On Tuesday, June 18, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing titled “Elections in Iran: The Regime Cementing its Control.” Mr. Alireza Nader, Senior International Policy Analyst at RAND Corporation, Dr. Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate at the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, testified. The subcommittee’s chairman, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), presided.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

In Rep. Ros-Lehtinen’s opening statement, “in our fervor to repudiate all things Ahmedinejad,” Ros-Lehtinen called Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani a “moderate hope.” She argued that it would be detrimental for the United States to “lull itself” into believing that the election was a victory for the Iranian people, as it was still ultimately Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini who made the decision to let Rouhani become President. In her view, the regime continues with “cementing its control” and will march on with its nuclear program. She called Rouhani part of the “core of the inner circle and an ally of those who led the 1979 revolution. She also mentioned Rouhani’s 1999 role in leading a violent crackdown on a student uprising against the regime, his role in concealing Iran’s nuclear program for 20 years before becoming the project’s chief international negotiator, as well as condemned the Iranian government for deeming women and members of religious minorities in the country ineligible to run for President.

Representative Ted Deutch (D-FL) continued with his opening statement, in which he called President-elect Rouhani a “token moderate” who intended to reengage the international community respectfully. He commended the Iranian people for their “civic action” on election day, but expressed his disappointment with the number of candidates that were disqualified, as well as the suppression of reformist activists and websites. He called Rouhani a supporter of the regime that has been  hostile towards the United States and Israel. He called on Iran to end  its support of international terrorist organizations, as well as Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. He called the Iranian government unsustainable and urged that it needs to do more to support its young population that finds itself more and more frustrated with everyday life. Representative Adam Kinzinger (R-IL) followed, arguing that the threats that Iran poses to American interests are far more urgent now than they were even ten years ago, and thus the United States simply cannot afford to wait and “see how things play out” in Iran with Rouhani as President.

Afterwards came Representative David Cicilline (D-RI), who described his disappointment with Iran’s democratic process overall and the lasting power of Iran’s Supreme Leader over the country’s elections, foreign policy, and nuclear program. He also expressed his concern for Iran’s elections on the future of the country’s people in general. Representative Tom Cotton (R-AR) called Iran “a totalitarian state” in his opening statement, expressing his disappointment at how every candidate in the election was screened by the Supreme Leader. He argued that Rouhani was not a moderate, and said that Iran wants to join the civilized world, it cannot hold “sham elections” and fail to recognize Israel.

Representative Brad Schneider (D-IL) called on those in attendance to recognize that the President in Iran represents just a small part within a wider power structure, and was eager to hear from the panel about any transformative policies that may come from the Iranian presidency in the near future. In his opening statement, Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC) was not optimistic about Iran’s future in his opening statement, citing the threats the regime poses to both the United States and Israel in addition to the support the regime provides Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

In Representative Juan Vargas’s (D-CA) opening statement, he argued that the United States must remain steadfast against Iran’s nuclear program and presence in Syria. Finally, in Representative Grace Meng’s (D-NY) opening statement, she argued that the question that people should ask is not who Rouhani is or was, “but where he is going.”

As the panelists began their opening testimonies Mr. Nader argued that Rouhani’s election ultimately shows the population’s frustration with the regime, the nuclear program, and the country’s diplomatic and economic isolation from the rest of the world. Inflation in Iran currently stands at about 30%, though some say the figure is actually much higher. He argued that Khameini’s policies could “unravel the Islamic Republic,” and that Khameini could look to back out of the crises he faces through Rouhani. He expressed that U.S. sanctions could be viewed within Iran as a way to cause the regime to implode, and that future sanctions should continue to put pressure on Iran’s nuclear program without causing additional damage to Iranian society. Creative solutions like sanctions that target Khameini’s business holdings are solid ideas while targeting food security in Iran may only make things worse. Sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program should also be separated from sanctions on Iran’s regional behavior and human rights record.

Dr. Maloney continued with her opening statement, beginning that the outcome of the election in Iran should not alter American foreign policy in Iran as of this time. She also argued that while any dismiss the election as illegitimate, it did provide the opportunity for many to challenge the regime and to discuss issues that had been off the table in Iran for years. She contended that the presidency matters in Iran, as shown by the affect Mahmoud Ahmedinejad had on American foreign policy and America’s expanded sanctions regime in Iran, as well as by the control Ahmedinejad had over Iran’s budget and state institutions. Rouhani won, according to her analysis, not only because he led a “smart campaign” but because he took advantage of the disarray and lack of unity within the conservative camp. She called Rouhani a “pragmatic conservative” who represents a new political force in Iran, and has the opportunity to bail Iran out of the crises it faces similar to how the President did the same after the Iran-Iraq war. She suggested that the US offer tangible rewards in exchange for concessions on nuclear power. She cautioned that Rouhani will experience real restraints in designing policy for Iran in the future, though his new role could help the United States reach the deal it needs with Iran on the country’s nuclear program.

Mr. Sadjadpour made the third and final opening testimony, where he expressed his surprise at the outcome of the election in Iran, joking that “there are no experts on Iranian politics, only students.” He called the elections unfair but nonetheless surprising in that the only somewhat moderate candidate won. He was even more surprised that the Supreme Leader allowed Rouhani to win, yet viewed the decision more as a way for the regime to avoid creating mass popular discontent in Iran, and called the result overall “light rain after eight years of drought” for Iran’s people. While Rouhani’s predecessors like Khatami and Ahmedinejad show that the President matters within Iranian politics, Rouhani is “no Nelson Mandela or even a Khatami.” He recalled Henry Kissinger’s observation that few nations have as many common interests as the United States but as many reasons why the countries do not interact. Sadjadpour also called Iran one of the only countries where the United States’ strategic and moral interest coincide rather than “clash,” as the latter is the case for many countries in the Arab World. He concluded by arguing that for the United States, the best way to hurt the Iranian regime is to diminish its control the creation and distribution of information. He cited the success that BBC Farsi enjoys and suggested improving Voice of America in Iran.

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen began the discussion section by asking what the United States can expect to be “different” about Iran’s future given Rouhani’s election, as well as asked what role Ahmedinejad will play within that future. Mr. Nader argued that the survival of the Islamic Republic means that major domestic changes in Iran seem unlikely, and that Rouhani will focus more on alleviating external pressure on Iran. Dr. Maloney argued that his top priority will be to reach a deal with the international community on the nuclear issue because that will be the only way to solve Iran’s long term economic problems, though perhaps a few political prisoners will be released under his administration. Nader followed up by stating that Ahmedinejad made a lot of enemies towards the end of his Presidency, and his future political career does not look bright. Dr. Maloney suggested that Ahmedinejad will be on trial soon and his top priority going forward will be to stay out of prison.

Rep. Ted Deutch followed up by asking how Iran’s offers to compromise on the nuclear issue will change, and how those offers will affect the unity of purpose against Iran within the P5+1 countries. Mr. Maloney argued that the European negotiators with whom he has met called Rouhani frustrating to work with and that Iran will continue to oppose the sanctions. Mr. Deutch followed up by asking if the new “spokesperson” will cause Iran to “give up less” in negotiations, to which Mr. Sajadpour replied that it will be difficult for the P5+1 to offer meaningful concessions on the nuclear program if Iran is not willing to make meaningful compromises. Mr. Nader followed up by mentioning that while uranium could be enriched at lower levels, nuclear enrichment in Iran will not stop under Rouhani. However which way the issue may change, sanctions from China and Russia will continue against Iran.  Before Rep. Kinzinger asked his questions, he took a moment to acknowledge the parliamentarians from many countries around the world, including Kyrgyzstan, where he was deployed at one point with the U.S. Air Force. He pledged his support for their struggle towards democracy within their home countries. With respect to Iran, he argued that the United States lost a huge opportunity in 2009 to strongly condemn the Iranian regime after the rigged election, and then asked if the Iranians could continue to develop uranium enriched at levels higher than international laws permit them to. Mr. Nader responded by arguing that more intrusive IAEA inspections will keep Iranian enriched uranium at satisfactory levels. In response to Rep. Kinzinger’s other question on how to engage Iran if the country acquires a nuclear weapon while Rouhani is in power, Dr. Maloney argued that Rouhani’s election should not change Washington’s strategic calculus towards Iran. Mr. Sadjadpour also argued that we should continue to pursue negotiations with Iran, and if they comply and the United States gets what it wants, it has executed successful foreign policy, and if Iran fails to cooperate in negotiations, “then we expose them as the problem.” Mr. Sadjadpour followed up by arguing that the Iranian regime possesses no “Machiavellian brilliance,” and that much of their long term policies are ad hoc and probably had no idea who would win the election that day.

Rep. Cecilline asked that if the Supreme Leader’s motivation to allow Rouhani to win had to do with dispelling criticism for the regime both in Iran and abroad, how does that affect U.S. sanctions on the country and the Supreme Leader’s ability to progress towards attaining a nuclear weapon? Mr. Nader argued that the Supreme Leader is using Rouhani to build confidence in the international community (after essentially being forced to support Ahmedinejad over the last four years) and will not move towards developing a nuclear weapon until Iran is welcomed internationally. Dr. Maloney agreed, and argued that the best way to avoid an “Iranian ploy” is “to continue to approach negotiations with full seriousness.” Mr. Sadjadpour followed up, however, by arguing that the Iranian regime possesses less “Machiavellian brilliance” than the U.S. assumes: much of their long term policies are ad hoc and probably had no idea who would win the election that day. But the Supreme Leader definitely has gained some popularity in Iran as a result of the election. Afterwards, Rep. Meadows asked the panelists to expand on some of their previous statements with his time, to which Mr. Nader argued that the regime has little favorability in Iran and that the days of the Islamic Republic are numbered, though little domestic change will happen while Khameini is still alive. Mr. Sadjadpour argued that while Khameini is an unpopular figure who helped lead Iran’s “revolution without democracy” in 1979, what the people want right now is “democracy without revolution” because they see how transitions in countries like Syria have destroyed the state from the inside and do not want to see Iran face a similar reality, even though such a movement is highly improbable.

Rep. Schneider likewise thanked the visiting parliamentarians before he asked the panelists to elaborate on the significance of the election turnout and whether or not the election should change U.S. strategic calculus on strengthening or weakening sanctions. Dr. Maloney described the election as insanely significant for the Iranian public because the “blatantly rigged” elections in 2009 disinterested many Iranians from voting altogether. As for sanctions, she argued that changes in sanctions need to come at the negotiating table and not from U.S. lawmakers because sanctions from the latter suggest to the Iranian people an attack on them directly. Otherwise, “our benchmark shouldn’t change” but the U.S. should be prepared to “give meaningful sanctions relief in exchange for meaningful concessions in the nuclear issue.” In response to Rep. Yoho’s question regarding how the U.S. should engage Rouhani given his human rights record and stances on Syria and Israel, the panelists argued that his stances on said issues are highly unlikely to change: Dr. Maloney argued that Iran overall will not change its stance on Syria if its role in Syria further harms Iran’s standing in the world, and Mr. Sadjadpour called rejecting Israel one of the few pillars from the 1979 revolution that have survived to today.

Rep. Vargas asked about what the dynamic between the Supreme Leader and President Rouhani will look like, especially given that they are both clerics, and how U.S. sanctions should change as a result. Mr. Nader described how the problem with Ahmedinejad was that “in Persian culture, you respect your elders,” and that Ahmedinejad often defied Khameini’s commands. Dr. Maloney discussed how Khameini has spent years publically making remarks against Rouhani, especially with regard to his stance on the nuclear issue. Whether or not Rouhani now takes the opportunity to defy the Supreme Leader on this issue, the United States should work to ensure it does not have to change its own stances on Iran’s nuclear program. Finally, Rep. Meng likewise welcomed the women dignitaries, and asked how the U.S. can reconcile its goal to aid Iran’s marginalized youth and women while also weakening the regime. Mr. Nader argued that regime change is ultimately out of America’s hands, but both he and Mr. Sadjadpour agreed that improving Voice of America (VOA) in Iran could have a huge effect against the regime. Millions of people in Iran receive their news through satellite TV channels, and the only alternative to state-sponsored news is BBC Farsi, which enjoyed an enormous leading up to the election. Mr. Sadjadpour expressed his dissatisfaction with VOA in Iran and argued that for the cost of an F-15 fighter jet, the United States could expand the station’s reach to several million more Iranians. Nonetheless, Mr. Nader argued that the U.S. should still focus first and foremost to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and Dr. Maloney argued that going forward, the top priority for the Iranian people is still to improve the economy.

With that, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen expressed her satisfaction with the discussion and adjourned the hearing.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

The discussion began as Sen. McCain discussed his meetings in Syria with commanders of the Free Syrian Army, who claimed that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict. According to McCain, the commanders are conscious that radical components of the opposition, like Jabhat al-Nusra, could assume power if President Assad falls in Syria, and are opposed to this happening.

He went on to describe the regional effects of the ongoing conflict, claiming there was a sectarian line being drawn through the region and predicting negative effects throughout the Levant. McCain declared that “Iran is all in” and said he anticipates the country’s role in the conflict will exacerbate the trend of radicalization already apparent in Syria and the surrounding states.

McCain said that Assad will not negotiate a political solution while he maintains his current military advantage, but did not want this to discourage US policymakers from playing an active role in the conflict. He emphasized the importance of the Middle East to the United States for reasons of enduring national interests, increasing American credibility and advancing democracy worldwide and stated, “The Middle East has always been more important than oil, and it still is.” He went on to reiterate the importance of immediate action in pursuit of these interests, declaring, “The longer we wait to take action, the more action we will have to take.”

Sen. McCain described the new political reality the Middle East faces in the wake of the Arab Spring as “upheaval unlike any time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.” He called the democratic upswing the Arab Spring represents “the greatest repudiation of al-Qaeda” and their ideology, and thus supporting the development of democracy and human rights in the region is “the best way to defeat terror in the long-term.” He argued that the United States is the only major world power not committed to this movement, and such a shift in engagement with the Middle East must start with “credible Syria policy.”

McCain assessed that the conflict in Syria will “grind on” until the balance of power shifts against Assad.  As for preliminary policy suggestions, he proposed using standoff weapons against Assad’s airfields and related assets, establishing a provisional government to help unify the civilian component of the Syrian opposition, and protect the government-in-exile with Patriot missile batteries (such as those currently in place in Turkey) to protect them. The Senator also suggested arming the rebels, arguing that the “only forces not getting weapons” are moderates. Decisive action could build American leverage in Syria.

He argued that there are other additional avenues for increased American engagement in the Middle East, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. And while the US should focus most of those efforts should be focused on the development of democracy and human rights, he argues that different countries will require different means to achieve for the U.S. to achieve its goals there. With respect to Egypt in particular, McCain called himself “a friend of Egypt,” but recent events, such as the conviction of 43 NGO workers (including 16 Americans), means that the United States should reevaluate its supply of aid to Egypt especially as the U.S.’s aid budget shrinks and international demands for U.S. aid grow. After that, McCain contended that the U.S. should also always continue to aid the Israel-Palestine peace process.

Only the President of the United States can demonstrate America’s stake in the Middle East, and rally American public support and the U.S.’s allies overseas to accomplish its goals. That sense of presidential leadership, McCain argued, is needed now “more than ever.” What leaders in the region want, and what McCain would like, is to know exactly where the President stands on issues in the Middle East and what he intends on doing about them.

As the Q&A began, in response to a question from the narrator on whether the international community is “past the point of decisive action in Syria,” McCain disagreed with the notion that the situation has not grown “too complicated” as the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued since the overwhelming majority of the National Security Council voiced its support for arming the rebels last year. He argued that the international community needs to give the Syrian civilian opposition a secure location to build a government in exile (a “Benghazi,” as McCain put it), and given that the United States’ relationship with General Idris of the Free Syrian Army remains intact, it will be easier to help organize the military opposition as well. In response to a question on how the U.S. regards Russia in light of its role in the Syrian conflict and affecting the passing of resolutions at the U.N. Security Council, McCain responded that the notion that Putin was “fooled” by the United States fighting in Libya until Qaddafi was defeated was a ridiculous assumption. As for working with Russia to stage talks in Geneva, he attested that as long as Bashar al-Assad is clearly winning the conflict in Syria, the suggestion that he would agree to such talks “defies all logic.” He later commented that the only way Assad will leave power is if “he thinks he can’t stay.”

In response to a question on the “marginalization” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a result of the war in Syria, McCain argued that while resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the long term key to peace in the region, the humanitarian crisis and threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction that the Syrian conflict poses calls for more immediate attention and resources than the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As for the peace process, McCain argued that Bill Clinton remains the ideal American politician to serve as a broker between the two sides.

In response to questions on Islamist extremist elements in Syria and the current makeup of Syria’s civilian opposition, McCain argued that their influence will wane as more moderate factions gain support. He further contended that the Free Syrian Army not only needs light weaponry and ammunition to gain momentum, it needs heavy weapons to fight the regimes tanks and other vehicles. On the political side, McCain put it that 19 year-old FSA fighters sense hardly any connection with the civilian opposition in Istanbul, and mending such disconnection remains a top priority.

Another question asked how“genocide” as reprisal against Syria’s minorities could be avoided if the Assad regime is defeated, to which McCain replied that the U.S. needs firm commitments from the opposition to respect humanitarian norms, and then insert a massive humanitarian once the war is over to make such a reprisal more difficult. He argued that international humanitarian commitment to Syria in the long term would be vital, arguing that “it took 100 years” for the United States to recover from the Civil War.  He did concede, however, that there “will be scores to settle” and that the United States is taking “a huge risk” in whatever policy it decides to implement in Syria.

In response to a question on the emerging protests in Turkey, McCain confessed that they were nearly impossible to predict, but suggested that they are reflective of the ruling AK Party’s increased incorporation of Islam into society, such as through the controversial restrictions on alcohol that it enacted, as well as its increasingly authoritarian bent, such as through its crackdown on journalists.

The final question, from The Mitchell Report author Garrett Mitchell, was on what President Obama should do to reassert American leadership in the Middle East as McCain would like to see. In response, McCain argued that he had already laid out what he thought needed to be done in Syria, but what the U.S. needs to do in Libya was far more indicative of what the President needed to do in the region in general. He argued in favor of a “heavy[er] footprint” in Libya and suggested things like treating wounded fighters from the war, securing Qaddafi’s arms caches and building the new government’s and security forces’ capabilities. In his words, “we have to be engaged, not militarily, so much, but in ways of assisting these people as they go through this incredibly tough transition. We all know that democracy is the most difficult of all. The best of all, but the most difficult of all. So I can’t say we can right every wrong, I’m not saying every revolution will succeed, I’m not saying that we can fix everything, but I do believe that we can be far more heavily engaged in a broad variety of ways, and I would argue that it’s in our national security interest to do so.” In one of his final remarks, as the Senator simply put it, “our values are our interests and our interests are our values.”

Photo Credit: Aris Messinis/AFP/Getty Images

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan returned from a North African tour on Thursday and was greeted at the airport by a crowd of supporters while protesters continued to rally in Taksim Square. While in Tunisia, Prime Minister Erdogan vowed to push ahead with plans to redevelop Gezi Park, saying “you cannot rule a state with the logic of give and take.” Meanwhile, the Turkish stock market fell by almost 5%.

On Friday, Prime Minister Erdogan accused the international community of hypocrisy. “Where was the outrage over tear gas” used in protests throughout the United States and Europe? he asked. Meanwhile, Stefan Fule, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, has said that any chances for Turkey’s accession to the EU will depend on the government’s handling of the protests and added that, “excessive use of force by police against these demonstrations has no place in such a democracy.”

Halil Karaveli notes that while the protests will not elevate liberals to power, they have hurt Erdogan, whose poor response has strengthened Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s President and Erdogan’s primary rival. The Economist argues that despite their diversity, protesters are united in their “belief that Mr Erdogan is increasingly autocratic, and blindly determined to impose his views and social conservatism on the country.” Senator John McCain endorsed this position saying that “it’s pretty clear that this was a rebellion against Erdogan’s push of the Turkish people towards Islam.” Şaban Kardaş posits that Erdogan’s AKP party can no longer hope to meet the public’s expectations using old paradigms.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Tamara Sonn, the William J. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Humanities at the College of William and Mary and Program Chair at CSID, provided opening remarks and sought to explain sources of distrust and concerns in the Middle East. Sonn explained that the favoring of minorities by colonial powers had left behind mistrust among the various sects throughout the Middle East that persists even decades after independence. Sunni-Shiite tensions and competition between the Gulf and Iran as well as government support for religious preachers and the following rise of militant Salafi Islam augment feelings of mistrust with fears of instability, she added.

Dr. John Voll spoke next and began by quoting a study by the Transatlantic Academy, which states, “Democracy is in trouble.” Voll agreed and explained that democracy the world over is in flux in the 21^st century due to an absence of an ideology of democracy as a broad program for society. Rather, democracy is characterized by “single-interest intransigence.” The most vigorous political actors, he said, are promoting a single cause rather than a vision for society. He also added that democracy should be less concerned with the mere expression of opinions and that leaders should be more interested in mobilizing populations to participate in democratic institutions. The involvement of citizens in bureaucracies actually operating in a political system is both lacking and necessary, he explained. Voll then argued that current terminology is obsolete and that secular, liberal democracy is no longer the only option. With the public good as the end goal of democracy, structures and approaches other than traditional secularism and liberalism can, and should, be utilized in the search for more relevant democratic systems for different countries and cultures.

Abdulkarim Soroush followed with a discussion on the mistakes of the Iranian Revolution and the inadequacies of Sharia law in the age of the nation-state. Soroush explained that the central flaw of the Iranian Revolution was that it was “a theory-less revolution” with no philosophy or guiding ideology. He explained that the Islamist movement saw Sharia as a guiding theory and believed that it would suffice as a philosophical framework for both the revolution and the nation. The Islamists were mistaken, he argued, because Sharia law is not a law intended for a nation-state. Rather, it is law for an Islamic Ummah, which no longer exists. “We are beyond Christendom and Dar al Islam,” Soroush emphasized, and “we live in an era of nation-states and we have national interests.” Sharia, however, has no concept of national interests, he added, and we would need real ijtihad to transform Sharia into a body of laws for a nation-state. For now, however, it is the tension between the theory of Sharia and its awkward application to practice that causes problems and frustration.

Soroush called for equal rights to be implemented in Tunisia and other Arab and Islamic nations and explained how inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims in these countries were problematic in the era of the nation-state. He drew parallels to explain that there are also inequalities in non-Islamic, democratic societies. Those who are only residents of the United States, for example, do not enjoy all the rights of citizens just as non-Muslims in Muslim countries do not enjoy all the rights of Muslims. “There is a natural logic” in this system, he added; however, in the age of the nation-state, divisions along religious lines are no longer relevant because we do not live in an ummah. There is a confused understanding of the nation-state and the Islamic Ummah. Iran, for example, is a nation-state but it follows a law designed for the whole Islamic Ummah, said Soroush. His final piece of advice for democratizing Arab countries was that “elections are the crust of democracy but the core of democracy is the judiciary. An independent and powerful judiciary is the heart of democracy.” It is the judiciary that protects and enforces democracy and its legislature.

Ashfaque Syed explained that while the Qur’an is infallible, Islamic Sharia law is fallible and open to interpretation. It is the reliance on interpretation that leaves Islam susceptible to hijack by extremists. A deeper understanding of the traditions, however, brings Islam more closely in line with democracy. Syed explained that Sharia law is often misunderstood, with Muslims calling for it without understanding the extent of its intricacies while the West fears it without understanding its wider benefits. Syed quoted Qura’nic verses that encouraged tolerance and democracy and provided historical examples of democratic consultation in Islamic history.

In response to a question on whether Islam and democracy were truly compatible, Soroush explained that there are two understandings of Islam, one maximalist, the other minimalist. Identifying himself as a minimalist, Soroush explained that for a minimalist, Islam is limited to the private sphere of personal spiritual belief. Minimalists have no additional expectations of Islam while maximalists want everything from economics and education to politics and foreign policy to stem directly from their faith. Maximalist Islam, Soroush argued, cannot truly be democratic and has not been democratic in the places in which it has been implemented. However, on the question of whether Muslims can live in a democratic society, Soroush replied with an emphatic yes, asserting that minimalist Islam has no tension with democracy. Syed added that proper, functioning democracy required centuries of development in the West until it took hold in its current form. Islam has a much shorter history, however, and Islamic countries will require more time to develop their own democracies.

Continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Ghannouchi stated that there is no contradiction between democracy and Islam. He pointed to the relationship between Islamists and secularists in Tunisia, saying that democracy did not automatically imply that governance should fall to the secularists, but also did not mean the secularists should be excluded from power. Furthermore, he said that the fact that Islamists came to power in Tunisia does not mean they will dominate the state. Ghannouchi pointed out that the role of the state is to provide security and services to the people and allow them to make their own choices about their way of life, and emphasized that the alliance between secularists and Islamists was important to the establishment of a free society in Tunisia.

Ghannouchi referred to Tunisia’s constitution writing process, citing the Constitution of Medina as a notable example of a document in which Islam and democracy co-existed. He stated that the guiding principle of the draft constitution was that it should not simply be the constitution of the majority, but the constitution of all Tunisians. He pointed to the assembly’s wide consultation with diverse political players and civil society organizations as being paramount to the achievement of this aim.

When challenges to the constitution-writing process arose, Ghannouchi noted that the assembly had organized a national dialogue around contentious issues. He cited the decision not to include sharia in the constitution, the mixed legislative system, and the acceptance of the universal human right of freedom of conscience as being major examples of compromise among the constitutional body. Ghannouchi stated that after the constitution was approved, Tunisia would prepare for its second round of elections. He expressed the hope that these elections would be free and fair and invited the international community to observe and monitor them. He also noted that, despite the recent successes in the constitution-writing process, Tunisia still faced several challenges in dealing with economic development, security, and persuading Salafists that working within the law was their best chance at accomplishing their goals.

During the Q&A, Ghannouchi discussed the issue of transitional justice and noted the establishment of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. He said, “We have to avoid any sort of revenge, because we cannot establish a system based on revenge.” Additionally, he emphasized that education was a major component of democracy, and said that many Tunisians needed to be “re-educated” about Islam in order to view it as being compatible with a democratic system. He noted that the concept of “freedom of belief” was extremely prevalent within the Qur’an.

Photo Credit: AFP

Bahraini lawmakers are urging their government to stop the U.S. ambassador from “interfering in domestic affairs,” and attending “repeated meetings with those who inspire sedition.” The government has agreed to the proposal and said they would take diplomatic measures, but it is not yet clear what these measures would entail. Following the proposal, Bahraini information minister Samira Rajab stated, “We affirm that nothing will affect the presence of the U.S. ambassador in Bahrain.” She later stated, “Ties between Manama and Washington did not get affected by the U.S. State Department about the human rights situation in Bahrain.” These demands from parliament come after the State Department released a human rights report that was critical of Bahrain.

Meanwhile, the lower chamber of Bahrain’s parliament on Tuesday proposed an amendment to the law on assemblies and rallies. Under the proposal, organizers would have to pay a warranty check of 20,000 dinars (US$53,050) in order to get an assembly or rally license. The parliament’s legal consultant tried to explain that the law might be unconstitutional, but he was overruled by the house members who said they wanted to end the “abuse of the freedom to organize rallies.”

In his blog Religion and Politics in Bahrain, Justin Gengler questions the accuracy of a new study of Bahrain’s sectarian demographics. The study attempts to dispel claims that “in Bahrain the demographics favor the Shia population… and second, the Shia community is disempowered economically.” Gengler argues that there are three explanations for the study’s apparent access to information usually restricted by authorities: “either [the author's] data and study are entirely fabricated; or the study was done with the explicit blessing/sponsorship of the government; or both.” He points out, however, that “the bigger problem with the paper would seem to be one for the government itself,” as the data “seems to have substantiated the primary complaint of many of the government’s fiercest critics: that Bahraini Sunnis are poorly rewarded for their staunch support of the government, which continues to patronize exactly those who oppose it.”

Photo Credit: CNN

According to the lawyer of a number of Bahraini medical professionals, 21 individuals originally charged with links to anti-government activities have been acquitted.  According to BBC, most of the 28 other medics that had also been charged since Bahrain’s unrest began in 2011 have been exonerated, but “three remain in jail and several of those acquitted have not been allowed to return to their work as doctors.” Brian Dooley of Human Rights First told BBC, ”A year after their trial started, two years after the alleged incidents, these medics have finally been vindicated after being mistreated or tortured in custody.” Ahead of the acquittal, Human Rights First said in a press release, “Though the 23 medics awaiting tomorrow’s appeal verdict have not been detained, several other Bahraini medics have remained in prison after separate convictions in cases stemming from perceived association with the protests.”

Last year, a group of two Senators and 22 Representatives issued a letter calling for King Hamad of Bahrain to pardon a number of medics in order “to adhere to international norms of medical neutrality.” The group suggests that the medical professionals were targeted due to the fact that they witnessed the brutality leveled against citizens of Bahrain, and it reiterated calls for the government to “adhere to its promises to implement recommendations from the [BICI report and UN Universal Periodic Review].

Photo Credit: REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi

In a piece for Foreign Policy, David Gartenstein-Ross urges the U.S. and the international community to press Tunisian officials to prosecute vigilantes responsible for acts of violence , obstruction of justice and threats to freedom of expression throughout the country. At the heart of the attacks, Gartenstein-Ross writes,  is the hard-line Salafi movement which is reportedly behind dozens of attacks against individuals they believe to have transgressed appropriate moral, Islamic standards. “Vigilantism has spread far and wide, affecting a broad spectrum of Tunisian society: artists, liberal clerics, Sufis, religious minorities, educators, secularists, foreigners, and civil society activists have all been its victims,” he said, adding, “alarmingly, there are several documented instances in which those who carried out the attacks were able to intimidate the security services, thus resulting in police inaction following acts of violence…” Fearful of challenging or capturing the ire of violent Islamist groups, or even consciously neglecting the attacks, Gartenstein-Ross faults the government for failing to maintain order and eroding citizens’ faith in authorities to do so. “If the government looks the other way, or if police are too intimidated to make arrests, then the extremists will have won an important battle in the struggle for Tunisia’s future.”

Also in Tunisia, General Carter Ham, the outgoing chief of the U.S. Africa Command, warned that al-Qaeda is attempting to establish a presence in Tunisia. Alongside U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Jacob Walles, Ham held meetings with Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh, Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces General Rachid Ammar to address the country’s security concerns. “Good governance, education, and economic development,” are the best ways to counter al-Qaeda’s influence in North Africa, he said. The Interior Minister later announced that Tunisia’s Supreme Security Council planned to establish “crisis cells” to monitor and combat terrorist activity in the country.

Photo Credit: PM Jebali’s Facebook page

The Council of Elders recommended to Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali that he form a national unity government rather than a government of technocrats. They said the formation of a unity government would enhance the legitimacy of Tunisia’s political institutions by being more inclusive of a variety of political views. The Council was also critical of the National Constituent Assembly’s failure to draft a new constitution or electoral law. In contrast, the ruling Ennahda party said it could leave power if Jebali continued to pursue the formation of a government of technocrats. The group’s announcement marked a shift in its attitude toward Jebali’s plan, indicating an openness to cooperating with implementation of the proposed government.

Meanwhile, the Bank of Financing Small and Medium Enterprises (BFPME) has partnered with  a private investment arm of the Islamic Development Bank to aid small companies in Tunisia. The plan is based on Islamic financing, which adheres to the religious principle of a ban on interest and is increasingly popular among North African governments.  The fund will focus its efforts on urban areas and hopes to increase foreign investment, create jobs, and develop Islamic banking in the country.

The International Crisis Group has published a report titled “Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge.” The report identifies three key problems in Tunisia - the marginalization of Tunisian youth and the role of  Salafism as a way out; the ambiguity of Ennahda’s stances and Tunisia’s religious identity; and the jihadi threat that faces the country. ICG recommends an investigation of Chokri Belaid‘s assassination and a dialogue including all parties to create a clear plan for the next stage of the transition in order to mitigate the current crisis. The report also suggests the adoption of policies giving social and economic support to unprivileged communities, promotion of a version of Islam rooted in the country’s reform movement, and implementation of new training programs for security forces and law enforcement.

Photo Credit: Reuters

Discussions on a cabinet reshuffle in Tunisia have come to a halt this weekend. The talks broke down after the Congress for the Republic, a secular member of the governing coalition, asked that certain Islamist officials connected to Ennahda, the leading Islamist party, be replaced in their positions. The CPR also threatened to withdraw from the new government unless Ennahda drops two specific Islamist leaders from their positions. Also, Secretary-General of the Congress for the Republic, Mohammed Abbou, said, “If Ennahda does not change its foreign and justice ministers within a week, the Congress for the Republic will withdraw its ministers from the government and President Marzouki may resign from his post.”

There is concern among opposition parties that Ennahda is attempting to monopolize power and limit freedom of expression. The opposition is also frustrated with Ennahda’s unwillingness to cede major government positions to other members of the coalition or the opposition.