biden administration has requested $250 million for FMF, the same amount that Congress has earmarked annually since FY16. This is in sharp contrast with the Trump administration, which did not request any FMF funding for Iraq in FY18–21. According to the CBJ, the requested funds will “focus on training, advising, and materiel that will assist the Iraqi Security Forces and select civilian security institutions in protecting against transnational terrorist networks, maintaining Iraq’s sovereignty, promoting regional stability, and ensuring interoperability with the United States.”

The FY22 request of $47.5 million in NADR funds, the largest request for any country in the world, would help build the capacity of law enforcement and civilian security institutions to interdict and detect terrorists, support demining efforts, and strengthen border security and enforcement capabilities.

For the third year in a row Congress appropriated considerably more for Iraq than the Trump administration requested. The total $454.1 million earmarked in the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act is consistent with the congressional appropriation for Iraq since FY19.

In FY21, Congress appropriated $150 million in ESF, targeting a portion of this assistance for the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRG), Anbar province, religious and ethnic minorities, and the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund. Also, for the first time, Congress instructed the administration to use a portion of ESF and INCLE funds for judicial sector initiatives “to combat corruption, strengthen adherence to international standards of due process, improve juvenile justice, protect the rights of prisoners, and support civil society engagement with the judiciary.”

In FY21, Congress for the fourth year in a row rejected the Trump administration’s proposal to end FMF for Iraq and instead earmarked $250 million for the military aid account. Congress also appropriated $710 million from the DOD’s Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).

Since FY15, the State Department has provided more than $1.5 billion in FMF for Iraq, with this aid going toward the sustainment of U.S. military equipment, counterterrorism, and “the stabilization of liberated areas.”

The United States has provided more than $348 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY20 and FY21, including more than $47 million for Iraq’s COVID-19 response. According to USAID, this assistance “provides critical shelter, essential healthcare, food assistance, and water, sanitation, and hygiene services to vulnerable people across Iraq affected by conflict, displacement, and the COVID-19 pandemic.”

ESF for Iraq has prioritized democracy and governance programs—$81 million or 17.8 percent of the total allocated in FY20—that support government transparency, natural resource management, and delivery of government services, as well as economic growth programs designed to try to improve Iraq’s private sector.
IRAQ

- According to a U.S. official interviewed for this report, the Biden administration has continued programs to support vulnerable populations in Iraq, including Christian populations, despite the politicization of some of these programs during the Trump administration.32
- An additional focus of USAID programming this year is electoral support activities in conjunction with the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq to “bolster efforts by the Government of Iraq and Iraqi civil society to hold free and fair elections and enhance voter engagement.”33 One congressional staffer interviewed for this report noted that Iraq’s preparations for the elections “have not been great” and expressed concern about the legitimacy of the elections, particularly amid pervasive political violence.34

EXPECTATION FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- Congress is likely to maintain current assistance levels to Iraq and retain previous recommendations for reconstruction, humanitarian efforts, and assistance to the KRG. Indeed, the amounts appropriated in HACFO’s FY22 bill match the administration’s request.35

POMED RECOMMENDATIONS

- POMED supports the administration’s FY22 request, although we urge Congress to condition at least a portion of U.S. security assistance on the Iraqi government holding accountable those responsible for the deaths of protesters and activists since 2019. U.S. assistance helps Iraqi security forces counter legitimate security threats, but government-aligned militias operating with impunity also pose a great risk to Iraq’s stability and must be taken more seriously by the United States.
- POMED supports an increase in aid for Iraqi civil society. This would be an important signal of support for the legitimate demands of Iraqi protesters for a more responsive, less corrupt government.


10. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 379.


34. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on Jordan, leaving more than 10,000 dead. The government’s response—mandated curfews and travel restrictions—has led to further economic despair for Jordanians, including one of the highest unemployment rates in the region.

To help bolster Jordan’s economy, the World Bank in May 2021 approved a $1.1 billion loan for pandemic assistance, and since early 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has issued $900 million in loans through an ongoing Extended Fund Facility and $400 million under the Rapid Financing Instrument.
In response to widely perceived government mismanagement of the pandemic and continued economic frustrations, protests broke out across the country earlier this year, with some chanting, “Down with the government. We don’t fear coronavirus.”

In April 2021, amid shocking allegations of a coup attempt, Jordanian authorities arrested prominent members of Jordanian tribes along with Bassem Awadallah, former finance minister and chief of the royal court, and royal family member Sharif bin Zaid. While the tribal members were released, Awadallah and bin Zaid were convicted of sedition in an expedited, closed-door military court trial.

Prince Hamzah bin Hussein, the popular royal who was formerly crown prince, has been under illegal house arrest since April amid unsubstantiated allegations that he sought to undermine the government by speaking out against widespread corruption and government mismanagement.

Although Jordan remains one of the closest U.S. partners in the region, former President Trump sidelined King Abdullah II. The Jordanian king opposed Trump’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing that they threatened to further destabilize the region and Jordan specifically, due to the country’s large Palestinian population.

The Biden administration has sought to reassure the Jordanian government of strong U.S. support. In early 2021, it signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Jordan and subsequently closed three military bases in Qatar, moving equipment and personnel to Area Support Group-Jordan. The cooperation agreement reportedly provides U.S. soldiers immunity from prosecution in Jordan and allows personnel, aircraft, and ships to enter Jordanian territory without any visa requirement. The deal sparked controversy in Jordan when it was approved without being presented to parliament.

Following the palace’s allegations of a coup attempt in April, the State Department spokesperson affirmed the Biden administration’s full backing for the king, saying: “We value immensely our relationship and King Abdullah II’s leadership. We value his integrity, his vision. And as we said over the weekend very clearly, that the king has our full support.”

In July 2021, as a symbolic reset of relations and an indication of the Biden administration's strong commitment to Jordan, King Abdullah II traveled to Washington and met with President Biden at the White House, becoming the first Arab head of state to receive this honor.

Jordan is the second-largest recipient of U.S. bilateral assistance in the region after Israel, receiving more than $1.5 billion annually since FY18, in addition to $1.5 billion in U.S. military aid from Defense Department accounts since FY15.

In 2018, the Trump administration signed a five-year Memorandum of Understanding on Assistance (MoU) in which the United States made a non-binding commitment to provide Jordan with no less than $1.3 billion annually, including $750 million in ESF and $350 million in FMF, an overall increase of $275 million from the previous MoU signed in FY15. The Biden administration has initiated negotiations for a new MoU before the current one expires at the end of FY22.
The Biden administration’s FY22 request of $1.3 billion for Jordan aligns with the last year of the current five-year MoU and is consistent with each request over the life of the MoU.

According to the CBJ, the administration’s $910.8 million request for ESF would promote economic reform, help Jordan mitigate the effects of COVID-19, and support the large refugee populations inside the country. This funding also would support maintaining water security and expanding water-related infrastructure to increase Jordan’s capacity to “govern, regulate, and manage water sector operations.”

The ESF request also includes $490 million in direct budget support for the government of Jordan for “non-military expenditures” to decrease “anticipated budget shortfalls.”

In addition, $77 million in ESF would be used for the GJD objective. This funding would support rule of law and good governance programs, but the majority of the GJD funds would go toward “capacity-building” for civil society.

The administration’s request for security assistance includes $350 million in FMF to strengthen the Jordan Armed Forces’ border security capacity and interoperability with the United States, with a focus on continuing the modernization of Jordan’s F-16 aircraft.

In FY21, Congress again went above and beyond the MoU and appropriated $1.7 billion for Jordan. Appropriators earmarked more than $1.1 billion in ESF, $845.1 million of which is for direct budget support in the form of a cash transfer, $85 million for Development Assistance (DA), and $425 million for FMF.

In the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act explanatory statement, Congress indicated that the State Department, in consultation with USAID, should prioritize funding “to improve Jordan’s ability to deliver essential services in the education, energy, health, and water sectors.”

Congress also provided Jordan with authorization to secure an FMF direct loan, not to exceed $4 billion, and an FMF loan guarantee also not to exceed $4 billion. The loans, according to one administration official interviewed for this report, are designed to help Jordan “facilitate” the modernization of its F-16 fleet.

According to USAID, programming in recent years has focused on generating inclusive, private sector-led growth, improving healthcare and education quality, bolstering water security, and strengthening democratic accountability through transparent elections and a commitment to the rule of law.

Direct budget support for Jordan is a privilege provided to the kingdom; no other country in the world receives more of this form of aid. According to one government official interviewed for the report, the U.S. government continues to place conditions on which ministries and accounts the funds can support as well as reforms “that reflect our values and objectives.”

Jordan’s FMF currently supports the acquisition of equipment for electronic warfare; ground, air, and maritime mobility; night operations; command, control, communications, and computers (C4); and cyber security, among other areas. It also helps sustain equipment acquired through DOD-funded programs, including Black Hawk helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
A U.S. government official interviewed for this report indicated that Jordan has been granted cash flow financing authority to allow it to commit future years’ FMF to pay for the modernization of its F-16 fleet, which has an expected total cost of $2 billion. Though it was initially approved under the Trump administration, the Biden administration has continued this privilege, considering it a better option than the loan authorities provided by Congress, which, according to the same government official, Jordan could have difficulty repaying.

The kingdom is also one of the largest recipients of funding under the Department of Defense’s Section 333 Global Train and Equip program, having received $327 million since FY18 in support of “[urgent] needs to rapidly respond to transnational threats along its border.”

Expectation for FY22 Appropriation

Consistent with the past several years, Congress will likely appropriate more than $1.5 billion in total funding for FY22 due to continued strong bipartisan support for Jordan.

POMED Recommendations

For the past 10 years, Jordanians have been protesting against corruption, high unemployment, and the shrinking space for free speech and association. Prince Hamzah’s comments on the “breakdown in governance, the corruption” during the alleged coup attempt in April highlight significant concerns among Jordanians that U.S. administrations and Congress have preferred to ignore. For Jordan to remain a stable partner to the United States, the Biden administration must hold the Jordanian government accountable for its gross economic mismanagement and the widespread loss of faith in its governance.

A cash transfer to the government is a privilege that should be reserved for U.S. partners committed to democracy and human rights and not known for rampant corruption. POMED recommends that the Biden administration and Congress work together to phase out direct cash transfers to the Jordanian government until it can meet these conditions.

U.S. policymakers should reconsider the efficacy of signing another MoU with Jordan considering the country’s unstable trajectory and the leverage that the U.S. government cedes with such multi-year commitments. If the administration is determined to proceed, however, then it must put concerns over governance and human rights at the forefront of their MoU conversations. The administration should secure commitments for legitimate, genuine reforms that benefit the Jordanian people before agreeing to provide the government with billions more in U.S. taxpayer-funded assistance.

We also recommend that Congress condition security assistance and the direct cash transfer (if it is unwilling to phase out the program) on Jordan’s meeting human rights and democracy benchmarks. Jordanian citizens are increasingly frustrated with the direction of the country. As one of Jordan’s strongest supporters, it is in the interest of the United States to help the government usher in the necessary reforms to address Jordanians’ concerns.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


19. Ibid.

20. POMED interview with an administration official, August 2021.


23. POMED interview with a government official, July 2021.

24. Cash flow financing (CFF) is a statutory authority provided in the Arms Export Control Act that allows the U.S. government to permit countries of U.S. foreign military aid, such as FMF, to pay for U.S. arms in partial installments over time rather than all at once. CFF was initially provided for the exclusive benefit of Israel in the mid-1970s but has occasionally been extended to other countries such as Turkey, Greece, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Egypt. As of the writing of this report, only Israel—and now Jordan for its F-16 modernization efforts—have access to this special authority. For more on CFF, see this Congressional Research Service report on Cash Flow Financing to Egypt: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf

25. POMED interview with an administration official, August 2021.


LEBANON snapshot

**FY22 REQUEST** in thousands of dollars

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**FY21 APPROPRIATION**

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**TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, REQUEST VS. APPROPRIATION** in millions of dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FY16</th>
<th>FY17</th>
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*Note: ESDF requests for FY17-FY21 are labeled ESF to make comparisons easier. Nearly all ESDF requested for MENA would fall under the ESF account, which Congress still uses.*

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

- Lebanon is experiencing a multitude of crises—a catastrophic economic collapse, criminally negligent political paralysis, and an associated humanitarian fallout compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and August 2020 Beirut port explosion—leading to a country seemingly in freefall.

- After years of mismanagement and corruption, Lebanon’s already tenuous economic situation has become dire: The Lebanese pound has lost 90 percent of its value since late 2019, inflation reached 85 percent in 2020, and there are shortages of food, medicine, and fuel. The World Bank ranks the country’s financial crisis as one of the world’s worst since the mid-1800s.

- The blast in Beirut’s port in August 2020, one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history, both highlighted and exacerbated the challenges facing the country. The blast destroyed the port and much of the city, killing more than 200 people, injuring more...
than 7,000, and leaving more than 300,000 homeless. One year after the blast—and despite evidence that senior officials in the government were warned about the risks—there has been no accountability for the disaster.2

- Lebanon finally formed a government in September 2021, more than a year after caretaker Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned in August 2020 following the blast. Diab’s successor (and predecessor) Saad Hariri stepped down in July 2021 after failing to form a government. As Lebanon’s new prime minister, business tycoon Najib Mikati—who has been prime minister twice before—now has the unenviable job of trying to tackle Lebanon’s crises.3

**POLICY CONTEXT**

- In May 2021, the Biden administration announced it would provide $15 million in FMF for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) during an inaugural Defense Resourcing Conference,4 followed by $47 million in aid for the LAF in September 2021.5 The administration also announced $100 million in humanitarian assistance on the first anniversary of the port blast.6

- Yet President Biden has also made clear that “no amount of outside assistance will ever be enough if Lebanon’s own leaders do not commit to do the hard but necessary work of reforming the economy and combating corruption.”7

- Some in Congress continue to be wary of Hezbollah’s influence within the Lebanese government and the ongoing threat the group poses to Israeli security. But, as one congressional staffer interviewed for this report noted, other members of Congress hope that the Biden administration will be “more forward-leaning” in helping Lebanon form a government and take the necessary steps to begin to emerge from the crises.8

**BASICS OF U.S. AID**

- Since FY17, the United States has granted Lebanon an average of $236 million in bilateral economic and security assistance annually, plus more than $350 million in military aid from Defense Department accounts.9

- Economic assistance for Lebanon focuses on economic growth, water access, humanitarian assistance, and educational opportunities.10

- In addition to bilateral assistance, the United States continues to provide humanitarian assistance for the estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees who remain in Lebanon and for the growing number of Lebanese who are struggling as a result of the economic and health crises.11

**FY22 REQUEST**

- The Biden administration’s overall bilateral request for FY22, at almost $296 million, is more than twice the Trump administration’s FY21 request and 22.2 percent more than the $242.3 million that Congress appropriated in FY21.12

- This overall increase comes from the additional $55 million in FMF the administration requested above the $105 million that has been appropriated each year since FY17. The CBJ notes that the proposed increase in FMF is meant to support the LAF in procurement and
sustainment of equipment, particularly as the armed forces “continue to take on additional responsibilities in response to compounding crises facing Lebanon.”

- The administration has requested $112.5 million in ESF to “advance activities that help effectively stabilize the economy, boost employment in Lebanon’s key productive sectors, strengthen the delivery of public services, and leverage existing investments.”

- According to the CBJ, ESF would support “conservation, energy efficiency, and cost recovery in [Lebanon’s] water sector” following severe infrastructure damage in the Beirut blast, continue years of support for the education sector, and help mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic on early childhood education.

**FY21 appropriation**

- In FY21, Congress appropriated a total of $242.3 million for Lebanon, including an earmark of $112.5 million for ESF, $12 million of which is for scholarship programs.

- Congress also required the secretary of state and the USAID administrator to provide humanitarian assistance, “primarily through local NGOs,” to those affected by the port explosion.

- Continuing its strong support for the LAF, Congress appropriated $105 million in FMF funds in FY21 for the fifth consecutive year. But consistent with its concerns about equipment ending up in Hezbollah’s hands, appropriators have required the secretary of state to submit a spending plan to the Appropriations Committees prior to disbursing aid to the LAF, including “any funds specifically intended for lethal military equipment.”

**How aid is spent**

- According to USAID, the U.S. government provided more than $370 million in humanitarian assistance in FY21 in an effort to support the 3.2 million Lebanese and refugees in need inside Lebanon, as the economic crisis has increased food insecurity, degraded access to water, and led to massive fuel shortages.

- A U.S. official interviewed for this report indicated that this past year, the United States was able to reprogram some funding to help address pressing needs of people in Lebanon.

- A representative from a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report suggested that “demand is huge” in Lebanon for democracy programs, but a major challenge in providing assistance is the number of U.S. government procedural hurdles, such as obtaining U.S. embassy approval for initiatives and undergoing an intensive vetting process to ensure funds will not inadvertently support Hezbollah.

- The loss in value of the Lebanese pound has devalued the defense budget, including military salaries, at the same time as LAF soldiers are being asked to take on additional humanitarian and public safety assignments. Therefore, FMF funds have been used for the procurement, maintenance, and sustainment of equipment that would otherwise be unaffordable without U.S. dollars.
LEBANON

EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- Congress is likely to back the administration's request for increased support for Lebanon, particularly for humanitarian and security assistance, even if it does not include an earmark for the requested amount.

- According to one congressional staffer interviewed for this report, calls for cutting assistance to the LAF “have died down,” making continued security assistance for Lebanon less contentious compared to previous years. Nevertheless, as the FY22 SFOPS bill notes, the committee “continues to be concerned about Hezbollah’s growing influence within the Government of Lebanon.”

POMED RECOMMENDATIONS

- We recommend maintaining robust support to the Lebanese people and refugees inside Lebanon. We also call on the Biden administration to prioritize helping to find a peaceful resolution to the political crisis and to insist upon accountability for corrupt officials.

- Given the continued political dysfunction in Lebanon and the fact that governance problems are at the heart of the country’s crises, we strongly encourage Congress to earmark a significant increase for democracy programs in Lebanon. Funding should go beyond the paltry $21.6 million for GJD, which is only 7.3 percent of the FY22 request, in order to support civil society in its effort to push for reforms and to hold the country’s leaders accountable.

2. “‘They Killed Us from the Inside’ An Investigation into the August 4 Beirut Blast,” Human Rights Watch, August 3, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/08/03/they-killed-us-inside/investigation-august-4-beirut-blast#
7. Ibid.
8. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
20. POMED interview with an administration official, June 2021.
21. POMED interview with an administration official, June 2021.
22. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, April 2021.
23. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, April 2021.
24. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
LIBYA snapshot

FY22 REQUEST in thousands of dollars

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FY21 APPROPRIATION

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<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>FY21 APPROPRIATION</th>
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TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, REQUEST VS. APPROPRIATION in millions of dollars

Note: ESDF requests for FY17-FY21 are labeled ESF to make comparisons easier. Nearly all ESDF requested for MENA would fall under the ESF account, which Congress still uses.

* Though the FY21 law stipulates “not less than” $30 million for Libya, SACFO’s recommended funding levels by account only add up to $29.6 million.

** In FY18, Congress appropriated $500 million in bilateral assistance for Libya, Syria, and Yemen from the Relief and Recovery Fund.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- In October 2020, the UN brokered a ceasefire to end years of fighting between the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in the west and its rival in the east, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Commander Khalifa Haftar.

- The following month, the UN announced that the warring sides had agreed to hold parliamentary and presidential elections on December 24, 2021, which marks Libya’s Independence Day. Since that agreement, however, Libyan officials have been unable to reach consensus on necessary electoral laws, which could force a delay in the vote.

- The UN estimated in January 2021 that 1.3 million people in Libya are in need of humanitarian assistance, following years of armed conflict that have left the country’s economy reeling and the population lacking basic services. These problems have been compounded by the pandemic and by an increasing number of internally displaced persons returning to their places of origin.
The continued presence of foreign forces and mercenaries in Libya—including from Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates—has complicated the attempt to fully implement the fragile ceasefire agreement, which required that all foreign forces depart within 90 days of its signing. Despite that deadline being long past, calls from the UN Security Council and other international actors for those forces to leave have gone unheeded.5

In March 2021, the Libyan parliament approved an interim Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah.6 Prior to the GNU’s establishment, Libya effectively had two governments: the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli, led by Fayyez al-Saraj, and a rival cabinet based in eastern Libya, backed by Haftar and not recognized internationally.

In May 2021, U.S. Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland was dual-hatted as U.S. Special Envoy for Libya, with a stated goal of “[promoting] international support for a Libyan-led, inclusive, and negotiated political solution to the conflict, facilitated through the UN.”7 The Biden administration has re-engaged in diplomatic efforts in Libya, as exemplified by Norland’s appointment. While there is a “desire to be more involved,” as one administration official interviewed for this report noted, the administration is wary of becoming bogged down in another Middle East conflict and “security conditions continue to make [engagement] difficult.”8

Another administration official interviewed for this report stated that the United States is “concerned about Libya’s ability to get to elections” and that U.S. policy is therefore “micro-focused on getting to an election day.”9

In Congress, members on both sides of the aisle remain committed to passing the Libya Stabilization Act. Original co-sponsor Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) has said that the act would “[impose] costs on those seeking to stand in the way of a diplomatic solution in Libya while signaling to parties on the ground that the United States is committed to supporting peace and stability for the Libyan people.”10

Since 2011, the United States has provided almost $900 million in aid to Libya: $605 million in bilateral assistance and nearly $270 million in humanitarian aid.11 The U.S. government has implemented more than $82 million in democracy and governance programming since FY16, which has focused on promoting a peaceful political transition and on strengthening the foundations of a unified Libyan state.12

For FY22, the Biden administration has requested $43 million for Libya, double what the Trump administration requested the previous two years and 43 percent more than what Congress appropriated in FY21.13 Of the $43 million request, $40 million is for ESF. According to the CBJ, this funding would focus almost entirely on Libya’s “democratic transition to a stable and unified state,” including $19.5 million specifically for democracy, rights, and governance programs. The remainder would support economic growth programs.14

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In the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress included an earmark of “not less than” $30 million for stabilization assistance (which can be provided from more than one account), including “support for a United Nations-facilitated political process and border security.”

In addition, due to the fluid security situation and lack of a diplomatic presence in the country, Congress required the secretary of state, prior to obligating the funds, to report to the Appropriations Committees on what steps the administration is taking to ensure that “mechanisms are in place for monitoring, oversight, and control of such funds.”

SACFO’s FY21 Explanatory Statement recommended funding levels by account just shy of the law’s $30 million earmark. The recommended levels were $21.3 million in ESF, $1.5 million in NADR, $2 million in INCLE, and $3 million from the Democracy Fund (DF).

USAID’s recent democracy and governance aid has focused on good governance, elections, and civic participation. In addition, the United States has provided more than $27 million in FY21 to support health, protection, shelter, and other humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in Libya.

According to a representative of a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report, U.S. programming before the ceasefire had been shifting toward combatting disinformation and hate speech. After elections were scheduled, programming abruptly shifted to electoral preparations.

According to a representative from a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report, U.S. security restrictions still prohibit American citizens from entering Libya, which presents challenges in implementing effective programs.

The remaining $3 million is for NADR programs that will help build the capacity of the Libya Mine Action Center to carry out demining activities.

Congressional staff interviewed for this report believe the Libya Stabilization Act is likely to move forward later this year. One section requires the administration to provide democracy assistance that is commensurate with the administration’s FY22 request. It is POMED’s expectation that the chairman of SACFO and co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Coons, will ensure that Congress provides funding at a level similar to the president’s request.

The FY22 HACFO bill, while not including an earmark for Libya, recommends assistance above the $30 million appropriated last year. It also “directs the Sec-
While it is promising that an election date has been set, much work remains to ensure that the elections take place and are free and fair. The administration should continue to engage diplomatically to push for clear election rules.

Congress should provide bilateral assistance at the levels requested by the administration for FY22 and demonstrate its commitment to a democratic Libya by passing the Libya Stabilization Act.
**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

- The pandemic has severely affected Morocco’s economy, which had already been struggling to meet the needs of most Moroccans (as exemplified by the kingdom’s UN Human Development Index ranking, the lowest in North Africa). In the past year, the country experienced its first recession since the middle of the 1990s, unemployment reached its highest level since 2001, and the percentage of Moroccans under the poverty line increased to nearly 20 percent.

- Meanwhile, the kingdom has continued its crackdown on freedom of expression and the press. Authorities have “weaponized the #MeToo movement” to target critical journalists, as Moroccan-American activist Samia Errazzouki described in a recent congressional briefing. This latest wave of repression has resulted in unjust prison sentences and forced the last remaining independent newspaper in the country to cease operations.

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**FY22 REQUEST in thousands of dollars**

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**FY21 APPROPRIATION**

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**TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, REQUEST VS. APPROPRIATION in millions of dollars**

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*Note: ESDF requests for FY17-FY21 are labeled ESF to make comparisons easier. Nearly all ESDF requested for MENA would fall under the ESF account, which Congress still uses.*
The Moroccan security services continue to arbitrarily arrest protesters, activists, human rights defenders, and a U.S. citizen for his critical YouTube videos. In April, the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that it had arrested more than 1.5 million people for violating COVID-19 restrictions, with nearly 300,000 being brought to trial.

In September 2021, Morocco held parliamentary elections that saw the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist political party that had won the previous two elections, lose most of its seats to the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM). The leaders of RNI and PAM are both closely aligned with King Mohammed VI, who continues to hold most of the power in the country.

In a dramatic policy shift, the Trump administration in December 2020 announced it was recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the contested Western Sahara territory after the Moroccan government agreed to normalize relations with Israel. Several members of Congress quickly expressed opposition to the Trump administration’s policy change; a number of them, led by Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), have called on President Biden to reverse the decision.

One administration official interviewed for this report explained that the Biden administration’s policy “is not to take a position” on Trump’s Western Sahara decision, especially given that a reversal could upend normalization. National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk, however, has reportedly assured Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita that the Biden administration will maintain Trump’s policy.

While the Biden administration remains supportive of Morocco’s normalization with Israel, the kingdom’s repression has drawn some attention from administration officials. One government official interviewed for this report identified Morocco as one of three countries in the region, along with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that has taken up most of their time regarding human rights concerns.

The State Department expressed concerns about the prison sentences handed down to journalists Omar Radi and Suleiman Raissouni in July 2021 for the sentences’ chilling effect on freedoms of expression and association and about violations of due process and the right to a fair trial. The Department also said that the kingdom’s crackdown on independent journalists “is inconsistent with the promise of the 2011 constitution and His Majesty King Mohammed VI’s reform agenda.”

Meanwhile, some members of Congress have grown concerned by the kingdom’s deteriorating human rights situation, as highlighted in a recent briefing held by Congress’s Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission.

U.S. bilateral assistance to Morocco remains relatively modest, averaging $37.9 million since FY16 and divided evenly between security and economic aid.

As of April 2021, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) had committed more than 70 percent of its 2015 $450 million compact with Morocco. This is the second compact the MCC has signed with Morocco.

In December 2020, the International Development Finance Corporation signed a four-year, $3 billion Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Morocco to invest in projects inside the kingdom and in co-investments with Moroccan partners in sub-Saharan Africa.
FY22 REQUEST

- The Biden administration’s FY22 request of $35.9 million in bilateral assistance is 166 percent higher than the Trump administration’s request of $13.5 million but 12.4 percent lower than the $41 million Congress appropriated in FY21.
- According to the CBJ, $20 million requested in ESF would address “core grievances of the Moroccan people,” including a “lack of economic opportunity” and “social marginalization.” About half of these funds would be directed toward good governance and civil society programs.
- Despite the Biden administration’s stated concerns about press freedom, the FY22 request does not explicitly mention any funds to support independent media or to increase the overall support for the Governing Justly and Democratically objective compared to FY20.
- The request of $10 million in FMF, the same amount that Congress has appropriated since FY17, would be used to sustain and refurbish U.S.-manufactured military equipment.

FY21 APPROPRIATION

- In the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress for the second consecutive year appropriated $41 million in bilateral assistance for Morocco: $20 million in economic assistance and $21 million in security assistance.
- Appropriators also restricted the use of FMF funds to the “purposes requested” in the FY17 CBJ, as they have done every year since FY17. The Obama administration’s FY17 request indicated that FMF for Morocco would be used for sustaining current military equipment, improving the military’s command and control capabilities, and developing its special forces.

HOW AID IS SPENT

- According to USAID, current programming in Morocco supports participatory governance, economic growth, and community resilience. It also supports education, including “technical assistance to elected sub-national governments,” “vocational training and workforce skills,” collaboration with NGOs to provide local services, and support for the Ministry of Education to improve reading and language instruction.
- One representative of a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report warned that there is a “lot of anger and discontent below the surface” in Morocco that should be addressed and stated that “it’s a shame” there has not been a lot of U.S. support for democracy and governance programming in Morocco, especially as other donor countries have cut funding to the kingdom. The same person noted that acquiring programming approvals from the U.S. government is difficult, often taking a year or more.
- One administration official interviewed for this report explained that programming for democracy and governance remains a challenge and that the U.S. government is “operationally constrained” due to the Moroccan government’s clear opposition to such programs.
- Morocco is using its FMF for the sustainment of U.S. equipment as well as constructing a peacekeeping operations training center through the Countering Chinese Influence Fund, which Congress established in FY20.
Since FY17, Congress has appropriated at least $38.5 million annually in bilateral assistance for Morocco. HACFO’s FY22 bill earmarks no less than $30 million in assistance, making it unlikely that foreign aid for Morocco will dramatically change.23

POMED RECOMMENDATIONS

POMED recommends the Biden administration elevate human rights and governance reforms to a priority in its engagement with the Moroccan authorities and commit to supporting Moroccan civil society, especially independent media, even if such programming offends the Moroccan government.

We also recommend that Congress condition all security assistance on demonstrable human rights improvements to signal to Moroccan authorities the need to improve the situation.

9. POMED interview with an administration official, July 2021.
11. POMED interview with a government official, April 2021.
18. Ibid.
22. POMED interview with an administration official, July 2021.
FY22 REQUEST in thousands of dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCOUNTS</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
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FY21 APPROPRIATION

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TOTAL BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, REQUEST VS. APPROPRIATION in millions of dollars

Note: ESDF requests for FY17-FY21 are labeled ESF to make comparisons easier. Nearly all ESDF requested for MENA would fall under the ESF account, which Congress still uses.

** In FY18, Congress appropriated $500 million in bilateral assistance for Libya, Syria, and Yemen from the Relief and Recovery Fund.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- Syria remains effectively divided into three parts. The northeast is controlled by the semi-autonomous administration of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the northwest by Turkish forces and their Syrian proxies, and the rest of the country by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Al-Assad claimed to have won 95 percent of the vote in a May 2021 election held only in regime-controlled areas and condemned as fraudulent by the Syrian opposition, the United States, and European countries.  

- While the Islamic State lost its last Syrian territory to the U.S.-backed SDF in 2019, the group continues to wage an insurgency in parts of Syria. The Biden administration maintains a small military footprint in Syria to assist the SDF.

- After a decade of civil war, Syria remains one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. According to the UN, more than 13 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance, more than half of whom are in severe...
SYRIA

need. Nearly seven million Syrians are internally displaced, and some 2 million are living in informal settlements, a 20 percent increase from 2020.\(^2\)  

The Syrian currency has reportedly lost nearly 80 percent of its value since October 2019. Almost 90 percent of the population is living below the poverty line, with more than 60 percent in extreme poverty.\(^3\)

POLICY CONTEXT

Since the rise of the Islamic State in Syria in 2014, U.S. policy has largely focused on countering that terrorist group. Although the Trump administration expanded U.S. objectives to include countering Iranian influence and denying oil resources to the al-Assad regime, the Biden administration has refocused policy on the narrower goals of ensuring the enduring defeat of the Islamic State and expanding humanitarian support.\(^4\)

In July 2021, the United States reached a significant deal with Russia to extend the UN Security Council mandate allowing cross-border humanitarian aid operations into Syria from Turkey to continue for at least one more year, ensuring that aid can still reach areas of Syria not controlled by the regime.\(^5\)

Following the Trump administration’s actions, the Biden administration has imposed targeted sanctions on the Syrian regime for its human rights abuses. In July 2021, the administration issued its first designations against eight Syrian intelligence-run prisons and their five directors.\(^6\)

BASICS OF U.S. AID

Since FY12, the United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Syria, providing more than $12 billion. According to USAID, U.S. assistance activities operate in all 14 governorates and reach more than 4.5 million Syrians per month as well as 1.1 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.\(^7\)

Following its March 2018 decision to suspend bilateral assistance to Syria, the Trump administration did not request bilateral aid to Syria in FY20 and FY21.\(^8\) In response, Congress provided an earmark of $40 million for stabilization assistance every year since FY19, requiring the administration to provide at least that amount.

FY22 REQUEST

President Biden’s FY22 request of $145 million for bilateral assistance is more in line with U.S. policy before FY20, when the administration was committed to supporting local communities outside the control of the al-Assad regime.

One U.S. official interviewed for this report suggested that the additional funds requested are an opportunity for the U.S. government to “expand programming and impact” in comparison to the last few years.\(^9\)

The Biden administration’s FY22 request includes $125 million for ESF for “stabilization activities in non-regime held areas,” and $10 million each for INCLE and NADR accounts for civilian internal security and demining programs, respectively. Of the bilateral total, the administration aims to spend $80 million on programming for the Peace and Security objective, $45 million for GJD objectives, $12 million to promote economic growth, and $8 million on basic education programs.\(^10\)

According to the CBJ, ESF would bolster the capacity of local governance actors to provide health services, electricity, water, and wastewater management as well as help local governments with the restoration of critical public infrastructure.\(^11\)
FY21 APPROPRIATION

- Ignoring Trump’s request to zero out U.S. assistance to Syria, the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act included an earmark of “not less than” $40 million for non-lethal stabilization assistance, of which $7 million must be spent on “emergency medical and rescue response and chemical weapons use investigations.”

- SACFO’s FY21 Explanatory Statement recommended that of that $40 million, $21 million should come from ESF, $8 million from INCLE, and $11 million from the Democracy Fund (DF) to be implemented by DRL.

- According to a congressional staffer interviewed for this report, the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act underscored the continued support for stabilization efforts within Congress, but due to budget constraints, lawmakers were unable to earmark more.

HOW AID IS SPENT

- The Biden administration, according to an administration official interviewed for this report, has elevated assistance to Syria, alongside assistance to Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza, as a priority.

- Demonstrating this commitment, in June 2021 Secretary Blinken announced an additional $436 million in humanitarian assistance for safe water, hygiene and relief supplies, and cash assistance. According to USAID, during FY21, the administration has provided more than $1.3 billion in humanitarian assistance inside Syria and to neighboring countries.

- USAID is using U.S. humanitarian funds and contributions from other countries to implement five main programs in Syria to restore essential services such as water and electricity, to promote inclusive and democratic engagement, and to improve food security and economic resilience.

- According to the Biden administration, stabilization assistance has helped to strengthen the political opposition in the UN-led negotiation process, support civil society in areas liberated by the Islamic State, improve access to education in northern Syria, and provide local and provincial councils governing in northeast Syria with training, equipment, and financial support.

EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- Congressional leaders remain concerned about Syria’s stability and are prepared to provide stabilization assistance on programs that help secure and strengthen local administrations in territories controlled by U.S. partners. HACFO’s FY22 Explanatory Statement explicitly supports non-lethal stabilization assistance for Syria and backs the administration’s efforts to ensure the continued delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance to countries hosting Syrian refugees.

- According to a congressional staffer interviewed for this report, Congress is supportive of the administration’s request, but it may not seek to “lock in” that amount with an earmark as it has done in recent years.
We urge Congress to support President Biden's request for increased bilateral assistance to Syria. Humanitarian aid is vital for millions of Syrians, and additional bilateral assistance can advance U.S. objectives to stabilize territories liberated from the Islamic State and to build the capacity of local governments to provide for their communities.
Ten years after the 2011 revolution, Tunisia's democratic experiment hangs in the balance following a power grab by President Kais Saïed. This year began with protests over police brutality and deteriorating socio-economic conditions; as the year continued, political gridlock between the presidency and parliament deepened. On July 25, President Saied froze parliament, dismissed the prime minister, and seized all executive power. He claimed to be taking such extraordinary steps in accordance with Article 80 of the constitution, although that article explicitly prohibits the suspension or dissolution of parliament. On August 24, Saiéd announced that his “exceptional measures” would remain in effect until “further notice,” and he affirmed his intention to change the constitution the following month. Saïed has stated that “the existing political institutions and the way they are operating are a danger to the state... Parliament itself is a danger to the state.” In an alarming devel-
opment on September 22, Saïed declared he was suspending parts of the constitution, ruling by decree, and preparing to change the political system unilaterally.4

- Since his July 25 announcement, Saïed has maintained apparent popular support among many Tunisians, likely due to widespread frustration over the country’s stagnant economy, public health crisis, endemic corruption, and political paralysis, together with Saïed’s promises to make radical changes to address those problems.

- Tunisia’s economic challenges have persisted since the revolution, which was itself sparked by socio-economic discontent. 2020 was a particularly difficult year; hampered by rampant corruption, a looming debt crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy shrunk by 8.6 percent, unemployment rose to nearly 18 percent, and livelihoods were upended.5

- While Tunisia appeared to weather the early months of the pandemic with relatively low case rates and deaths, by August 2021 it was home to the African continent’s second-highest reported death toll from the virus.6 The epidemiological situation improved somewhat in the following weeks, with case numbers dropping, vaccinations picking up with the help of donations from abroad, and restrictions being eased.7

- After taking office, the Biden administration made Tunisia a higher priority—at least relative to the Trump administration, which mostly ignored the country. For example, Vice President Kamala Harris called President Saïed on May 11, and the White House’s readout of the call stated that the two leaders “reaffirmed the importance of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and fighting corruption.”8

- Yet the Biden administration was apparently reluctant to pursue more robust engagement with Tunisia, even as the country’s health, economic, and political crises worsened in the first half of 2021. For example, a U.S. official interviewed for this report before Saïed’s power grab noted that some within the administration worried that a visit by a top U.S. official could be misconstrued as “meddling” in Tunisia’s gridlocked politics.9 The same U.S. official, again before July 25, observed that the U.S. Embassy in Tunis was more focused on Tunisia’s “economic problems” than on “consolidating democracy.”10

- The U.S. administration appeared caught off guard by President Saïed’s July 25 power grab. After some missteps in its initial messaging,11 the Biden administration publicly urged Saïed to re-open parliament, appoint a new prime minister, and engage in an inclusive dialogue “about proposed constitutional and electoral reforms in response to the widely expressed demands of many Tunisians for improved living standards as well as honest, effective, and transparent governance.”12 Principal Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer visited Tunisia on August 13 to urge “a swift return to the path of Tunisia’s parliamentary democracy” and the appointment of a prime minister who could form “a capable government able to address the immediate economic and health crises facing Tunisia.”13

- After President Saïed blew through the 30-day constitutional deadline to end his exceptional powers and continued not to appoint a prime minister or announce a political roadmap, however, the administration had no public reaction.

- Members of Congress from both parties raised concerns about the implications of Saïed’s moves for Tunisia’s democracy, calling on Saïed to adhere to the constitution’s framework and allow for the resumption of parliament.14 Neither U.S. lawmakers nor Biden administration officials have publicly called Saïed’s July 25 declaration a coup.
Since FY16, the U.S. government has provided Tunisia a total of more than $1 billion in bilateral assistance—averaging $190 million a year, more or less balanced between security and economic assistance.

In July 2021, prior to Saïed’s power grab, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved a five-year, $498.7 million compact with the Government of Tunisia to help the country strengthen its transportation, trade, and water sectors. USAID Administrator Samantha Power described the compact as “an affirmation of Tunisia’s commitment to constitutional democratic governance and equitable prosperity at a critical time in Tunisia and the broader region.”

According to one congressional staffer briefed on the status of the compact and interviewed for this report, the Tunisian parliament—which is now suspended indefinitely—never approved the compact for its implementation to begin, as is required by Tunisia’s constitution.

The administration’s FY22 request of $197.1 million is more than double the Trump administration’s request for FY21, but it is 18 percent lower than the $241.4 million Congress has appropriated every year since FY19. According to a Biden administration official interviewed for this report, the request is a signal of “continued support” to Tunisia, but the failure to match last year’s appropriation is a “reflection that the administration doesn’t want to be in the Middle East or focus on the Middle East.”

Of the $85 million requested in ESF funding, $39 million would go toward support for private sector-led growth and workforce development, which the CBJ describes as “essential to the development of Tunisia’s economy and the strengthening of its strategic partnership with the U.S.” The administration has requested that the remaining $47.8 million in ESF would be for the GJD objective, noting that “a major focus will be on initiatives that address citizens’ concerns that a democratic system has not improved their quality of life.”

The CBJ identifies Tunisia as a key security partner, including in the fight against the Islamic State and as a part of AFRICOM. The CBJ indicates that the request for $85 million in FMF would “[augment] Tunisian security forces’ ISR and border security capabilities, as well as [ensure that] its aging equipment remains combat-capable, including a replacement for Tunisia’s F-5 fleet.”

The request for INCLE funding ($22.8 million) is higher than what Congress appropriated in FY21 ($13 million). According to the CBJ, this funding would support “the continued evolution of Tunisia’s civilian law enforcement institutions” by providing “training, technical assistance, equipment, and limited infrastructure support.” Similarly, the $2 million requested for NADR would provide additional training and equipment for the Tunisian National Police and National Guard. 2021 has seen rising incidents of police violence and brutality against protestors.

Congress again rejected the Trump administration’s request to cut aid to Tunisia, appropriating $241.4 million in total assistance for the third year in a row.

In addition, for the first time, the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act earmarked “not less than” $241.4 million, though the Act’s explanatory statement indicated that, as in the past two years, $50 million of the total would come from prior year ESF funds. In FY19 and FY20 the earmark was for only $191.4 million, but in the explanatory statements, appropriators included an additional $50 million from prior year funds.

Reflecting strong support for Tunisia, HACFO’s FY21 explanatory statement notes that “a stable and viable democratic Tunisia is critical to regional security,” adding that...
the committee “supports the government of Tunisia’s efforts to continue improving the security situation in the country, democratic governance, and economic reform.”

- For the second year in a row, Congress divided the economic assistance package for Tunisia between ESF and Development Assistance (DA) accounts. According to one government official interviewed for this report, the shift in some funding to DA—an account not frequently used in MENA—did not affect programming objectives or strategy but instead reflected a need to stay below budget caps.

**HOW AID IS SPENT**

- The robust security assistance to Tunisia continues to support, among other things, the acquisition, sustainment, and modernization of manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment; rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft; light-attack aircraft; and fast patrol boats.

- U.S. economic assistance has supported programs promoting job creation, including a $100 million multi-year Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund (TAEF), and democracy programs that support decentralization, countering violent extremism (CVE), and elections and political processes.

- USAID has shifted more than $31 million in Economic Growth and GJD objectives to help Tunisia’s response to the pandemic and mitigate some of its economic and social effects. In addition, the U.S. government has delivered 1 million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine as of August 2021.

- One representative from a democracy-promotion organization indicated that since Saïed’s power grab, many local partners and civil society organizations have turned to “self-censorship” out of growing concern for Saïed’s intentions and to avoid being “targeted as enemies of the state.”

- A former U.S. official interviewed for this report cautioned that Tunisia is a good example of how foreign aid alone “isn’t going to get anything done unless you've got leverage over the larger macro forces,” because “in the absence of really serious government reform . . . you can throw money at the country and nothing is really going to change.”

**EXPECTATION FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION**

- In the aftermath of President Saïed’s power grab and amid doubts about Tunisia’s democratization process, the future of U.S. assistance is not clear. Some members of Congress have called for conditioning or suspending assistance until Saïed returns the country to a democratic path. Developments inside Tunisia in the weeks ahead will be critical as the Senate marks up its appropriation bill and eventually reconciles it with the House bill.

**POMED RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The significant increase in U.S. assistance to Tunisia since 2011 has largely been based on U.S. support for the country’s democratic progress. With that progress now in jeopardy, U.S. aid to Tunisia cannot simply continue as usual. The Biden administration should suspend all security assistance and direct support for the Tunisian government until Saïed returns Tunisia to a democratic path, which would include the presence of a freely elected, pluralistic, empowered legislature.
◆ For appropriations in FY22, Congress should make all assistance that directly supports the Tunisian government conditional upon Tunisia's return to an inclusive government that respects the separation of powers, democratic principles, and rule of law established under its 2014 constitution.

◆ The administration and Congress should also work together to find creative ways to support Tunisian citizens independent of the government and assist their efforts to address the country's daunting political, economic, and health challenges.

◆ While continuing to speak out about undemocratic developments, the Biden administration and Congress should be especially vigilant about the use of U.S.-trained security forces and U.S.-supplied weapons and equipment to repress Tunisian citizens.

2. Tarek Amara and Angus Mcdowall, “Tunisia’s President Saied indicates he will amend constitution,” Reuters, September 11, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisia-president-saied-indicates-he-will-amend-constitution-2021-09-11/
9. POMED interview with an administration official, April 2021.
10. Ibid.
11. Secretary Antony Blinken, Twitter Post, July 26, 2021, https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1419782963886239746
senior-administration-officials-travel-to-tunisia/
13. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
18. POMED interview with an administration official, July 2021.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
23. POMED interview with an administration official, August 2021.
25. Ibid.
27. POMED interview with a former government official, April 2021.

The events of July 25 in Tunisia took place amid Tunisian citizens’ growing despair over the country’s deteriorating public health and economic conditions and political leaders’ incompetence, infighting, and corruption. The United States, over successive administrations, clearly failed to adequately recognize or respond to Tunisians’ growing disenchantment with their governing institutions and political leaders or to provide effective support to help Tunisians address these legitimate grievances. Congress should mandate that the administration conduct a review of U.S. policy (including aid) toward Tunisia since 2011 to determine where U.S. support fell short or was counterproductive and how U.S. policy and assistance to Tunisia should be changed.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- In late 2020, Israel tabled formal annexation of the West Bank as part of its normalization agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Despite this, Palestinian frustrations over the decades-long occupation escalated in the spring of 2021 when Israeli security forces attacked worshippers at the al-Aqsa Mosque and Palestinian families in East Jerusalem faced eviction.

- Tensions culminated in an outbreak of violence between Israel and Hamas in May 2021 that saw Hamas launch thousands of rockets indiscriminately into Israel, leaving 10 dead. Israel’s military responded forcefully in Gaza, causing 200 Palestinian deaths and widespread damage to buildings, roads, and other infrastructure.¹

- Before the eight-day conflict broke out, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas in April 2021 had indefinitely postponed long-overdue parliamentary and presidential elections that were scheduled to begin in May.² Abbas argued that the delay was necessary because Israel had refused to guarantee Palestinians in East Jerusalem the right to vote,

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¹ Total Bilateral Assistance, Request vs. Appropriation in millions of dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY22 REQUEST in thousands of dollars</th>
<th>FY21 APPROPRIATION</th>
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<td>ACCOUNTS</td>
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Note: ESDF requests for FY17-FY21 are labeled ESF to make comparisons easier. Nearly all ESDF requested for MENA would fall under the ESF account, which Congress still uses.
but many interpreted the delay as an effort to protect his Fatah party from losing to Hamas in the elections.

- While Hamas and Israel have mainly held to a ceasefire brokered by Egypt, the conflict has exacerbated the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, where 80 percent of the population was already in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN estimates that 1.3 million Palestinians require humanitarian aid as a direct result of the conflict, including approximately 800,000 who lack access to clean water and 40,000 who have been forced into shelters.

POLICY CONTEXT

- The Biden administration has reversed President Trump’s policy towards the Palestinians, including by re-engaging with the PA and resuming U.S. aid for Palestinians, which Trump had withheld.

- In March 2021, the administration announced it would provide $15 million in humanitarian assistance for the West Bank and Gaza, before revealing in April that it would restore aid previously frozen by the Trump administration. In total, the Biden administration has committed to providing more than $360 million in economic, development, security, and humanitarian assistance for Palestinians, including more than $150 million for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

- The administration’s plan to resume assistance to the Palestinians has been met with substantial pushback from Republicans in Congress. Senator Jim Risch (R-ID) and Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, respectively, have maintained an informal hold on $75 million in ESF. Eighteen Republican senators called on Secretary Blinken to halt the ESF funding. Other Republican members of Congress have introduced bills, such as Senator Rick Scott’s (R-FL) Stop Taxpayer Funding of Hamas Act, to restrict assistance to Palestinians.

- Despite renewed engagement with the PA, the Biden administration demonstrated only tepid support for the scheduled elections before they were postponed, stating that the “exercise of democratic elections is a matter for the Palestinian people to determine.” According to a U.S. official interviewed for the report, the administration was unwilling to put more support behind the elections, fearing a repeat of the last vote, in 2006, when Hamas won a plurality of seats.

BASICS OF U.S. AID

- U.S. aid to the Palestinians—totalling more than $5 billion since 1994—has long supported humanitarian assistance, the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and security cooperation with Israel, economic growth, infrastructure development, improvements in the health and education sectors, and some democracy and governance programs.

- This aid has received perhaps the greatest congressional scrutiny, restrictions, and conditions of any foreign aid package. Among other laws, it is regulated by provisions in annual appropriations bills and by the 2017 Taylor Force Act (TFA), which prohibits ESF funding that “directly benefits the Palestinian Authority” until the PA ceases payments to families of Palestinians who were detained for or died during what Israel deems terrorist acts.
WEST BANK & GAZA

FY22 REQUEST

- For FY22, the Biden administration requested $219 million in bilateral assistance for the West Bank and Gaza, a complete shift from the Trump administration's decision not to request any funds for the Palestinians last year. Of this, $185 million would be for ESF and $33 million would be for INCLE.

- According to the CBJ, the request for ESF would support critical humanitarian relief, boost economic and health development, and preserve the path toward a two-state solution. ESF funds would also go toward supporting “environmental and climate change issues, focusing on reliable and affordable water supply and solid-waste treatment.”

- The administration’s $33 million request for INCLE would continue support for Palestinian security coordination with Israel. This request is a 56 percent reduction from the FY21 appropriation. The assistance, according to the CBJ, would help the PA to strengthen security and criminal justice institutions and to “maintain stability in the West Bank.”

- Of the administration’s total request, just 8.7 percent, or $19 million, is slated for democracy and governance programming. This is a similar percentage of assistance for the GJD objective as was provided during the Obama administration.

FY21 APPROPRIATION

- Frustrated with the Trump administration’s refusal to provide assistance to the Palestinians, Congress provided an earmark in the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act for $75 million in ESF and $75 million in INCLE for the second year in a row.

- Congress also included the Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA) in the FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which will provide $250 million over five years. Representative Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE), one of the legislation’s cosponsors, said that MEPPA could “help create a new foundation for a road to peace, a new foundation of trust.”

- Also known as the Lowey Fund—after former Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY), who as chair of the Appropriations Committee was instrumental in getting the bill passed—MEPPA will be the first U.S. government funding mechanism with the explicit purpose of building “peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and [...] a sustainable two-state solution.” The program will establish a people-to-people partnership fund run by USAID as well as an economic development fund run by the U.S. International Development Financial Corporation.

HOW AID IS SPENT

- The Biden administration said that the resumption of assistance previously held up by the Trump administration would support emergency shelter, food, relief items, and health care for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as mental health and psychosocial support for those who have experienced trauma. In addition, the funds would support private sector growth and civil society.
According to USAID, in FY21 the U.S. government has provided $79.1 million in humanitarian assistance through multilateral accounts for emergency food assistance, cash assistance, and health services.\textsuperscript{20}

The administration has also resumed providing INCLE assistance, developing a new citizen security and law enforcement project with the overarching goal of building the PA's security forces into an accountable and effective force.

In April, the State Department clarified its position on the Taylor Force Act (TFA), affirming that it was continuing the Trump administration's broad definition of assistance that could be considered to directly benefit the PA. Among other factors, its definition requires the Biden administration to determine "the extent of ownership or control the PA exerts over an entity or an individual" before providing any assistance and to ensure that such aid does not "directly replace assistance or services that the PA would otherwise provide."\textsuperscript{21}

One Middle East peace advocate interviewed for this report raised concerns that the administration's policy to work with the Palestinian Authority on providing assistance to Gaza could conflict with administration's definition of the TFA's "directly benefits" prohibition.\textsuperscript{22}

One congressional staffer interviewed for this report indicated that the administration has answered all of the questions posed by the members of Congress who are holding up some of the ESF, predicting that the hold would be lifted "soon."\textsuperscript{23} According to a spokesperson for Senator Risch, however, he intends to hold the funds "as long as there is any question that additional funds could fall into the hands of terrorists," despite this already being prevented by the TFA.\textsuperscript{24}

In line with the administration's request, the majority of Democrats support resuming assistance to the Palestinians, according to a congressional staffer interviewed for this report.\textsuperscript{25}

Republicans vociferously continue to oppose assistance to the Palestinians, despite the strict conditions already in place.\textsuperscript{26} For example, Representative Lee Zeldin (R-NY) argues that by resuming assistance the Biden administration is "bowing to terrorists."\textsuperscript{27} According to an informed observer, Republicans "don't actually care about the law" but rather see the issue as a political winner in advance of the 2022 midterm elections.\textsuperscript{28}

POMED supports the administration's FY22 request and efforts to provide critical aid to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We also encourage those members of Congress concerned about the misuse or abuse of U.S. assistance to work with the Biden administration to ensure compliance with U.S. laws rather than preemptively blocking congressionally appropriated funds.
11. POMED interview with an administration official, July 2021.
14. Ibid.
22. POMED interview with a peace advocate, June 2021.
23. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
25. POMED interview with a congressional staffer, July 2021.
28. POMED interview with a peace advocate, June 2021.
The situation in Yemen remains the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with about 80 percent of the population (more than 24 million people) in need of humanitarian or protection assistance.¹ Yemen’s beleaguered healthcare system has been strained further by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aid organizations believe the reported count of 1,500 deaths from the virus is well below the actual number.²

Nominally, the conflict is a fight between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Saudi-backed forces aligned with the internationally recognized government. But, as a recent Foreign Affairs analysis points out, the war is “fundamentally an internal conflict in which a dizzying array of rival factions are taking part, with outside powers fanning the flames.”³

UN-led efforts at brokering peace have not succeeded, with Yemeni factions preferring to vie for battlefield gains rather than compromise and external actors unwilling or unable to secure concessions from the warring parties.

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1. The situation in Yemen remains the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with about 80 percent of the population (more than 24 million people) in need of humanitarian or protection assistance.1 Yemen’s beleaguered healthcare system has been strained further by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aid organizations believe the reported count of 1,500 deaths from the virus is well below the actual number.²

2. Nominally, the conflict is a fight between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Saudi-backed forces aligned with the internationally recognized government. But, as a recent Foreign Affairs analysis points out, the war is “fundamentally an internal conflict in which a dizzying array of rival factions are taking part, with outside powers fanning the flames.”³

3. UN-led efforts at brokering peace have not succeeded, with Yemeni factions preferring to vie for battlefield gains rather than compromise and external actors unwilling or unable to secure concessions from the warring parties.
Soon after taking office, President Biden described ending the war as one of his regional priorities. He announced that the United States would be “ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales,” and that his administration would attempt to broker a ceasefire and then a peace agreement, starting with the appointment of Timothy Lenderking as U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen.\(^4\)

The administration has also emphasized humanitarian assistance. Secretary Blinken reversed former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO),\(^5\) a decision that experts had warned would severely hamper efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas.\(^6\) In March 2021, the United States pledged $191 million in humanitarian aid for FY21,\(^7\) followed by an additional $290 million in September.\(^8\)

Members of Congress remain concerned about the humanitarian crisis and the U.S. role in the war. In April 2021, more than 70 Democrats urged the Biden administration to “publicly pressure” Saudi Arabia to lift its blockade restricting fuel into the port of Hodeidah.\(^9\) That same month, congressional pressure forced the administration to acknowledge that it continues to provide maintenance equipment and services to the Saudi Air Force despite the fact that such support could be used for offensive operations in Yemen.\(^10\)

The United States has provided more than $3.4 billion in humanitarian aid to Yemen since FY15.\(^11\) In FY20, USAID and the Department of State provided $630 million for emergency food aid, medical treatment, and vaccination support for children.\(^12\)

In addition, since FY17 the United States has provided between $35 and $40 million per year in bilateral economic assistance to help address the “underlying causes of instability in the country,” according to USAID.\(^13\)

In FY22, the Biden administration has requested $45.1 million in bilateral assistance for Yemen, similar to the Trump administration’s requests for the three previous years. The request includes $30 million for ESF, $4.6 million for NADR, and $10 million for Global Health Programs, which would primarily support maternal and child health.\(^14\)

ESF would support programs to “strengthen social cohesion, mitigate conflict, and promote peace and stability within local communities,” including $8.5 million for good governance and human rights.\(^15\)

The request does not include a specific amount of humanitarian assistance for Yemen—a regular policy to allow the administration the flexibility to respond to shifting humanitarian needs around the world—but the CBJ does indicate that Yemen would remain a focus for U.S. humanitarian assistance for FY22.\(^16\)
FY21 APPROPRIATION

- The FY21 Consolidated Appropriations Act’s Explanatory Statement includes $37 million for Yemen in bilateral aid, specifically for “health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance.” It also earmarked $3 million for democracy programs to be implemented by DRL.
- Illustrating concern that humanitarian assistance is being obstructed by the warring parties, HACFO’s FY21 Explanatory Statement requires the secretary of state to report on access restrictions for humanitarian organizations, port capacity, and other impediments to the delivery of assistance. It also highlights “the importance of fuel to alleviating the humanitarian crisis, including access into all Red Sea ports, which are critical lifelines for the Yemeni population.”

HOW AID IS SPENT

- In FY21, the U.S. government has provided more than $800 million in humanitarian assistance to address food insecurity, healthcare deficiencies, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) needs.
- U.S. aid also supports a UNICEF-implemented cash transfer program for vulnerable Yemenis as well as a DRL program to help civil society address human rights violations, empower women and marginalized groups, inform transitional justice processes, and work with independent journalists.
- According to a representative from a democracy-promotion organization interviewed for this report, implementing organizations have pressed U.S. government officials not to wait until Yemen regains a functioning national political system to increase assistance for democracy and governance. Instead, the organizations have recommended that the United States take advantage of small, targeted opportunities to support grassroots, bottom-up efforts at rebuilding governance.

EXPECTATIONS FOR FY22 APPROPRIATION

- Congress is likely to provide some bilateral aid for health and stabilization assistance in line with the president’s request. While appropriators do not include country-specific earmarks for humanitarian assistance, they are likely to provide a substantial amount for humanitarian accounts.
- In addition, members of Congress will likely continue to raise concerns about restrictions on the ports of entry and distribution of assistance throughout the country. In HACFO’s FY22 Explanatory Statement, for example, appropriators urge the secretary of state to press Saudi Arabian officials to “unconditionally ease all restrictions on Yemen’s ports and airports and to enable the free flow of fuel, food, and medicine into and throughout Yemen.”
YEMEN

POMED RECOMMENDATIONS

◆ Despite Biden’s declared end of U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen, the administration continues to provide equipment and services that the Saudi Air Force can use in air raids, thereby implicating the United States in ongoing civilian casualties. The administration must end all arms transfers, including maintenance equipment, that can be used for offensive operations.

◆ The United States should continue to provide significant humanitarian assistance, rally other countries to contribute, and ensure that humanitarian aid and commercial goods are able to enter and move throughout Yemen.

◆ Congress should earmark substantial funding to support Yemeni civil society in order to help lay the groundwork for a post-conflict political transition that can help address the root causes of the conflict.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
20. POMED interview with a representative of a democracy-promotion organization, April 2021.
There may be variance in numbers used throughout this report due to rounding.

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**TABLE 1: TOTAL ASSISTANCE BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, FY13-FY22 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)**

*Since the FY20 request, the administration has divided the Investing in People objective between a Health objective and an Education and Social Services objective. The administration also renamed Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) to Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. The FY20 request also divided the Conflict, Human Rights, and Governance (CHRG) subobjective under the Peace and Security objective into a Human Rights and Conflict subobjective. For this report we have kept the original names to make comparisons to previous years easier.*

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**APPENDIX: DATA TABLES**

**TABLE 2: GJD FUNDS BY PROGRAM AREA, FY13-FY22 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)**
TABLE 3 - BILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY
AND BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, FY13-FY22 (MILLIONS USD)

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