With negotiations set to begin today in Washington between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, members of the Palestinian community are calling on their leaders to resolve internal disputes. In an interview with Reuters, influential Palestinian leader Marwan Barghouti emphasized the need for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the importance of this reconciliation to the peace process: “The problem is not in the principle of negotiations, which we accept, but that without a popular foundation and action on the ground which supports negotiations, they will not reach any results.” This feeling is echoed by Hani Almadhoum who writes that he is not surprised by the “cynicism” of the Palestinian people: “…in the past five years, when was the last time you heard of a Palestinian leader giving a key speech…the kind of speech that inspired a national dialogue?…I cannot remember such a day…Such banality is dangerous.” Almadhoum goes on to describe the governments in both Gaza and the West Bank as “managers”, capable of hanging on, but not much else: “…managers worry about their respective departments. Leaders worry about the whole unit. We need both decent leaders and wise managers to go hand in hand in an increasingly complex and volatile political and economical (sic) situation.”
Amidst domestic perceptions that the Pakistani government’s response to the continuing flood crisis has been inadequate, some observers have asked whether the disaster will affect the country’s political future. Issam Ahmedwrites in the Christian Science Monitor that President Asif Ali Zardari’s decision to continue his tour of Europe as the crisis grew “enraged ordinary Pakistanis.” This, in addition to the slow pace with which politicians addressed their constituents’ needs and the general sense that corruption plagues Pakistani politics, has increased “momentum in favor of military rule…among Pakistan’s upper-middle classes.” There is a growing perception that “at least the Army gets the job done” and is less corrupt than civilian politicians. According to one interviewee, the military is “pretty happy and pretty comfortable seeing the civilian process bleed like this.” Although positive perceptions of the military seem to be on the rise in Pakistan, some observers contend that no government, civilian or military, can truly meet popular expectations.
Yousef Munayyer, Executive Director of the Palestine Center, asks in an article today what recent “upticks in politically repressive activity” by the Palestinian Authority might mean for the prospect of peace with Israel. He writes that “Abbas is now about to enter direct negotiations in spite of the adamant objections of the Palestinian public.” By cracking down on political opponents, according to Munayyer, Abbas is only damaging his government’s legitimacy and confirming that he “is in no position to sign a binding and lasting agreement on behalf of Palestinian stakeholders.” Amidst an inter-Palestinian divide, Munayyer points out that many Palestinians do not feel adequately represented by the PA, and this sentiment is exacerbated by the continued repression of non-Fatah voices in Palestinian politics. He concludes that “Palestinian domestic political disarray is likely to continue,” and contends that a viable resolution of the conflict with Israel can only be possible under a “unified and representative” Palestinian government.
Heather Ferguson, a Stanford University fellow, and Ty McCormick, an intern at the American University in Cairo, argue in the Huffington Post today that the Obama administration has “respectfully declined” to press for political reform in Egypt. In their view, “this policy reflects a sincere belief on the part of the Obama administration that Islamists cannot be democrats.” Ferguson and McCormick criticize the view that Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood might eliminate democratic processes and institutions if elected to office. This type of thinking, they reason, stems from the notion that Islamists are a monolith and have one particular, rigid view of democracy and the role of religion in public life. The authors suggest that the Obama administration has, in effect, “declar[ed] the incompatibility of Islam and democracy,” thereby ignoring the possibilities for elasticity and synthesis in that relationship. Ferguson and McCormick assert that “the U.S. should seize the opportunity presented by ElBaradei [and] attempt to engage positively with his diverse group of followers,” so as to enhance the credibility of Washington’s rhetorical support of democracy in the region.
Recent reports have highlighted Iraq’s struggles to provide adequate social services to its citizens. For al-Jazeera yesterday, Victoria Fine profiled the troubled health care system in Iraqi Kurdistan. She describes the obstacles that patients face in getting access to doctors, surgeries, and other state-based medical services, which are officially free in Iraq. To cope, Fine writes, many citizens have turned to “a loose network of NGOs,” including international humanitarian organizations, to access care. In part, the obstacles in accessing medical services stem from a shortage of surgeons and urgent care physicians. Political realities also pose difficulties, according to Fine - a constituent of a particular political party, for example, might “run into problems” by appealing to another party for funding or services.
In a story on Iraq’s recent electricity shortages, Charles Recknagel writes for Radio Free Europe that “the amount [of electricity generated in Iraq] is still woefully inadequate to meet ordinary Iraqis’ needs,” despite improvements in recent years. Historically, electricity shortages have been blamed on the insurgency - the considerable weakening of the insurgency, however, “puts the spotlight for the electricity problems squarely on the government’s ability to deliver a better future.” Ali al-Saffar, an Iraq expert at the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit, estimates that Iraq is meeting only 46% of the demand for electricity, and blames “government bureaucracy, corruption, and unwillingness to get things done.” Recknagel concludes that eliminating some of the “bureaucratic entanglements” limiting power supply might “put Iraq more firmly on the free-market course it needs to become economically and politically strong enough to survive as a democracy.”
An article at the Middle East Monitor today claims that the Palestinian Authority runs the risk of “changing rapidly into a repressive, dictatorial regime in the same mold as other Arab governments”. This piece was prompted by the recent breakup by Palestinian Security Forces of a symposium put together by Palestinian groups opposed to direct negotiations with Israel. While President Mahmoud Abbas has said that the incident will be investigated, the reaction from the Monitor was less than hopeful: “…when have the Authority’s investigations ever brought about real results? Indeed, when have real results ever been possible, the findings implemented and the accused brought to justice?”
In Newsweek today, Babak Dehghanpishehwrites that the head of Iraq’s Accountability and Justice Commission and Shi’a politician, Ahmad Chalabi, is continuing to find success while “playing the sectarian card” in national politics. Dehghanpisheh cautions that “what Chalabi wants isn’t always best for Iraq,” citing General Ray Odierno’s assertion in February that Chalabi had frequently traveled to Iran to coordinate with Iranian officials on how to influence Iraq’s elections. Moreover, Chalabi’s recent efforts to broker compromises between competing political blocs seem more like efforts “to ensure his own place in the next government,” according to Dehghanpisheh. As a “hard-nosed politician,” Chalabi has both worked to ensure the delivery of basic services like water and electricity to Iraqi communities and has “made plenty of enemies over the years” for using those projects for political ends.
In Newsweek, Babak Dehghanpisheh interviews Adel Abdul Mahdi, the current vice president of Iraq and a member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, about the current political situation in Iraq. In the interview, Mahdi addresses the rift between the State of Law Party (headed by current P.M. Nuri al-Maliki) and his own National Iraqi Alliance (which includes the Sadrists). “Yes, it’s no secret there are differences. Especially about the prime-minister candidate. But the alliance is still there.” The parties formed a coalition to deny the Iraqiyya bloc (led by former PM Iyad Allawi) a majority after the elections in March of this year.
At the Council on Foreign Relations website, Bernard Gwertzmaninterviews Jane Arraf, the Baghdad correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. Arraf describes the environment of corruption in Iraq: “It’s as blatant as government officials, deputy ministers, directors of departments stuffing cash into their suitcases and leaving the country…On a day-to-day level, it’s very hard for anybody here to get anything done unless they pay a bribe.” When asked about the status of the current political stalemate, Arraf describes some of the political horse trading that is occurring: “The Sadrists will not support him (Maliki) as prime minister because he sent the Iraqi army into Baghdad and into Basra to get rid of their militia. They’ve actually suggested that they could pull out of that coalition and back Allawi, which would be an interesting development.” However, Arraf concludes that, “We keep thinking that perhaps there’s a lot going on beneath the surface, but apparently there isn’t. It is what it is. It’s stalled.”
Over at historiae.org Reidar Visseroutlines two possible paths for breaking the political stalemate in Iraq. The first, which Visser labels the “governance” path, focuses on better equipping the Iraqi government to effectively address basic issues like security and public health while attempting to ignore sectarian divides. The second path focuses on striking an armistice between Iraqi’s sectarian parties. The author believes that American officials currently favor a limited compact between Ayyad Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition and Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition under which the election winner would assume the premiership and the loser the presidency of a new national security council.
Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections will be held on September 18th in Afghanistan. Tina Blohmreports from Paktika on the difficulties of running free and fair elections there. The problems range from a shrinking number of polling places (190, down from 265 in last year’s presidential elections) due to security issues, to a lack of poll workers brought about by a fear of insurgent reprisals, and the fact that “According to the provincial head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), after the 2009 election, 1555 of its staff members were blacklisted in Paktika alone due to allegations of fraud.”
Candidates have also found it difficult to campaign in Paktika: “Out of 22 candidates (one of lowest numbers in the country), six were in the province … the rest staying in Kabul mainly due to security concerns.” Blohm also discusses the rising anti-coalition sentiment in the province, raising the concern that international observers are going to be unable to perform their jobs when “the question of movement beyond the provincial capital is central - and in case of the internationals this is unrealistic.”
A piece at The Los Angeles Times’ Babylon & Beyond explores the roots of the Popular Coalition for Supporting Gamal Mubarak, noting that speculation and debate have emerged regarding whether the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) is behind the coalition. The piece observes that NDP spokesman Ali Eddin Helal denied that the party endorses or finances the coalition, whereas Iglal Salem, the coalition’s assistant coordinator, claimed that NDP Policies Committee official Ibrahim Kamel gave $350,000 to the campaign, sparking rumors of ties between NDP businessmen and the coalition. One political analyst, Salama Ahmed Salama, argued that “the whole thing is meant to look like a grass-roots movement, but the NDP stamp is hard to miss.” However, Amr Chobaki, an analyst at the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, suggested that “the sudden appearance of the posters could be a window into the battle taking place within the ruling party,” adding, “It’s a sign that the issue [of nominating Gamal Mubarak] has not been settled internally.” Analyst Deyaa Rashwan confirmed this interpretation, proposing that President Hosni Mubarak will ultimately be the one to decide the matter of his son’s potential candidacy.
Meanwhile, NDP Secretary-General and Speaker of the Shura Council Safwat al-Sherifannounced in an interview that the party has unanimously agreed to nominate President Mubarak as its presidential candidate, stating that “the NDP has chosen Mubarak for the upcoming presidential election, however we cannot override the President’s own decision, because the decision is primarily his own.”
Babak Dehghanpishehwriting in Foreign Policy says that Moqtada al-Sadr “is now a kingmaker in Iraqi politics.” Noting that Sadr will play a decisive role in determining the new Iraqi prime minister, Dehghanpisheh argues that this state of affairs was “the result of careful and deliberate planning,” pointing out that Sadr set up an election strategy committee over a year before the March elections, with the result that his Free Movement party won 39 seats in parliament. According to Dehghanpisheh, Sadr has legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi population because “his movement is one of the few on the Iraqi political scene that’s homegrown.” Moreover, he suggests that Sadr’s influence puts the U.S. in a difficult position, since “the cleric is clearly following the Hezbollah model, creating a populist political movement backed by a battle-hardened militia.” He proposes that whoever Sadr ultimately supports for PM will have to make major concessions to the cleric’s demands, including releasing Sadrist detainees and relaxing pressure on the Mahdi Army. Long term, Dehghanpisheh argues that “what Sadr is after is power itself,” noting that “there are any number of issues he could block or help push through parliament,” including the final status of Kirkuk, control over Iraqi oil revenues, and women’s rights. More broadly, Dehghanpisheh also asserts that Sadr “wants to be seen as a prominent regional player,” adding that he “would like to promote his Mahdi Army as a member of the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ made up by Hezbollah and Hamas.”
Sheik Ali Salman, head of Wefaq society– the largest Shi’a bloc in Bahrain’s parliament –commented on the Sunni government’s recent crackdown on Shi’a activists and opposition members at a press conference on Saturday. Salman stated, ”The way the ongoing security campaign has been handled and the rights violations that accompanied it have in one week destroyed 10 years of progress in this country.” The majority Shi’a population has also reacted strongly to the detentions, engaging in daily clashes with Bahraini security forces. Attorney Mohammed al-Tajir estimated that approximately 160 individuals have been detained over the past week, including 10 prominent leaders, adding that “we are having trouble meeting with the detainees and finding out where they are kept.” The crackdown follows a similar tightening of control over the media. The Bahraini regime recently suspended a number of websites hosting political commentary, including the site of independent newspaper Al Wasat. Analysts suggest that the events in Bahrain reflect a wider regional tension, with Sunni Arab states in the Gulf increasingly fearing the influence of Shi’a Iran, even as majority Shi’a complain of systemic persecution and discrimination. The detentions come in advance of October parliamentary elections in Bahrain.
Daud Khattakwrites in Foreign Policy that in the midst of the flood crisis in Pakistan, fears of targeted killings by the Taliban have not only sent key secular leaders into hiding, but also contributed to a lack of leadership in the Peshawar province, providing “an opening for religious and pro-Taliban elements to win the hearts and minds of the hundreds of thousands in the area.” Pointing out the ineffectiveness of local and central governments in assisting the victims of the flood, Khattak argues that Islamists have stepped in and “used their relief efforts as a propaganda opportunity,” instructing locals that the flood “occurred because Pakistanis have not obeyed God or implemented sharia.” With the secular parties under threat from the Taliban, Khattar writes that “not a single elected government in Pakistan has completed its five-year term since 1988,” adding that “religious movements that keep secular parties from providing services to their constituents will only help ensure that after the next elections it will be the religious parties governing in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.”
Lawyer Mohammed al-Tajirreported earlier this week that Bahraini security forces had detained 6 more Shi’a opposition members, bringing the total number of human rights defenders, political activists, and clerics arrested to 10, in a crackdown on the majority Shi’a in the country in advance of upcoming October elections. Of those detained, 8 are prominent figures of the political opposition. Al-Tajir said that the individuals detained have not been charged and that their current location is unknown. Meanwhile, when the tally of those detained reached 8, Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Deputy Director at Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa program, issued comments stating that “the Bahraini authorities must make it clear why these eight men have been arrested, and either release them or charge them with recognizable criminal offences. It is unacceptable for them to be held merely because of their human rights activism, non-violent political activities or criticism of the government.” Amnesty International has also noted that “many of the men have now been held for more than 48 hours without having been presented to the Public Prosecutor as required under the Bahraini law.”
Update: The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies has issued a statement (Arabic version here) signed by 26 human rights organizations, expressing “their grave concern for the deteriorating human rights situation in Bahrain.” The statement argues that the Bahraini government’s recent actions represent “intimidation of political and rights activists and a denial of freedom of expression, including of opinion critical of the government,” adding that “this turn of events is also a significant milestone on the path to the total political marginalization of the Shiite majority and will tighten state control over the electoral process in the parliamentary and municipal elections scheduled for the last week of October 2010.” Additionally, Joe Stork, Deputy Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch, voiced criticism of the Bahraini regime, stating, “A country that respects human rights, as Bahrain claims to do, does not arrest people just because they harshly criticize the government.”
Meanwhile, an anonymous Bahraini security official stated that the individuals arrested are suspected of attempting to carry out “illegal practices and other acts that would harm the stability of the kingdom of Bahrain and its civil peace, as well as endangering lives and properties.” Reports indicated that the arrests have already sparked domestic tension and incited protests, with Shi’a activists blocking roads near the capital earlier this week and setting fires to trash cans.
Reidar Visserwriting at Iraq and Gulf Analysis analyzes Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s full comments in a recent interview at Al-Hurra. Stating that “it is strange that the reactions so far have focused so much on Maliki’s description of the Iraqiyya party as “representing the Sunnis,’” Visser points out that “there were other remarks by Maliki that amount to the most primitive form of sectarianism that exists: His assertion that ‘The prime minister post should definitely go to the Shiite component.”’ Visser observes that “nowhere in the Iraqi constitution is there a demand that the PM post should go to any particular sect,” concluding that Maliki’s remarks do “not bode well for any kind of ideology-based rapprochement between Iraqiyya and Maliki’s State of Law.”
An opinion piece in The Jordan Times today argues that “US President Barack Obama should reconsider the decision to withdraw US combat troops from Iraq on the designated date,” in light of the fact that “there is a huge power vacuum in Iraq in view of the political impasse over the formation of a new government.” The piece proposes that the lack of progress on government formation, along with continuing terrorist attacks in the country, mean that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would inevitably lead to “an unstable Iraq,” to the detriment of the region’s stability as a whole. However, Juan Zarate, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former member of the National Security Council, suggests that the prospects for changing the withdrawal time line are slim, stating, “Right now, it makes no sense for the White House to rethink the policy, and there’s no political advantage for [Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-] Maliki to signal weakness or vacillation when that decision doesn’t have to be made today and the reality isn’t yet clear.”
A study released recently by the Aswan Centre for Social and Legal Studies and Researches in Sana’a found that disenchantment with Yemen’s political parties may be turning women away from greater participation in the electoral system. According to the survey– which polled 500 Yemeni women from across the country –only 18.2% of respondents expressed confidence in Yemen’s political parties, while 17.7% said they believed that the parties view women’s issues merely as propaganda tools. At the same time, the study notes that only 18.7% of key positions among the 4 parties in parliament are held by women; that between 1990 and 2010, the number of seats in the legislature held by women has dropped from 11 to only 1; and that from 1993 to 2003, the number of women competing in parliamentary elections fell from 42 to 11. Respondents to the survey attributed these failures to a variety of factors, including a “lack of societal encouragement for [women] to engage in politics” (14.9%), and the “lack of financial support political parties give women running for office (10%). The study argues that “these findings mean that the relationship of political parties with women from their perspective is based on exploitation in which women issues and their votes are manipulated [by political parties] without a serious and sincere adoption of their concerns,” concluding that “it is necessary to build a bridge of confidence between the political parties and women.”
A campaign in support of Gamal Mubarak as a presidential candidate in the upcoming national elections was officially launched in Cairo earlier this week, under the slogan “Egypt Looks Forward to a New Beginning.” The campaign is collecting signatures for a petition in support of the younger Mubarak. On that note, the Muslim Brotherhood announced yesterday that it has collected over half a million signatures for Mohamed ElBaradei’s campaign for reform, while the National Association for Change (NAC) put its own tally at 98,000. Meanwhile, President Hosni Mubarakissued remarks calling on all Egyptian voters to go to the polls, stating that the new electoral system would ensure democratic representation and claiming that the upcoming elections would take place in a “new climate of political reform.” These political developments occurred amidst protests organized by members of the April 6 movement, demanding that the government transfer their colleague Ahmad Abu Duma from Al-Qatta Prison to the Damanhur Prison; and amidst preparations by Egyptian intellectuals to hold a conference to discuss fears that President Mubarak will attempt to pass the premiership to his son in a non-democratic, hereditary fashion.
The Center for a New American Security held a conference focusing on the changing role of the U.S. in Iraq, in light of the continuing drawdown of U.S. troops to 50,000 by September 1. Nathaniel Fick, CNAS’s Chief Executive Officer, moderated discussion by two leading Administration officials on Iraq: Michael Corbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq; and Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East.
