

POMED Backgrounder: Previewing Libya's Elections

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INTRODUCTION

On July 7, 2012 Libyans will go to the polls to elect a 200-member General National Congress (GNC) in the country's first national elections since 1965. The GNC will replace the interim National Transitional Council (NTC), which formed in the East in the early days of the uprising to serve as the political face of the revolution, growing in membership as the rebels moved westward. During the revolution, the NTC also appointed an Executive Board to assume government functions in areas under rebel control. After the declaration of Libya's liberation on October 23, 2011, the NTC relocated to Tripoli and named an interim government to oversee the transition until national elections could be held. While the NTC is supposed to serve as the legislative body and the interim government as the executive, these responsibilities have not been clearly demarcated, sowing some confusion over the separation of powers. The public has grown increasingly frustrated with the interim governing bodies, which are viewed as lacking transparency, not being adequately representative or accountable, and poorly managing the transition, particularly in terms of rebuilding security. Against this backdrop, Libyans are enthusiastic to replace the self-appointed government with one they have elected themselves, even if few know exactly what it is they are voting for.

WHAT ARE THESE ELECTIONS FOR?

GENERAL NATIONAL CONGRESS

As outlined in the [Constitutional Declaration](#) of August 2011 and [Constitutional Amendment No. 1-2012](#) of March 2012, the primary responsibilities of the General National Congress are twofold:

- 1) Appoint a Prime Minister, who shall in turn name a government, within 30 days of the GNC's first meeting.
- 2) Select, within 30 days of the GNC's first meeting, a Constituent Assembly from outside the membership of the GNC to draft a constitution for the country.

It is worth noting that unlike in Egypt where legal ambiguity over criteria for candidacy in the constituent assembly led to the dissolution of this body by the courts, in Libya, Constitutional Amendment No. 1-2012 explicitly prohibits the nomination of current members of the GNC to the Constituent Assembly.

In addition to the aforementioned duties, the Congress is tasked with promulgating the new constitution and facilitating national elections in accordance with the new constitution. Beyond these provisions, the authority of the GNC remains undefined, which could potentially create problems if the body is seen as exercising authority outside of its mandate.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Composition

Per the Constitutional Amendment, the Constituent Assembly will “be composed of sixty members along the lines of the sixty-member commission that was formed to prepare the constitution of the independence of Libya in the year 1951.” This historical reference was inserted to placate the resource-rich eastern province of Cyrenaica, the cradle of the February 17 revolution. Long neglected by Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, the people of Cyrenaica are now demanding greater authority in the new political order just as they did in 1951. That year, the three distinct regions of Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica in the East, and Fezzan in the South, were brought under unified leadership for the first time in their history. Both then, and now, Tripolitania was home to roughly two-thirds of the population, and thus wanted the constituent assembly to reflect the country’s population distribution. Cyrenaica and Fezzan, however, successfully persuaded the U.N. Commissioner overseeing Libya’s transition to independence that each of the three regions should have 20 representatives in the assembly despite major differences in their population sizes.¹ The reference to 1951 in the current Constitutional Amendment, therefore, sets up a system where each province is granted twenty seats in the Constituent Assembly.

However, unlike in 1951 when Cyrenaica and Fezzan were able to overcome Tripolitania’s desires for a centralized system of governance by joining together to codify a federal monarchy in the constitution, all decisions in the new Constituent Assembly must be passed by two-thirds majority of its members plus one member, effectively preventing any two regions from overruling the third.

Timing

Initially, the Constituent Assembly was given only 60 days from its first meeting to write and adopt a constitution, but this provision was later amended to 120 days—still a very tight timeframe. To put this in context, the last time Libya drafted a constitution in 1951, it took 25 months to negotiate and complete, and the process was overseen by the international community. This time, there is no international pressure and the stakes are just as high, suggesting that four months will be an almost impossible deadline to meet.

Once a draft of the constitution is adopted by the Assembly, a referendum will be held within 30 days. A handful of political parties and Libyan legal experts are opposed to the draft constitution going straight from the appointed constitutional drafting body to popular referendum. They worry that this setup could cause some to question the draft text’s legitimacy since the drafters will be appointed rather than elected. In the case of the political parties, moreover, they most likely want a greater say over the final draft. Several politicians have therefore indicated that if elected, they will seek to amend Article 30 of the Constitutional Declaration so that the Constituent Assembly’s draft constitution must first be endorsed by the General National Congress prior to being put to a popular referendum.

As the Constitutional Amendment currently stands, if the Libyan people approve of the draft constitution by a two-thirds majority of voters, the Constituent Assembly will ratify the constitution and refer it to the General National Congress for promulgation. If it is not approved, the Assembly will put a revised constitution to a public referendum within 30 days of the first referendum’s results.

¹ Kane, Sean. “Libya’s Constitutional Balancing Act.” Foreign Policy. 14 December 2011. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/14/libyas_balancing_act

The process will then culminate in general elections in accordance with the new constitution's provisions within 210 days of the constitution's approval.

ELECTORAL PROCESS

LAWS CONCERNING ELECTIONS

The Constitutional Declaration of August 2011 (later amended by Constitutional Amendment 1-2012 in March 2012) provides a very tight timeline for the electoral process based on the date of Libya's liberation, October 23, 2011. As stipulated in the Declaration, the interim National Transitional Council (NTC) was to promulgate an electoral law and establish an electoral commission within 90 days of the declaration of liberation in preparation for elections that would take place within 240 days of this same date.

With this timetable in mind, the NTC began creating the legal framework for the General National Congress (GNC) elections in early January 2012. The NTC first passed [Law No 2-2012](#)² to formally legalize political parties (often referred to as "political entities," due to the negative connotation of the term "political party" in Libya), which had been outlawed by the Gaddafi regime. When [Laws 29- and 30-2012](#) were jointly passed, political parties formed on the basis of religious, ethnic, or tribal affiliations were prohibited, although this ban was quickly lifted after outcry from some in Libya's Islamist movements.

A [draft electoral law](#) was released publically on January 3, 2012, providing an opportunity for Libyan civil society groups and individuals to submit feedback online. International election experts also advised the NTC, and a revised version of the law, [Law No. 4-2012](#), was issued in late January. Despite the online effort to incorporate the public's views, many Libyans were angered by the lack of transparency in the drafting of the electoral law, and some went so far as to storm the NTC offices in mid-January.³ Much of the debate over the law concerned the women's quota and whether to utilize a party-based system or individual-based system of elections. Regarding the first issue, the draft law proposed a 10 percent quota (i.e. 20 seats) for women, which was widely criticized by Libyans and rights groups as being too low; it was thus replaced by a horizontal and vertical zipper system. Despite going further than Tunisia's much-lauded electoral law for its October 2011 elections, which only required a vertical zipper system, there are still major criticisms of this system (see "Party-Based System" below). On the second issue, the draft electoral law had mandated a system based entirely on individual races. Some argued that an individual-based system would exacerbate regional divisions by empowering local elites rather than nationally-oriented figures, but others argued that a party-based system would provide too much power to established groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴ The end result was the creation of a hybrid system that included both individual and party lists.

THE HIGH NATIONAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION

The NTC established the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) with [Law No. 3-2012](#) in mid-January to oversee the GNC elections. The law provides a mandate for an independent, 17-member commission (amended twice with [Laws No. 31- and 44-2012](#) to a final membership of 11) that is allowed to create a structure to oversee and administer the election process. Five members of the commission, including the chairman, were replaced in late April, leading to the final composition

² For a full list of laws, decisions, and links to English and Arabic versions of the texts, see Appendix A: A List of Laws & Decisions at the end of this document.

³ Associated Press. "Libyans storm transitional government headquarters in Benghazi." The Guardian. 21 January 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/21/libyans-transitional-government-headquarters-benghazi>

⁴ Blanchard, Christopher. "Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. 28 March 2012. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf>

of the commission before the elections.⁵ Although the reason for their removal was unclear, it was speculated that the committee was moving too slowly, which may have significantly delayed elections, pushing back the transitional timeline beyond what was considered acceptable.⁶

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Per NTC Law No. 4-2012, GNC elections will take the form of a parallel system utilizing both individual-based and party-based systems to elect a 200-member congress. 120 representatives will be elected by the majority system, while the remaining 80 will be elected by the proportional list system. With local councils deciding the electoral system for their respective districts, the proportion of individual races to party races in each district varies considerably.

Individual-Based System

For the individual-based system, in districts with one seat open, a first past the post (FPTP) system will be used so that the individual with the highest number of votes is the winner. In districts with more than one seat open, a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system will be used so that voters will be issued a single vote, and the candidates with the highest number of votes will be elected. Individual candidates are theoretically to be independent of political parties, although in recent days several parties, including the Justice and Construction Party, have openly endorsed some individual candidates.⁷ In an attempt to remove the legal ambiguity of these endorsements, the HNEC put forth a statement noting that it was fully within individual candidates' rights to be endorsed by a political entity—a move that was perhaps motivated by a desire to avoid the dissolution of the parliament as happened in neighboring Egypt.

Party-Based System

Concerning the party-based system, closed electoral lists will be used. Political entities submitted lists consisting of a number of candidates that is at least 50 percent and no more than 100 percent of the open seats for each district in which they wish to run. To determine seat distribution in a given district, the number of valid votes will be divided by the number of available seats in order to obtain an electoral average. The number of votes for an entity's list will then be divided by the electoral average. The number of seats distributed to that party will be the integer of the quotient. Any remaining vacant seats will be distributed on the basis of largest remainder. Within a winning list, seat allocation will be determined in descending order.

Party lists must alternate between men and women. This rule applies both within a list (i.e. if a party starts a list with a man, the second candidate in the list must be a woman) and across lists (i.e., if a party runs candidate lists in multiple districts, half of those lists must have a man at the top of the list, and half must begin with a woman). In cases where a political party chooses to replace a candidate within a list, the replacement must be of the same sex as the original candidate. While this system will certainly increase the number of women in the Congress, it will most likely not result in gender parity for the party-based seats. With over 100 political parties running in the elections, many of these parties are smaller and may be running only one list with a man in the first position. If districts' votes are divided by many parties, thus leaving only the first candidate on any given list with the ability to obtain a seat, women are presented with a smaller chance of winning a seat. It should also be noted that this requirement only applies to party lists; no rules concern the number

⁵ "Election Commission Chairman Replaced." *Libya Herald*. 25 April 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/election-commission-chairman-sacked/>

⁶ Zaptia, Sami. "Election Commission sacked – what's next for the elections?" *Libya Herald*. 1 May 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/election-commission-sacked-what-next-for-the-elections/>

⁷ Khan, Umar. "'Independent' individual candidate campaigns with backing of Justice & Construction Party." *Libya Herald*. 3 July 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/independent-individual-candidate-campaigns-with-backing-of-justice-construction-party/>

of women running for individual-based seats. There are also some fears among more liberal circles that conservative parties have taken positions friendly toward women in order to field more lists, but will seek to drive them out of the party once they are elected and fill their seats with men. Such a scenario, however unlikely, may be legally possible since the law does not explicitly stipulate that a seat must be replaced with someone of the same gender once in the GNC.

Electoral Districts

Electoral districts are determined by [Law No. 14-2012](#). The country is divided into 13 primary districts. Primary districts with higher populations, such as Tripoli, are also divided into sub-districts to create a total of 20 districts for the party-based system. Each primary district (or sub-district, where applicable) is assigned a number of seats for the party-based system and will have its own ballot based on the parties that registered to run in that district. The Gharyan district is not assigned any party-based seats and will not have a party-system ballot.

Primary districts (or sub-districts) are then further divided into 69 secondary districts for individual-based seats. Each secondary district is assigned a number of individual-based seats and has its own individual-system ballot based on the individuals who registered for candidacy. Four secondary districts - al-Marada, Central Tripoli, Janzour, and Zaltan – are not assigned individual-based seats and will not have an individual-system ballot.

Since the issuance of Law No 14-2012, several changes have been made to the electoral districts by [Law No 34-2012](#). The secondary districts of Ghat, Tawergha, al-Khoms al-Madina, Bani Walid, and Gasr al-Khayar will no longer be voting for party-based seats. The secondary district of al-Marada was created, but given no individual-based seats. An individual-based seat was taken from al-Jufra secondary district and given to neighboring Sirte. The secondary district of Zuwara and Zaltan was separated into two districts, as was the secondary district of al-Jamayl and Ragdalin. This brings the total number of districts to 73; 19 of which are without party-based ballots and four without individual-based ballots. The remaining 50 districts will have both kinds of ballots.

Electoral districts are nearly divided along the traditional boundaries of the three regions of the nation: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica in the East, and Fezzan in the South. Only one electoral district – District 5, Sirte – is divided between two regions. Seats are, thus, allocated to each of Libya's three regions roughly based on population: 35 seats for Fezzan, 60 seats for Cyrenaica, and 105 seats for Tripolitania.⁸ This formulation has been opposed by federalists in the East, a fringe group that is boycotting the elections and calling for eastern autonomy. Less than a week before elections, armed protestors ransacked the offices of the HNEC in Benghazi and Tobruk to protest Cyrenaica's alleged marginalization. Armed militias have also blocked the country's main highway, demanding a greater share of seats in the Congress. The NTC, however, believes it has already conceded to the East's demands by establishing equal representation for all three regions in the Constituent Assembly, as explained above.

VOTER REGISTRATION

Criteria

In accordance with NTC Law No. 4-2012, any Libyans meeting several criteria are eligible to vote in the coming election. They must be Libyan nationals at least 18 years of age who enjoy full legal competence, are registered in the national voter registry, and have not been “convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, unless rehabilitated.” In addition, members of official military institutions are not eligible to vote.

⁸ This is assuming that Sirte's four party-based seats are divided equally between Fezzan and Tripolitania, the two regions where it lies. The secondary districts in Sirte are divided along the historical regions' borders, thus leaving three of the primary district's individual-based seats to Tripolitania and two to Fezzan.

Registration

Voter registration for the election took place in Libya between May 1 and May 21 at 1548 registration centers. Originally scheduled to take two weeks, the registration period was extended for an additional week to accommodate the response of potential voters. Over 2.8 million Libyans registered to vote, representing an estimated 80 percent of those eligible. According to the High National Elections Commission, approximately 45 percent of those registered to vote are women.⁹

Challenges for IDPs and Minority Groups

Internally displaced persons coming from several districts, including Beni Walid, Tawergha, Misrata, and Yafran, were allowed to register to vote in designated centers in six districts – Benghazi, Sirte, Sabha, Gharyan, al-Khoms, and Tripoli. 14,104 displaced persons registered to vote, 7,087 of whom are women.¹⁰ As displaced persons and nomadic groups have trouble providing proper documentation to prove Libyan nationality (either a passport or a family book, which provides a family history for Libyan individuals), they may have experienced widespread disenfranchisement. In one instance, over 1,000 Tebu in southern Libya were determined to be ineligible to vote because they lacked valid proof of their Libyan identity.¹¹

Out-of-Country Registration

Out-of-country registration and voting, while under the regulation and jurisdiction of the High Commission, is being implemented with the aid of the International Organization for Migration. Registration and voting will take place in six countries – Canada, Germany, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. While voters do not have to reside in these countries in order to register or vote, they must register and vote in person and may not vote by proxy, thus presenting a difficulty for those who do not reside in these six countries but wish to vote. Unlike in-country registration, out-of-country registration will occur concurrently with the voting process, lasting five days and ending on the day of in-country voting. Out-of-country voters are eligible to register in any electoral constituency they desire.

CANDIDATE AND PARTY REGISTRATION

Criteria

The NTC's electoral law also establishes the criteria for candidates for the elections. In addition to meeting the requirements set for voters, candidates must be at least 21 years of age and fully fluent in reading and writing. Members of the NTC and interim government, former members of the Executive Office or chairpersons of local councils, and members of the High National Elections Commission (and its subcommittees and polling center committees) are not eligible to be candidates. In addition, candidates must meet national standards as determined by the NTC in its Decision No. 192-2011. In practical terms, this translates into receiving approval from the High Commission on the Application of Standards of Integrity and Patriotism (see section below).

A draft of the electoral law published in January originally had the age of candidacy set at 25 and prohibited candidates from holding dual nationality; both stipulations were amended. The draft version also laid out certain criteria concerning members of the former regime, which would later be moved to the mandate for the High Commission on the Application of Standards of Integrity and Patriotism.

⁹ "Voter Statistics from the Registration Period May 1-21." High National Elections Commission. 18 June 2012. <http://www.hnec.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=146>

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Grant, George. "Kufra election boycott going ahead as 1,000 Tebu are barred from vote." Libya Herald. 4 July 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/kufra-election-boycott-going-ahead-as-1000-tebu-are-disbarred-from-vote/>

Registration Period

Candidate and party registration for the elections opened concurrently with voter registration, taking place between May 1 and May 17. During this period, 2,639 candidates registered for the individual-based system, and 142 parties running 1,266 candidates registered for the list-based system. Due to the rules on placement of women in the party lists, 44 percent of candidates on party lists were women. Only 3 percent of individual candidates who registered for candidacy were women, meaning that approximately 17 percent of all candidates submitted were women.¹² The High Commission published preliminary lists of candidates and parties on May 22. During a period of 48 hours after posting these lists, the public was able to challenge the candidacy of any candidate or party; due to a lack of advertising, the public appears not to have utilized this option.

THE HIGH COMMISSION ON THE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS OF INTEGRITY AND PATRIOTISM

Per NTC Decision No. 192-2011, which establishes the national standards of integrity and patriotism concerning members of the former regime, the NTC passed [Law No. 26-2012](#) establishing an independent commission to determine the eligibility of candidates based on past involvement with Gaddafi's government. The commission, known as the High Commission on the Application of Standards of Integrity and Patriotism or the National Integrity Commission for short, is tasked with determining the suitability of those who hold offices of national importance, such as congress members, ambassadors, ministers, and their deputies. Local commissions may be established to mirror the functions of the national commission.

Some former members of the regime—such as ministers, ambassadors, security and military officers, and popular leaders—may be eligible for candidacy if their allegiance to the revolution prior to March 11, 2011, is unequivocally established. Other regime members—such as Revolutionary Guard officers, revolutionary committee members, those who glorify the ideology of the former regime and the Green Book, former regime business partners, and those implicated in torture in prisons—are forbidden from holding office regardless of when they pledged allegiance to the revolution.

The vetting process undertaken by the National Integrity Commission has been criticized as being overly vague in its criteria for disqualification of candidates.¹³ The process for establishing whether one pledged allegiance to the revolution by the given date is unclear, and the extent to which one must have “joined” the revolution has not been established. Some criteria for disqualification, such as “those known to glorify the former regime,” do not require concrete evidence in order to disqualify the candidate.

Election candidates were required to submit answers to a specific questionnaire as well as a résumé to the commission. After considering the candidates' applications, the commission issued a list of disqualified candidates on June 9, 2012, with 242 candidates (21 of whom were women) disqualified in this round.¹⁴ Ten candidates' applications were returned for not being filled out properly; 12 parties were also disqualified for not running candidates. Candidates then had 48 hours to appeal this decision. Appeals were sent to the judge presiding over the locale in which the voting district where the candidate is registered to run; the judge had 48 hours to issue a ruling on each appeal. The HNEC was then given five days to implement the decision of the court. Inundated with appeals, the HNEC chose to delay elections by 18 days (from June 19 to July 7) to give more time for the appeals process.

¹² “Electoral Briefing.” High National Elections Commission. 31 May 2012.

¹³ “Libya: Amend Vetting Regulations for Candidates, Officials.” Human Rights Watch. 28 April 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/28/libya-amend-vetting-regulations-candidates-officials>

¹⁴ “Final candidate figures for National Conference elections revealed.” Libya Herald. 18 June 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/final-candidate-figures-for-national-conference-elections-revealed/>

On June 18, the HNEC issued a final list of candidates. 82 candidates (6 of whom were women) successfully appealed, thus leaving 150 candidates disqualified.¹⁵ The final list of candidates contains 3702 candidates – 2500 candidates (of whom 85 are women) for the individual-based seats, and 1202 candidates (of whom 540 are women) running in 130 parties for the list-based seats.

CAMPAIGNING

Campaigning Period

Campaigning officially started on June 18, 2012, although many parties had registered and created websites prior to this date. All campaigning activities must cease 24 hours before election day, thus leaving July 5 as the last day of campaigning. Campaign materials and activities are subject to several restrictions: they may not contain content that incites hatred, violence, or illegal activity, nor may they involve bribery; they must clearly state the candidate or party's name and contact information; campaigning may not occur in houses of worship, education facilities (public or private), government-owned spaces, and military- or police-owned spaces; and campaigning may not intimidate any individual or obstruct other candidates from the campaigning process. [Law No. 37-2012](#), which criminalized glorification of the dictator, attacks on the February 17 revolution, and insults to Islam or the state and its institutions, could also have limited expression during the campaign, but was overturned by the Supreme Court on June 14 after being widely criticized both domestically and internationally.

Financial Limits

Financial ceilings on campaign activities were set by HNEC Regulation No. 85-2012, issued on June 16, 2012. Limits on spending vary based on the population of an electoral district and differ for individual candidates and parties. For individual candidates, limits range between 25,000 – 150,000 Libyan dinars (approx. 19,900 - 119,000 USD), and limits for parties range between 90,000 – 400,000 Libyan dinars (approx. 71,600 - 318,200 USD). While candidates and parties may receive campaign contributions from Libyan sources, all foreign funding of campaigns has been strictly prohibited. Within 15 days of the announcement of the final elections results, all candidates and parties must submit a detailed expenditure and revenue report to the HNEC.

VOTING AND COUNTING PROCESS

In-country voting will take place on July 7, 2012, from 8:00 am to 8:00 pm. If deemed necessary by a polling station's manager, a polling station may be kept open longer to accommodate additional voters. Voters will vote in the same stations where they registered to vote. At the station, they will receive separate ballots for party-based and individual-based voting (where applicable). Voting by proxy or absentee voting is not permissible under Libyan electoral law; however, voters with special needs and illiterate voters are permitted to bring an individual to the polling station to assist them with voting. Once the polling station closes, vote counting will begin immediately in the station. The HNEC will then have 10 days to prepare the final results of the elections and announce the official winners.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

POLITICAL PARTIES

OVERVIEW

Political parties had long been banned and stigmatized in Libya prior to the February 17 revolution. King Idris, Libya's first and only monarch from 1951-1969, outlawed parties after the main opposition party staged protests against the results of the country's first ever parliamentary elections in 1952, which it had expected to win. Three years after Gaddafi overthrew King Idris in a coup in 1969, he reimposed a ban on political parties and opposition groups under a law only repealed by the National Transitional Council (NTC) in early 2012. Gaddafi's Green Book, moreover, which provides the theoretical underpinnings for the leader's idiosyncratic rule, flatly rejects the idea of political parties, arguing that they represent only a segment of society and are thus a "contemporary form of dictatorship." According to Gaddafi's philosophy, even "the mere existence of a parliament means the absence of the people."

The complete absence of political parties, elections, or a popularly elected national parliament has created a uniquely nascent electoral environment that contrasts sharply with that of Tunisia or Egypt. Unlike in these latter countries, where admittedly toothless opposition groups had competed in fraudulent competitions in the past, Libya's parties have not even that experience. In practical terms, this means that networks are being developed in many areas of the country for the first time, and campaigning is taking place among an electorate indoctrinated for decades to be suspicious of political parties. Indeed, a countrywide focus research group conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in April 2012 found that while there has been "a striking improvement in public perceptions of political parties" in recent months, many still express "discomfort with political parties due to the legacy of Gaddafi's propaganda" and "are adamant that political parties have no place in Libya's new politics."¹⁶ This unique set of circumstances will likely produce a 200-member body without any single dominant group.

That said, four parties seem to have distinguished themselves in terms of having national reach and fielding candidates nationwide. That is not to say that those four parties will finish with the largest number of seats, given the lack of any reliable public opinion polling data, but regardless of the raw number of seats attained in the upcoming 200-member body, these groups are worth paying special attention to as they will likely be key power brokers in the next leg of the political transition. These groups will compete explicitly for 80 seats designated for party lists, but have also worked to support individuals loyal to their party for the 120 remaining seats designated for individual candidates.

THE JUSTICE AND CONSTRUCTION PARTY - حزب العدالة والبناء

Leadership: Mohamed Sawan

Number of party-list candidates: 73

In a field of fledgling parties, most observers agree that recently established Justice and Construction Party (JCP) is the best organized – or put differently, the least disorganized. The party was launched by leaders of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, and is widely viewed as the Brotherhood's political party, even though the two are officially independent.¹⁷ The party's strength and organizing capacity owes in large part to the relatively long history of the Brotherhood in Libya.

Though the Muslim Brotherhood's presence can be traced to 1949, the group only began growing in number during the mid-1950s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser's crackdown on political opposition groups brought a flood of Egyptian Brothers westward across the border. King Idris, leader of Libya

¹⁶ "Building Libya." National Democratic Institute. May 2012. <http://www.ndi.org/files/Libya-Focus-Group-May2012.pdf>

¹⁷ This relationship closely mirrors the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the newly-established Freedom and Justice Party there.

at the time, offered members of the group political asylum. Many of these Brotherhood members began teaching at Libyan universities, where they amassed a student following that would, in turn, build a Libyan branch of the Brotherhood in the 1960s. When Gaddafi, who was deeply influenced by Nasser, came to power in 1969 he perceived the Brotherhood as an immediate threat and shut the organization down. Thus, just as the group was evolving into a distinct Libyan movement, it was forced underground, where it would more or less stay, until very recently.

Given this oppressive climate, much of the Libyan Brotherhood's organizational structure was developed outside of the country. For example, in the United States, Brotherhood expatriates established the Islamic Group and began regularly publishing a magazine, *The Muslim*. In the early 1980s the group attempted to reestablish itself in Libya but failed badly; scores of members were thrown in jail and several were executed. In 1998 a similar crackdown ensued; 152 leaders and members were arrested, several reportedly died in custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death.

Only in 2005 and 2006, when Saif al-Islam Gaddafi – Muammar Gaddafi's son – led a reconciliation effort to bring Islamists back into the mainstream under the auspices of the Gaddafi Foundation were the group's members released from prison.¹⁸ Nonetheless, in 2009 one group leader estimated that there were likely only a few thousand members present inside the country.¹⁹

With the eruption of protests in 2011, the Brotherhood quickly mobilized to provide food, aid the wounded, and conduct humanitarian missions. This early participation in the revolution allowed the Brotherhood to establish grassroots networks, which has helped them in their political ambitions.

Following the revolution, in November 2011,²⁰ the Brotherhood held its first national congress in Benghazi. At this point they decided on a political party modeled after the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, wherein membership would be kept separate from the parent organization. Today, party leaders are quick to point out that a majority of their members come from outside of the formal membership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Also like their Egyptian counterparts, a large number of Muslim Brotherhood members hail from the middle and professional class.

A key fault line in Libya's Muslim Brotherhood emerged early on over whether the group should pursue a pan-Islamic agenda or frame itself as a purely nationalist, Libya-first organization. At the group's first national conference in the fall of 2011, speakers called for Islamic solidarity, invited guests from the Free Syrian army, and elected Bashir Kabti—known for his loyalty to the pan-Islamic movement—as the Brotherhood's general representative. By the spring of 2012, however, the Libyan Brotherhood was perceived to have been hurt by its association with its Egyptian counterpart, widely seen within Libya as performing poorly since winning parliamentary elections. Criticism that the organization could end up beholden to the Egyptian Brotherhood and was overly concerned with broader regional issues led the Libyan Brotherhood to use its party's launch to reassert its nationalist credentials, emphasizing a “build Libya first” platform.

The JCP's current president is Mohamed Sawan, formerly the president of the Brotherhood's Shura council and a resident of Misrata. Sawan was part of the infamous 1998 Brotherhood crackdown and spent several years in prison. In an interview with a local Libyan paper, Sawan emphasized the JCP's moderate Islamic values, similar to those of Turkey's Justice and Development party, its strong encouragement of women's participation— including in leadership positions – in the party, and its

¹⁸ Miller, Barbara. “Gaddafi son seeks reconciliation.” *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*. 21 August 2005 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/18235/gaddafi-son-seeks-reconciliation.html>

¹⁹ Ashour, Omar “Libyan Islamists Unpacked: Rise, Transformation, and Future.” *Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing*. May 2012. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2012/5/02%20libya%20ashour/omar%20ashour%20policy%20briefing%20english.pdf>

²⁰ “Libya's Muslim Brotherhood holds their first congress in Benghazi after 25 years.” *Al-Arabiya*. 18 November 2011. <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/18/177829.html>

plain rejection of federalism, noting that “declarations of federalism are not truly democratic.”²¹

Unlike in neighboring countries where the boasting of Islamic credentials is enough to distinguish Islamist parties from their competitors, in Libya, the role of Islam in public life is a foregone conclusion—although the precise manifestation of Islam in the political sphere remains unclear—forcing the Brotherhood to develop positions on other issues while still claiming to be the most authentically Islamic. The party’s platform is centered on four key issues: security and stability, reconciliation with members and supporters of the former regime, the economy, and the curbing of arms proliferation.²² To this end, the party has launched a series of one-minute advertisements that dominate national television, each focused on one specific issue.²³

The JCP is competing for more party-list seats than any other party – 73 out of 80 available. Moreover, the party is also backing many of the individual seat candidates and has even created campaign videos – their party logo conspicuously absent – supporting some of them.²⁴

THE NATIONAL FORCES ALLIANCE - تحالف القوى الوطنية

Leadership: Mahmoud Jibril

Number of party-list candidates: 70

The National Forces Alliance (NFA) is the political entity running the second-largest number of party-list seats in the elections, after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party. Along with the Brotherhood, it is the only national party organized in the less populous southern areas of the country.

The coalition is comprised of 58 political parties contesting 70 of the 80 total seats designated for parties. Like the Brotherhood, the coalition has also openly endorsed independent candidates running in the individual system that it feels have “ideas close to the program of the coalition.”²⁵ Thus, the coalition’s reach appears to extend far beyond the 80 party-specific seats.

A possible testament to the extent of religious conservatism in Libya, the coalition presents itself as a more liberal, progressive option despite openly accepting an Islamic reference to the law. In other words, a group of parties that endorses sharia law is also viewed as a liberal counterweight to the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood party, which the coalition seeks to paint as “extremist.”

Mahmoud Jibril, the face of the coalition and its president, became well known for his work with Libya’s National Economic Development Board, which he headed from 2007 to 2011. In this capacity, Jibril worked closely with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi during a period of liberalization in which the regime was attempting to open up to the west. In a diplomatic cable from 2009 released by Wikileaks, Jibril was described as “a serious interlocutor who ‘gets’ the U.S. perspective.”²⁶ This neoliberal agenda, however, is viewed somewhat suspiciously by the Libyan public and could potentially hurt Jibril.

21 “Dialogue with professor Mohamed Sawan, president of Justice and Construction Party.” Libya Al-Youm. www.aleslaah.net/site/save_pdf.php?id=3008

22 Khan, Umar “Party Profile: Justice & Construction Party.” Libya Herald. 30 June 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/party-profile-justice-construction-party/>

23 “Wings of change capable of imposing security - Justice and Construction.” Web, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImNWSomrrPs&feature=plcp>.

24 Khan, Umar “‘Independent’ individual candidate campaigns with backing of Justice & Construction Party.” Libya Herald. 3 July 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/independent-individual-candidate-campaigns-with-backing-of-justice-construction-party/>

25 “List of independents supported by the coalition.” Official Facebook page for Dr. Mahmoud Jibril. 4 July 2012. <http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=366358140099661&set=a.366357960099679.83732.278685185533624&type=1&theater>

26 “Wikileaks - 09TRIPOLI386” 11 May 2009. <http://46.4.48.8/cablegate/wire.php?id=09TRIPOLI386&search=jibril%20National%20Economic%20Development%20Board>

Jibril was appointed to head the NTC in March 2011 when it first formed.²⁷ He led the opposition government through the end of the revolution, when Sirte was captured by rebel forces, before stepping down.²⁸

Jibril's resignation from the NTC in the fall of 2011 is seen by many as having been a politically savvy move, as he is now attempting to distance himself and his coalition from the increasingly unpopular ruling body.

Perhaps in part because of Jibril's experience in economic development, the coalition's platform goes into greater detail on economic issues than most other parties. The NFA favors the creation of special economic zones to encourage trade and investment. While against federalism, the coalition strongly supports the decentralization of certain areas of governance such as education, healthcare and transportation. The NFA also proposes a proportion of taxes collected specifically for local councils to utilize as they see fit.

The challenge for Jibril will be to keep his unwieldy coalition of diverse parties unified; many worry that he promised more than he can deliver to persuade parties to enter his coalition and is now struggling to assert control, particularly over the number of candidates running for each seat.

Once in the GNC, Jibril's coalition will attain additional strength from its alliance – coordinated before the elections – with the party of popular figure Ali Tarhuni. Tarhouni, a long-serving professor of economics at the University of Washington prior to the revolution, served as the NTC's minister for oil and finance until the end of the war.²⁹ Departing the NTC just after Jibril, Tarhouni criticized the incoming government appointed by Abdurrahim el-Keib – former member of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya – as elitist, unrepresentative, and supported by foreign powers.³⁰ In the fall of 2012 Tarhouni launched the National Centrist Party, which, though not formally part of Jibril's coalition, shares many of its values.

Finally, while Jibril and Tarhouni can serve as leaders for their coalition and party respectively, each are barred from contesting seats in the election, as former members of the NTC are legally prohibited from running.

THE HOMELAND PARTY - حزب الوطن

Leadership: Abdel Hakim Belhaj and Ali al-Salabi

Number of party-list candidates: 59

The Homeland Party (sometimes translated “The Nation Party”), is the brainchild of two of Libya's most prominent Islamists, Abdel Hakim Belhaj and Ali al-Salabi. Running for 59 of the 80 total party seats, it ranks as the fourth largest party.

Belhaj was an early leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), formed in the early 1990s by Libyans who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. The group dedicated itself to the violent overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, attempting and failing at several assassination attempts in the 1990s. Following the events of 9/11, the U.S. labeled the LIFG as an international terrorist organization. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report suggested this may have been a gesture of “solidarity” with the Libyan regime, with whom the U.S. was trying to work more closely on terrorism-related

27 “Libyan air force ‘no longer exists.’” Al Jazeera. 23 March 2011. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201132316258646677.html>

28 “Libya's NTC names interim prime minister.” Al Jazeera. 1 November 2011. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011103118460574109.html>

29 Fisher, Max “Ali Tarhouni” The Atlantic. November 2011. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/11/ali-tarhouni/8670/>

30 Gera, Vanessa. “Tarhouni criticizes Libya's new leaders as ‘elite.’” Seattle Times. 25 November 2011. http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/20116858875_libya26.html

issues.³¹ In a recent op-ed in *The Guardian*, Belhaj recounts how he “spent seven years in prison, where [he] was tortured” after being handed over to the Qaddafi regime by CIA agents.³²

In November 2007, Al Qaeda leaders Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al Libi announced the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, but LIFG leaders publicly refuted this claim in 2009, expressing their support for the negotiations with the Libyan regime.

Like the Brotherhood, LIFG entered into dialogue with Seif Qaddafi, which ultimately led to a 2009 agreement in which the LIFG renounced violence against the Libyan state in exchange for the release of 40 LIFG prisoners. Belhaj, himself, was released in 2010. Ali al-Salabi, widely viewed as Libya’s most influential Islamist scholar, and the party’s other household name, played a key role in these negotiations when Saif al-Islam Gaddafi recruited him to serve as a mediator between the regime and LIFG.

During the revolution, Belhaj served as head of Tripoli’s military council. Although many Libyans were surprised by his appointment as rebels reported that he was not present during the fall of Qaddafi’s compound and arrived only in time to deliver a victory speech.³³ On May 15, 2012, Belhaj resigned from this post in order to work on building The Homeland Party with al-Salabi, which officially launched on June 2, 2012.³⁴

Both Belhaj and al-Salabi have publicly denounced extremism and consider themselves moderate Islamists. Their party, though often considered the “conservative” party relative to the other big four, reflects this moderation – an unveiled female candidate tops the party’s list in Benghazi.³⁵ When asked in a television interview on June 1, 2012, about whether the party’s Islamism is characterized as being close to that of the Brotherhood’s, Salafists, or otherwise, Belhaj responded by explaining the party did not adhere to any specific ideology, but was rather generally interested in an Islamic reference that was open to all groups.³⁶ That being said, Al-Watan has floated the same names for their candidates to the constituent assembly as the Brotherhood, suggesting that these parties may interact closely after the elections.

Thus, although the party openly characterizes itself as Islamist, it also describes itself as an inclusive religious party with a progressive approach. Its platform calls for an inclusive constitution, decentralization, national reconciliation, an independent judiciary and the formation of a national army.

Of the major national parties, The Homeland Party was the last to get off the ground.³⁷ Despite this late start, the party may find success with voters looking for an Islamist party but distrustful of the Brotherhood. Of note, just as Mahmoud Jibril has attempted to refer to Islamist groups as extremists, al-Salabi has called Jibril an “extreme secularist” who could very well guide the country into “a new era of tyranny and dictatorship.”³⁸

31 Blanchard, Christopher “Libya: Background and U.S. Relations” Congressional Research Service. 16 July 2010. <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2617.pdf>

32 Belhaj, Abdel Hakim. “The revolution belongs to all Libyans, secular or not” *The Guardian*. 27 September 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/27/revolution-belongs-to-all-libyans>

33 Omar, Manal. “Libya: Rebuilding from Scratch” *The Islamists Are Coming*, Chapter 6 <http://theislamistsarecoming.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/node/23183>

34 Khan, Umar “Media event for The Nation Party on 2 June” *Libya Herald*. 28 May 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/media-event-for-the-nation-party-on-2-june/>

35 “Homeland Party List, Benghazi” Official Facebook page for Homeland Party. 20 June 2012. <http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=375994189121053&set=a.322106757843130.85473.312497195470753&type=1&theater>

36 “Explicitly: With Abd al-Hakim Belhaj.” YouTube. 7 June 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8RWklp-eN44>

37 “Founding of The Homeland Party.” YouTube. 2 June 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBChoj3ZfXk>

38 McDonnell, Patrick. “Libyan rebel factions showing fissures.” *Denver Post*. 14 September 2011. http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_18888312

THE NATIONAL FRONT PARTY - حزب الجبهة الوطنية**Leadership: Mohamed Magariaf****Number of party-list candidates: 45 candidates**

The National Front Party is the political entity of the now-dissolved National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), an opposition group formed in exile in the early 1980s for the express purpose of overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi.

Much like the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction party, the National Front Party brings with it the advantage of organizational history in a country where this is rare. While accepting an Islamic reference to the law – much like almost every other party – the Front frames itself as a nationalist rather than Islamist party. Many of the party's founding members were initially part of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s.

The party's true advantage may come from being able to credibly claim that it never worked with the previous regime.

The party's current president, Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf, is widely popular even outside party circles. Magariaf was Libya's ambassador to India before resigning out of disagreement with the regime. It was at this point, in 1981, that Magariaf led the effort to form the NFSL.

Today, the party may be looked upon suspiciously for having worked with foreign intelligence agencies, but in the 1980s foreign support was a critical aspect of its development. The organization initially received assistance from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia – each of which, for various reasons, took a keen interest in seeing Gaddafi overthrown – while Sudan allowed the group to use its country as a base of operations for the first four years of its existence. The group formally announced its launch from Khartoum in October of 1981.

During this period, a series of terrorist attacks launched on American targets abroad and connected to the Gaddafi regime became a cause of increasing concern for the Reagan administration. Thus, the NFSL was quickly viewed as a tool for the administration to overthrow Gaddafi. With alleged CIA support and operating out of Sudan, the NFSL plotted its 1984 assassination attempt, an assault on Gaddafi's family compound in Tripoli. The effort failed and Gaddafi ultimately escaped untouched. The group's dealings with the CIA, however, would continue. Most famously, members were trained across the border at a base in Chad for anti-Gaddafi operations in the late 1980s.³⁹

As the group entered the twenty-first century, military operations against the regime gave way to less hostile tactics – namely, media campaigns from abroad. In 2005 and 2006, when Saif al-Islam Gaddafi reached out to exiled individuals to return to Libya – successfully bringing back members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – the NLSF conspicuously did not take part, instead maintaining their stance of total opposition.

The National Front Party was launched at a Benghazi conference in May 2012 with NFSL leader Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf elected president.⁴⁰ The party is fielding 45 candidates, 22 of whom are female. It presents itself as an inclusive, liberal and progressive party, focusing on many of the same issues as the other major parties. As listed in a recent profile by the *Libya Herald*, these issues include “the development of institutional democracy, national reconciliation, justice, good governance, the role of women in the country and improving Libya's economic infrastructure.”⁴¹ Of all the main parties, the National Front has been most explicit about working in coalition with other groups.

³⁹ For sources discussing CIA history with NFSL see Baker, Russ “Is General Khalifa Hifter the CIA's Man in Libya?” Business Insider. 22 April 2011 http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-04-22/politics/30085091_1_libyan-leader-moammar-gadhafi-rebel-army-qaddafi and Adams, Chris “Libyan rebel leader spent much of past 20 years in suburban Virginia” 26 March 2011.

⁴⁰ Khan, Umar. “National Front to Elect New Leadership on May 9.” *Libya Herald*. 28 April 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/national-front-to-elect-new-leadership-on-9-may/> See also “Announcement on Foundation of National Front Party.” YouTube. 8 May 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4WL8UXiAPA>

⁴¹ Khan, Umar. “Party Profile: The National Front.” *Libya Herald*. 30 June 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/party-profile-the-national-front/>

The party's stronghold is believed to be in the east. It has shown strength in the west as well, however, having won key positions in recent local elections in Misrata. The party is also said to be popular among the Imazighen, or Berber, population, estimated to comprise 5 to 10 percent of the population.⁴²

Potential threats to the party include ties to the interim government, which has grown increasingly unpopular. The current Prime Minister Abdurrehim Al Keib and his Deputy Mustafa Abu Shugur were affiliated with the NFSL while in exile. Moreover, the group was an adamant supporter of the National Transitional Council (NTC) early on. Shortly after its formation, it used its international connections to lobby other countries to recognize the NTC.

OTHER PARTIES

Other than the four major parties listed above, a handful of lesser-known, though still well-represented parties have emerged and may take a considerable number of seats away from the larger parties.

The Union for Homeland Party, led by long-time anti-Gaddafi critic Abdul Rahman Swehli, is fielding an impressive 60 candidates and is expected to do particularly well in Tripoli, where Swehli resides. In September of 2011, a major campaign based out of Misrata lobbied for Swehli to be chosen as the next Prime Minister of the NTC.⁴³ Like Mahmoud Jibril's Coalition of National Forces, Swehli's party is comprised of a wide array of different groups. Its slogan, "new Libya, new faces," can be interpreted as a direct attack on groups and individuals who are considered too close to the previous regime, particularly Mahmoud Jibril, whom the party's members have publicly criticized in the past.

The Party of National Development and Welfare, competing for 50 seats, frames itself as a liberal party with an Islamic reference.⁴⁴ The party's leader, Ali Zidan, served as a foreign representative for the NTC and was part of a successful effort to get the EU and France to recognize the rebel government. Unlike most other major party leaders, Zidan comes from the Fezzan region of the country, specifically the central city of Waddan.

The National Centrist Party, competing for 43 seats, is yet another moderate Islamist party. Among its most prominent members is Sami Mustafa Al-Saadi, a formerly jailed Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member.⁴⁵ The party has been described as the "political wing of the LIFG."

The National Rally for Justice and Democracy, a party largely based in Benghazi, is one of the few competitive youth-based groups to emerge. Its platform is highlighted by a general concern for building civil society institutions.

Beyond these parties, a long list of political entities with shorter geographical reach has also emerged. Given local and tribal affiliations, these smaller parties may prove competitive – particularly in the south, where even the largest parties are less organized.

⁴² Lane, Edwin. "After Gaddafi, Libya's Amazigh demand recognition." *BBC*. 23 December 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16289543>

⁴³ Allam, Hannah. "Misrata demand for leading role in transition roiling Libya's politics." *McClatchy*. 24 September 2011. <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/24/125149/battered-libyan-city-demands-leading.html>

⁴⁴ "Ali Zidan." *Akhbar Alaan TV*. 14 April 2012. <http://akhbar.alaan.tv/video/alaan-reports/Ali-Zeidan/>

⁴⁵ "United Kingdom." *Amnesty International*. 2012. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/uk/report-2012>

Also worth mentioning are those groups conspicuously absent from the electoral picture; there are three in particular. The first are Salafists, who, though often described as strong in the east, have failed to coalesce around any single party or group. It is unclear which major party, if any, these Islamists are most likely to support. This does not account for the fact that Salafists may take any number of the 120 individual-based seats.

The second absentee group is those aligned with the Barqa Military Council, who in early March declared the eastern region a semi-autonomous state.⁴⁶ Though many have called for decentralization, none of the major parties have adopted a federalist stance even approaching that of the Barqa Council. Even in the east, moreover, this hard-line stance on federalism appears to be a minority view.⁴⁷

Finally, an extremely common sentiment among Libyan youth is a feeling of marginalization from the political process. While Libyan youth made up a majority of rebel fighters during the revolution, the major parties today are dominated by the country's older generation. To push back against this trend, several youth-led parties have been formed. Among these are the Centrist Youth Current, Youth Voice Gathering, and the Libyan Youth Party. These parties appear to be less organized than the major parties, and it is unclear whether any of these parties will have significant success in the elections.

⁴⁶ al-Shaheibi, Rami. "Libya Barqa Region Declared Semiautonomous." 6 March 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/06/libya-barqa-region_n_1323875.html

⁴⁷ "UPDATE 2-In eastern Libya, a push for more autonomy from Tripoli." Reuters. 5 May 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/libya-east-federalism-idUSL5E8E5A2O20120305>

APPENDIX A: LIST OF LAWS & DECISIONS

This list is not meant to be a comprehensive list of laws. All translations are unofficial unless otherwise noted and are not to be used for legal purposes.

Law No 2-2012 Annuling the Criminalization of Political Parties ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 3-2012 Establishing the High National Elections Commission ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 4-2012 on the Elections of the General National Congress ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 14-2012 Establishing Electoral Constituencies ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 26-2012 on the Integrity Commission ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 28-2012 Amending Law No 4-2012 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 29-2012 on Political Parties ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 31-2012 Amending Law No 3-2012 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 34-2012 Amending Law No 14-2012 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 37-2012 Criminalizing Glorification of the Tyrant ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 43-2012 Amending Law No 30-2012 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 44-2012 Amending Law No 3-2012 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Law No 53-2012 Amending Law No 26-2012 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

National Transitional Council Decision No 13-2012 Assigning Members of the HNEC ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

National Transitional Council Decision No 16-2012 Assigning Members of the Integrity Commission ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

National Transitional Council Decision No 35-2012 Assigning Members of the HNEC ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

National Transitional Council Decision No 42-2012 Assigning Members of the HNEC ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Constitutional Declaration of August 2011 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

Constitutional Amendment No 1-2012 Amending Article 30 ([English](#) | [Arabic](#))

APPENDIX B: CHART OF ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES

Primary District Number	Primary District Name	Sub-District Name	Number of Party-Based Seats	Secondary District Number	Secondary District Name	Number of Individual-Based Seats
1	Tobruk	-	5	1	Tobruk	3
				2	al-Quba	1
				3	al-Derna	2
2	al-Bayda	-	5	4	Shahat	1
				5	al-Bayda	2
				6	al-Marj	2
				7	Gasr-Libya	1
3	Benghazi	-	11	8	Benghazi	9
				9	al-Tokra	2
				10	al-Abyar	2
				11	Qimimis	1
				12	Suluq	1
4	Ajdabiya	-	3	13	Ajdabiya	4
				14	al-Brega	1
				15	Jalu, Awjila, Jikharra	1
				16	Tazirbu	1
				17	al-Kufra	2
				-	al-Marada	0
5	Sirte & al-Jufra	-	4	18	Sidra	1
				19	al-Sirte	3
				20	al-Jufra	1
6	Sabha & al-Shati	Sabha	5	21	Sabha	4
		al-Shati	4	22	al-Shati - Brak	1
				23	al-Shati - al-Qorda	1
				24	al-Shati - Idri	1
7	Ubari & Marzuq	Ubari	4	25	Ubari	2
		-	0	26	Ghat	2
		Marzuq	3	27	Marzuq	4

APPENDIX B: CHART OF ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES, CONTINUED

Primary District Number	Primary District Name	Sub-District Name	Number of Party-Based Seats	Secondary District Number	Secondary District Name	Number of Individual-Based Seats
8	Gharyan	-	0	28	Gharyan	3
				29	al-Asabiya	1
				30	Kikla & al-Qalaa	1
				31	Yafran	1
				32	al-Riyayana	1
				33	al-Rahibat	1
				34	al-Rajiban	1
				35	Jadu	1
				36	al-Zintan	2
				37	Mizda	1
				38	Nalut	1
				39	Batn al-Jabal	1
				40	Kabaw	1
41	Ghadamas	1				
9	Misrata	-	0	42	Tawergha	1
		Misrata	4	43	Misrata	4
		-	0	44	Bani Walid	2
		Zliten	3	45	Zliten	2
10	Khoms	Khoms	3	46	Tarhuna	2
				47	Maslata	1
				48	Coastal Khoms	2
		-	0	49	City Khoms	2
		50	Gasr Khiyar	1		
11	Tripoli	Castelverde, Tajoura, & Souq al-Jumaa	3	51	Castelverde (al-Gara Bulli)	1
				52	Tajoura	2
				53	Souq al-Jumaa	4
		Central Tripoli	3	-	Central Tripoli	0
		al-Andalus District	3	54	al-Andalus District	3
		Abu Selim & Ein Zara	4	55	Abu Selim	2
				56	Ein Zara	2
Janzour	3	-	Janzour	0		

APPENDIX B: CHART OF ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES, CONTINUED

Primary District Number	Primary District Name	Sub-District Name	Number of Party-Based Seats	Secondary District Number	Secondary District Name	Number of Individual-Based Seats
12	al-Aziziya	-	3	57	al-Maya	1
				58	al-Nasseriya	1
				59	al-Aziziya	1
				60	Suani Bin Adam	1
				61	Gasr Bin Ghashir	1
				62	Emsihel, Sa'eh, al-Sabaiya	1
13	al-Zawiya	al-Zawiya	4	63	al-Zawiya	4
		Sorman, Sabrata, al-Ajaylat, Zuwara & Zaitan, al-Jamayl, and Ragdalin	3	64	Sorman	1
				65	Sabrata	1
				66	al-Ajaylat	1
				67	Zuwara	1
				68	al-Jumayl	1
				69	Ragdalin	1
		-	Zaltan	0		