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Newsletter - December 2006


POMED Updates

POMED is pleased to announce that planning for our Bringing the World Home conferences in Jordan, Egypt and Morocco is going well. We have agreed to cooperate with several local partners including the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, (Egypt) the Moroccan Center for Strategic Studies, the Young Researchers Group in Social Sciences and Development Studies (Morocco) and the New Jordan Research Center.

As a reminder, you can read summaries of all of POMED's events on our website at this link. Our most recent event on sectarianism in the Middle East with John Duke Anthony and Joe Stork can be found here.

If you want to subscribe to this newsletter, please send an email to subscribe@pomed.org For more information about how to get involved with POMED, go to www.pomed.org/support or you can email info@pomed.org.


Legislative Update

Election Retrospective

November saw dramatic electoral losses for Republicans, leading to their loss of control of both the House and Senate. The Democrats now hold the house with a 232-199 advantage (and 4 seats undecided), and the Senate 51 - 49. The elections raise two significant questions about US democracy promotion in the Middle East. First, what role did this issue play in determining the results? And second, what kind of legislation can we expect with regards to democracy in the region when the 110th Congress comes into session in January?

While few candidates, if any, campaigned explicitly on the issue of democracy promotion in the Middle East, almost all spoke at length about the ongoing war in Iraq, and some also discussed US policies towards Iran. One prominent example of an elected official campaigning on his views regarding democracy in the Middle East was Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA). As detailed in POMED's previous newsletter, Sen. Santorum authored the Iran Freedom and Support Act – that took a particularly aggressive stance toward promoting democratic change in Iran. The bill offers funding for groups within the country opposed to the ruling Islamic regime while simultaneously threatening sanctions against nations that aided Iran in its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. The bill was passed and signed into law in the final weeks of the campaign. Sen. Santorum went on to lose his bid for reelection, but it is unclear what role this legislation played in voters' decisions, as there were many other issues in the campaign.

Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) was a strong advocate for Middle East peace, opposed the war in Iraq, and recently fought off the Bush Administration’s attempts to nominate John Bolton as Ambassador to the UN and also lost. Historically Chafee gained significant support from many progressives and independents. In the end, however, this was not enough in Rhode Island, a state John Kerry won with 60% of the vote. Chafee lost his race to Rhode Island Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse.

Whereas individual races tell a mixed story, the overall picture was clear. Among issues that determined the outcome, Iraq was dominant. The voters perceived that Congressional Republicans, together with President Bush, were responsible for the ongoing war and its results and punished them at the voting booth. Nation-wide exit polling found that voters who disapproved of the war in Iraq outnumbered those who approved of it by a margin of 56% to 42%, and 4 out of 5 who disapproved voted to send a Democrat to Congress. Voters also sent a strong message to President Bush. Respondents disapproved of the way the President was handling his job by a 57-43% margin and 82% of those who disapproved voted for Democrats. Moreover, across the country, incumbent Congressman and Senators whom the voters perceived as being too close to the president lost their bids for reelection. In short, the election was a referendum on President Bush, the radical brand of foreign policy he executed, and those who assisted him. Americans voted for change, but specifically, they voted for a change in the way we pursue our foreign policy objectives abroad.

The Future of US Democracy Promotion Policy

Although the American public raised their voices loud and clear asking for a change in U.S. foreign policy in Iraq during the mid-term elections, the future of democracy promotion in the Middle East is unclear. While the executive branch drives foreign policy decision-making, it is important to examine what impact the new Democratic congress will have.

With the control of both Houses of Congress, the Democrats may be able to pass bold legislation supporting democracy that would have the votes to surmount a Bush veto. Paramount among this body of legislation is the Real Security Bill and the Advance Democratic Values, Address Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance Democracy Bill of 2005 [hereafter, ADVANCE Democracy Act].

The Real Security Bill seeks to counter the risks of terrorism by addressing its root causes, in addition to other more traditional methods aimed at terrorist financing or sanctuaries. The Bill would stem the tide of Islamic radicals through the promotion of education, democracy, the rule of law, women’s empowerment, economic development and media freedom. In particular, it would take a tougher stance on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are allies of the United States but have weak records on freedom and democracy. As such, it would build a security policy that is deeply connected with democracy promotion.

Another Bill with related goals, the ADVANCE Democracy Act would promote freedomand democracy in foreign countries as a fundamental component of United States foreign policy.” It argues for re-engineering the Department of State towards these goals through methods such as creating an Under Secretary of State for Global affairs that would take the democracy promotion portfolio, developing an Office of Democratic Movements and Transitions, training Foreign Service Officers in democracy promotion and establishing Regional Democracy Hubs—including in the Middle East. It also calls for a couple of ventures to partner with democratic allies abroad.

The New Democratic Foreign Policy Team

A survey of newly elected Democratic leaders reveals ambivalence about the extent to which holistic democracy promotion in the Middle East is a priority for them. The Democrats’ campaigning on foreign policy issues focused on Iraq. Nancy Pelosi’s New Direction for America emphasizes security issues but through a lens of military preparedness rather than a lens of democracy promotion. Similarly, the closest the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee’s Democratic Agenda came to foreign policy is advocating energy independence.

Several members of the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives will have a strong influence over legislation and are more oriented towards democratic reform. The Senate leadership is more mired in the continuing situation in Iraq.

The House of Representatives

Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), the presumptive chair of the House International Relations Committee (HIRC), has a strong record of advocacy for reform in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and for religious freedom around the world. One issue he is expected to address is the continued high levels of military aid the United States sends to Egypt. Lantos may propose cutting US military assistance, as he has before together with outgoing HIRC chair Henry Hyde (R-IL) [make link this whole clause] perhaps in favor of additional aid for democracy and civil society. Alternatively, he may propose that the United States condition aid sent to Egypt on the meeting of certain benchmarks of reform. David Obey (D-WI) will likely chair the Appropriations Committee. He has also been critical of U.S. aid to Egypt because of the country’s track record, voting to cut military aid to Egypt in the wake of the jailing of Ayman Nour, a candidate trying to challenge Hosni Mubarak for President.

Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) will also be influential if, as expected, she becomes Chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operation, as will Gary Ackerman (D-NY), if he becomes Chair of the IRC’s Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. Lowey has voted to restore funding for the UN, and is a stong supporter of US aid to Israel. She is not one of the co-sponsors of the ADVANCE Democracy Act. Ackerman is a co-sponsor of the ADVANCE Democracy Act and has been critical of President Bush's claims that the Iraq war was initially about democracy. However, he also states that now that we are there, we have an obligation to support the development of democracy.

The Senate

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) will be the incoming Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee. He has authored a comprehensive plan for dealing with Iraq, centered on a Bosnia-like solution. It aims to produce three ethnically compatible, economically viable semi-autonomous regions in the country to which the central government could grant certain types of authority. The Democratic leadership in the Senate is heavily focused on the critical issue of Iraq.

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) will play a major role in foreign policy as the Chair of the Armed Services Committee. He called for the beginning of a phased redeployment of our forces within four to six months

Meanwhile, Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) has been supportive both of the war and President Bush and has tremendous power with the 51-49 split. All eyes are on Senator Lieberman who calls himself an “independent democrat” and has not ruled out the possibility that he may switch parties.

Patrick Leahy (D-VT) will be the Chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the State Department and Foreign Operations and Chair of the Judiciary Committee He has already asked the Justice Department to allow the public access to two important documents, one authorizing secret prisons aboard and one detailing legal methods of questioning al-Qaeda.

Regardless of Democratic wins in the House and Senate, however, it is the President, not the Congress, that holds the reins of United States foreign policy. Divided government may usher in the bipartisanship that both sides have been extolling since the election or, alternatively, two years of gridlock. The near future of American democracy promotion in the Middle East could depend as much on the kind of relationship struck between the White House and Congress as it does on the agenda of either.

It is clear that many of the differences among members of Congress regarding US democracy promotion policy stem from the link between Iraq and democracy created by the Bush administration. While Americans rejected the status quo policies in Iraq, promotion of Middle East democracy through peaceful means was not on the table, and hopefully members of congress will realize this distinction, and continue to support political reform throughout the region.

America's Impact on Middle East Reform

US Support for Democracy in Lebanon: Boon or Bust?
by Rima Abushakra

When an estimated 1.5 million Lebanese took to the streets on March 14th, 2005 in protest of Syrian occupation, it was touted by President Bush and his supporters as an important success for his "freedom agenda"and downplaying the impact of Prime Minister Hariri's assassination exactly one month before. Recently, Lebanon has been embroiled in a political struggle that threatens to return the country to civil war, as tensions rise between the Hizbullah-affiliated forces and Prime Minister Fuoad Siniora's March 14th coalition.

Lumping the March 14th protests together with the idea of a Bush-inspired Arab spring had negative consequences that are often overlooked. First, it confused the concept of protests, in this case an act of civil disobedience, with democracy. This removed from the definition the need to create and abide by a transparent, participatory system. It is worth nothing that no one in Washington is praising Lebanon's democracy now that it is the supporters of Hizbullah that are staging massive demonstrations. Second, in taking credit for the movement, the US downplayed the uniquely local factors that led to the demonstrations. In fact, at the time of the protests, Walid Jumblatt who was one of the chief organizers was not permitted to travel to the United States on account of a statement he had made about Paul Wolfowitz. While it might have been in the US's national interest to see such "democracy" be displayed, it is not in its interest for it to be seen as the impetus for it. This is especially true today when the US is viewed so negatively as a result of the Iraq war, the Palestinian issue and in refusing to call for a ceasefire during Israel's brutal bombardment of Lebanon this summer.

US support has allowed the Syrian and Iranian-allied opposition to consistently launch accusations at the government of being an American puppet. Hassan Nasrallah himself said in a speech on Sunday, November 19th that Hizbollah is not trying to rid Lebanon of Prime Minister Siniora's rule but of Feltman's rule. (Feltman is the US ambassador to Lebanon.) This is a powerful argument for undermining the government on the Lebanese and Arab Street that was beginning to succeed.

Despite Hizbullah and their allies' recent rise, the tragic assassination of the young Minister of Industry Pierre Gemeyel may have reshuffled the deck in the March 14th coalition's favor, rushing the opposition to pursue more aggressive steps in their campaign. The assassination gave the March 14th movement a moral high ground and has reinvigorated the movement's supporters.

By supporting the Lebanese government, the US is supporting democracy in Lebanon. It is protecting the system from the dangerous precedent pro-Syrian opposition forces are threatening to set. However, it is harmful when the US supports a movement, but then does not back up its support due to conflicting obligations in the region. By tacitly endorsing Israel's attacks on Lebanon, the US undermined its previous support of the March 14th forces and severely weakened their position in the country. It became extremely easy for Hizbullah to organize anti-government sentiment, that in a worst case scenario, could lead to a destabilization or collapse of the government.

If the US wants to successfully improve its image in the region, it has to avoid making commitments that it cannot fulfill. Its conflicted stance on Lebanon reinforces the idea that the US is not genuinely concerned with democracy and only supports it when it will weaken its opponents.

Rima Abushakra is the coordinator for the Tharwa Project in Lebanon. She also teaches at the Lebanese American University.

Ominous Signs of Growing Insularity in Sudan
by Evan Ray

For almost a decade now, the United States in concert with other Western countries has attempted to reform the Sudanese government. Despite applying consistent diplomatic pressure on the regime to quit its genocidal campaign in Darfur, little has changed. Even the international sanctions imposed in 1996, the quasi-coercive deployment of African Union troops in the country, and an extensive media campaign highlighting the atrocities associated with the regime, have led to stagnation, and at times a worsening of the situation. A decade later, strong economic and political indicators suggest that the strategy of promoting reform in Khartoum has been largely incoherent; facilitating the regime to effectively gain optimum insularity from any substantive pressure the United States and its allies might bring to bear. One of the keys to the Sudanese government's ability to side-step real political reform is its close relationship to China.

Although sanctions have prevented Western investment and development from uninhibited access to Sudan, Chinese firms have filled the void left behind, leaving the regime with far greater access to financial capital and oil profits than previously experienced under Western auspices. As of 2004, Chinese investment in Sudan hovered around $150 billion, making it the largest single recipient of Chinese financing as reported in the October 28th issue of The Economist. The results are clearly contrary to the crippling effect of sanctions intended by the United States and others. In fact, business is clearly booming in Khartoum. Pumping over 500,000 barrels of oil per day at a premium rate has dramatically changed the economic landscape of Sudan earning it a projected GDP growth of approximately 12% in 2007. Furthermore, though the importation of many luxury items is prohibited in Sudan under international legal stipulations intended to target the regime, they nonetheless find harbor through indirect channels involving the United Arab Emirates and other willing accomplices.

In addition, though a weapons embargo is favored by the international community, China has ensured that effective implementation of such an embargo remains an impracticality. Even more ominous for the future of Darfur, the Sudanese regime is already developing alternatives to its regular weapons suppliers by embarking on its own weapons manufacturing industry with the assistance of Chinese advisors. Soon, the international weapons embargo will lose even its superficial value with Sudanese factories ensuring a continual supply of arms for the regime.

It is clear that without Chinese-American dialogue on Sudan, any further sanctioning or punitive measures sought will likely remain politically stillborn or left completely ineffective, resulting in greater exposure of the Sudanese regime’s triumph over international pressure. This scenario could play out in many different places in the coming years as China increasingly becomes an alternative source of aid and investment that doesn't care about the quality or type of government that the aid goes to. There are no easy answers for the US, but it is important to recognize what is really going on in Sudan, and understand the implications for the future.

Evan Ray has an M.A. from the Georgetown Center for Contemporary Arab Studies


From the Editors

Democracy equals war?

The "Forum for the Future" in Jordan in late November received lukewarm reviews for its lack of substance and general malaise. But at the Forum, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made it clear just how divorced the administration is from the reality of how Middle Easterners perceive the "freedom agenda."

By identifying democracy with some of the most conflict-ridden countries of the region – countries in which American aggression or neglect has been an inescapable factor in causing the current dangerous situations – the administration is discrediting the word democracy in the region.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice restated President George W. Bush's position that only a democratic Middle East can be a stable Middle East. But then, in a reprise of her highly criticized comments about the “birth pangs of a new Middle East,” she went on to cite three elements of a “changing Middle East” moving toward democracy – “Lebanon without Syrian occupation, Iraq with the end of the Saddam Hussein regime,” and “a democratic Palestine.”

It is hardly surprising that many Arabs want nothing to do with America’s idea of democracy when they hear it identified with Lebanon (where massive opposition demonstrations, in the wake of the war with Israel, threaten the government); Palestine, where the result of democratic elections has been an international aid embargo; and Iraq, which speaks for itself.

After referring to these three countries, said Rice, "“These are all elements of a changing Middle East and so, the region as a whole is going through enormous change. And I think that's why it's important to keep engaging the states like the Egyptians, the Jordanians and the Gulf states." Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq are not examples that Egyptians, Jordanians and residents of the Gulf want to emulate.

Forgotten Libya

In mid-November the Washington Post ran an article on the plight of Libyan dissident Fathi al-Jahmi. By their account, al-Jahmi is imprisoned on charges of having had an unauthorized meeting with a foreign official, most likely from the US. While the state department has said that they will raise this issue with the Libyan government, it is clear that a “minor issue like this will not jeopardize diplomatic relations between Libya and the US.

At the time of resumption of diplomatic negotiations, Libya was once in the spotlight and subject of much debate. Since then, it has faded away, and despite its cooperation with the Bush administration, it has not changed its ways one bit. This sends a message loud and clear to other dictators. Work with us, and lack of democracy isn't a problem.

At POMED's first event, our two speakers were very critical of the US-Libyan negotiations for neglecting the issue of political reform and freedoms. As Professor Tarek Yousef asked so poignantly, “When will the Libyan people matter?...They are watching, they are seeing, and they are listening.”

Middle East Views and Developments

The Arab Reform Bulletin, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , provides news and analysis of the latest reform-related developments from the region. The Bulletin's November 2006 articles include (reprinted with permission from the Carnegie Endowment):

- Syria: Interview with Ayman Abd Al Nour, political analyst and former economic advisor to the Baath Party
- Arab World: Regional Conflicts as Moments of Truth by Amr Hamzawy
- Lebanon: Hizbollah's Enduring Myth by Emile El-Hokayem
-
U.S. Policy and Palestine: Reform and Peace are Interdependent by Philip C. Wilcox, Jr
- Jordan: A Balancing Act that Keeps Political Change at Bay by Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
- Palestine: Progress in Hamas-Fatah Talks
- Lebanon: Government Talks Collapse
- Jordan: Pending Cabinet Reshuffle
- Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood-NDP Tensions; Liberal MP Sentenced
- Bahrain: Run-Up to Elections
- Saudi Arabia: New Succession Rules
- Kuwait: Debate on Electoral Violations Continues
- United Arab Emirates: Improvement in Labor Rights
- Morocco: Justice and Charity Leader Imprisoned; Yassine Trial Postponed, Algeria: Referendum Delayed
- Libya: National Security Council Established
- New Transparency International Corruption Index

The Arab Reform Bulletin is also available in Arabic.


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