Photo Credit: Ikwhan Web.com

Amr Darrag, Senior Muslim Brotherhood member, professor of engineering at Cairo University, and recently appointed Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, commented on the goals of the controversial proposed NGO law in a conversation with the Middle East Institute’s Ursula Lindsey, saying, “On the one hand we’d like to empower civil society and allow innocent funding for different activities to get through. On the other hand we don’t want the country to be open to financing that supports something that does not benefit the country.” Darrag professed the Egyptian government’s need to regulate funding for foreign NGOs, arguing that if ”someone is financing a group of demonstrators that is using violence by throwing Molotov cocktails, this is something that must be illegal. You cannot say that [the group] is an NGO and that funding has to be free.”

In addition to his assertion that Egypt’s ruling Freedom and Justice Party is an “independent organization” from the Muslim Brotherhood, he described Egypt’s demand for a new style of engagement with the United States. In his words, “the relationship between the United States and Egypt under Mubarak was a one-way relationship. Mubarak did what the United States wanted. We are interested in having a good and balanced relationship with the United States, which means fostering mutual interests and mutual respect. We do not want one party to dominate this relationship.”

The United States has consistently condemned the contents of Egypt proposed NGO law, with Secretary of State John Kerry calling the bill “incompatible with the transition to democracy.” The Secretary did, however, waive the conditions on Egypt’s democratic development before authorizing the United States’ $1.3 Billion of military aid to Egypt. The decision, however, came “well before” 43 NGO workers (including 16 American citizens) were convicted in Egyptian courts.

For full event notes continue reading, or click here for the PDF.

Sarah Morgan began by asserting that Egypt’s draft NGO law, which is currently being passed on from the Shura Council to the General Assembly, was “antithetical to the ideals of the revolution.” She noted that although the law was subject to many different interpretations, most of them were “quite restrictive” and “discretionary.” She noted that the law sought to curb freedom of association, and was “replete with administrative and bureaucratic hurdles” that would make it difficult for NGOs to operate even if they did receive approval. Morgan declared the law “falls so short of Egypt’s human rights obligations,” not only to the international community, but to Egypt’s own constitution. Among her concerns were the arbitrary limitations on NGO funding, including foreign funding. Additionally, the draft calls for the formation of a Coordination Committee that would have the authority to approve requests for foreign funding, and would require organizations to submit an Annual Report detailing all decisions made within the organization. The Coordination Committee would have the ability to reject decisions made by the internal governing body of the organizations. Morgan emphasized, “governments should not have a place in regulating the internal operations of an NGO.” She expected that, despite the problems she mentioned, the law would be adopted within a matter of weeks, and identified several courses of action with which the international community could respond. She expressed that the conversation with Egypt needed to be about more than the economy and the IMF, saying that putting human rights at the center of dialogue would be a “critical articulation of how we see the whole package” of U.S.-Egypt relations. Finally, she noted that the U.S. should consider incentivizing human rights reform using the security aid they are obligated to provide under the Camp David Accords by shifting how the funds are allocated.

In her presentation, Nancy Okail addressed the implications of the NGO law and explained what the law would actually mean in practice for Egyptian civil society. She said the law would have an impact on two major types of organizations: those working on development and economic issues, and those working on human rights and democracy issues. Okail noted that the government in Egypt, along with the other Arab governments undergoing democratic transitions, often makes the appeal for economic aid rather than for democracy assistance. However, she pointed out that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) lists several criteria for effective development projects. One of these criteria is country ownership of the project, whereby people within the country identify and determine their own needs and priorities. Okail noted that this requires a needs assessment survey of the civil society, and access to local information and budgets in order to determine a framework under which the project can be conducted. Thus, in order to conduct an effective economic development project, Okail argued, it is necessary to work with civil society. Egypt’s NGO law would place restrictions on these organizations’ ability to operate. Secondly, she pointed out that the laws would not only impact those organizations established to assist with Egypt’s transition, but also organizations that work on daily legal and rights issues in Egyptian society. She expressed concern that the NGO law would be seen as a “green light to crack down on the rest of local organizations in Egypt.” Okail concluded, “This law does not put an end to civil society only, but also an end to the revolution.”

After the main remarks, Sebastian Graefe from the Heinrich Boll Foundation commented that the German government was “very concerned” about Tuesday’s NGO verdict. Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the State Department, said that the State Department was “outraged” by the verdict and would be releasing a more detailed statement on Monday. Julie Hughes, Egypt Country Director at the National Democratic Institute, said that a conversation needed to be had about what sort of minimum standards would be mutually acceptable to both Egypt and the international community. She declared that Egypt was “too big to fail.” A representative of the Egyptian embassy responded to comments made during the main remarks. He said that the NGO verdict was issued by a court of law, and that the lawsuit was raised by a different government under a “law we are trying to change.” He noted that claims that the verdict was politicized directly contradicted claims that the Morsi government and judiciary were at odds with each other, saying, “I fail to understand how these pieces are put together.” Finally, he said that “at the end of the day, we believe in the separation of powers” and noted that there would be restorative justice options for those affected by the verdict “if the law is on their side.” He noted that the law was “only a draft” and would be open to revision and discussion by many different stakeholders. He also refuted the earlier claim made by Morgan that, under the law, a Coordination Committee would have the power to reject funding from NGOs, saying that no committee could make a decision itself to banish funding; rather, this decision had to be made through a court of law. Seelye and audience members pressed him on this point, asking if he meant that decisions made by a Coordination Committee could be appealed in a court of law under the draft NGO law. The representative insisted on his reading of the law, leading Seelye to note that one of the perceived problems with the draft law was that it was open to several different interpretations. In response to the comments made by the Egyptian embassy representative, Okail expressed concern that the draft law would be signed into law before an adequate discussion had been had. Morgan reinforced the notion that the draft law should be the subject of further debate, saying “that’s what a draft is for—for conversation.”

POMED Condemns Verdict on NGO Workers in Egypt

The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) condemns today’s conviction of 43 Egyptian and international NGO workers, as well as the forced closure and ordered confiscation of funds of five international NGOs in Egypt today. This ruling is part of an ongoing broader effort by the Egyptian government to foster a climate of fear for civil society organizations. The verdicts come as the Shura Council, the acting legislative body in Egypt, considers an alarming draft of a new NGO law. In defiance of Egypt’s international obligations, the proposed NGO law would mandate that the programming and funding of civil society organizations be subject to the approval of a governmental committee composed of political appointees as well as Egyptian intelligence and security officials. This would go even further than the harsh restrictions in place against NGOs during the Mubarak era.

We urge the U.S. administration and Congress to take a strong stance in support of civil society organizations in Egypt and the rights and protections that they seek. It should be made clear that continued attacks against civil society will have consequences for the bilateral relationship.

In a vibrant democracy, civil society organizations serve as a critical bridge between citizens and governments. By handing down these convictions, the Egyptian government seeks to intimidate civil society organizations and subject them to the machinations of its political leaders. Following Egypt’s revolution, Egyptians hoped for a new era of political openness and civic participation. What has followed instead has been the select targeting and intimidation of NGOs, unfounded statements by government officials accusing civil society organizations of seditious activities, and a show trial against NGO workers. Egyptian government figures have claimed that the trial is an issue for Egypt’s courts and that the executive branch may not interfere. However, the fact that the campaign against the NGOs in Egypt was instigated by a politically appointed government minister more accurately illustrates the trial’s origins and intent. Today’s convictions and the language in the latest drafts of the NGO law—set against the background of prosecutions of opposition figures and critics of the Freedom and Justice Party’s rule—are cause for serious alarm regarding Egypt’s democratic transition.

For more information on the trials of NGOs in Egypt, please see POMED’s two backgrounders on the issue, released in February and March 2012, as well as the recent statement signed by 40 leading Egyptian civil society organizations.

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For more information, or for those seeking comment, please contact Susannah Cunningham, at(202) 828-9660, ext. 26/ Susannah.cunningham@pomed.org

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Orazio Bellettini opened the panel by characterizing his group, Grupo FARO, as a “think and do tank.”  He argued that merely generating strong ideas for policy is insufficient for think tanks in general, and instead stressed that think tanks should work to help governments better implement these policies. The goal of a democracy-minded think tank, Bellettini summarized, should be to better understand how ideas are developed, shared, implemented, and/or rejected within a country’s political system.

Bellettini continued by describing the three key factors that these think tanks must consider when designing and executing their operations. The first was that think tanks need understand the political context in which they are attempting to promote reform, both domestically and internationally. The policy recommendations these groups then draft should be designed to interface within that system in the best possible capacity. Second, Bellettini emphasized the importance of establishing linkages and networks among different communities of think tanks, other researchers, advocacy groups, etc. in order to affect change. Bellettini provided the example of how various advocacy groups worked with the scientific community in Ecuador to successfully save wilderness areas, noted for their biodiversity, from deforestation. He also added later on that having strong universities within a country can also greatly enhance the Finally, Bellettini stressed the value of domestically conducted research. Like research and advocacy efforts conducted in a non-partisan and secular manner, domestic research reaffirms a group’s commitment to building a fair, equitable, transparent democratic process ahead of any other political interests. He concluded his remarks by commenting on how the way evidence is presented is often just as important as the evidence itself, as well as the significance of building a wider policy narrative beyond the bullet points of evidence think tanks produces.

Sami Atallah added his remarks by talking about the work many think tanks and advocacy groups in Lebanon had accomplished had brought some hope for the country’s future among the youth.  He cited the role think tanks played after the government pushed off elections in 1997, and how they successfully compelled the government to agree to hold elections in June 1998. He focused most of his talk after that by sharing three key lessons he gained through his experience working in Lebanon. The first agreed with Bellettini’s point that think tanks need to have a greater policy vision beyond just the bullet points in their recommendations.  To do this, he emphasized the importance of collaborating with other civil society groups to create a common vision for policy, as well as “read[ing] the reality on the ground” in order to bring greater weight into the policymaking arena. The latter is especially significant because it allows one to detect disagreement among political elites, which can provide an opportunity for civil society to “strike,” meaning a window where think tanks and advocacy groups can most effectively inject their policy recommendations.

The second recommendation, like Bellettini’s, was to build as wide and as inclusive a coalition of think tanks and advocacy groups as possible, emphasizing that a coalition’s shared policy vision and greater negotiating leverage is worth whatever internal disagreement and debate that may arise. He also emphasized the importance of establishing a “division of labor” among the various researchers, advocates, activists and others that would make up such a coalition, arguing that “researchers do fundamentally different work from advocates.”

Atallah’s last recommendation focused on directing democracy promotion campaigns themselves, stating that “the key is to stay focused, despite many temptations,” meaning that a think tank, advocate, or coalition cannot stray from its efforts to build a fair, transparent democratic system. Citing his experience in 1997 in Lebanon, many groups within his coalition faced many partisan appeals from political parties, and while their requests were earnest and legitimate, the coalition’s campaign ignored their requests so as to not “sidetrack” the “cohesion of the movement.” This also meant that no one from his campaign ran in the election or even affiliated him/herself with a political party. The reverse is also true: “the best way to kill a think tank,” Atallah argued, is to insert think tank researchers into government. While the bureaucracy “is not paid to think,” many former politicians who work for think tanks want to return to politics eventually and thus can cause a think tank to censor itself. While Atallah did argue that a think tank having a voice within the government can be helpful, he cautioned against the risk of “co-option” if government influence seeps back into one’s organization.

Sally Roshdy then added her insights by commenting how think tanks in developing countries have to rely almost exclusively on foreign donors for fundraising, as well as the importance of establishing “long term funding” in addition to finding “project specific funding.” She also discussed how separating research from advocacy is almost impossible within the Egyptian context. Atallah responded to Roshdy’s remarks by discussing the importance of engaging the private sector. Although he conceded that think tanks “haven’t capitalized on this,” he described how recruiting private companies to donate to think tanks is a challenge because the benefits think tanks provide are arguably less tangible than those of other charities.

Maksim Karliuk then added his remarks by discussing the challenges think tanks in Belarus face. In addition to the challenges of fundraising that Roshdy and Atallah touched on, Karliuk discussed the challenge of advocating for policies in a country where the government “does not want to be advised.” As of now, only 12 think tanks currently operate inside Belarus, and most “political parties have [their own] research arms.” Think tanks in Belarus took advantage of the internal disagreement within the Belarusian government during the beginning of the Euro Zone crises to insert their influence.  However, while this has led to the expanded role of economic-oriented think tanks within Belarus, democratic- and other reform minded-think tanks have not shared such success. Orazio Bellettini likewise responded how in closed political systems like Ecuador’s or Belarus’s, approaching democracy promotion research and advocacy requires more of a “bottom up” approach as opposed to a “top down” one: in this kind of reality, mobilizing citizens and the media to advance the cause of democracy becomes all the more important.

Photo Credit: U.S. State Department

U.S. State Department Spoekswoman Jennifer Psaki expressed the U.S.’s concerns over a new draft of a controversial NGO law in Egypt that was presented by President Mohamad Morsi this week to Egypt’s Shura Council. The bill seeks to reform Egypt’s regulation of NGOs. President Morsi argued that the law “enables civil society to be assured that the state will not…restrict civil society organizations that work in service of the sons of the nation.” Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Director  Sarah Leah Watson disagreed, stating that “This draft law dashes all hopes that independent groups could operate freely and independently after the revolution…[it] would allow the government free rein to cut off funding and halt activities of groups that it finds inconvenient.”

The State Department confirmed that it received a copy of the draft law that the Shura Council is currently reviewing. Psaki shared the Department’s concerns, stating that “while some improvements were made from earlier drafts…the draft law still imposes significant government controls and restrictions on the activities and funding of civic groups, which appear contrary to the right of freedom of association enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Egypt is a party.” Psaki added that ”we have urged the government in consultations with civil society to revise the draft in accordance with Egypt’s international obligations.”

Also in Egypt, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) lifted the ban on Egypt’s military and police from voting in national elections. Former military officers and Egypt’s Islamists voiced discontent with the decision, arguing that the restriction first enacted in 1976 would keep the military and security agencies out of politics.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Jakob Wichmann opened the meeting discussing some of the preliminary results of a current study he is conducting with Ellen Lust on the role of religion in Tunisian and Egyptian politics. He began discussing how popular support and electoral representation are mismatched in both Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, Islamists hold 75 percent of seats in parliament yet less than half of Egyptians describe themselves as Islamists. He emphasized that in both Egypt and Tunisia there was a greater polarization in political representation than in public opinion. In Tunisia, secularism had a much stronger presence than it did in Egypt. Wichmann also mentioned that in Egypt, there was not a strong correlation between religious behaviors and voting for Islamist while in Tunisia, religious behavior was a better indicator of political behavior. Citing the results of his current research he noted that 30 percent of Egyptians and Tunisians feel “that religion should play a significant role in the state.” He closed his presentation discussing the political strength that Islamist parties had won in rural areas.

Ellen Lust opened her presentation by discussing the political cleavages in both Egypt and Tunisia and how they relate to the political climate in each country. She then introduced two broad categories of political struggle seen during transitory periods. The first she described as a “universalist” in which groups perceive their membership as fluid and are therefore maybe subject to marginalization through either religious or political conversion. These types of struggles usually result in the suspension of freedoms in order to maintain the status quo. The second type of struggle she discussed was “particular” in which groups perceive themselves as concrete and therefore they are motivated by the distribution of resources among the different groups.

Lust began the second half of her lecture discussing the two different types of political parties found in Egypt and Tunisia. The first of these are social movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nahda. These groups developed constituencies through grass roots efforts and when the political system opened they formed political wings. “Rentier” parties on the other hand participated in government under authoritarian regimes as the opposition. They developed a reputation among the population and were given “a place at the table” by the regime in exchange for playing politics under the regime’s rules. These parties are better known by the politicians who represent them and are poorly organized and have little connection to the people or real constituency.  She emphasized that “historical experiences have shaped the way these parties act.” She closed her remarks arguing that the political cleavages in these countries are more complex than is often acknowledged, saying, “This isn’t just about Islamism or secularism.”

Fredrick Wehrey spoke last focusing on Libya and the struggle of the democratic transition there. He began by putting the Libyan transition in context saying, “I think that it is important to remember the tremendous weight of Gadhafi’s 40 years on Libya.” He pointed to how four decades with no political participation has shaped the Libyan people and left the state devoid of institutions and civil society networks. He went on to say that in this environment “there is a sense that the Gadhafi regime is reproducing itself.” Pointing to the gulf-funded political parties and their dismal performance in parliamentary elections, Wehrey emphasized how the lack of institutions and civil society has inhibited political organization and that Libyan political parties are still fairly inept. He followed that by stressing “it is a very different situation than in Egypt.” Politicians from the Gadhafi era are almost non-existent and political capital is bestowed on activists depending on how early they were involved in the revolution. Wehrey closed by asserting that “the idea of Libya still exists” and worries that it will become a failed state are overstated and that Libya is flirting with a sort of decentralized federalism.

During the Q&A, Ellen Lust pointed out that “democracy means different things to these people.” In Egypt especially democracy has less to do with rights and more to do with economic security. She said we should also not discount that there has been a tendency in the region for people to want to vote for winner in an effort to win support later. She closed saying that “clientalism and democracy are not quite as antithetical as we think.”

Jakob then addressed questions on why the political cleaves occurring in the Levant are not stronger in North Africa. He pointed out that North Africa is still relatively homogenous and there are only a handful of minorities in the region. He refuted the idea that national identity is weaker in the Levant saying, “notions of citizenship depend on our circumstances.” Wehrey addressed some questions in the context of Libya stating that the militias are serving many of the same functions that civil society would otherwise serve and that the Islamist currents have yet to delineate their position in regard to democracy. He ended on an upbeat note saying, “Libyans are beginning to remember that they had a constitution” emphasizing that there is a thirst for proper governance in the state.

Marwan Muasher ended the event stressing that “the right to be different is a fundamental pillar of democracy that has yet to take hold in the Middle East.” Middle Eastern democracy will not be realized until Middle Eastern peoples embrace this idea.

AP/Egyptian State TV

Egypt’s president Mohamed Morsi is set to present to the country’s Shura Council the final draft of his proposed NGO law,  following criticism from rights groups in Egypt that previous drafts brought back  policies  ”similar to, if not worse than, the autocratic policies of Mubarak’s regime.” Previous versions of the law mandated that Egyptian NGOs obtain a “certificate of registration” from a steering committee under the Social Solidarity Ministry before they can legally operate. The proposed steering committee has also been criticized for the role in which Egypt’s security agencies would have a say in granting NGOs legal status and would have access to sensitive testimony.

President Morsi’s Human Rights Coordinator Nermin Hassan explains that the new law would approve NGOs to operate as long as the steering committee does not “voice objections within a set period of time.” It would also allow NGOs to receive foreign funds directly instead of through government bank accounts, and does not mandate that personnel from security agencies sit on the steering committee. Presidential aide Khaled al-Qazzaz attests that the new bill removes many Mubarak era restrictions, though many observers contend that the government still holds many powers to “stifle” NGOs. As Human Rights Watch’s Egypt Director Heba Morayef argued, “there have been no major changes. It still gives the government the power to restrict their activities and cut off funding.” The bill would also allow the steering committee to deny legal status to groups that participate in partisan politics or profiteering.

Egypt’s strict regulation of NGOs has  been a significant cause for contention within the U.S. government, especially when the interim military government shut down several U.S.-funded organizations, and charged  16 American activists from those organizations with criminal offenses. The U.S. has criticized previous drafts as “a step backwards,” and Secretary of State John Kerry said in April that the Obama administration has “real concerns about the direction that Egypt appears to be moving in,” with particular concern for recent “arrests, street violence and a ‘lack of inclusivity with respect to the opposition.”

For full hearing notes, continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Acting Chairman Collins opened the hearing, saying, “It is vitally important that the United States remain a global leader in promoting democracy, ensuring regional stability, and providing humanitarian assistance abroad.” However, he said, these goals must be balanced with responsible use of taxpayer dollars through appropriate use of U.S. aid money to further American national security interests. Collins expressed concern over what he views as a lack of transparency and oversight in many State Department and USAID programs and the lack of “a clear and cohesive foreign policy agenda” under the Obama administration. He also noted his support for the FY 2014 budget’s continued emphasis on assistance to Israel.

In his opening statement, Ranking Member Ted Deutch (D-FL) noted the FY 2014 request of $7.36 billion for the Near East and … He also noted that the International Affairs budget comprises one percent of the total budget and stated that we must ensure efficient use of these funds. He stated that the U.S. cannot ignore the need to an immediate response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. He urged efforts to ensure that Israel can defend itself and U.S. interests in the region. Deutch stated that the influx of Syrian refugees is compounding existing economic problems in Jordan and that the U.S. should continue to support its “crucial ally” to prevent a collapse that would have serious implications for the region. Discussing Egypt, Deutch said he understands concerns over the U.S. continuing to provide aid to Egypt. He said, “I support our continued relationship with the Egyptian military but those cannot be the only ties can’t be the only ties between our countries,” adding, “We cannot ignore the human rights abuses, the repression of women and religious minorities, and the refusal of the Morsi government to engage in an inclusive political process.” Deutch noted that Egypt’s draft NGO law poses a particular threat to these values. Deutch also discussed the upcoming elections in Iran, calling for the U.S. to engage the Iranian people and stating that he was disheartened by Rafsanjani’s exclusion from the list of candidates and the Iranian regime’s “immediate steps” to repress the people’s freedom of expression. He also noted the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund as a means of achieving the flexibility necessary for the U.S. to respond to the changes in the region.

Acting Assistant Secretary Jones began by stating that the Middle East and North Africa are experiencing “tectonic political, social, and economic changes” and that these changes present new challenges and opportunities for U.S. engagement. She asserted that U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa remain the same in spite of recent changes in the region; these interests include protecting Israel’s security, advancing Middle East peace, decreasing Iran’s destabilizing influence in the region, holding Iran to its international obligations, combating extremism and terrorism, and protecting commerce and energy security. Jones added that protecting and furthering these interests requires engagement in the region. She stated that the budget request of $7.36 billion reflects the national security interests and enduring commitments of the United States. The largest increase in the budget request is due to the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund, which will be used to promote political and economic reform in the region. These funds will be derived in part from the decreased request for Iraq.

Acting Assistant Administrator Romanowski began by noting that democratic transitions are “messy” and take time. She stated that USAID is “focused on making smart and sustainable investments” in the constrained budget environment. Describing USAID’s recent work, she cited significant humanitarian aid to Syria and a wide range of assistance to countries in transition throughout the region. Romanowski stated that Egypt remains a critical priority, with USAID “responding to citizen demands for education, jobs, and rights” and launching a new U.S.-Egypt Enterprise Fund. She also noted USAID programs in Tunisia, Libya, the West Bank, and Gaza supporting private sector investment and growth, institutional capacity, education, health, and respect for rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. Romanowski also noted the decreased funding for programs in Iraq in keeping with the decreased U.S. presence in the country. She stated that the FY 2014 budget request sustains the foundation for USAID to partner with and positively influence the changes occurring in the region.

Collins asked what conditions the U.S. is currently placing on assistance to the Egyptian government. He expressed concern over the Morsi government’s restrictions on human rights, specifically noting the arrests and prosecutions of figures accused of insulting the president, and asked if there is a red line for providing aid to Egypt. Jones responded that the State Department is pleased that Egypt has upheld the peace treaty with Israel and feels U.S. assistance to Egypt has furthered this goal. She also asserted the benefits of the U.S. relationship with the Egyptian military, including cooperation in counterterrorism. She stated that the relationship allows the U.S. to talk to the Egyptian government about the importance of maintaining democratic institutions and values, such as protection for NGOs, religious freedom, and women’s and minority rights. Jones asserted, “Nothing we do with Egypt is automatic,” saying that the State Department has not missed an opportunity to speak to Morsi and senior Egyptian officials about the importance of democratic values and to urge them to speak out against these recent arrests and prosecutions. She also said the State Department has used these opportunities to underscore how it can use this assistance to enhance the ability of the Morsi administration to work with civil society and advance democratic values.

Deutch asked what is being done to prepare for the possible outcomes of the Iranian elections, particularly potential conflict between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader or protests similar to the ones that took place in 2009. He also inquired about what the United States is doing to raise awareness about human rights abuses in Iran. Jones stated that she is very concerned about the fact that the Guardian Council, which is not accountable to the Iranian people, chose the candidates and noted that the selected candidates will likely represent the interests of the Guardian Council. She added, “We use assistance as best we can to shore up the ability of Iranian civil society… to increase the space in which they operate” and to bring about the democratic institutions for which they strive. Jones also called Iran a major human rights abuser and said the State Department does not hesitate to publicly call attention to these abuses.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX) asked about Camp Liberty in Iraq.

Deutch stated that humanitarian assistance to Syria is still insufficient and asked the witnesses to discuss how the U.S. could do more. Romanowski stated that the humanitarian situation is worsening and poses a significant challenge for the international community. She said USAID is working to ensure that assistance is reaching all governorates in Syria as well as communities in Lebanon and Jordan. Deutch asked whether there should be a broader discussion of a humanitarian corridor and whether the U.S. could participate in such a corridor. Jones said there are a variety of ways to go about establishing a humanitarian corridor and said the U.S. is engaging in talks internationally regarding enhancing the ability to get supplies to areas that need them.

Rep. Ted Yoho (R-FL) asked if there is a better way to bring about stability in Egypt than the U.S.’s current approach and said that Egypt will have a repressive government regardless of what the U.S. does, claiming that very little has changed in the country over the past 2000 years. Jones argued that the U.S. has very different tools now to deal with the challenges facing new democracies, citing the proposed MENA Incentive Fund and the flexibility it gives the U.S. to address these challenges. Romanowski echoed Jones’ statement about the use of new tools for assistance, pointing to increased efforts engage Egyptian civil society and the Egyptian and international private sectors. She specifically noted the implementation of an Egyptian Enterprise Fund and efforts to launch a higher education initiative in Egypt.

Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA) disagreed with Yoho’s assertion that Egypt had not changed significantly in recent years. He cited the Camp David Accords and the financial assistance to Egypt pursuant to the agreement as an example of how financial assistance from the U.S. has had a positive impact in Egypt. Jones and Romanowski agreed that there have been positive outcomes from this assistance.

Rep. Tom Cotton (R-AR) questioned Jones about the 2011 attacks in Benghazi.

Collins asked who will provide oversight for the MENA Incentive Fund. Jones stated that her office at the State Department and USAID will provide oversight but that the State Department will have final decisionmaking power.

Deutch asked whether Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent statement that the window for a two-state solution will close within two years is the official U.S. position on the subject. Jones confirmed that it is the official position but noted that the quantity is only an estimate. Deutch then asked about the Egyptian economy and whether the Egyptian government will be able to make the reforms necessary to allow the IMF loan package to move forward. Jones stated that the U.S. has made it clear to Egyptian officials that agreeing to the IMF’s conditions will unlock funds from other organizations.

Photo Credit: AP

Egypt’s National Salvation Front (NSF) criticized a draft NGO law over the weekend, saying the Muslim Brotherhood-backed bill is more restrictive than laws under former President Hosni Mubarak. The opposition bloc said the law “seeks to reproduce a police state by putting into law the role of security bodies in overseeing the work of civil society groups.” The bill stipulates that NGOs be vetted by a committee comprised in part of members of the security services and get official permission to receive foreign funding. According to the NSF’s statement, “This can allow these entities to refuse funding for rights groups that monitor elections or work to fight torture.” The NSF announced it would support an alternate bill drafted by a group of 50 civil society organizations.

The NSF has also formed an alliance with the Islamist, Salafist-dominated Al Nour party in an effort to limit the increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, the Salafists stand to gain most in the partnership; they may appeal to voters since they are untested in Egyptian politics. Al Nour may pull votes from the Brotherhood’s “less-loyal constituents,” particularly in conservative rural areas. Analysts say that if the parties are successful in the elections, they could form a coalition government or achieve a majority in parliament, giving them the power to choose the prime minister.

Also in Egypt, two journalists at a newspaper critical of President Mohammed Morsi are facing criminal charges of defamation. Public Prosecutor Talaat Ibrahim, a Morsi appointee, ordered an expedited trial for Magdy El Gilad, editor in chief of El-Watan newspaper, and Alaa El-Ghatrify, the paper’s managing editor, on Sunday. These charges are based on claims that the paper defamed the head of a “local public opinion research center.”

This video from the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran examines the crackdown on journalists leading up to Iran’s June elections.