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In his opening remarks, Frederick Wehrey, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, discussed the perception among policymakers in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings that the Gulf remained a stable region immune to change. He noted that the exceptionality of the Gulf region in this regard was often attributed to factors such as oil rents, small and homogeneous populations, robust security forces, and high levels of wealth. However, Wehrey pointed out that another body of scholarship had been devoted to predicting the collapse of the Gulf regimes, focusing on factors such as the involvement of new social and political actors, an increasing youth population questioning the social contract, the diminishing returns of subsidies, increasing sectarianism, and the changing dynamics of global partnerships with external actors.

Kristen Diwan began her discussion by noting that describing the Gulf as “dynamic” pushed back against a “strong meta-narrative” that the Gulf is an “island of stability,” and added that it was important to acknowledge the changes taking place in the region. One of the major changes she identified is the overall form that activism takes. Traditionally, activism in the Gulf states occurred through organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and emphasized hierarchy, recruitment, education, da’wah, and a group mindset. However, Diwan noted that recent social changes, such as the rise of consumerism, have created an environment that is more individualistic, attune to personal preferences, and less exclusive. This phenomenon is also creating more opportunities for engagement and interaction. As a result, the old model of engagement used by organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer effective in rallying youth. New structures of activism, Diwan said, are not nearly as top-down, and are rooted more in volunteerism which allows activists to pursue individual strengths and interests. This new model also relies more on technology. These changes are important because they force us to take another look at who is influencing the younger generation, and reflect the frustration that young people are feeling with the formal government structure.

Jane Kinninmont re-emphasized the dynamism of the Gulf, noting that even if we are not seeing changes in formal political structures, we are seeing changes in informal politics and activism. Kinninmont said that although political grievances and demands over time have had common themes, the form that these grievances take has changed. She noted that since 2011, even Gulf countries with established parliamentary systems have grown dissatisfied with formal political structures. One of the newer forms this dissatisfaction has taken is the emergence of “leaderless” protests. This structure is beneficial to protesters because having no leadership makes it difficult for the government to suppress protests by arresting the top tiers of leadership, or to co-opt the leadership by giving them jobs. However, having no clear leadership makes it difficult to hold negotiations between the government and the opposition. Kinninmont also pointed out that the ideological basis for activism has changed substantially over time—from nationalism, to pan-Arabism, to political Islam—and noted that observers should question what ideological basis will follow Islamism. Next, Kinninmont discussed aspects of activism that were genuinely new developments. The involvement of women in political spaces is a recent development she said, pointing to a generation of young women that are involved in the government and in protests. “That generation of women wants something in return,” she said; however, women remain lacking in representation, and even those women in parliamentary structures are a very small minority and are largely pro-government. Another new factor impacting activism, Kinninmont said, is the access to international and social media, and the increased availability of information. She concluded by noting that it was important to remember that activism was not always necessarily “oppositional” in nature, and urged the audience to question what happens to people when they become “newly politicized” as those in the Gulf are.

Ahmed al Omran pointed to three activist movements that had been present in Saudi Arabia since the 2011 Arab uprisings. The first was the Shi’a movement in the eastern province; the second was the movement of the families of prisoners; and the third was the Saudi women’s movement for the right to drive. He noted two commonalities between these three movements. The first was that much of the activism took place on the streets, which was a rare occurrence until very recently. Al Omran pointed out that Saudi Arabia was an absolute monarchy, and that the people had no tradition of challenging the government. Furthermore, the Saudi regime often used religion to mollify protesters, imploring the religious establishment to issue fatwas against protesters. Secondly, al Omran emphasized the role of social media in providing a means through which to organize and hold debates. However, he noted that “these tools are agnostic,” and explained that the Saudi government eventually adopted social media as a way to promote their own agenda and counter the narratives of activist movements. He concluded that although protests had been limited, social media had encouraged new forms of criticism and debate that “are not just talk.” He added, “At some point, these people begin to convert these words into action.”

In response to a question from the audience about how youth in the Gulf felt about U.S. policy in the region, al Omran responded that, although the groups often claim that they are not waiting for our expecting U.S. support, there has been frustration that the U.S. has largely been ignoring government crackdowns on protests. Kinninmont added that youth tended to be critical of U.S. policy in Israel, Iraq, and Syria, and noted that the U.S. was “caught between a rock and a hard place” because, while the people in the Gulf see the U.S. as siding with their governments, the governments are sensitive to language from the U.S. encouraging democracy. Another audience member asked about the role of Gulf students educated abroad in the changing dynamics of activism. Kinninmont replied that students educated abroad were a major factor in driving change, but added that many came back to work for the government rather than to challenge it. Al Omran disagreed, noting that many returning graduates were unable to find employment, even with the government. He said this only served to further frustrate youth, and cautioned that Saudi Arabia might face a “brain drain” in the coming years.

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Okail posed a question to Dr. Arfaoui about whether she thought Tunisia’s revolution had been “hijacked” by Islamists, and asked her to comment on the state of freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and women’s rights in Tunisia today. Dr. Arfaoui discussed the changes in the status of women since Tunisia’s revolution. She noted that Tunisia’s independence in 1956 had opened a number of doors for women, and although Ghannouchi himself had stated he did not want to make any changes to women’s personal status in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the reality on the ground was different. “Women appear to be the first targets of the Islamists,” Dr. Arfaoui said.  She cited a number of examples, including changes occurring in schools whereby girls as young as five were required to wear a hijab and classes for boys and girls were held separately. She noted that the Islamists were “teaching hatred to children” by encouraging their participation in anti-secularist protests. Dr. Arfaoui also pointed to the increasing number of Tunisian jihadists being sent to Mali and Syria to fight, with girls as young as 13 sent to accompany them to as their “sex brides.” She declared that the Salafists were “attacking the very foundations of liberalism” and “changing the fabric of life” in Tunisia.

Okail expanded on this point, noting that Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya repeatedly emphasized that they would not ban practices commonly associated with secular ways of life. However, she argued the Islamists forget that the duty of a government is not simply to “not ban things,” but also to protect people’s right to engage in such activities. Okail asked how Dr. Arfaoui felt Islamist governments could best be encouraged to do this. Dr. Arfaoui replied that civil society has been very active on these issues; however, she noted that Islamists have the power and pointed to the recent constitutive assembly as an example of the clash between civil society and Islamists. She noted that, despite the efforts of the Islamist-dominated government to get a broad spectrum of civil society actors involved in the process, Islamists made changes to articles that had been previously agreed upon.

Dr. Arfaoui briefly discussed the Salafists’ source of funding, after an audience member noted that this was a conversation rarely held in D.C. because it often pointed to allies of the U.S. She stated, “We believe that Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been financing the Salafists,” and went on to describe how foreign funding enables the Salafists to capitalize on Tunisia’s dire economic situation through patronage. Later, in response to a follow up question from an audience member on what the U.S. should do to address the economic component of the problem, Dr. Arfaoui called on the U.S. to provide more support to Tunisia’s vibrant middle class and took issue with “the silence that has always been shown toward the lack of respect for the law in the country.” She stated, “The U.S. has a very important role and it should show a much firmer attitude toward the Islamists.”

Finally, when asked how the opposition was organizing in order to be a competitive force in the next round of elections, Dr. Arfaoui noted that most opposition groups had failed to heed warnings about the “Algerian example.” This time, however, she stated that many opposition parties were already in the process of joining together in order to limit fragmentation for the next round of elections. There are “still too many [parties],” she said, “but much better than 2011.”

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Daniel Calingaert introduced the panelists and noted several recent news pieces on the Syrian conflict.

Kinda Kanbar focused on rape and sexual violence in Syria, citing the research of human rights lawyer Laila Alodaat. She began by stating that Syrian women are in crisis. Kanbar provided statistics from Alodaat’s work on sexual violence in Syria, saying that 81 cases were recorded in March 2011. She pointed to a political ideology that tolerates sexual abuse and discrimination as a central problem, saying that this ideology is enshrined in legislation and litigation. She noted specific laws that exempt men from prosecution for killing or raping women under certain circumstances. She stated that legal reforms directed at changing these laws will only be effective if they are accompanied by a social, cultural, and political movement that eliminates the ideology that supports discrimination throughout Syrian society. Kanbar called for a more proactive role for judges in order to change these laws, efforts to integrate women into Syrian society and politics, and an efficient policy for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants.

Mohammed Aly Sergie described a surgical student enrolled in the University of Aleppo when the revolution began who has become deeply involved in activities related to the revolution. While many doctors left Aleppo as the area became more dangerous, this student remained in Aleppo to treat wounded rebels and regime soldiers. Through this role, he has built a reputation as an honest broker between the two sides. He was also elected to a position on Aleppo’s local administrative council. Sergie stated that the group of young doctors working in Aleppo has encountered the same problem faced by all organizations in Syria: a lack of funds. He noted the difficulty of establishing a transitional government and building legitimacy without funding. He argued that if organizations cannot deliver assistance to these doctors on the ground, they are “just an act of democracy” and do not change the situation.

Omar Hossino focused on relations between Syrian minorities. He noted the emergence of mediation groups addressing conflicts between minorities as reason for hope. These groups have emerged in areas of conflict between rebel groups and majority and minority groups. He cited two examples in which mediation between rebel ethnic groups and the Free Syrian Army has ended or prevented conflict between these rebel factions. He stated that these councils have forged mediated agreements in instances of ethnic fighting that did not include government forces. Hossino stated that efforts to solve local problems through a “local grassroots Syrian affair” have made him very hopeful for the future in Syria.

Oubab Khalil discussed stereotypes of the conflict in Western media, noting a tendency in the United States and the United Kingdom to characterize the situation in Syria as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites and calling this characterization “disturbing” and “not true.” He stated that sectarian tensions exist but said, “We have not seen any systematic retaliations.” Khalil also emphasized the need for an interim government. He stated that “every struggle must end with a political solution, an enforceable one,” adding that once an enforceable political agreement is in place, they can move to a transitional government. On the subject of intervention, he praised the United States as the highest donor of humanitarian aid but stated that the U.S. and U.K. are not doing Syrians a significant favor by protecting civilians because this protection is an international responsibility. He also asserted the opposition’s belief in the Geneva Communique as a foundation for a solution to the conflict.

Opening the Q&A, Daniel Calingaert asked whether Hossino’s examples of mediation councils are isolated incidents and whether the work of these groups could be translated to a broader level. Hossino responded that they were not isolated examples but said the groups could not have a significant impact on national issues, arguing that it would be difficult to establish the legitimacy needed to act so broadly and would be difficult to translate their ability to address micro-level issues to a capacity for handling broad questions of war and peace. Calingaert also prompted Kanbar to discuss further the problem of reporting sexual abuse and the role of women in Syrian society. Kanbar agreed that there are difficulties in documenting rape, noting a particular reluctance of victims to come forward in certain areas of the country. She also called for greater representation for women, directing a call for a 30% quota for female representation in the opposition to Khalil. Khalil agreed that greater representation was necessary and responded by stating that a 60% quota that roughly matched women’s proportion of the population might be more appropriate. Kanbar agreed that this quota would be more desirable but expressed her belief that the National Coalition would not allow such a high quota.

On the issue of rape, Khalil emphasized empowering civil society to receive and assist victims of sexual abuse. On a related question on the role of women, Sergie described workshops hosted in southern Turkey by American organizations for young Syrian activists and recounted an encounter with two young men who were avidly “evangelizing” for women’s rights after attending a workshop. He claimed the U.S. is unable to create democracy but that “promoting values is probably the best avenue to go.”

Responding to a question on whether proto-ministry groups would remain active during and after the transition, Sergie stated, “These are the guys who are going to stay.” Hossino echoed this sentiment. Answering a question regarding the revolution’s chances for success without armed outside assistance, Khalil said, “If we had a level playing field, we could do it on our own.” He noted, however, that the opposition is fighting more than just Assad’s forces, pointing to Russian arms sales to the regime and the participation of Iranian and Iraqi forces in the fighting. He stated that the opposition may be able to dissolve the regime but they will not be able to return to the pre-war status quo without assistance and will eventually live in a failed state. Sergie agreed, adding that the weapons the rebels have received from other countries are “rudimentary” and are not a match for the capabilities of the regime. On the subject of foreign aid, Sergie stated that rebel groups are receiving money but the funds are insufficient. Khalil noted that there can be a substantial gap between when aid is pledged and when it is distributed.

When asked what concrete steps should be taken by the international community, Khalil called for stronger leadership, enforcement of a full or limited no-fly zone, lethal support, and increased humanitarian aid. He stated that balance of power on the ground must be achieved in order to achieve a political transition, saying it would change Assad’s calculus by showing the need for a power transition. Kanbar stated that they need to see a sign of goodwill from the regime that indicates it is ready for negotiations.

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Daniel Brumberg, Senior Adviser at USIP and Co-Director of Georgetown University’s Democracy and Civil Society Program, gave welcoming remarks and spoke of the opportunity to engage in a productive conversation with the guest delegation from Tunisia. Dr. William Zartman, Professor Emeritus of Johns Hopkins University SAIS, opened the discussion with a short assessment of current political dynamics in Tunisia. He pointed out that despite the disappointments of the Tunisian revolution thus far, “any coin has two sides,” and there still exists reasonable justification for optimism. Tunisia has held free and fair elections, the country is currently being ruled by a coalition government rather than single authoritarian leader, and a constitution that sets a precedent for multi-party rule is still in the works.

“Key Political and Economic Challenges: The Broad Horizon”

Lotfi Mechichi, Dean and member of the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Tunis, opened the first panel discussion with a brief summary of the transformations that have taken place in Tunisia since the revolution began. While in the first year of the revolution Tunisia saw much success, several revolutionary objectives have not yet been met by the government, including the achievement of dignity and improvement of economic conditions. The principal battle now takes place over ideological and political conflicts, Mechichi said.

Salwa Trabelsi, Professor at the School for Higher Education in Economic and Commercial Sciences in Tunis spoke on the current economic situation and key challenges. She analyzed a number of socio-economic indicators in a comparative perspective pre- and post-revolution, namely dropout, poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy rates and the variance across provinces. She noted that levels of public and private investment are higher in the southern and coastal areas and lowest in the inland regions, where there are the greatest socio-economic disparities. Trabelsi also pointed out that these disparities were the principal problems that instigated the revolution, and have worsened in the two years since. The main challenge will therefore be to strengthen economic and social cohesion across regions through education, health, and infrastructure investment that targets inland provinces in particular. This can be accomplished through government intervention that encourages private investment, rather than privatization and public disengagement.

Mohamed Chafik Sarsar, Professor at the Faculty of Law and Politics at the University of Manar, discussed how Tunisia’s revolution has “escaped typical patterns” of transition. Certain characteristics of the uprising provide hope for a new kind of democratic transition, including its comparative peaceful nature, absence of leadership directing the transition process, and consensus achieved in the high authority of the revolution. Nevertheless, difficulties have accumulated since the elections, including lack of achievement of political consensus, need to adopt a democratic constitution and regain confidence of the citizenry and international actors, deteriorating security situation, and economic instability. The three principal challenges for the government remain: 1) resolving the timing problem—delays in achieving electoral and transitional justice undermines the legitimacy of political actors, 2) reconstruction of the political landscape, and 3) the “double problem” of reforming the justice system and achieving transitional justice. To meet these challenges dialogue should take place so that consensus can be achieved.

Stephen McInerney, Executive Director at POMED, considered the question “where are we going?” regarding the future of the Tunisian transition. He emphasized the fact that unemployment and poverty problems have not improved, but worsened over the past two years, and economic challenges cannot be separated from the political challenges. The international community has however tried to separate the two concerns, and provide economic support while leaving political needs aside. The strategy of focusing on financial support should therefore “be coupled with pressure on the elected government to address political concerns.” McInerney also pointed out that the timeline issue addressed by previous panelists is very much intertwined with other issues of concern; the lack of achievement of the one-year constitutional mandate has complicated the political process, impacted the credibility of elections, and fostered the proliferation of political parties. Moreover, the political landscape has changed since the elections, and the constituent assembly and government no longer reflect the will of the people or represent the dominant political forces in the country, fostering decreasing legitimacy and credibility of political parties. The government therefore needs to solidify a timeline in a credible way, and address economic disparities between governorates so that the political process can move forward.

In the Q&A session, the panelists addressed a number of questions posed by the audience. Regarding why the process of agglomeration toward a smaller number of political parties has been so slow moving, Zartman pointed out that the pattern is hardly surprising; continuing divisions among coalitions prevents achievement of high levels of support. McInerney contended that this has been further hindered by the uncertainty over the outcome of the constitution and electoral law writing processes. Trabelsi again reiterated the problem of investor confidence, which must be resolved to deal with Tunisia’s economic difficulties. Sarsar cautioned against the potential risk of Tunisia moving towards a hybrid regime rather than full democratic consolidation.

“Gender, Religion, Media and the Struggle over the Constitution”

The second session began with Fethia Saidi, Professor of Sociology at the University of Manar in Tunis, who discussed women’s rights in Tunisia, comparing their status in society and pre- and post-revolution. Prof. Saidi expounded on the many international conventions on the rights of women that Tunisia is party to, as well as the many national laws that protect women’s rights and gender equality in Tunisia. She went on to note that though Tunisian women’s rights are protected on paper, these laws’ application is far from complete, citing clear income inequality, limited access to the job market for women, and the low number of women serving in the National Constituent Assembly. She also noted the wider traditional societal constraints that seem to have become stronger since the more conservative Islamist and Salafist forces have taken a more open and active role in Tunisian social and political life since the revolution.

The panel continued with Professor Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Professor of Law at the University of Kairouan in central Tunisia, who discussed security sector reform and the continuing process of drafting the post-revolutionary constitution.  In unpacking the issue of security sector reform, Ben Mahfoudh explained that the institutions of Tunisia’s security sector are well formed, which has be helpful in maintaining security. However, in addition to providing reliable and quality security for citizens, the security forces must be more transparent, democratic, accountable, and maintain standards of human rights. He also noted that beyond reforming the Ministry of Interior’s police and national guard institutions, parallel reforms are needed to bring order, professionalism, independence to the Ministry of Justice and to institutionally bring the military under civilian control. Prof. Ben Mahfoudh continued by discussing security reform in the context of the constitution under discussion by the NCA. He characterized the first draft of the constitution negatively. However, he went on to describe the second draft of the constitution released in December 2012 and the current draft under discussion now in the NCA as having made significant improvements. The more current drafts include some mention of reforms to ensure human rights, transparency, and parliamentary oversight, but largely focus on increasing efficacy and capacity of security forces and not enough to ensure effective security sector reform.

Next, Professor Faycal Allani of the University of Tunis gave his analysis and breakdown of the different Islamist groups currently in Tunisia. Prof. Allani laid out the major divisions between what he described as the two major “currents” of Islamism in Tunisia today.  The first “current” he described was the more conservative groups of Salafis, many of whom view democracy as a corrupting influence of the West, and incompatible with Islam. The second “current” he described as moderate Islamists, who see some problems reconciling certain liberal democratic values (human rights, women’s rights, judicial punishments, etc.) with their views, yet seem to accept the premise of democracy. Prof. Allani later indicated a possible third path exemplified by the ruling Ennahda Party’s platform of democratic values supported and inspired by Islam. Ultimately, according to Allani, the struggle for Islam’s role in the state comes down to each political group interpretation of Article 1 of the Bourguiba constitution which states, “Tunisia is a civil state whose religion is Islam and whose language is French.” While this debate in recent weeks and months has become more outwardly violent, Allani indicated that the debate has lived for decades and will likely continue.

Manal Omar of the United States Institute of Peace concluded the panel with positive remarks about the enlightening comments of the panel, and expressed her optimism at the seeming willingness to have the difficult conversations to deal with the diverse issues facing Tunisia. She also highlighted that, in her view, the way that women’s issues are dealt with in moving forward with Tunisia’s transition is a good indicator for how well the process will move forward as a whole, and has wider affects on other issues such as Islam and the state, and issues in security sector reform. She also tried to highlight the “social contract” that must exist between the grassroots and the larger state institutions on all of the issues, ranging from women’s rights and the constitution to security sector reform and the issue of Islam and the state.

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Senator Robert Casey opened the hearing by citing statistics on the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Syria and sharing specific stories of individuals who have been affected by the Syrian conflict. He applauded the aid community for the work in delivering assistance, noting the U.N.’s inability under international law to enter Syria to deliver aid directly without an invitation from the Assad government. He also discussed the strain Syrian refugees have placed on neighboring countries. Casey noted the election of Ghassan Hitto as prime minister of the opposition’s interim government, calling him “a capable alternative to Assad” and stating that he would give the United States and the international community an important partner in distributing aid.

Senator James Risch, Ranking Member of the subcommittee, expressed concern over the U.S.’s ability to aid the Syrian population, saying, “The finances of this country have deteriorated to the point that we cannot provide the kind of assistance we used to provide in the past.” He emphasized the complexity of the situation in Syria and expressed interest in what a post-Assad Syria will look like.

In the first panel, the Honorable Anne Richard began her testimony by discussing the issues associated with Syrian refugees. She noted the growing number of refugees, citing the recent milestone of one million refugees. She also expressed gratitude to the countries who have allowed Syrian refugees to enter and noted the strain placed on the infrastructure and host communities of these countries. Richard urged that these countries keep their borders open. Discussing the State Department’s aid efforts, Richard stated that the State Department is working to get as much aid as possible to the victims of violence in Syria. State Department funds are used to meet basic humanitarian needs like shelter, water, and health. Richard stated that humanitarian organizations provide aid in a neutral and impartial manner and it is a violation of humanitarian principles for Syria to deny U.N. access for the purposes of distributing assistance. She also claimed that humanitarian aid will likely continue beyond Assad’s fall, saying, “needs could extend into the long term.” Discussing the State Department’s ongoing efforts to provide the maximum amount of assistance, Richard said the State Department is deepening its coordination with the Syrian opposition coalition’s coordination unit. She also stated that they are speaking with other governments about their monetary pledges, traveling to the region, and trying to gain access to hard-to-reach places in Syria in an effort to “save as many lives as possible.”

The Honorable Nancy Lindborg stated that U.S. aid has been a lifeline to people inside Syria. Discussing the current level of aid, she said, “We know it’s not enough, but we’re working to ensure that it reaches as broad a swath of those in need.” She also stated that it is more important than ever for the international community to increase its pledges of assistance as the situation in Syria worsens. Lindborg stated that the U.S. works closely with the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit as well as with the United Nations, NGOs, and local Syrian groups. She stated that USAID has prioritized food, basic medical and trauma care, and relief supplies as the primary needs. She noted a particular focus on assisting Syrians who are internally displaced. Lindborg also stated that all programs are looking at the psycho-social impact of this conflict. She noted the shifting focus as winter ends, saying that warm weather brings increased concerns about clean water and sanitation to prevent the spread of water-borne diseases. She stated that there are particular problems with access and security. She also discussed the question of branding assistance, saying that branding is an essential part of ensuring that Syrians know the U.S. is sending assistance but can become a security problem for humanitarian workers on the ground. She closed by calling all countries to contribute to the assistance effort and stating that a full-fledged humanitarian response is necessary for Syrians to achieve their democratic aspirations.

Senator Casey asked Lindborg to expand on her statements on branding. Lindborg said that USAID wants to ensure that their partners and aid recipients are not targeted. She stated that they add branding when possible and work through social media and Arabic media within Syria in order to communicate to the Syrian people that the U.S. stands with them.

Senator Ron Johnson asked Richard to provide a breakdown of the percentage of casualties that have been opposition or Assad supporters and a breakdown of the number of supporters of the regime among the refugee population. Richard stated that there is no breakdown for casualties. She stated that most refugees are critical of the regime and are horrified by the situation in Syria. Johnson also asked if there was a likely scenario in which Assad remained in power and the humanitarian crisis did not escalate. Lindborg stated that there will probably be assistance for a long time to come, and Richard stated that it is hard to imagine a winding down of the conflict while Assad is in power. Johnson asked if the goal of U.S. policy should be the removal of Assad. Richard responded that Ambassador Robert Ford is dealing with the political side of the conflict. Johnson also questioned the ability to move funds around in the foreign aid budget. Richard said that the State Department’s budget request for this year was submitted before the escalation of the crisis and expressed gratitude to Congress for allowing flexibility in using contingency funds. She also stated that “the mood on the Hill” forces the Department to be very careful about how it spends its money. Johnson closed by asking how high a priority Syria is in the administration, and Richard and Lindborg both stated that it is a top priority in their offices.

Senator Barbara Boxer asked about the situation of female refugees, particularly victims of sexual assault, and child refugees. Richard stated that her office funds UNHCR and NGOs in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq to respond to sexual violence and prevent reoccurrence. Lindborg stated that USAID is supporting hospitals and clinics inside Syria and is prioritizing getting rape kits to these facilities and training healthcare staff on providing counseling services.

Senator Bob Corker asked whether the U.S. is doing enough to prepare for the day after Assad falls. Richard stated that the administration formed committees early last year to begin planning for this possibility. She also stated that not enough is being done by other countries to contribute funds to prepare for reconstruction efforts. Corker also asked what the U.S. could do to ensure the success of the new prime minister of the interim government. Lindborg stated that it is essential that Hitto gain the trust of the people by delivering essential services. Corker also inquired about whether Syrians know the U.S. is providing assistance. Lindborg affirmed that they know the U.S. helping.

Senator Benjamin Cardin asked for assurances that aid money is furthering U.S. national interests and is helping Syrians achieve their objectives. Richard stated that she has confidence that aid to refugees is being provided in a very efficient way, pointing to a significant professionalization of aid providers in recent years. She also noted the challenge of access.

In the second panel, Antonio Gutteres began by discussing the significant problems associated with the refugees, citing the numbers of refugees in Syria’s neighboring countries and the specific burdens associated with this influx of refugees. He called the growing number of refugees an “alarming escalation.” Guterres outlined a variety of groups the U.N. is working with, including NGO partners, local authorities, host communities, religious leaders, and the refugees themselves. He noted specific efforts to assist victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. Guterres also stated that there is significant concern over internally displaced persons in Syria and noted the specific case of Palestinian refugees living in Syria. He stated that the UNHCR was focusing on providing “community services, shelter assistance and providing relief items to internally displaced people” in both opposition- and government-controlled areas. He urged international support for countries hosting refugees, noting the economic and social strains the refugees placed on these communities. He expressed particular concern over a “dramatic lack of resources” to fund these efforts and stated that if the agencies and organizations dealing with this crisis run out of funding, the results could be disastrous. Gutteres closed by saying that the current situation in Syria poses a risk of escalating beyond the international response capacity on political, security, and humanitarian dimensions.

Senator Casey inquired about details on the gap in resources Guterres had identified. Guterres stated that the gap is in pledges made and that the UNHCR is continuing its work and hoping for increased support. He also said that he expects one million refugees to be living in each of the current host countries by the end of 2013.

Senator Johnson stated that humanitarian aid is a band-aid but the true cure in Syria is the fall of Assad; he asked Guterres whether that fall is inevitable. He also expressed concern over who would replace the Assad regime and over possible resentment of America by Syrians for not doing more militarily. Guterres stated that there is no military solution to the current crisis and that he worries that the conflict could last and lead to a permanent degradation of the living situation in Syria. He also called for the international community to unite to find an international solution.

Senator Casey closed by asking about the most difficult challenge of the humanitarian crisis. Guterres expressed concern that the informed and politicized community would become angrier and more active and contribute to more spillover of the conflict.

During the third panel, Tom Malinowski described his recent trip to Syria, saying that “suffering was extreme and evident.” He said it was striking how absent the United States and the United Nations were in Aleppo and noted the “Sophie’s choice” the U.N. faced regarding operating in either the south or the north. He said he had witnessed anger at the U.S. for not doing more, saying that Syrians assume U.S. actions are part of larger plan and therefore assume that a lack of help symbolizes a desire for Assad to win. Malinowski did note, however, a significant increase in aid over the months since his visit. He stated that the central problem is not the humanitarian issue alone, but rather is the punitive scud strikes launched by the government, which make the implementation of humanitarian assistance plans impossible and makes targeted areas ungovernable. He argued that there is that can be done to open borders, register NGO workers on the ground, and get the United Nations operating on the ground. He echoed Lindborg’s concerns about branding aid but deferred to the people on the ground and their judgment on the security of branded aid. He also stated that it is “profoundly unfair” that the burden of proving U.S. assistance is placed on the people on the ground distributing the aid. He argued that this is the job of governments. Malinowski closed by saying that humanitarian assistance is desperately needed but that the U.S. is not meeting its responsibilities if focuses only on this aid rather than addressing the source of the suffering.

Michael Singh stated that it is impossible to address the conflict in Syria without a plan to resolve the origin of the crisis. He argued that the U.S. has a strategic interest in doing more, citing the possibility of spillover of the conflict, the destabilizing effect of the refugees on the region, and Assad’s role as a conduit of Iranian power in the Levant as particular concerns for the U.S. He argued that the current U.S. policy is not working. He also stated that we must assess our objectives, which he claimed are bringing the war to a quick resolution, preventing further spillover of the conflict, and strengthening the moderate opposition in Syria. He pointed out obstacles to success, including the presence of extremists in the opposition and the possibility that the Syrian government may resort to using chemical weapons. Singh proposed a three-pillar strategy focused on people, funding, and military support. He urged the U.S. to advocate for the representation of Syrian minorities in the opposition government and called for incentives for military officers and other high-level Assad supporters to defect. He also urged support for opposition leaders focused on democratic government. Singh argued for increased sanctions on the governments providing goods and other support to the Assad regime and increased humanitarian support. He also claimed that the U.S. must degrade the regime forces or bolster the opposition forces. He noted the regime’s reliance on air forces and called for a discussion in NATO for limited air strikes to destroy this capability. He stated that it is necessary to build support for these steps internationally rather than attempting to implement the strategy alone. He closed by saying that bolder action carries risks, but inaction carries risk as well.

Senator Casey asked Malinowski to discuss the influence of extremist groups within the opposition, specifically requesting a breakdown of the composition of the opposition. Malinowski stated that there are clearly some extremists involved in the opposition and that there is a perception among Syrians that they are not getting help from anyone else; essentially, “bad guys [are] filling the void.” He said there is an attitude that the U.S. is using these groups as an excuse not to provide assistance. He noted a relationship between Syrians’ perception of the amount of help from the international community and how the extremists provide help. He also stated that there is not significant support for extremists among the general opposition. Singh added that we need to ask the administration why there is not greater knowledge about the composition of the opposition.

Senator Johnson asked for an explanation of the administration’s reluctance to do more militarily in Syria. Malinowski stated that the president must weigh the ability to save lives and the consequences of inaction against the next step after the conflict ends. Johnson also inquired about methods of providing arms, to which Singh noted the importance of degrading Assad’s forces with air power and bolstering opposition security forces that would remain useful after Assad’s ouster.

Senator Casey closed by inquiring about the use of sanctions to create pressure on the regime. Singh stated that more sanctions may not be sufficient to convince Assad to cease his fight for survival but they may help encourage defections from Assad’s inner circle.

For full event notes, continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Dr. Nejib Ayachi, President of the Maghreb Center, began the opening remarks panel by reminding the attendees of the “tense political atmosphere” that has developed in Tunisia in addition to the security situation which “has become unpredictable to say the least.”  He noted that Chokri Belaid‘s assassination was the first political assassination in Tunisia since political independence in 1956.

Dr. Mohammed Mattar, Executive Director of The Protection Project at The Johns Hopkins University, welcomed attendees by raising three important issues he thought would be addressed throughout the day’s discussion. First, Mattar identified a need to examine the relation between international law and the Tunisian constitution, which is still being drafted. Second, he discussed how the new constitution will protect women’s rights. He noted the draft constitution had articles that obliged the state to protect women’s rights and gave specific protections against violence towards women, and he said he hoped these articles would stay in the final version. Third, Mattar highlighted the issue of Islam in forming Tunisia’s new constitution. “I am against separation between religion and state,” he said, but added “the question is how you interpret religion.”

Issam Saliba, Secretary of the International Council for Middle Eastern Studies, stated that his comments were strictly his opinion and did not represent any organization he was affiliated with. Saliba believes that there are two important hurdles to overcome in Tunisian: the economy and the relationship between Islam and the state. Specifically, he said, “the question is not whether the government should be Islamic; the question is, ‘what is an Islamic state?’”

Following the opening remarks, the panel on the post-revolution political and constitutional transitions began. Alexis Arieff, analyst for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, spoke first. She reminded attendees that after the initial revolution, Tunisia faced many internal challenges and the transition process “seemed to be slow and unwieldy.” Elections in 2011 re-energized this process, but every time Tunisians wait until the last minute to come together it deepens “the level of mistrust between segments of the Tunisian political elite.”

Dr. Ahmed El Hamri, a development economist at The World Bank, discussed the economic conditions that led to the Tunisian revolution and the continuing problems that Tunisia still faces. He noted that economists considered Tunisia a regional showcase in the 90′s and 00′s as there was strong growth that resulted from Tunisia’s focus on exports. “Despite this growth, the main motivation for the uprising was that many Tunisians were excluded from the benefits.” He blamed the fundamental economic model used in Tunisia, which he said created a mismatch between created jobs and the skills of the labor force. Education increased significantly but a growth of skilled jobs did not, creating a large population of unemployed but educated Tunisians. He also noted a downward trend of private investment in the past two decades, making Tunisia one of only three countries in the MENA region that witnessed a decline in investment as a percentage of GDP.

El Hamri noted that Tunisia still faces “significant socioeconomic development challenges.” His forecast was bleak, saying that while the new government put in place an action plan, the economy is likely to remain in a recessive mode.  He pointed to Tunisia’s increasing external debt as a major problem and predicted a continuing decline in the export of goods and tourism revenue in addition to an increase in public debt, inflation, and the chronic unemployment rate. El Hamri then listed suggestions he had for Tunisia. First, he stressed the need to limit external debt. This could be done through international debt forgiveness, the opening of special export channels, and by returning money to the Tunisian people through the World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR).  He also recommended that the new constitution include language that addresses corruption in order to improve business and good governance practices.  Furthermore, he recommended getting rid of gender disparities in the work environment, reducing geographic disparities as most economic development is at the coasts, creating a social inclusion program targeted at the poor, and revising the investment code.  He concluded by saying “Tunisia needs a lot of help from the international community,” specifically with regard to their international debt. He added, “I stress the implementation of the StAR initiative that should give Tunisia the assurance that the international community is with them.”

In a question and answer session that followed the panel, El Hamri said “Yes, we got it wrong,” in response to a question about whether the World Bank was inaccurate in its positive assessment of Tunisia pre-Arab Spring. Commenting on the economic situation of Tunisia’s past, moderator Dr. William Zartman said, “Tunisia succeeded very much in the education sector but the economic model was not good… every time a business succeeded it was taken over by Ben Ali.”

Eric Goldstein of Human Rights Watch opened the second session by discussing human rights, democratic transition, and the new constitution. He said that Tunisia is “in a transitional stage politically” and the situation there is “volatile.” He said the lack of a general election since the revolution raises some issues for human rights because the current government has a limited mandate and does not have the same legitimacy of an elected government. Discussing the new draft of the constitution, Goldstein said that there are improvements between the first and second drafts. However, he expressed concern over Article 15, which makes Tunisia’s respect for international conventions contingent on whether those conventions contravene Tunisia’s constitution, and over “inadequate” provisions for an independent judiciary. He also said that ensuring human rights is only partly about getting the constitution right. Goldstein commented on the state of Tunisia’s security sector, saying it is in transition. Specifically, he said that the police are not always doing their job, which produces a climate of insecurity and sometimes increases the boldness of militant groups. He also said changing the way the police manage protests is an important part of security sector reform. Tunisian police had never dealt with the protests on this scale before the revolution because demonstrations were illegal under Ben Ali. He also mentioned concerns over the presence of armed individuals who work with the police but move among the population in plain clothes; Goldstein argued that this limits police accountability. Goldstein stated that the draft law on transitional justice, which would establish a truth commission, is a good law. He said a major question facing Tunisia is how to build a judiciary where judges feel independent and thus begin to act independently. He stated that there has been progress in freedom for NGOs and general transparency in Tunisia. He said foreign human rights organizations are allowed to maintain a presence in Tunisia and activists are not denied entry to the country. He said there is a “spirit of cooperativeness” across the government. Goldstein stated that Tunisia is now “unquestionably better than it was under Ben Ali” but that its transition will continue to be “messy” for years to come.

Naziha Rejiba, a Tunisian journalist and human rights activist, spoke about freedom of the press. She began by praising the role of the press in Tunisia’s history and culture. She called the current situation in Tunisia a moment of “creative chaos.” She said the chaotic atmosphere that surrounded the election affected the outcome, pointing to a recent controversial film portraying the prophet Mohamed as a trigger that temporarily shifted support to Ennahda before the election. Rejiba described several means used to limit the media, including death threats to journalists and physical punishment. She also said the Islamist government blames its negative image among the public on what they call anti-government media. Rejiba stated that democracy and human rights advocates will not allow Ennahda or any other group to kill their dream of democracy. She also argued that Tunisia must have free journalists before it can have free speech.

Nancy Okail of Freedom House spoke on Islamists and women’s rights. She said that although the status of Tunisian women is one of the most progressive in the region, there are “conflicting signals” on their current situation. Most of the progress on women’s place in Tunisian society is associated with the Ben Ali regime, which is now used as an excuse for the ruling Islamists to move in the opposite direction. She said women’s rights must be viewed in relation to the power dynamics in the country and in terms of who and what is driving change. She said incidents of repression of women are often also stories of the police state and a lack of rights for all Tunisians. Based on this, she argued that women’s issues are not isolated. She said repression is felt by all marginalized populations, including women, youth, and religious minorities. Okail also discussed the role of drivers of change, saying that not all drivers of change are positive and that there are often triggers brought about by an accumulation of effort. She said rules and laws are not the only tools to create change and basic imbalances in society must be addressed in order for change to have an effect. She said this is particularly true in situations where structural barriers remain in spite of the passage of a law that nominally allows an activity, for example allowing women to participate in political life but scheduling all political meetings after women’s curfew to prevent their attendance. Okail listed education and media tools to change culture. She closed by saying that change cannot be pursued in isolation from human rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press.

Among the questions during the question and answer session was an inquiry about specific desired reforms for the judiciary in the new constitution. Panelists indicated that Ennahda was reluctant to reform the judiciary and security sector because it is able to use them for its own benefit. Goldstein spoke specifically about the need to reform the way police and judges handle criminal cases, saying that the current practice of relying solely on a single confession or witness statement for conviction needed to give way to a new practice of thorough police work and judiciary judgments that fully investigate crimes. A question on the role of media and social media in the transition was raised. Rejiba stated that Facebook has been critical in mobilizing people for demonstrations, for information sharing between Tunisian and Egyptian youth on demonstration tactics, and for publishing facts about political life in Tunisia. She also noted the potential negative impact of social media, citing slander, spreading rumors, and scaring citizens as common negative uses of media. She also mentioned efforts by some to develop a framework for rationalizing and managing Facebook. Okail discussed the role of social media in equalizing voices in the public sphere, saying that the social space had traditionally allocated power according to position but social media allowed citizens to interact freely with no power hierarchy to obstruct discussion. Okail also noted that the impact of social media is limited by poor education and low literacy rates in Tunisia. Goldstein commented that “social media is not the exclusive domain of the good guys.” The final question addressed the issue of whether change in Tunisia is simply a phase or will be genuine and lasting. Rejabi stated that Tunisia will come through the era of Islamists and return to normal and that ultimately the issue of Islamism will need to be resolved to achieve peaceful coexistence among the people of Tunisia. The moderator closed by saying that there will be setbacks but Tunisia is moving in the right direction.

Photo Credit: Reuters

King Abdullah swore in Saudi Arabia’s first female members of the Shura Council on Tuesday. One fifth of the new Shura Council is comprised of women, with a total of 30 female members.  The Council is remodeling its chambers to accommodate gender segregation among members. The change is hailed by some as an important step toward female participation in the Saudi public sphere, but critics claim the change is only symbolic given the Council’s limited legislative power and the king’s role in appointing its members. King Abdullah has also enacted reforms allowing women to vote and compete in municipal elections in 2015.

Meanwhile, countries across the Gulf are acquiring military hardware. The purchases point to rising concerns among Gulf states about the threat of Iran’s nuclear program and the potential spreading of regional unrest. Requested hardware includes mine-resistant vehicles, a Patriot missile system, medium-range surface-to-air missiles, warplanes, and observation drones. Private companies and Western states, including Britain and France, are competing for the sales. Recent requests by the United Arab Emirates to the U.S. Congress for defense missiles have raised questions regarding whether the U.S. is backing a GCC effort to develop a regional missile defense shield. Analysts indicate that the idea of a regional shield is up for debate but that there is not yet multinational cooperation on the subject and plans for a shield would face significant political obstacles in the region.

Photo Credit: Susan Baaghil/Reuters

A group of Saudi women and children were arrested last weekend after publicly demanding the release of relatives that have been held by the state for years without access to a lawyer.  The women were arrested because protests are illegal in Saudi Arabia, but the authorities also arrested the children who were brought to the demonstration by their mothers or grandmothers. CNN reports that three of the women arrested are family members of prominent political activist Suleiman al-Rashudi. Al-Rashudi was arrested in December after giving a speech that said protests are permitted in Islam.

Meanwhile, Simon Henderson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy wrote about the royal succession possibilities in Saudi Arabia today, examining the possibility of Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, half-brother of King Abdullah, becoming the next king. Prince Muqrin was recently appointed the second deputy prime minister, the third most powerful position in the country. The current king, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, is 88 years old and the crown prince, Salman bin Abdulaziz, is 77 and suffers from dementia. As all previous Saudi kings have been the sons of the first king, Ibn Saud, the relatively healthy 70 year old Prince Muqrin is a likely option for royal succession. Henderson notes that while Prince Muqrin’s mother was Yemeni, and possibly not even married to Ibn Saud, his father ”clearly regarded Muqrin as a full son,” and he has a “bond” with current King Abdullah because both men have  no full brothers.

The succession possibilities get more complex when examining Saudi law. Henderson points out that the Basic Law of Governance says “rule passes to the sons of the founding king and to their children’s children,” and that among the sons, rule should pass to “the most upright” without giving a definition of what that means.  While the current king created an Allegiance Council to help with the next succession, Henderson notes that “there is nothing to stop the king from abolishing the Allegiance Council and establishing alternative procedures.”

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Libya’s  General National Congress voted Wednesday to directly elect the 60  members to the Constitutional Commission. A  previous National Transitional Council declaration stipulated that the members would be appointed, but disagreements over the makeup of the body’s membership has stirred controversy since congressional elections last July.  “It is obvious people wanted elections,” Hassan El Amin, an independent lawmaker from the western city of Misrata, said. “There’s a lack of confidence in the National Congress.” Tarek Mitri, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and chief of the UN Support Mission in Libya, said, “This decision is an important milestone, paving the way for continued progress toward a constitution that reflects the needs, priorities, and aspirations of the Libyan people.” No date for elections was announced, but a congressional committee to establish the High National Electoral Commission, the body charged with setting up and overseeing the Constitutional Commission’s elections, will be established in the next three days.

In Syria, opposition leader Mouaz al Khatib gave the government of Bashar al Assad until Sunday to release all female detainees or his offer for direct talks would be rescinded.  ”If the women are not released by Sunday I consider that the regime wants to break the initiative,” al Khatib said in a BBC interview Wednesday. It is unclear how many female detainees Assad’s government is holding, but al Khatib has conditioned dialogue with the regime on the release of an estimated 160,000 political prisoners.  The government has not responded to al Khatib’s offer.

Photo Credit: AFP

A 28-year-old protester died early Monday morning after allegedly being tortured to death, an Egypt opposition party charges. Mohammed el Gindy was protesting in Tahrir Square last month on the second anniversary of the country’s revolution  before going missing for several days.  According to the Health Ministry, el Gindy, unconscious and suffering from internal bleeding, was brought by ambulance to a Cairo hospital January 28 – four days after he went missing – having been involved in a “car accident.” Activists detained with el Gindy in a police roundup last week reported that he was taken to a police camp and subjected to torture.  Mona Amer, a spokeswoman for Popular Current, the party to which el Gindy belonged, said she observed signs of electrocution, strangulation and broken ribs on el Gindy’s body. Mohamed Abdel Aziz, a lawyer with Al-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, accused the hospital of changing el Gindy’s arrival date to conceal his kidnapping.  The Interior Ministry issued no immediate comment.

Widespread protests and allegations of violence have rocked Egypt in the past two weeks, including reports of ongoing sexual violence against women in Tahrir Square and the dissemination of video purportedly showing several police officers dragging and beating a naked man on a Cairo street last Friday.  The National Salvation Front on Sunday issued a statement condemning President Morsi, the security forces and the Interior Ministry for failing to protect peaceful protesters and holding them responsible for the violence and torture in recent days. The prosecutor-general’s office has called for an investigation into protests outside the Presidential Palace on Friday that left one person dead, and President Morsi’s office said in a Facebook statement Monday that it had ordered a probe into el Gindy’s death, adding, “[there is] no return to rights abuses of citizens and their freedoms… after the January 25 revolution.”