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Daniel Calingaert introduced the panelists and noted several recent news pieces on the Syrian conflict.

Kinda Kanbar focused on rape and sexual violence in Syria, citing the research of human rights lawyer Laila Alodaat. She began by stating that Syrian women are in crisis. Kanbar provided statistics from Alodaat’s work on sexual violence in Syria, saying that 81 cases were recorded in March 2011. She pointed to a political ideology that tolerates sexual abuse and discrimination as a central problem, saying that this ideology is enshrined in legislation and litigation. She noted specific laws that exempt men from prosecution for killing or raping women under certain circumstances. She stated that legal reforms directed at changing these laws will only be effective if they are accompanied by a social, cultural, and political movement that eliminates the ideology that supports discrimination throughout Syrian society. Kanbar called for a more proactive role for judges in order to change these laws, efforts to integrate women into Syrian society and politics, and an efficient policy for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants.

Mohammed Aly Sergie described a surgical student enrolled in the University of Aleppo when the revolution began who has become deeply involved in activities related to the revolution. While many doctors left Aleppo as the area became more dangerous, this student remained in Aleppo to treat wounded rebels and regime soldiers. Through this role, he has built a reputation as an honest broker between the two sides. He was also elected to a position on Aleppo’s local administrative council. Sergie stated that the group of young doctors working in Aleppo has encountered the same problem faced by all organizations in Syria: a lack of funds. He noted the difficulty of establishing a transitional government and building legitimacy without funding. He argued that if organizations cannot deliver assistance to these doctors on the ground, they are “just an act of democracy” and do not change the situation.

Omar Hossino focused on relations between Syrian minorities. He noted the emergence of mediation groups addressing conflicts between minorities as reason for hope. These groups have emerged in areas of conflict between rebel groups and majority and minority groups. He cited two examples in which mediation between rebel ethnic groups and the Free Syrian Army has ended or prevented conflict between these rebel factions. He stated that these councils have forged mediated agreements in instances of ethnic fighting that did not include government forces. Hossino stated that efforts to solve local problems through a “local grassroots Syrian affair” have made him very hopeful for the future in Syria.

Oubab Khalil discussed stereotypes of the conflict in Western media, noting a tendency in the United States and the United Kingdom to characterize the situation in Syria as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites and calling this characterization “disturbing” and “not true.” He stated that sectarian tensions exist but said, “We have not seen any systematic retaliations.” Khalil also emphasized the need for an interim government. He stated that “every struggle must end with a political solution, an enforceable one,” adding that once an enforceable political agreement is in place, they can move to a transitional government. On the subject of intervention, he praised the United States as the highest donor of humanitarian aid but stated that the U.S. and U.K. are not doing Syrians a significant favor by protecting civilians because this protection is an international responsibility. He also asserted the opposition’s belief in the Geneva Communique as a foundation for a solution to the conflict.

Opening the Q&A, Daniel Calingaert asked whether Hossino’s examples of mediation councils are isolated incidents and whether the work of these groups could be translated to a broader level. Hossino responded that they were not isolated examples but said the groups could not have a significant impact on national issues, arguing that it would be difficult to establish the legitimacy needed to act so broadly and would be difficult to translate their ability to address micro-level issues to a capacity for handling broad questions of war and peace. Calingaert also prompted Kanbar to discuss further the problem of reporting sexual abuse and the role of women in Syrian society. Kanbar agreed that there are difficulties in documenting rape, noting a particular reluctance of victims to come forward in certain areas of the country. She also called for greater representation for women, directing a call for a 30% quota for female representation in the opposition to Khalil. Khalil agreed that greater representation was necessary and responded by stating that a 60% quota that roughly matched women’s proportion of the population might be more appropriate. Kanbar agreed that this quota would be more desirable but expressed her belief that the National Coalition would not allow such a high quota.

On the issue of rape, Khalil emphasized empowering civil society to receive and assist victims of sexual abuse. On a related question on the role of women, Sergie described workshops hosted in southern Turkey by American organizations for young Syrian activists and recounted an encounter with two young men who were avidly “evangelizing” for women’s rights after attending a workshop. He claimed the U.S. is unable to create democracy but that “promoting values is probably the best avenue to go.”

Responding to a question on whether proto-ministry groups would remain active during and after the transition, Sergie stated, “These are the guys who are going to stay.” Hossino echoed this sentiment. Answering a question regarding the revolution’s chances for success without armed outside assistance, Khalil said, “If we had a level playing field, we could do it on our own.” He noted, however, that the opposition is fighting more than just Assad’s forces, pointing to Russian arms sales to the regime and the participation of Iranian and Iraqi forces in the fighting. He stated that the opposition may be able to dissolve the regime but they will not be able to return to the pre-war status quo without assistance and will eventually live in a failed state. Sergie agreed, adding that the weapons the rebels have received from other countries are “rudimentary” and are not a match for the capabilities of the regime. On the subject of foreign aid, Sergie stated that rebel groups are receiving money but the funds are insufficient. Khalil noted that there can be a substantial gap between when aid is pledged and when it is distributed.

When asked what concrete steps should be taken by the international community, Khalil called for stronger leadership, enforcement of a full or limited no-fly zone, lethal support, and increased humanitarian aid. He stated that balance of power on the ground must be achieved in order to achieve a political transition, saying it would change Assad’s calculus by showing the need for a power transition. Kanbar stated that they need to see a sign of goodwill from the regime that indicates it is ready for negotiations.

Photo Credit: Hamad I Mohammed/Courtesy Reuters

Bahraini authorities raided the home of a prominent Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim on Friday. Opposition group al-Wefaq said Qassim was not home at the time of the raid but there were women and children present. A leading human rights activist believes the house was raided in pursuit of fugitives who had fled from a neighboring house. Mohammed al-Maskati, president of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, said this was the first time Qassim’s house has been raided and that it is “hugely offensive” for many in Bahrain. He added, ”People see him as a red line. I expect that this will cause a big reaction.”

Amnesty International called on the government of Bahrain to “immediately release five men sentenced to a year imprisonment for allegedly insulting the King of Bahrain in messages posted on Twitter.” Five men were tried separately and sentenced on March 15 to one year imprisonment. “The authorities in Bahrain seem to be using every trick in the book to stop people from expressing their views,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Middle East and North Africa Deputy Director at Amnesty International.

Writing for Foreign Policy, Marc Lynch discusses the lack of international attention to Saudi Arabia’s protest movement, specifically the stories of imprisoned activists Mohammed Fahd al-Qahtani and Abdullah al-Hamed, and their lawyer Abd al-Aziz al-Hussan. He points to “generic concern” from the U.S. government in response to crackdowns and a government “offensive against human rights activists and Sunni protesters.” Lynch argues, “Even if a revolution isn’t on the immediate horizon, it would be dangerous to assume that Saudi Arabia will forever be a ‘Kingdom of No Surprises.’”  He says the Saudi government should be reaching out to reformists and ”Washington should more effectively support the opening of political space for reformist voices in Saudi Arabia and all of its regional allies.”

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In her opening remarks, Nina Shea  introduced the panelists and pointed out that the Center for Religious Freedom in the past focused on the persecution of Christians in the Muslim world, and the discussion is being expanded to include treatment of other religious minorities, both Muslim and non-Muslim. She noted that the Syrian case was especially characteristic of heightening sectarian tensions and religious persecution that has corresponded to the strengthening of radical Islamist forces.

Farahnaz Ispahi pointed out that Muslim and non-Muslim minorities are under attack in Muslim-majority countries and “Arab Spring” countries in particular, where governments are starting to face problems that have long plagued Pakistan. Ispahi offered a comprehensive historical overview of the Islamization process in Pakistan, where extremist groups enjoy an “extremely alarming” hold. While Pakistan was not founded as an Islamic state, in the years following partition, and since the 1970s in particular, the status of religious minorities “has deteriorated over the clamor” for religious influence. The decline in religious tolerance has generated population cleansing; religious minorities once constituted 25 percent of the population, and now total 3 percent. Attacks against Hindus, including forced marriage and conversion of girls, complement the “rampant state-sponsored discrimination… causing Hindus to migrate out in droves.”

Ispahi pointed out that the usage of the blasphemy law to persecute religious minorities for disrespecting Islam has risen sharply in the last four years, though the law technically applies to criticism of all recognized religions. There is however strong resistance to changing the law, not only by Islamists, but even mainstream parties, who refuse to speak on the issue, fearing reprisals. Since 1974 the law has not supported the rights of minority Islamic sects that “do not conform to Sunni/Salafi religious orthodoxy,” such as Ahmadis. The constitutionalization of Islam in 1979 moreover, heightened tensions between Sunnis and Shias, which ultimately resulted in an upsurge in the number of radical Sunni organizations and their militant offshoots, some of which have ties to Islamist and mainstream political parties, and consequently, political leverage. Leading figures in the Shia community are regularly attacked by these radical Sunni groups, culminating in the labeling of 2012 as the “year of Shia genocide,” a pattern that is being repeated in 2013. For Ispahi, it is clear that “this is a genocide” that “reflects the ambitious project of Islamists to purify Islam and transform Pakistan into a land of religious purification.”

Jamsheed Choksy spoke on how Iran’s position towards religious minorities is conditioned by Shia notions of purity, Islamic law on the status of dhimmis (traditionally protected religious minorities), anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism, and Islamic sentimentalism. Article 13 of the Iranian constitution stipulates that only Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are recognized by the state, and therefore protected through representation in the Majlis, though barred from higher posts. For other groups such as Catholics, Mandeans, and Baha’is though, Iran’s constitution “enshrines religion as a prime marker of difference,” as they are not recognized nor enjoy any legal standing. Sunnis and Sufis are regarded as heterodox Muslims and therefore “viewed with suspicion and disdain.” Choksy argued that hostile attitudes toward religious minorities ultimately derive from the fundamentalist ideals of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who once stated “every aspect of a non-Muslim is unclean.” To the regime therefore, challenges to theocracy are considered both an attack on the faith and a threat to security and the nation-state. Choksy contended that to address the rights of religious minorities it is pointless to focus on Ahmedenijad since he will soon be out of the picture; ultimately, the Ayatollah possesses more influence and prominence. Moreover, though religious freedom often takes a backseat to economic and security issues in negotiations between states, “the opportunity exists” to pressure the regime to honor its commitments and “reshape attitudes towards minorities.”

Stephen Schwartz noted that among Muslim-majority countries, Pakistan’s holds the record of most bloodshed of religious minorities, while Iran is most effective at legal repression. Moreover, as the civil war in Syria escalates, the Alawites’ systematic destruction of sacred Sunni sites in the country where Sunnism was founded “will not be forgotten” by the world’s Sunnis, ultimately galvanizing the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups. Listing dozens of holy sites destroyed in Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere, Schwartz contended “local resistance by moderate Muslims” is the only thing that works to protect these shrines. Moreover, Sufis in Iran need to defend themselves as no one else “is coming to their defense” since they reject the notion of valayat-i-faqih, which is fundamental to the state. Schwartz also pointed out that “real political change will mean the end of [established] Islamist regimes” in Saudi Arabia and Iran, where “people have had enough” and will not accept a more extreme system.

During the Q&A, Schwartz noted that Sufi-Christian relations are generally strong, although inter-religious dialogue “shouldn’t be a fake dialogue that tries to pretend there aren’t differences.” Choksy discussed how the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fixation on purity that ultimately defined his philosophy and attitude towards Sunni-majority states such as Saudi Arabia (and vice-versa). Choksy also pointed out that the widening of the Sunni-Shia divide is happening across the region, and there is more cause for concern than is noted in the press. Schwartz commented that this split is cemented by the destruction of Syria; extremists will attempt to “pay back the Shias in blood… Al Qaeda will have a one-word incontrovertible appeal for generations.” Choksy contended the spread of fundamentalism and the battle within Islam will “reshape everything from India-Pakistan to Morocco, and not for the better in terms of a pluralistic society.” Ispahi responded that the Sunni-Shia dynamic is not new, the fallout of which will be extremist destruction of the weakest segments of the Pakistani population first—non-Muslim religious minorities—since political parties are unified in their common anti-American, anti-minority, and pro-Taliban attitudes. Concluding on an optimistic note, Schwartz considered the reforms in Saudi Arabia are achieving positive change, leaving some room for optimism.

Photo Credit: Reuters

Results of Iraq’s provincial elections, which took place two weeks ago, were released on Saturday. The results indicate that the Shia-dominated coalition led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki received the most votes in seven of twelve districts. However, Maliki’s State of Law Coalition failed to garner a majority in any of these districts. Secular, Sunni-dominated Iraqiya, a bloc that seriously challenged the Shi’ite bloc in 2010 parliamentary elections, did not win more than three seats in any province. The results may indicate the governing coalition’s strength ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections. According to Ahmed Ali of the Institute for the Study of War, ”The results signal to the blocs that pursuing a majoritarian government approach is difficult to bear fruit.” Voter turnout is estimated at about 50%. The poll was the first election since the U.S. withdrawal in late 2011 and was the first election since the U.S. invasion during which the Iraqi security forces bore primary responsibility for security.

Saturday’s results do not include two Sunni-majority provinces or the Kurdish region. Elections were postponed in two provinces dominated by Sunnis based on security concerns due to heightened sectarian protests and violence. Officials say these elections may be postponed further if violence continues. The three governorates of the Kurdish region has a separate timetable for elections.

According to the United Nations, April was Iraq’s deadliest month since June 2008. A total of 712 people were killed in “acts of terrorism and acts of violence.” The increase in deaths has coincided with growing sectarian tensions as Sunnis protest what they view as the Shi’ite-dominated Maliki government’s efforts to marginalize them. Fourteen candidates, many of whom were Sunnis, were killed in the weeks before the election, and several bombing attacks since the election have killed over 200 people. Baghdad was the governorate with the highest number of deaths.

Photo Credit: Reuters/Haider Ala

On Wednesday, the Kurdistan Alliance announced that its ministers and members of parliament would resume participation in Iraq’s government. The State Department’s Acting Deputy Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell said that the U.S. urges “all parties to build on this positive step by promptly addressing issues raised in a constructive and effective manner.” He also commended “positive and encouraging statements from both Baghdad and Sunni leaders on the need to work together to isolate violent extremists.” The U.N. reported that April was the deadliest month in Iraq since June 2008 with 712 people killed and 1,633 wounded in acts of terrorism and violence.

Writing for the Institute for the Study of War, Stephen Wicken suggests that the apparent deal between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki‘s and the Kurds “indicates that Maliki has discerned a renewed need for Kurdish support as he approaches a majority government.” Wicken recaps the events since last week’s major clash between security forces and protesters, finding that they “demonstrated the depth and breadth of ethno-sectarian tension in northern and western Iraq.” More specifically, they showed that Maliki is willing to deploy the military against protest camps and prominent Sunnis, with Sunni leaders’ resorting to negotiations with the military to avoid further clashes. Wicken predicts that the current crisis will end either “in exclusion of significant Sunni participation in government or in negotiated settlement that legitimizes majoritarian rule.”

Meanwhile, the Gulf Center for Human Rights reported that Jalal Thyab al-Jawhar, president and co-founder of the Liberty Supporters Association, was assassinated on April 27th by unknown assailants near Basra. The center believed the assassination “to be solely motivated by his peaceful and legitimate human rights work,” which focused on defending “the civil and human rights of marginalized Iraqi black citizens.”

Photo Credit: Wissm al-Okili/Reuters

Increasing incidents of violence have swept across Iraq in recent weeks and Reuters reports that “tensions are at their highest in Iraq since U.S. troops pulled out more than a year ago.” Bombings on Monday and Wednesday killed more than 50. This violence comes during the fourth consecutive month of Sunni protests against the Shia-dominated government. Iraqi officials, fearing that the growing political frustration could be exploited by extremist and militant groups, closed the country’s border with Jordan on Tuesday. One protest organizer criticized the move as “another escalation…to punish the revolting Iraqi people,” because it would drive up food and medicine costs.

On Tuesday, State Department Acting Deputy Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell expressed concern over Iraq’s suspension of the licences of ten media outlets: “This action undermines the democratic principles of the Iraqi constitution and the Iraqi Government’s ability to guarantee freedom of the press and freedom of expression.” He added that the U.S. urged Iraq to “reverse this decision” because “the protection of journalistic freedom is an essential aspect of all democratic societies.” Ventrell also condemned the recent violence.

In The Washington Post, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker argues that “the United States must lead a sustained, high-level diplomatic effort” in order to calm the situation and pull Iraq “back from the brink.” Crocker writes that protesters and government forces had “exercised considerable restraint,” but that “that all changed last week.” The violence and reports of increasing al-Qaeda involvement threaten “the gains made since 2007, but also to energize the forces of violent extremism in the heart of the Arab world, already burning in Syria.”

Meanwhile, Kurdish military forces advanced southward into Kirkuk, souring ongoing negotiations between the Iraqi government and high-level Kurdish officials. Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan accused the Kurds of trying to capture oil reserves, while Kurdish officials called the troop movement a necessary security measure. The negotiations failed to end the Kurds’ boycott of Iraq’s government, but the dialogue will continue.

Photo Credit: Karim Jaafar/AFP/Getty Images

The Iraqi government suspended the broadcasting licenses of ten satellite television channels, including Al Jazeera. Iraq’s Communication and Media Commission is imposing a ban on the operations of Al Sharqiyah, Al Sharqiyah News, Babylonian, Baghdad, Salah al-Din, Anwar 2, al Tagheer, Fallujah, Al Jazeera, and Al Gharbiyah inside Iraq, accusing them of inciting sectarian unrest that led to deadly protests and clashes last week. The commission said these channels used “rhetoric and substance coverage” that was “provocative, misleading and exaggerated with the objective of disturbing the civil and democratic process.” Since nine of the channels have Sunni financial backers and have aired extensive coverage of the Sunni uprising, the shutdown is perceived by many as an attempt by the Shiite-dominated government to silence dissent among Sunnis.

Al Jazeera expressed surprise over its suspension, stating, “We cover all sides of the stories in Iraq, and have done so for many years. The fact that so many channels have been hit all at once, though, suggests this is an indiscriminate decision.” The commission claimed it has authority to restrict news coverage that encourages “hatred on the basis of national or ethnic or religious identities that can incite discrimination, hostility or violence.” However, an unidentified State Department official asserted, “This undermines confidence in the Iraqi government’s ability to govern democratically and guarantee freedom of expression.” Ziyad al-Ajili, Executive Director of the Iraqi Journalistic Freedoms Observatory, said, ”We do not deny there is an incitement to violence by some media outlets, but we consider the suspension of licenses of 10 satellite channels a blow for democracy.”

Meanwhile, Egyptian newspaper Egypt Independent was shut down due to financial problems. Al-Masry Al-Youm, the paper’s parent company, prevented the final issue from being printed because it contained strong criticism of the government and the company itself. Al-Masry Al-Youm has previously censored the paper’s critical content. Amira Ahmed, Egypt Independent’s former deputy editor, said, “For Al Masry Al Youm, media freedom does have boundaries – but for us, those limits didn’t exist.” Egypt Independent has made the issue, which is its 50th edition, available online.

Photo Credit: AP

The annual State Department report on human rights practices in Iraq details a host of human rights concerns in 2012 attributed to a weakened government, increased sectarian and societal divisions and a culture of impunity and widespread corruption that threatened the effective protection of human rights and persecution of violators. Chronic problems persisted in 2012, including politically motivated sectarian and ethnic violence and torture and abuse perpetrated by both government actors and illegally-armed groups.

Extrajudicial killings and disappearances were a serious problem in Iraq in 2012, according to government officials and human rights organizations, and rose dramatically since 2011. Reports by multiple government officials indicate government forces tortured detainees to death, and local and international media in 2010 reported a secret detention facility under the control of the Prime Minister’s Office that was still operating as late as March 2012.  ”As in previous years, credible accounts of abuse and torture during arrest and investigation, in pretrial detention, and after conviction, particularly by police and army, were common.”

Violence by illegally-armed groups against government forces and officials, the general public and civilian infrastructure remained a significant problem throughout the year, the report finds, adding, “bombings, executions, and killings were regular occurrences throughout the country.” Militant and terrorist sectarian and ethnic groups perpetrated widespread violence across the country in 2012, including suicide bombings, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and killings. Similarly, the report finds that “threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, extremist, and criminal elements impaired judicial independence in many places,” and judges at both the trial and appeals level were widely reported to be influenced by threats of violence and intimidation.

Similarly, the effectiveness and safety of local and international NGO humanitarian organizations in investigating and reporting on human rights abuses suffered at the lack of government cooperation. The report finds that these organizations faced forced evictions, repeated and intrusive inspections, unannounced and intimidating visits, and arrest and torture of local staff, among other operational challenges. Moreover, many local NGO’s were found to be influenced by and affiliated with political parties and sects.

Photo Credit: Jim Watson

The White House today established that the U.S. Government now believes with “varying degrees of confidence” the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition. However, the Obama Administration stated that, given the stakes involved, they still need further “credible and corroborated facts” regarding chemical attacks to determine whether or not the Assad regime has crossed a “red line” on chemical weapons use.  This announcement comes on the heels of the U.S. doubling its “non-lethal” aid to Syrian rebels this past weekend, as well as a number of close U.S. allies stating their belief that the Assad regime has used sarin-type gas in a number of attacks on Syrian opposition fighters over the past several months.

Members of Congress are also considering the developing situation in Syria, as Syrian opposition supporters and advocates engage in a National Advocacy Day on Capitol Hill today.  The groups are calling for the U.S. to support a number of Syrian initiatives, most notably, taking a more active role in ending the conflict in Syria and supporting Syrian refugees around the region.

In a piece for Foreign Policy this week, James Jeffery advocates for consideration of broader consequences, both regionally and internationally, of potential U.S. military engagement in the conflict.  While Jeffery proposes that U.S. engagement will likely be limited to moving equipment, distributing humanitarian assistance and enforcing a no-fly zone, he cautions that such actions will likely meet strong opposition from countries like Iran, Russia and China, who have cultivated an ally in President Bashar al-Assad.  He warns that U.S. intervention in Syria could result in diplomatic fallout on issues ranging from nuclear talks with Iran to China relaxing engagement on North Korea.

Finally, the 12^th century minaret that was part of the UNESCO World Heritage Umayyad Mosque in Aleppo was destroyed by fighting between regime and opposition forces yesterday.

Photo Credit: Khalil Al-a’Nei/European Pressphoto Agency

A gun battle broke out at a Sunni protest camp north of Baghdad early Tuesday. Officials have reported that at least 20 people died and dozens injured. The clash occurred after government security forces entered the camp to make arrests, but protest leaders said they were unarmed when the security forces began shooting. Later in the day, thirteen gunmen reportedly died carrying out revenge attacks on army checkpoints. The government described the killed as “militants who were using the demonstration as a safe haven,” but in response to the violence United Nations envoy to Iraq Martin Kobler said, “We deplore the loss of life on both sides, but in particular, more died on the side of the demonstrators. This is a tragedy … and I’m so upset.”

The violence comes less than a week after local elections were held in 12 of Iraq’s 18 governorates. The government postponed voting in six governorates because of security concerns, a move that increased tension with the majority Sunni community in the postponed governorates, but announced today that elections will be held in the provinces of Anbar and Nineveh on July 4.  In response to last Saturday’s election, the U.S. State Department congratulated the Iraqi people and said, “In the face of security threats, millions of Iraqi citizens cast their ballots in 12 provinces across the country to choose new provincial councils. This is an important step forward for Iraq’s democratic future, including preparations for its spring 2014 national elections. So it’s now essential that the councils be seated, select new governors, and begin work on behalf of the Iraqi people.”