Newsletter - January 2007

POMED Updates

POMED Associate Shadi Hamid, along with Marc Grinberg of the Truman National Security Project published an article on tompaine.com titled, “National Security Temptations”. In addition, POMED launched it's new donation page at www.pomed.org/support and is now accepting online donations.

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Legislative Update

The American people made their voices heard in the November elections, issuing a clear call for change in US foreign policy (See POMED’s last newsletter here). The Iraq Study Group issued its own recommendations, notably for a new regional diplomatic initiative and a reduced role for American troops in Iraq. Not to be outdone, think tanks and pundits weighed in with their own suggestions for President Bush and the incoming Democratic-led Congress.

Washington is full of grand plans, new ways forward, and competing -isms. Moreover, the quiet of December often creates a moment when congressional leaders can sit back and consider big picture questions. Among all this chatter, one question merits particular attention: Has Washington given up on promoting democracy in the Middle East?

The release of the Iraq Study Group Report caused grumbling when readers noted that it hardly mentioned democracy at all – and then not as a goal to be pursued. Provincial elections were regarded as desirable, but for the most part the Group’s recommendations under the heading of “governance” were less ambitious: provision of services and a reduction in corruption. Meanwhile, the goal of diplomatic engagement with Syria, Iran and others in the region would be stability, not democracy or human freedom.

In the think tank world and on cable news an increasing number of pundits have seized upon the electoral victory of the violent Islamic group Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, as well as the chaos in semi-democratic Lebanon, to argue that democracy in the Middle East is antithetical to American interests in the region. Some are even beginning to voice again the sentiment that Arabs aren’t cut out for democracy (on this point, see Martin Kramer’s comments here).

Most significantly perhaps, a new batch of writers from both parties have leapt forward to promote their own brands of centrist “realism”– a word that to some connotes an amoral balance of power diplomacy that values short-term stability over human rights and democracy. In a piece published in the American Prospect, former NSC-staffer Flynt Leverett provocatively wrote, “realism has become the truly progressive position on foreign policy.” Likewise, liberal Anatol Lieven and conservative Jon Hulsman have ignited discussion with the publication of their book, Ethical Realism: A View for America’s Role in the World.

President Bush’s decision to replace Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates, has also been interpreted as a resurgence of the type of realism espoused by George Bush, Sr. and his long-time advisor, Brent Scowcroft. Reinforcing such speculation is President Bush’s own increasingly pessimistic rhetoric. Gone is the talk of victory; in its place Bush now seeks “success.” Recently he floated another rhetorical downshift, commenting to the press, “An interesting construct that General Pace uses is: ‘We're not winning; we're not losing.’”

Reasons for pessimism regarding democracy promotion in the Middle East suddenly appear everywhere. Nonetheless, the picture is not as bleak as it seems.

The modesty of the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations can be understood in their context. Iraq is a mess, and threatens to detonate the entire region unless correctives are taken immediately. This is not a situation conducive to grand ambitions or even long-term planning; rather, it requires triage. Under these circumstances, the Group’s focus on short-term exigencies and a circumscribed set of goals can be understood. Short-term efforts toward greater security, improved government service provision, and strengthened rule of law complement the long-term goal of a functioning democracy.

The recent crop of realist policy reading does indeed attack President Bush’s neoconservative agenda, but the critiques include much with which progressives from both parties agree. Rather than opposing themselves principally to internationalism – a belief in the importance of American engagement, multilateralism, and the progressive notion that we are all better off when we are each better off - these analysts are most concerned with the moralistic idealism endorsed by the Bush Administration: ideological flights of fancy that dismissed the importance of hard facts in decisionmaking. They sharply criticized the Bush doctrine of preventive war, arguing it sets a dangerous precedent for other countries, and warning that its continuing use is more likely to undermine American interests than promote their achievement. When they call for diplomacy with Iran and Syria, they do so in part out of a belief that the neoconservative refusal to engage with regimes deemed “evil” has strengthened hardliners in those countries against moderates.

In essence, what we see in Washington is a call for a reversion to moderation and the bi-partisan center, and it is this quality that fuels their popularity – not any derision of democracy. Washington’s political class feels duped; anything that smells of cynicism is therefore certain to receive support. Nonetheless, these pundits of the month both tap into and are contributing to a backlash against the arguments in favor of democracy promotion. This in turn has caused certain groups and individuals to defect from the coalition in support of democracy promotion as a central US foreign policy goal.

Some have concluded that democracy is simply far more difficult to achieve than they had anticipated, in large part because of failings inherent to Arab culture. Once convinced by the Bush Administration’s retroactively-conceived project of democracy promotion by force, they have now become disillusioned with the project.

Others have once again decided the US should privilege stability over democracy. These centrist realists had been chastened by the critique that consistent support for a stagnant status quo in the Middle East led to radicalization and, ultimately, 9/11. Now, however, they are terrified by the chaos engulfing the region and wonder if life would have been better with Saddam. They continue to look for a plan that might achieve sustainable stability in the region, policies that might serve the cause of democracy over the long-term without overly disrupting the near-term pursuit of other interests, but for now they wish to halt US enthusiasm for political change.

Regardless of these losses, support in Washington for democracy promotion remains strong. Neoconservatives remain confident in their moral support of “a forward strategy of freedom.” Most centrist-realists have accepted the premise, espoused by both President Bush and the left, that the root causes of terrorism, including political frustration, poverty and hopelessness, must be addressed as part of our struggle against radical Islamic terrorism. Many Christian conservatives, now internationalists thanks to Bush Administration policies, remain supportive of development initiatives, including democracy promotion. And liberals, who have been largely silent on the matter, will likely increase their support as the Bush Administration slides further into lame duck status.

It is unclear what democracy promotion policies will be proposed by Congress in the coming session. It appears that the recent attacks on the idea of democracy promotion are mostly motivated by short-term political considerations. In the long term, with support from organizations like POMED and others calling for consistent and principled democracy promotion, a new consensus can emerge.

 

America's Impact on Middle East Reform

FNC Elections in the UAE and the Strategy of Emiratization
by Jeremy Tamanini

On December 16^th, 2006, the United Arab Emirates joined other Gulf States in holding their first-ever elections. Similar to other countries in the Gulf, the UAE elections were a relatively cautious first-step towards political reform. Unlike some of its neighbors, however, the UAE elections were not a result of underlying sectarian pressure for reform or popular demands for political participation. Instead, they occurred to support the larger governmental goal of Emiratization: the greater incorporation of native Emiratis into the social and economic fabric of the country.

The December elections in the UAE were to the Federal National Council (FNC) and took place just weeks after the nation celebrated its 35^th anniversary as a federation. The FNC is an advisory body responsible for reviewing pending federal laws and serving as intermediary between cabinet ministers and FNC sub-committees organized to debate and perfect proposed laws. The UAE elections decided one half of the forty (40) seats on the FNC and did so through an Electoral College already nominated by the Supreme Council, rather than through an open election to all registered UAE nationals. The remaining 20 seats on the FNC will continue to be filled by mandate from the Supreme Council.

Communication from the UAE government during the election period repeatedly linked the FNC elections to a new ‘Enabling’ period in UAE history. Earlier in December, UAE President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan gave a lengthy interview to the London-based Arabic Daily Al Sharq Al Awsat about the elections. In discussing his hope that the elections encourage a more active UAE citizen, Sheikh Khalifa noted:

“One of our key objectives in the next stage is to lay the groundwork for the emergence of a more active UAE citizen. It was necessary to increase the experience of the FNC, and to move it to a stage where it will be more representative, and will interact more closely with the rest of the country and with the affairs of its citizens."

The government web site, UAE Interact, published during the election a recap of the key issues in FNC candidate’s campaigns. Interestingly, the highlighted candidate concerns mirror those often discussed by government officials as priorities, ranging from improving the quality of healthcare and education in the country to preserving Emirati culture amidst the presence of such a large non-native population. This observation further supports an underlying strategy to use the elections to engage native Emiratis with urgent national matters.

The governmental media here validate this observation further. An analysis of coverage of the elections in Gulf News, the leading daily paper in the country, reveals frequent and sometimes heated commentary from locals about the elections. The Dubai police chief refused to register in protest of the fact than the unelected FNC members weren’t required to present a good conduct certificate, a requirement for all registering candidates. Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a professor of political science at UAE University, wrote an opinion piece in Gulf News emphasizing the importance of evaluating candidates based on their legislative credentials. He warned against FNC candidates seeking only the prestige of the position or the one-month paid leave from work. A writer running in the elections openly criticized the council for lacking a more complete legislative role asking “How can we give promises to improve elements of our society when the council only have an advisory role?”

Coverage of the elections was sparse in the international press due to their limited nature and the local function of the FNC. Despite the US push for democratization in the region, the US Department of State Daily Briefings contained no comment on the elections during the week in which they took place. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the main US entity responsible for distributing pro-democracy funds to non-governmental organizations in the region, is based in the UAE yet did not have any involvement in the elections here. The apparent US absence from this election process further suggests that they occurred to support an Emiratization strategy originating from within, rather than as a result of external pressure.

The UAE elections are a small step towards reform. Yet considering the lack of underlying pressure to hold them at all, it becomes clear that the elections serve a strategic function for the government in advancing the ‘Emiratization’ of civic life in the UAE. As the majority expat workforce here lacks citizenship and the vital economic climate here appears to mute significant protest over the matter, local Emiratis remain the core constituency of the ruling classes. Structuring limited elections in this way reminds Emiratis that their leaders are looking out for them and furthers the government goal of more fully incorporating these citizens into the public and private institutions of their country. However, it does little for increasing the transparency of the government, or letting the public have a genuine voice in the direction of the country. Much like elections in the other gulf countries, the reforms are mostly superficial, and the legislative body will most likely serve to reinforce the policies of the ruling elite, rather than provide a forum for opposition and contestation.

Elections in Iran
by Toni Zuzolo and Rashad Mahmood

The December elections in Iran were a victory for the coalition of “pragmatic conservatives” and reformists that sought to limit the power of President Ahmadinejad and his spiritual adviser Mohammed Mesbah-Yazdi. By winning the majority of seats on the council of experts this coalition ensured that they will control the appointment of the next supreme leader if Khamenei is to pass away in the next 8 years. The results of local elections also favored the conservatives and reformists over Ahmadinejad’s faction. In Tehran’s city council elections, Ahmadinejad’s list only won two of the fifteen seats, while the reformists won four, conservatives eight, and independents one.

For the council of experts, former president of Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was the leading vote getter, with few supporters of Yazdi and Ahmadinejad winning seats. Above all, this was a victory for Ayatollah Khamenei who is now secure in his seat for at least the next eight years.

But what does it mean for the US-Iranian relationship and Iranian democracy? Tension between the US and Iran is being driven by three factors - Iran’s belligerent language towards the US and Israel, its alleged covert nuclear weapons program, and Iranian support for Hizbullah and Hamas.

The elections were a clear repudiation of Ahmadinejad, but his decreased popularity is unlikely to change the direction of Iran’s major foreign policy initiatives. Iran’s nuclear program continued during the Khatami presidency, so a return of moderates to power is unlikely to change that factor, and support of Hizbullah and Hamas have been ingrained in Iran policy for the last twenty years, irrespective of governments. Besides, in the complicated structure of Iran’s government, most of the real foreign policy decision-making power lies with the supreme leader, rather than the president.

Despite the high turnout (an estimated 60%) the elections did not show much progress towards a more transparent and egalitarian democratic system. Most power is still concentrated in an elite group of clergy clustered around Khamenei, whose strengthened position will allow him to continue to restrict which candidates can run for office. Many candidates were disqualified from running in the elections, and that the slow release of vote totals could have been a sign of tampering and interference.

Nevertheless, compared to the state of democracy in many other Middle East states, Iran is practically a beacon on the hill. The fact is that despite all of the systems flaws, this is the third time since 1997 that there have been significant changes in the power structure of the country prompted by elections. Furthermore, women made significant gains, apparently taking nearly half of local council seats in several cities.

It would be nice to be able to say that these elections signify accelerating reforms, however it seems like Iran has reached a stable equilibrium. There is continuous contestation at the mid and lower levels of government, and for the presidency, but most of the major levers of power remain in the hands of the clergy. Despite widespread desires for reform, the apparatuses of control remain firmly entrenched, including severe restrictions on who can run for office, closing newspapers, purges of university students and faculty, and other forms of repression.

While the elections presented Washington with a perfect opportunity to reassess its Iran policy, and make changes based on the apparent unpopularity of Ahmadinejad, recent events seem to have overtaken calls for dialogue and negotiations. The recent US raid on an Iranian consulate and other hostile rhetoric and actions are likely to frighten the Iranian people, and increase support for Ahmadinejad's particular brand of hyper-nationalism, much the same way Israel's attacks on Lebanon temporarily created a spike in Hizbollah's popularity.

Unfortunately there is little that the US can do to influence reform in Iran. As long as there is open hostility between the two governments, US rhetoric about democracy and reform will seem like an attack. This is only compounded by the administration’s tendency to preach about democracy for countries like Syria and Iran, but letting allies that are just as, if not more repressive slide without comment. Another example of this behavior was the vehement criticism from President Bush of the presidential elections in 2005 that brought Ahmadinejad to power, and the lack of criticism for the same process that weakened him in December.

Toni Zuzolo is the Director of Fundraising for POMED. Rashad Mahmood is the Vice Chair of POMED, and a Senior Economic Researcher at the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt

Middle East Views and Developments

The Arab Reform Bulletin, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , provides news and analysis of the latest reform-related developments from the region. The Bulletin's December 2006 articles include (reprinted with permission from the Carnegie Endowment):

- Iraq: Is Democracy the Problem by Peter Sluglett
- Bahrain: Elections and Managing Sectarianism by Fred Wehrey
- Kuwait: The Beginning of Real Politics? By Nathan J. Brown
- UAE: A Toe in the Water of Political Reform by Amal Hashim
- United States: Congressional Politics and the Pursuit of Democracy by Deborah E. Bodlander
- Bahrain: New Cabinet and Consultative Council after Elections
- Saudi Arabia: Human Rights Watch Visit
- Yemen: Anti-Corruption Draft Law; Editors Imprisoned
- Palestine: Debate over Early Elections
- Jordan: Cabinet Reshuffle; New Public Opinion Poll; Anti-Corruption Law
- Syria: Human Rights Trials
- Egypt: Constitutional Amendments; Muslim Brothers Released; Blog Writers Arrested
- Libya: Another Critic Detained; U.S. Call for Al Jahmi Release Reiterated
- Morocco: Party of Justice and Development Prepares for Elections

The Arab Reform Bulletin is also available in Arabic.

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