“Erdoğan might pull a January 6. . . . How would [the Biden administration] feel if in just three months, Turkey has its first unfree election in decades . . . and they have sold the F-16 to Turkey just months before?”

“[NATO allies] want to demonstrate to Russia that NATO is more united than ever and that even Erdogan’s Turkey won’t be able to spoil that. So Erdogan knows that he can get away with [bargaining over Sweden and Finland’s membership].”

“To many Turkish citizens, such Western efforts to shore up ties with a loathed Turkish autocrat—while trumpeting the cause of democracy in Ukraine, no less—only serve to reaffirm some of the key reasons why they distrust the West’s intentions.”

“Right now NATO is more united than ever. A veto would damage the relationship so much, Erdogan will not go that far… He wants US attention so he can show his domestic audience that he can threaten and get something done with it.”

“The move is likely to negate the goodwill that Ankara has recently earned in Washington by selling drones to Ukraine… It will be difficult for Congress to allow the export of F-16s to Turkey after Erdogan’s remarks.”

“Sputnik has positioned itself so well. When they criticise Nato and the US, they have these messages that are targeting and exploiting mistrust between the different factions.”

“Authoritarian governments do not listen to public opinion. They seek to manipulate and mold it according to their interests. Erdogan never pays attention to public opinion in Turkey unless it directly serves his own political ends.”

“I think it’s quite revealing that such a large proportion of the Turkish public… that about half of them see the U.S. and NATO as the main culprit here, as being responsible for the war.”

“There is a softening in Congress toward Turkey because of Ukraine and Afghanistan, but I am not sure they are on board with any military sales just yet.”