|
|
From the POMED Wire
Amid doubts as to whether President Obama‘s outreach to the Middle East will be a break with past U.S. policy, the Arabist argues that so far Obama has pursued an Egypt policy that reinforces the military establishment. The Arabist claims that the sale of F-16 fighters to Egypt-which were denied by President Bush over concerns about human rights and democracy-undercuts the values Obama promoted during his speech in Cairo last month…
Drawing criticism from some senior clerics over the way it has handled the fallout from last month’s elections, Iran is reported to have hanged six supporters of presidential candidate and opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi…
Laura Rozen at Foreign Policy offers predictions for upcoming hiring at the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), pending the confirmation of Jeffrey Feltman, NEA’s assistant secretary nominee. Brookings’ Tamara Cofman Wittes is a likely candidate to fill the roll of deputy assistant secretary who oversees Middle East democracy issues…
|
In order to continue to expand our work, POMED needs your support. Please consider making a donation through our secure, online donation site.
Click Here to Donate to POMED
|
|
| Dear Friends,
The protests in Iran have died down - at least for now - but in Washington the tumult over US policy toward the country is just heating up. Op-ed pages and cable news shows have been ablaze with discussion over the Obama Administration’s performance during the height of the post-election protests. At issue is a crucial question – How can the U.S. best support democracy in Iran?
In the past weeks, scores of pundits and leaders have called out the Obama Administration for failing to put the U.S. “on the right side of history” – and on the right side of the stand-off between the Iranian regime led by Grand Ayatollah Khamenei and the green-clad protesters in the streets. The editorial page of the Wall Street Journal lauded French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s condemnation of Iranian electoral fraud, in contrast to President Obama’s cautious decision to express concern for the rights of the peaceful protesters while avoiding the issue of the election outcome itself. LA Times columnist and National Review Online editor Jonah Goldberg claimed the president was turning “a blind eye” to independent civil society groups in Iran. Senator John McCain framed the issue explicitly in terms of the extent to which the president intervened rhetorically, and noted his disapproval: “A debate has been going on about how much the United States of America, its president, the Congress, and the American people should speak out in favor and in support of Iranians, whose average age in Tehran is 33 years of age, in their quest for freedom and democracy that we have enjoyed for more than a couple centuries.”
On the other hand, President Obama and his staff have argued that the best way to support Iranian activists is to stay out of the debate. The president said in remarks on June 16, “It’s not productive, given the history of U.S.-Iranian relations, to be seen as meddling.” And later in an interview with CBS, “The last thing I want to do is to have the United States be a foil for those forces inside Iran who would love nothing better than to make this an argument about the United States.” The Obama administration made repeated statements of concern for the rights of the Iranian people – for instance, Obama: “I stand strongly with the universal principle that people’s voices should be heard and not suppressed.” – but has avoided strong comment on the election itself – Vice President Joe Biden told David Gregory on Meet the Press that the election results asserted by the regime were “surprising” but that “we don’t have all the details.”
Iranian dissident Akbar Ganji seemed to support the administration’s approach in an interview last week. On the one hand, he told Washington Independent reporter Spencer Ackerman, “Iran’s path to democracy is for the people of Iran. No foreign country, either America or any other, should get involved in that process.” On the other hand, he argued, there is a role for the international community: “Human rights is an international condition. When a country denies human rights for its own people, the entire world should punish that government.”
The U.S. should stand squarely in support of democracy, but we need to do it in a smart way that responds to the particular needs of the situation. Sometimes doing more requires saying less. If he had stepped into the debate between candidates, Obama would have risked bolstering Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s talking point that Mousavi was an U.S.-backed stooge. Whatever hopes we have that the U.S. image is improving in the Muslim world, that label undermines Mousavi and democracy activists in Iran today.
But beyond the question of rhetoric and moral support, other policies matter. The Bush Administration’s strategy of threatening Iran with sanctions, a posture of regime change, and potential military strikes, had the effect of rallying Iranian political factions around the flag of nationalism. Whatever their views about the nuclear program, the Iranian people stand opposed to external military intervention. The threat of attack strengthened Ahmadinejad and other Iranian hardliners. By offering to engage in dialogue, and the replacing language of regime change with that of mutual respect, Obama took steps to remove the perception of threat, laying bare the divisions between Iran’s political factions. The Iranian election played out as a debate over corruption and economic management, with the U.S. as a peripheral rather than central element.
The Obama administration has hardly had a blemish-free record on these issues thus far. But on Iran, they deserve credit for a thoughtful, nimble, coordinated approach that responded to the expressed wishes of Iranians and supported Iran’s democracy movement by getting out of their way. By avoiding Bush-style saber rattling, and continuing to listen to democracy activists in Iran, the U.S. may yet play a deeply positive role in encouraging the emergence of a more open, democratic, and law-based system in Iran.
All the best,
Andrew
–
Andrew Albertson
Executive Director
Project on Middle East Democracy
andrew.albertson@pomed.org
(202) 422-6804
|
|
|
POMED Updates
Assessing Obama’s Speech to the Muslim World
On June 4th, on the heels of President Obama’s Cairo Address, POMED and the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy co-hosted a discussion of the speech’s substance and impact. Geneive Abdo of the Century Foundation, Richard Eisendorf of Freedom House, and Will Marshall of the Progressive Policy Institute offered their thoughts on the speech’s overall effect and its implications for the future of U.S. policy toward the region. As many expressed concern over whether democracy would figure into the president’s speech at all, the panelists expressed differing opinions on the efficacy of the way in which it was utilized by Obama. However, all seemed to agree that actions will ultimately speak louder than words, and the true test will come in the following months as the president seeks to implement his policies. (More here)
Restoring Credibility on Human Rights and Democracy
On June 15th, POMED and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for American Progress held a panel discussion on restoring U.S. credibility on human rights in light of the current debate on torture and extraordinary rendition. Panelists expressed cautious optimism toward Obama’s approach to this issue but also outlined the problems he will face, both at home and abroad, with the closure of Guantanamo. (More here)
POMED in Print
Ahead of the President’s speech in Cairo, POMED’s Executive Director, Andrew Albertson and the Director of Advocacy, Stephen McInerney published a web exclusive for Foreign Policy titled “Don’t Give Up on Egypt.” As democracy and governance funding to Egypt was “quietly slashed” by 60 percent back in March, the article underscores the need for a consistent U.S. strategy that pairs democracy assistance with pro-democracy diplomacy as the best way to encourage gradual reform.
All Eyes on Iran
As the events of Iran’s contested election have been unfolding, POMED has diligently been following developments on its blog and weekly newsletter. On June 26, we hosted our monthly Hill briefing on this very topic, with Karim Sadjadpour providing his analysis of the situation. Meanwhile, Andrew Albertson discussed Obama’s reaction to the election results and subsequent protests with Montel Williams on Air America Radio’s Montel Across America and with Jeff Santos of Revolution Boston’s The Santos Show.
Happy Hour
POMED organized two fun happy hours this past month that brought together young professionals working on Middle East policy issues. If you wish to be added to the invite list for POMED’s upcoming happy hours, please contact happyhour@pomed.org.
Upcoming Appropriations Paper and Event
POMED’s Director of Advocacy, Stephen McInerney, is preparing to release his annual report on the president’s budget request, examining funding levels for FY2010 as they relate to democracy, governance, and human rights in the Middle East. POMED will be hosting a public roll out event on Capitol Hill on July 21th where Stephen will discuss the report’s findings. Stay tuned for more!
|
|
June Legislative Roundup
June was a busy month for Congress, particularly in terms of the appropriations process, as the House and Senate both passed the Conference Report of the FY09 emergency supplemental spending bill, while the House Appropriations Committee moved on immediately to FY10 State and Foreign Operations bill; which was marked up and approved by the subcommittee and full committee. In addition, a few bills were introduced in reaction to the crisis in Iran. In July, the House will aim to pass the State and Foreign Operations spending bill before adjourning for the August recess, while the Senate Appropriations Committee will mark up their version of the bill by mid-July.
Foreign Affairs Funding
On June 23, the House Appropriations Committee approved by voice vote the Fiscal Year 2010 State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, which provides for significant expansions of the State Department, USAID and security operations. Overall the bill would provide $48.8 billion for international affairs, $3.2 billion below the President’s request of $52.0 billion. Generally speaking, the bill provides nearly as much funding as requested by the President for Middle East programming, which includes significant increases for many programs and accounts for supporting democracy. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, The Middle East Partnership Initiative, The UN Democracy Fund, and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives were all listed by the committee as programs that were granted less funding than requested, but all four received sizable increases over their funding for FY 2009. The National Endowment for Democracy, on the other hand, receives funding of $100 million, equal to President Obama’s request, which is itself a reduction from the FY09 level of $115 million. A new Rapid Response Fund within USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives receives $50 million in the House bill, $26 million less than requested by the President. Also attached to the bill was an AIPAC-endorsed amendment expanding sanctions on Iran to target companies outside Iran that assist Iran with its domestic gasoline supply. A week prior, the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee marked up and approved its bill, and Chairwoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) released a statement and a press release outlining some highlights from the bill.
In addition, on June 10, the House approved in a 235-187 vote the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2410), a bill which authorizes appropriations for the Department of State for FY 2010 and 2011 and aims to modernize the Foreign Service. The bill, the first re-authorization bill introduced since 2002, aims to invigorate American diplomacy efforts through Department of State and USAID expansion and training.
On June 17, the House also passed the Conference Report for the Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental Spending Bill (H.R.2346) in a 226-202 vote. The $106 billion bill, which authorizes funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, had been debated since its introduction by (D-WI) in May. Separate versions of the bill had been passed by the House and the Senate in May. The Senate passed the Conference Report in a 91-5 vote on June 18. In addition to war funding, the bill also provides supplemental bilateral foreign assistance to a number of countries, including Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen.
Reacting to Iran
On Wednesday (6/24), Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) introduced H.Res.579, expressing support for all Iranian citizens who embrace the values of freedom, human rights, civil liberties, and rule of law called for the invitation for Iranian officials to attend 4th of July celebrations at U.S. Embassies abroad to be rescinded-was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The introduction of the bill coincided with an announcement from the White House that this invitation was in fact being rescinded.
On June 18, Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee introduced H.Res.560, condemning violence against Iranians and expresses support for “all Iranian citizens who embrace the values of freedom, human rights, civil liberties, and rule of law.” The House resolution passed the resolution under suspension of the rules in a 405-1 vote on the same day.
Pakistan and Afghanistan
On Thursday (6/11), the House passed H.R.1886, which provides for conditional trade and foreign aid to Pakistan. The bill increases non-military aid, authorizing $1.5 billion to Pakistan each year through 2013 and designates $400 million for military assistance in 2010.
On Tuesday (6/2), S.Con.Res19, originally introduced in the Senate by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and calling for the repeal of Afghanistan’s Personal Status Law, which “violates the fundamental human rights of women,” was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bill was passed in the Senate by unanimous consent on May 21.
|
The summer of 2009 – through the prism of Iranian youth
by Raja Karthikeya
The crisis in Iran was neither sudden nor merely triggered by the elections. It is the result of a general feeling of “oppression” and a sense of discontent felt by Iran’s youth – the post-1979 generation in the country. This generation, which came of age after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, views the rhetoric used by the regime to justify its laws and rules, with derision. The centrality of this generation to Iran’s future will not go away with the wane of the post-election protests – in fact, their story is just beginning.
Iranian youth do not buy into the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric in the same way as their parents. The Iranian regime’s propaganda has generally been characterized by three elements: nationalism, social conservatism and neo-socialism. For the generation that fought the Iran-Iraq war, these elements held a certain amount of appeal, but much less so for the generation that grew up in the nineties. Since the 1979 revolution, the regime in Tehran has sought to inter-weave nationalism with the legends of martyrdom from Shia Islam. For example, the regime in Tehran has woven through its propaganda a remarkable narrative linking the battle of Karbala with the Iran-Iraq war and the hostility toward Israel. This narrative, however, has been progressively rejected by the post-1979 generation, especially those with a college education. Sales of martyrs’ portraits and souvenirs have steadily fallen in Iran over the past decade. Imamzadehs (shrines) that are dedicated to fallen martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war are seeing decreasing attendance.
Jobs are what matter to Iran’s young people. To the more than 300,000 college graduates that Iran produces every year, the continued calls for sacrifice from the regime have started to sound hollow, particularly when there is no commensurate effort by the state to promote employment. Unemployment has climbed from 10 to 17 percent since Ahmedinejad came to power. Iran’s worsening international relations due to its controversial nuclear program has further weakened the domestic economy, contributing to the spike in visa applicants and the diminishing percentage who actually receive permission to travel, study or work abroad. Many of the 4,000 government sponsored scholars who go for studies abroad choose not to return.
Meanwhile, many youth chafe at Iran’s social strictures. Social conservatism by itself is not atypical of Iranian society, but the fact that it is enforced by the State is a major grievance among the youth. Social policing measures such as separation of the sexes (although at a much lower scale than in the Arab countries) and the enforcement of dress code for women (stricter code in the larger cities), and the necessity to display false piety in order to have any hope of securing government employment are issues of concern for youth.
Prior to the 2009 elections, this generation had felt deprived of an effective and coherent opposition to the regime around which they could gather. In most cases, they did not identify with the goals or methods of what opposition existed to the regime in Iran – foreign-supported agents of democracy promotion cum regime change or secular but violent dissidents like the Mujahedin-e-Khalq. Nor could they identify with monarchist voices from among the Iranian diaspora. The regime often exploited this fact by casting any dissident voice as belonging to either of these categories.
Mussavi thus came as a blessing for the Youth. The elections provided an opportunity for the young and unemployed to see that there was a chance of rejecting the regime. And although Mussavi is a doyen of neither democracy nor non-violence himself, he acted as a lighting rod for the youth because he questioned the regime.
The significance of the protests lay in that Civil Disobedience was actually rediscovered by a generation which has only heard about its use during the 1979 revolution. The justification for violence accompanying the narrative on martyrdom was effectively rejected – as exemplified by the flurry of Tweets after the shooting of Neda Soltan which appealed for “non-violent resistance”.
However, the very fact that these protests were overwhelmingly dominated by youth weakened them. They had tacit but inadequate active support from their parents’ generation (many of those who participated in the 1979 revolution now feel disenchanted with the regime). Further, given their relative inexperience, the Youth were not able to organize themselves into a broader, mass movement against the regime, and although the protests did rope in elements of the clergyd, they could not inspire support from among the armed forces. Worse, the leaders that the youth looked up to during these protests – Rafsanjani, Karroubi, Larijani and even at times, Mussavi – are not opponents of the theocratic regime but rather incrementalists whose opposition to the regime is based on a largely political (even self-serving) agenda. This did not help the Youth whose agenda is as much about social and economic goals as political change.
The moment for Iran’s youth may not have come yet, but it is clear that they – the post-1979 generation – have emerged as a potent political force. How Iran’s Generation Y capitalizes on this momentum will go far in determining how the drama unfolds from here.
Raja Karthikeya is an independent foreign policy analyst focusing on South Asia and the Middle East. He received a Masters of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, where he was a Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. |
|
|
