Newsletter - November 2006
POMED Updates
Two weeks ago we held our latest event titled, "Sectarianism or Civil Rights: Reform in the Gulf". Speakers John Duke Anthony and Joe Stork discussed sectarianism in Iraq and the Gulf. Stork focused his remarks on the permissive conditions that enable sectarian violence such as resource competition and insecurity. Anthony agreed but chose to focus on the fear and lack of communication that often correlates with sectarianism.
POMED
was covered in the Arab press when POMED Associate Shadi
Hamid was featured in an interview
with al-Masri al-Youm,
the only independent daily Arabic paper in Egypt. He also
published
a piece
on “the failure of Arab democracy” for Qahwa
Sada, a
new “blog-journal” on Middle East politics
and society, edited by Professor Marc Lynch.
Our next event will be held in early December and will
examine the effect of China's rising influence in the
Middle East as both an alternative market for oil and
political counterwieght to the United States. What role
is China seeking to play in the region? What will China's
influence mean for the United States' purported "democracy
agenda" in the Middle East?
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Legislative Update
The
final legislative session of the year before November
elections was dominated by hot-button legislation and
efforts to pass resolutions to provide ongoing funding
for federal agencies in the absence of approved budgets.
In this context, one bill was passed and signed into law
that holds great significance for US democracy promotion
policy: The
Iran Freedom and Support Act
(IFSA). That bill renews sanctions against the Iranian
regime, provides funds for organizations within Iran working
for democratic change, and threatens to adjust relations
with countries that aid Iran in its pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction or destabilizing amounts of other
technologies. It also discontinues sanctions against Libya
in recognition of its discontinuation of WMD programs.
Many have noted
the similarities
between IFSA and the Iraq
Liberation Act
of 1998, which laid the groundwork for U.S. invasion in
2003.
With sanctions on Iran laid out in the 1996 bill the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
(ILSA) and its 2001
extension
set to expire September 29th, Congress was
given a powerful incentive to enact new legislation governing
America's relations with that country. Earlier legislation
sponsored by Rep.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL) passed the House in April. However the Senate version
of that bill, sponsored by Sen.
Rick Santorum
(R-PA), was stalled
by White House complaints
that it bound the Administration's hands in its negotiations
with Iran. The final bill asks less of the White House
in terms of reporting to Congress and allows the President
to provide waivers for entities engaged in business with
the regime if such an action is deemed "vital to
the national security interests of the United States."
In the end, the bill was re-introduced by Rep. Ros-Lehtinen
and Sen. Santorum, passed with mere voice votes in each
chamber, and signed into law in just 4 days. With elections
near at hand, few were willing to oppose the thrust of
the measure, lest they appear weak on national security.
Dissenters from the bill mainly argued that it disrupted
ongoing nuclear negotiations. Rep.
Earl Blumenauer,
for example, echoed the objections of Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to an earlier version of the bill when
he labeled
the measure
a "cruise missile aimed at a difficult diplomatic
effort just as they are reaching their most sensitive
point." Given the political risk of opposing a measure
so laden with national security significance five weeks
before an election, there was little debate of the attendant
questions for democracy promotion: Can the goals of non-proliferation
and democratization be advanced simultaneously? Can America
strengthen the position of moderates and democratic reformers
in a nation without first assuring the nation is under
no threat of military attack? Can democracy be promoted
in a confrontational manner: that is, by funding organizations
within a nation bent on regime change against the will
of the existing regime?
Following mid-term elections November 7th,
Congress is expected to return on November 9th
for a lame-duck session. The length and policy direction
of such a session will be determined by the midterm election
results. Among other measures Congress may consider are
the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006
and 2007, the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science,
State, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007,
and the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2007.
America's Impact on Middle East Reform
Egypt: An Atomic Mistake
by Rashad Mahmood
Coverage of Egypt's recent decision to actively pursue the development of nuclear power has focused on fears of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. However, what has gone under-analyzed are the implications for US policy of its rapid and eager support for Egypt's announcement.
Looking at the issue from a political reform perspective, it seems like a missed opportunity. Despite the power and influence of the United States, it has relatively few points of leverage on its authoritarian allies aside from drastic measures such as cutting or increasing aid, or weaker ones like public diplomacy. It is when countries want something from the US that it can work towards concessions. Indeed, the US is currently doing just that with the US-Egypt free trade agreement which is indefinitely on hold due to lack of progress on political reform in Egypt.
Mubarak's decision to revive Egypt's nuclear program provided a perfect opportunity for the US to ask for some small, tangible, reforms as a price for their acceptance of a nuclear Egypt. However, they chose to embrace the decision immediately, seemingly giving something away for nothing. The situation is similar to Libya's decision to pursue rapprochement with the US in 2005. This was the topic of POMED's first event and one of the points repeatedly raised by both speakers was the missed opportunity to work towards political reform in Libya. At that panel, Dr. Michele Dunne said, "My concern is that the relationship is being established and conducted without enough regard for developments inside Libya itself, particularly as regards human rights and prospects for reform, particularly political reform and legal reform."
Of course, pure realists might argue that any delay in accepting the decision would merely drive a larger wedge in the US-Egypt relationship at a time when Egyptian cooperation is needed more than ever. However, it appears that despite the US administration's enthusiasm for their program, Egypt will probably be turning to Russia and China as sources for its nuclear technology. How does this benefit US interests?
How best to promote genuine democracy and political reform is a genuinely difficult question for the US. However, blowing easy opportunities like this indicate that it is sinking lower and lower on the administration's priority list.
Rashad Mahmood is Vice Chair and co-founder of the Project on Middle East Democracy. He is currently a Senior Economic Researcher at the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt.
US Policy: Downplaying
Democracy Promotion
By David DeBartolo
Journalists and commentators have argued that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's vocal support for "moderate" forces during her recent trip to the Middle East signaled the end of this administration's democracy promotion agenda.
That may be slightly overstating the case; President Bush and Secretary Rice have not entirely abandoned their rhetorical support for democracy. But there appears to have been a distinct and dangerous shift in the administration's priorities. Whereas previous visits to the region featured firm and bold statements of America's support for freedom, on this trip Secretary Rice mentioned reform and democracy almost reluctantly.
The shift in priorities away from democracy was most sharply seen in Cairo. In June 2005, Secretary Rice made a groundbreaking speech at the American University in Cairo, calling for Egypt's emergency law to be replaced, for opposition groups to have the right to assemble and participate, and for parliamentary voting to occur "without violence or intimidation." In a press conference that same day, Egypt's foreign minister listed the topics that Rice had addressed with President Mubarak; in her opening statement, Rice pointedly added Egyptian reform, which the foreign minister had omitted from the list.
But this past month, in her opening remarks with the Egyptian foreign minister, Secretary Rice spoke of the many regional issues she had discussed with Egypt's leaders – and said not a word about democracy or political reform. Similarly, when a television reporter asked Rice on another occasion about the purpose of her visit, her answer mentioned strengthening "moderate Palestinian forces" but neither reform nor democracy.
When journalist Barbara Slavin asked Rice about Ayman Nour's continued imprisonment and retrogression of political reform in Egypt, the result was downright embarrassing. Secretary Rice offered a bland statement that the U.S. was still interested in reform, expressed only mild disappointment with the 2005 parliamentary elections (during which voters were violently prevented from voting for the opposition), and praised the "competitive" presidential elections. She added, "I've spoken about Ayman Nour at each time that I meet with my Egyptian counterparts." The Egyptian foreign minister hung her out to dry by replying, "You didn't raise it today," to which Rice weakly responded, "I will Ahmed. I'm certain. You can be certain I will."
President Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 19 laid the groundwork for the subtle switch in the administration's regional priorities. The president spoke of a struggle between "extremists who use terror as a weapon to create fear" and "moderate people who work for peace." After defining the struggle, Bush stated that "We must stand with democratic leaders and moderate reformers across the broader Middle East." By linking "moderate" with "reformers," Bush appeared to uphold his expressed commitment to democracy; the administration would stand only with moderates actively pursuing democratic reform.
Alas, the embrace of "moderate reformers" was short-lived. In the penultimate paragraph, the previous narrow term "moderate reformers" became "moderates and reformers," as the president said, "America has made its choice: We will stand with the moderates and reformers." The difference is far from trivial; the president could easily have said, "We will stand with the moderate reformers." Instead, by choosing to stand with both moderates and reformers, reform subtly became an option rather than a necessity.
In response to questions on the trip, faint hints of the older reform rhetoric appeared. The secretary had a scheduled "democracy discussion" with Arab newspapers, but her opening remarks were brief and banal. In response to the by-now-expected question of whether democracy had slipped from the top of America's agenda, Rice reaffirmed that the U.S. still supported democracy in the region as the only path to long-term stability. But this trip was focused squarely on short-term stability rather than the courageous and visionary goal of democracy.
In another television interview on the trip, Secretary Rice outlined her agenda, stressing strengthening the region's moderate forces. As she finished, she added, "I look forward to talking with [President Mubarak] also about how the domestic situation here is evolving, the reforms. But it's a full agenda and it's always a full agenda." We must ensure that supporting democracy in the Middle East is first, not last, on America's policy agenda.
David DeBartolo is a Fulbright fellow in Jordan, and is co-founder and chair of the Project on Middle East Democracy.
Demographic Gulfs and Democratization in the
Arab Khaleej
By Arif Rafiq
This week, Qatar hosted the Sixth Annual Conference on New and Restored Democracies. Like its fellow Gulf Coordinating Council (GCC) members, the tiny kingdom is neither a new nor a restored democracy. There is, however, strong indication that its leadership is fairly committed to the evolutionary development of a democratic polity.
This project involves the introduction of local government elections in 2003 and parliamentary elections in 2007; the creation of an environment with a relatively free and open press—a scene animated mostly by the Al-Jazeera Network; and the comprehensive overhaul of its educational system to better develop critical thinking skills, encourage creativity, and provide basic proficiency with the liberal arts and sciences.
The democratic future of Qatar looks bright in comparison with other GCC members. In addition to its progressive reforms, Qatar has no serious equivalent of Bahrain's sectarian divisions or Saudi Arabia's institutionalized and oppositional religious extremism. The optimism that colors discussions of Qatar's democratization attempts, however, is somewhat excessive. All GCC members, including Qatar, face a common long-term and underappreciated obstacle to democratization: the presence of and dependency upon large numbers of foreign workers.
Qatar's democratic reforms only target a minority of its population. A majority of Qatar's population—approximately 70%—consists of non-citizens, most of who are from South Asia. The situation in the United Arab Emirates is more extreme, with foreigners consisting 80-85% of the population. Foreigners make up 60% of residents in Kuwait and between 20-35% in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.
Naturalization throughout the GCC is nearly impossible and currently impractical in any meaningful number. All Gulf countries have policies of labor force indigenization (e.g. Saudization), but their effects have largely been superficial. These programs have exacerbated human resource inefficiency in the public sector and, to a lesser degree, the private sector, as they amount to quota systems for largely underqualified and underperforming natives. Blue-collar labor is off limits to most natives of the GCC.
As a result, the region's foreign laborers will remain fixtures for the coming decades. Concurrently, majorities and large minorities in GCC countries will be permanently excluded from political participation. This issue will become distinct and problematic should political rights for natives increase and high levels of labor abuse and exploitation prevail.
The potential demographic-democratic divide in the Arab Gulf is the product of a variety of factors: the abundance of capital, shortage of skilled and unskilled labor, tribal conceptions of citizenship and identity, and native inhibitions toward demanding labor. Despite its complexity, the emerging problem can be prevented. Gulf Coordinating Council members should begin to think of creative ways to slowly politically integrate migrant populations—short of citizenship—in concert with the opening of political participation for natives.
Examples of such measures for foreign residents can include: reserved, elected seats in legislative bodies; special elected councils; designation of a special minister for foreign resident affairs, and permission to vote in local elections. Qatar and other GCC members have begun to change local conceptions of citizenship and civic involvement; however, it is also in their interest to integrate foreign resident populations in these plans and form a healthy relationship between natives and the sizable, if not greater, foreign migrant population.
Washington has been relatively active in its criticism of worker exploitation and forced labor in the Gulf. In a 2005 report the state department grouped Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates into the same category as Burma and Cuba for human rights violations. Congress is also aware of the issues and nearly voted down the recent US-Oman Free Trade Agreement, partly because of human rights concerns. However, despite the increased concern for human rights, the administration is still mostly ignoring the restricted freedoms and political repression in the Gulf countries.
Unskilled foreign laborers in the region lack an advocate and institutionalized means of redress. Their countries of origin depend greatly on exporting labor and are unwilling to anger host countries whose huge development projects are enabled by both high energy rents and low worker wages. Amidst this vacuum, many workers have turned to rioting as a means of expressing their discontent. Washington should be more persistent in pressing GCC members to ensure rights of foreign laborers. For example, it can include related provisions in future free trade agreements with Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, measures to include limited political representation for foreign residents should gradually enter U.S. political reform advocacy in the region.
GCC members should be more headstrong in addressing both the near-term and long-term challenges stemming from their sizable foreign resident populations. Despite talk of indigenizing their labor forces, foreign residents in the GCC are as permanent as the rising towers in the sand.
Arif Rafiq is an American consultant living in Doha, Qatar
Middle East Views and Developments
The Arab Reform Bulletin, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , provides news and analysis of the latest reform-related developments from the region. The Bulletin's October 2006 articles include (reprinted with permission from the Carnegie Endowment):
- Palestine: How Weak is Hamas? by
Jarret Blanc
- Egypt: A Leap toward Reform-or
Succession? by Joshua Stacher
- U.S. Policy and Yemen:
Balancing Realism and Reform on the Arab Periphery by
Jeremy M. Sharp
- Saudi Arabia: Local Councils
Struggling to Produce Results by Jafar Muhammad Al-Shayib
- Iraqi Kurdistan: Time
to Get Serious about Governance by Bilal Wahab
- Iraq: Parliament Passes Federalism Bill
- Yemen: Presidential and Local Election Results
- Bahrain: Run-Up to Elections
- UAE: First Elections Coming; Crackdown on Human Rights
Activists
- Kuwait: MPs Blame Government for Electoral Violations
- Jordan: King Pardons MPs; Parliament Approves Laws
- Syria: Human Rights Developments
- Libya: Verdicts by Abolished Courts Upheld; Prison Clashes
The Arab Reform Bulletin is also available in Arabic.
Further Reading
POMED does not necessarily endorse the views presented in these articles.
One
Nation, Divisible
John Tierney
The New York Times, 10/24/06
The columnist suggests that the US decentralize authority in Iraq into near-autonomous zones of Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni. This will be the only way to mitigate local clan obligations that are preventing the success of a national unity government.
Turkish
Tiger
Matthew Kaminski
The Wall Street Journal, 10/21/06
The author points to Turkey as a goal for Western-style democracy in the Middle East. He argues that in building stable new democracies, market reforms should be emphasized as much as political reform.
Can
You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?
Jeff Stein
The New York Times, 10/17/06
Stein expresses surprise about the lack of basic knowledge about Islam among important American officials. He argues that knowledge of the cultures in which our troops are immersed is vital for success.
A
troubling Middle East era dawns
Richard Haass
Financial Times, 10/16/06
Haass predicts that visions of a prosperous, democratic Middle East will not be realized in the near future. He elaborates on methods of encouraging peace in the region, including the removal of military force as an option, the promotion of economic liberalization, reform of schools, and creation of the proper conditions for diplomacy.
Military
force will not defeat Islamic revivalism
Dana Allin and Steven Simon
Financial Times, 10/10/06
The authors argue against the continued use of military force in the Middle East. Instead, they believe the most feasible actions would be a policy of Cold War-style containment.
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