For full event notes continue reading or  click here for the PDF.

Robert O. Work, CEO of CNAS, opened the conference by declaring that America’s current defense strategy trajectory was “unsustainable” and declared his hope that the U.S. would shift completely to an “advising and assisting role” only in Afghanistan in the years to come, with absolutely no “boots on the ground.” Senator Bob Corker agreed that current DOD budget issues reflected how priorities would need to change, and said that the effects of sequestration, which began March 1^st, 2013, should be viewed as an “opportunity” and not as a constriction, to seek out new ideas and solutions to DOD issues. After some discussion of the recent NSA surveillance scandal and how it reflects a growing demand among U.S. citizens for better transparency into U.S. government decisions, Senator Corker extended that discussion to include the need for a greater amount of transparency into national security decisions made by the U.S. government. Specifically, Corker called for a “debate on the AUMF” (Authorization for Use of Military Force) which needs to be both “expanded and narrowed” depending on the unique challenges of each region in which the U.S. has “boots on the ground.” With respect to Syria, Corker supports the U.S. acting on any verbal promises it has already made, because in his view, America is the “only country” in the global community that has the international power to enact lasting and powerful policy. Corker additionally said that it is of shared “national and international interest” to invest American humanitarian aid in the “more pluralistic, secular groups” of Syrian society because it is “not in the world’s interest to see Syria further destabilize” and such an investment would increase the chances of helping shape a post-Assad Syria that is more prone to adhere to universal ideals of democracy and human rights.

Senator Corker, who is the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations went on to discuss the Arctic region and China as they relate to U.S. national security and characterized current U.S. foreign policy decisions in those regions and others as something more shaped by current fiscal restraints than by security concerns. The sequester, Corker said, is a current “embarrassing” reality and Congress and the President must work together to reduce fiscal burdens in other areas, like entitlements, so that current cuts to the defense budget do not negatively affect America’s security. After final words on North Korea, the importance of greater transparency in the intelligence community, and the immigration bill currently being debated in Congress, Corker concluded with remarks on the need for Congress and the President to share wartime decisions with the public to a greater and wider degree. “The AUMF needs to be debated and that’s why the Committee [on Foreign Relations] is pushing through something on Syria,” Corker said.

The next session focused on “Defense Strategy Dialogue” contained an interchange between Wes Bush, Eric Edelman, and Michele Flournoy on the subject of how the Defense Department should best handle its shrinking budget post-sequestration. Bush said that “sequestration is forcing needed change,” but also that “Congress has to enable DOD to do what needs to be done,” which includes keeping up with swiftly changing standards of technological capability. Bush continued on to say that the U.S. “national security framework relies on technological superiority and not commonality” and that retaining that superiority requires much greater investment in research and development, as well as attracting the best talent. Edelman agreed that declining R&D investment, to less than ¼ of 1% of GDP last year, was a bad idea for the future of U.S. national security. Attracting “human capacity” and talent, Edelman emphasized, should be a key goal of the DOD as well as defense contractors, like Northrop Grummann, even more so in an era of tightening budgets.  Flournoy agreed  that DOD is constantly struggling with budget constraints but that a “triage approach” will turn into a “gutting of modernization” plans that will harm DOD’s capabilities in the future. Edelman added that such an approach is a result of higher than ever personnel expenses within DOD, and characterized these high “internal costs” as the culprit of the sluggish investment in much-needed new capital and machinery. Bush and Flournoy concluded the panel by mentioning the need for “increased agility” in DOD to face “all possible scenarios” and for a new method of budget cutting that focuses on building a budget based on what the DOD truly needs instead of cutting down a budget based on what DOD does not need.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton B. Carter, opened the next session with a call for a “new generation” of national security and defense experts who are “preparing for a wide range of circumstances” into the future. Carter detailed the process that DOD employees go through in implementing sequestration policies, which are “at a minimum, embarrassing, and at a maximum, unsafe.” In removing 487 billion dollars from the FY 2013 budget per the Budget Control Act, DOD went through tough decisions while facing a “great uncertainty” with respect to what “strategic choices and management reviews” had to be made. Carter discussed the most important results of these tough management reviews, which include the realization for a need for greater support from Congress with respect to national security, and the constant need for more flexibility in DOD, and the ability for more agile and swift responses to national security threats. “It is all about preparedness,” Carter concluded, which is a goal made even harder, though not impossible, in an era of unprecedented internal costs to DOD. A transcript of Deputy Secretary Carter’s remarks can be found here.

Retired lieutenant David W. Barno concluded the first half of the conference by characterizing the different threats to American national security as “silicon, iron, or shadow” threats. Silicon threats include cyber and online threats, which have gained particular attention due to China’s aptitude at accessing U.S. cyber networks. Shadow threats include those national security threats which U.S. intelligence has difficulty accessing and understanding. Many emerging threats, such as radicalization in isolated populations that can result in terrorist activity, fall under the shadow threat category. Iron threats include traditional warfare, in which the “U.S. still dominates.”  In all types of warfare, Barno concluded that the U.S. needs to be constantly re-evaluating its capabilities and always renewing its methods and ideas.

Photo Credit: AFP

The Bahrain Interior Ministry announced that it had identified members of the February 14 movement who have alleged links to “a string of crimes committed over the last few months.” It named 11 arrested suspects as well as 13 individuals “who were leading the coalition from abroad, some of whom are based in London.” The government has stressed that the group’s members “frequently travel between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon to obtain financial and moral support as well as weapons training,” as well as communicate with leaders in Iran ”to receive direct financial support and field instructions…” The Iranian government continues to deny taking any role in Bahrain’s uprising.

The 13 overseas suspects included Bahraini national Saeed Abdulnabi al-Shahabi, “who is responsible for coordination with Iranian leaders.” Shahabi has since been tried in absentia, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry also announced that it was still searching for other members of the group. As the statement read, “The information presented shows the active role in incitement and terror acts and the support that is provided by extremist religious and political leaders from outside and inside Bahrain.”

The United States has not officially commented on this development, however, earlier this week, 20 Democratic members of the United States Congress sent a letter to King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa in which they expressed their “concern and disappointment that United Nations Special Rapporteur Juan E. Mendez will not be permitted to visit Bahrain” to investigate allegations of the government’s use of torture. The letter decried Bahrain’s violation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry’s (BICI) recommendation “that torture allegations be independently investigated, which your government agreed to implement.”

The House Armed Services Committee marked up the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the 2014 fiscal year last week. The bill (H.R. 1960) was reported out of committee with a 59-2 vote and included several provisions relating to the Middle East. Among these provisions is a Sense of Congress which reaffirms U.S. interests in Egypt despite lingering concerns regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to “a pluralistic, democratic Egypt.” Section 1242 also expresses support for continued military assistance to Egypt and requires a comprehensive report from the Department of State that outlines details for said support.

Section 1205 states that the Secretaries of Defense and State “may provide assistance to the military and civilian response organizations of Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries in the region of Syria in order for such countries to respond effectively to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction in Syria and the region.” Assistance is defined as supplies, training and equipment. Section 1251, which also pertains to Syria, urges the President to “fully consider all courses of action to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power,” and requires President Obama to consider “the provision of lethal aid and relevant operational training to vetted Syrian opposition forces.” The Department of Defense should also analyze the risks of the provision of such aid and training.

With regards to Iran, section 1232 recognizes that “maintaining only one aircraft carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf constrains United States’ options and could put at risk the ability to have diversified platforms from which to defend the Arabian Gulf and, if necessary, to conduct military operations to prevent Iran from threatening the United States,” or its allies with nuclear weapons. Therefore Congress finds that the U.S. should construct and sustain a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers, battle force ships, and “at least a two aircraft carrier battle group presence in the Arabian Gulf.” The provision also states that the U.S. should finalize agreements with key countries in the Gulf to support the Defense of the Arabian Gulf. Section 1231 also requires a report on the efforts to improve the interoperability of United States-Gulf Cooperation Council countries missile defense systems.”

The bill also repeals section 1203 of the 2013 NDAA which provides the Department of Defense with the authority to enhance counterterrorism capacity in Yemen.

For full event notes continue reading, or click here for the PDF.

Sarah Morgan began by asserting that Egypt’s draft NGO law, which is currently being passed on from the Shura Council to the General Assembly, was “antithetical to the ideals of the revolution.” She noted that although the law was subject to many different interpretations, most of them were “quite restrictive” and “discretionary.” She noted that the law sought to curb freedom of association, and was “replete with administrative and bureaucratic hurdles” that would make it difficult for NGOs to operate even if they did receive approval. Morgan declared the law “falls so short of Egypt’s human rights obligations,” not only to the international community, but to Egypt’s own constitution. Among her concerns were the arbitrary limitations on NGO funding, including foreign funding. Additionally, the draft calls for the formation of a Coordination Committee that would have the authority to approve requests for foreign funding, and would require organizations to submit an Annual Report detailing all decisions made within the organization. The Coordination Committee would have the ability to reject decisions made by the internal governing body of the organizations. Morgan emphasized, “governments should not have a place in regulating the internal operations of an NGO.” She expected that, despite the problems she mentioned, the law would be adopted within a matter of weeks, and identified several courses of action with which the international community could respond. She expressed that the conversation with Egypt needed to be about more than the economy and the IMF, saying that putting human rights at the center of dialogue would be a “critical articulation of how we see the whole package” of U.S.-Egypt relations. Finally, she noted that the U.S. should consider incentivizing human rights reform using the security aid they are obligated to provide under the Camp David Accords by shifting how the funds are allocated.

In her presentation, Nancy Okail addressed the implications of the NGO law and explained what the law would actually mean in practice for Egyptian civil society. She said the law would have an impact on two major types of organizations: those working on development and economic issues, and those working on human rights and democracy issues. Okail noted that the government in Egypt, along with the other Arab governments undergoing democratic transitions, often makes the appeal for economic aid rather than for democracy assistance. However, she pointed out that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) lists several criteria for effective development projects. One of these criteria is country ownership of the project, whereby people within the country identify and determine their own needs and priorities. Okail noted that this requires a needs assessment survey of the civil society, and access to local information and budgets in order to determine a framework under which the project can be conducted. Thus, in order to conduct an effective economic development project, Okail argued, it is necessary to work with civil society. Egypt’s NGO law would place restrictions on these organizations’ ability to operate. Secondly, she pointed out that the laws would not only impact those organizations established to assist with Egypt’s transition, but also organizations that work on daily legal and rights issues in Egyptian society. She expressed concern that the NGO law would be seen as a “green light to crack down on the rest of local organizations in Egypt.” Okail concluded, “This law does not put an end to civil society only, but also an end to the revolution.”

After the main remarks, Sebastian Graefe from the Heinrich Boll Foundation commented that the German government was “very concerned” about Tuesday’s NGO verdict. Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the State Department, said that the State Department was “outraged” by the verdict and would be releasing a more detailed statement on Monday. Julie Hughes, Egypt Country Director at the National Democratic Institute, said that a conversation needed to be had about what sort of minimum standards would be mutually acceptable to both Egypt and the international community. She declared that Egypt was “too big to fail.” A representative of the Egyptian embassy responded to comments made during the main remarks. He said that the NGO verdict was issued by a court of law, and that the lawsuit was raised by a different government under a “law we are trying to change.” He noted that claims that the verdict was politicized directly contradicted claims that the Morsi government and judiciary were at odds with each other, saying, “I fail to understand how these pieces are put together.” Finally, he said that “at the end of the day, we believe in the separation of powers” and noted that there would be restorative justice options for those affected by the verdict “if the law is on their side.” He noted that the law was “only a draft” and would be open to revision and discussion by many different stakeholders. He also refuted the earlier claim made by Morgan that, under the law, a Coordination Committee would have the power to reject funding from NGOs, saying that no committee could make a decision itself to banish funding; rather, this decision had to be made through a court of law. Seelye and audience members pressed him on this point, asking if he meant that decisions made by a Coordination Committee could be appealed in a court of law under the draft NGO law. The representative insisted on his reading of the law, leading Seelye to note that one of the perceived problems with the draft law was that it was open to several different interpretations. In response to the comments made by the Egyptian embassy representative, Okail expressed concern that the draft law would be signed into law before an adequate discussion had been had. Morgan reinforced the notion that the draft law should be the subject of further debate, saying “that’s what a draft is for—for conversation.”

AP/Egyptian State TV

Egypt’s president Mohamed Morsi is set to present to the country’s Shura Council the final draft of his proposed NGO law,  following criticism from rights groups in Egypt that previous drafts brought back  policies  ”similar to, if not worse than, the autocratic policies of Mubarak’s regime.” Previous versions of the law mandated that Egyptian NGOs obtain a “certificate of registration” from a steering committee under the Social Solidarity Ministry before they can legally operate. The proposed steering committee has also been criticized for the role in which Egypt’s security agencies would have a say in granting NGOs legal status and would have access to sensitive testimony.

President Morsi’s Human Rights Coordinator Nermin Hassan explains that the new law would approve NGOs to operate as long as the steering committee does not “voice objections within a set period of time.” It would also allow NGOs to receive foreign funds directly instead of through government bank accounts, and does not mandate that personnel from security agencies sit on the steering committee. Presidential aide Khaled al-Qazzaz attests that the new bill removes many Mubarak era restrictions, though many observers contend that the government still holds many powers to “stifle” NGOs. As Human Rights Watch’s Egypt Director Heba Morayef argued, “there have been no major changes. It still gives the government the power to restrict their activities and cut off funding.” The bill would also allow the steering committee to deny legal status to groups that participate in partisan politics or profiteering.

Egypt’s strict regulation of NGOs has  been a significant cause for contention within the U.S. government, especially when the interim military government shut down several U.S.-funded organizations, and charged  16 American activists from those organizations with criminal offenses. The U.S. has criticized previous drafts as “a step backwards,” and Secretary of State John Kerry said in April that the Obama administration has “real concerns about the direction that Egypt appears to be moving in,” with particular concern for recent “arrests, street violence and a ‘lack of inclusivity with respect to the opposition.”

For full meeting notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Chairman Menendez opened the discussion on S.960, the Syrian Transition Support Act, by stating that the bill was not a choice between arming and not arming Syrian rebels, but a choice to allow U.S. intervention in a responsible fashion or “leaving it to others who will simply arm the extremists.” He said the bill “includes thorough vetting mechanisms to ensure that we are exceedingly careful about who we arm and train.” He pointed out that the legislation focuses a great deal on training, which would help build relationships and influence the groups the U.S. supports. Senator Corker, who co-sponsored S.960 with Menendez, said the bill would lay out a strategy to cause the balance to change. He argued that the bill “looks at the day after” the fall of Assad and would support moderate groups that would help lead the transition.

Senator Casey argued the “branding element” of S.960 was important because opposition groups should know the aid is coming from the American people. He stated his disappointment that no new assistance was proposed in the bill but said he would support regardless because it is “in our direct national security interests to address this.” Casey then said he would introduce amendments to address medical neutrality, the post-Assad democratic process, transitional justice, and accountability to uphold human rights. Senator Rubio also said the legislation was in the direct national security interest of the United States. He mentioned that America’s ally Jordan fears the “rise of an unfriendly government” in Syria, and argued that the fall of Assad would be one of the “most significant sanctions” on the Iranian regime. Senator Coons said he agreed with Casey and Rubio. Senator McCain argued that the U.S. should be doing more than what S.960 calls for, but said he would support because it will send a message to Assad, the opposition, and the Syrian people. Senator Kaine said he was pleased to support S.960.

Senator Risch said he would support the bill but that it wasn’t easy because he doesn’t have the “same level of confidence” his colleagues have in the Syrian opposition. He pointed out that Syrian society is very complex. Senator Udall said, “We have to ask: ‘who are we arming?’ I don’t think we know.” He asked for more hearings so the committee could hear from the experts. He also pointed out that the Obama Administration was hesitant to arm the rebels. Senator Menendez responded to Udall’s concerns stating, “We have had several hearings,” and argued that the committee knows certain elements of the opposition that it can support. He also called attention to the “strict vetting rules” laid out in S.960. Senator Murphy associated himself with the concerns of Udall. He said the American Congress and Senate Foreign Relations Committee needs to learn from history. “We are not very good at pulling political strings in a region we don’t understand,” he argued. Senator Boxer argued the legislation is clearly not an authorization of force. She said the bill was a way to “shape” the situation in Syria “just a little bit,” and added, “I feel good about it.” She also added that the bill would send a message to Russia that they cannot support a dictator.

The committee then held a vote on Senator Casey’s amendment ensuring protection of civilians, medical neutrality, and a democratic process that uphold human rights after Assad. The amendment was agreed to by a voice vote. Additionally, a Manger’s package of amendments was agreed to by a voice vote.

Senator Paul then stated his concerns with S.960. He said the Syrian conflict was a “murky war” and that it was not a good idea to get involved. He offered an amendment that would not authorize the use of force in Syria. He stated that while his colleagues had good intentions, “in your rush… you may be arming Islamic rebels” who could shoot Christians. Senator Corker responded to Paul’s concerns saying S.960 clearly does not authorize the use of military force but that Paul’s amendment to forbid it could lead to the creation of a terrorist safe-haven in the future. He challenged Paul’s remarks about rebels killing Christians saying the purpose of S.960 was to support moderates in order to avoid that exactly. Senator Rubio also responded to Paul, reiterating the point that S.960 clearly does not authorize the use of force. He added that the conflict was “not the War of 1812″ with two clearly defined sides. He said that currently the best equipped rebel fighters are the radical groups and this creates a “perverse incentive” for moderate rebels to align with the radicals. He noted that Assad was already killing Christians and that S.960 would try to stop that and does not support violence against civilians. Senator Paul’s amendment failed by a roll call vote of 2-15 with Senators Paul and Udall voting in favor.

Senator Udall then introduced an amendment limiting the arms provided to the opposition. It would allow small arms but category II and IV weapons would require a waiver. He said the opposition “must show they can manage and maintain” a chain of custody before heavier weapons are provided. Senator McCain voiced his disagreement with Udall saying, Udall “wants to use shotguns against scud missiles.” McCain said the amendment would limit the opposition to an unfair fight. He added that it would be better to not have S.960 at all if the opposition was restricted under the provisions Udall proposed. Senator Corker urged a “no” vote on Udall’s amendment. Senator Rubio pointed out that pro-Assad forces are well armed and radical Jihad forces are well armed, leaving the moderate opposition with little support. He argued that foreign policy “is about our national influence,” and said that if the U.S. was not involved at all then “we are guaranteed to have no influence in a post-Assad Syria.” Senator Udall argued that McCain’s remarks mischaracterized his amendment. Senator Menendez said the Udall amendment would “neuter” the purpose of S.960 and urged a “no” vote. Senator Udall’s amendment failed by a roll call vote of 4-14 with Senators Udall, Durbin, Murphy and Paul voting in favor.

Senator Paul then offered an amendment to strike Title V from S.960, the title that authorizes the President to provide lethal weapons. He acknowledged that it went “one step further” than the Udall amendment that had just failed but said it was important to get a vote on record. “You will be funding allies of al-Qaeda,” he warned. Senator Menendez rejected the idea of arming al-Qaeda rebels and pointed out that al-Qaeda is already well armed. Senator Rubio “categorically” rejected Paul’s claim. He said no one would vote to arm al-Qaeda, and said that moderate parties are the only ones under-armed at present. He pointed out that the vetting process is very strict in S.960. Senator Corker stated that the “thrust” of S.960 was to shift the strength away from Assad and al-Qaeda. Senator Paul’s amendment failed by a roll call vote of 2-15 with Senators Paul and Murphy voting in favor.

Senator Menendez then called for a committee vote on the bill. S.960, the Syrian Transition Support Act of 2013 was ordered reported by a roll call vote of 15-3. Senators Udall, Paul, and Murphy voted against. Senator Menendez then called for a committee vote on S.Res.143. The World Press Freedom Day Resolution was agreed to by voice vote.

Photo Credit: Reuters

Egypt’s top jurists suspended participation today in a government-backed conference to move forward on judicial reform, reigniting a political showdown with the country’s judges. Lawmakers in the Muslim Brotherhood dominated Shura Council announced it would reexamine a contentious proposal opposed by the judicial establishment that sparked a political crisis last month and forced President Mohamed Morsi to intervene after opposition leaders claimed it would “purge the judiciary” and offer an alternative bill. Members of President Morsi’s party in parliament are threatening that compromise now by taking up the tabled bill in a parliamentary session next week, effectively negating the judges conference. “We’ve stopped work on the conference until the presidency clarifies its position on this issue,” senior judge Abdel Rahman Behloul said. The Judges Club, an informal union of Egypt’s judges, said it had agreed to participate in the government conference if the contentious proposal was dropped. If approved, the bill would forcibly retire nearly a quarter of the country’s judges.

Also on Egypt, Thomas Carothers, in a new piece for the Carnegie Endowment, urges the West to abandon imagined comparisons between  opposition party quality and behavior in Egypt and attempt to understand the country’s political life and possible political futures more realistically. For commentators early on making overly simplistic comparisons to post-war Central and Eastern Europe, they now subscribe to the notion of Arab political exceptionalism - “that democracy just won’t work in the Arab world” – after discouraging challenges to democratic transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. The shortcomings of Egypt’s political opposition – elitism, fractiousness, a tendency to squabble rather than unite and put forward concrete proposals – is the primary criticism of its weakness, he writes, but western observes need to approach the new political landscape in Egypt with an open mind. “Overly harsh views of the Egyptian opposition—combined with a lack of recognition that many once-weak opposition actors in countries emerging from authoritarian rule have gone on to win elections—fuel the unhelpful idea that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only political force likely to hold power in Egypt for the foreseeable future.”

photo credit: Reuters

This weekend saw the end of the nearly two week siege of the foreign and justice ministries by armed militias in Tripoli.  The armed groups had besieged the ministries beginning in late April demanding the passage of a new political isolation law, which would ban any senior officials to have served during the over four decades of Muammar Gaddafi‘s rule.  The General National Congress passed the isolation law after the first week of the siege.  The law has been criticized by international observers as sweeping, unfair and could cripple the government.  The law’s passage under duress has led some to speculate that after seeing results, armed militias may resort to threats of violence and sieges to accomplish future goals.

Late Saturday, the militias withdrew from their positions surrounding the two ministries after having negotiated with a committee made up of government officials following widespread protests Friday denouncing the use of violence by militias.  Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced that there would be a cabinet reshuffle “in the coming days” in response to the crisis.  The ministries are now guarded by interior ministry forces.

Meanwhile, in light of “unsettled situation” in the capital as well as the recent congressional attention paid to diplomatic security in Libya, the U.S. government announced its withdrawal of “non-essential” personnel from its embassy in Tripoli and put a Marine quick-response team and a special operations unit on alert. The British embassy in Tripoli as well as the British Petroleum (BP) oil group, one of the largest foreign companies active in Libya, both withdrew some of their staff in response to the rising instability.

Photo Credit: George Ourfalian/Reuters

Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) introduced legislation that would significantly increase the U.S.’s involvement in the Syrian conflict. The Syria Stabilization Act of 2013 has five components: the authority to provide weapons, training, and non-lethal supplies to armed opposition groups; creation of a Transition Fund; sanctions on the sale of arms and oil to President Bashar al-Assad; authority to provide humanitarian assistance; and amendments to the Syria Accountability Act.

To receive assistance, opposition groups must undergo a thorough vetting process and meet specific criteria on human rights, terrorism, and weapons nonproliferation. Under this legislation, the U.S. would also continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Syrians inside and outside the country and to neighboring states that have accepted Syrian refugees. This assistance would be constrained by fewer restrictions than supplies flowing to opposition groups, as the President would be authorized to provide humanitarian assistance “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”

The bill would also establish a Transition Fund of $250 million dedicated to providing “initial support in the early period of a potentially chaotic transition… to enable an effective political transition and provide for initiatives that will improve the security of the United States, United States partners and allies, and the people of Syria.” Supported activities could include provision of basic services, support for security institutions, transitional justice, conflict resolution, restoration of economic activities, and promotion of democratic institutions.

Additionally, the legislation would impose sanctions on individuals who knowingly participated in the sale or transfer of defense articles or services, petroleum, or petroleum products to the regime in any capacity. It also amends the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 to allow sanctions to be lifted when a transitional government is in place and certain criteria have been met. These criteria include Assad’s departure from power, cessation of government violence against citizens, and the initiation of a transition to a “representative and inclusive government” that protects human rights, rejects terrorism, cooperates internationally on nonproliferation regimes, and promotes the unity of the Syrian state.

Photo Credit: Reuters/Amr Abdallah Dalsh

Compromise on a contentious draft law that would have forced nearly a quarter of Egypt’s judges into retirement has been reached between the judiciary and the president’s office. A crisis over the proposed law erupted last week when the country’s Muslim Brotherhood-led parliament pushed forward with a reform bill that the opposition said would lead to a purging of the judiciary, only to be replaced with Brotherhood supporters. President Mohamed Morsi met with leaders of the judiciary Sunday to find a solution and announced that he will hold a “Justice Conference” at the presidential palace Tuesday for the country’s top judicial authorities to contribute to a new reform bill. That bill will then be presented by Morsi to the Shura Council for review and discussion. The original judicial reform bill that would have lowered the retirement age from 70 to 60 and forced the immediate retirement of nearly 3,000 judges is now dead, a government representative declared.