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Following clashes last week in Tunisia between security forces and supporters of the radical Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia, violence flared again over the weekend in Kairouan and Tunis leaving several injured and one dead. Police arrested 200 members of the al-Qaeda affiliated group Sunday, including its spokesman, after the government earlier banned its annual congress scheduled to be held in Kairouan that day. Prime Minister Ali Larayedh accused the group of being involved in terrorism, warning, “We will deal with extremism firmly, we will be rigid.” Police also prevented the group from holding a smaller meeting in the Ettadamen district in Tunis later in the day, prompting clashes with Salafis who chanted “the rule of the tyrant should fall.” The Interior Ministry announced that Ansar al-Sharia is an illegal organization “that does not abide by the law.”

The Tunisian government, led by the moderate Islamist Ennahda party, has taken a firmer stance against the Salafis’ puritanical strain of Islam in recent weeks, a marked change in course from its previously non-confrontational approach that allowed Salafist groups to operate freely in Tunisia. But after largely neglecting repeated attacks and harassment of journalists and artists by hard-line Salafis, the government now fears the influence of some Salafist groups is undermining the authority of the state and poses a threat to public safety. Clashes along the Algerian border between Tunisian troops and members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is supported by Ansar al-Sharia, and the Islamist insurgency in nearby Mali have exacerbated the threat.

Also in Tunisia, the country’s main political parties reached consensus on a series of contentious issues at a national dialogue conference meeting over the weekend. Among the points agreed upon are the date for new elections, a new electoral law and a system to balance the powers of the president and prime minster, respectively.

Continue reading for full notes, or click here for the PDF.

In her opening remarks, Nina Shea  introduced the panelists and pointed out that the Center for Religious Freedom in the past focused on the persecution of Christians in the Muslim world, and the discussion is being expanded to include treatment of other religious minorities, both Muslim and non-Muslim. She noted that the Syrian case was especially characteristic of heightening sectarian tensions and religious persecution that has corresponded to the strengthening of radical Islamist forces.

Farahnaz Ispahi pointed out that Muslim and non-Muslim minorities are under attack in Muslim-majority countries and “Arab Spring” countries in particular, where governments are starting to face problems that have long plagued Pakistan. Ispahi offered a comprehensive historical overview of the Islamization process in Pakistan, where extremist groups enjoy an “extremely alarming” hold. While Pakistan was not founded as an Islamic state, in the years following partition, and since the 1970s in particular, the status of religious minorities “has deteriorated over the clamor” for religious influence. The decline in religious tolerance has generated population cleansing; religious minorities once constituted 25 percent of the population, and now total 3 percent. Attacks against Hindus, including forced marriage and conversion of girls, complement the “rampant state-sponsored discrimination… causing Hindus to migrate out in droves.”

Ispahi pointed out that the usage of the blasphemy law to persecute religious minorities for disrespecting Islam has risen sharply in the last four years, though the law technically applies to criticism of all recognized religions. There is however strong resistance to changing the law, not only by Islamists, but even mainstream parties, who refuse to speak on the issue, fearing reprisals. Since 1974 the law has not supported the rights of minority Islamic sects that “do not conform to Sunni/Salafi religious orthodoxy,” such as Ahmadis. The constitutionalization of Islam in 1979 moreover, heightened tensions between Sunnis and Shias, which ultimately resulted in an upsurge in the number of radical Sunni organizations and their militant offshoots, some of which have ties to Islamist and mainstream political parties, and consequently, political leverage. Leading figures in the Shia community are regularly attacked by these radical Sunni groups, culminating in the labeling of 2012 as the “year of Shia genocide,” a pattern that is being repeated in 2013. For Ispahi, it is clear that “this is a genocide” that “reflects the ambitious project of Islamists to purify Islam and transform Pakistan into a land of religious purification.”

Jamsheed Choksy spoke on how Iran’s position towards religious minorities is conditioned by Shia notions of purity, Islamic law on the status of dhimmis (traditionally protected religious minorities), anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism, and Islamic sentimentalism. Article 13 of the Iranian constitution stipulates that only Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are recognized by the state, and therefore protected through representation in the Majlis, though barred from higher posts. For other groups such as Catholics, Mandeans, and Baha’is though, Iran’s constitution “enshrines religion as a prime marker of difference,” as they are not recognized nor enjoy any legal standing. Sunnis and Sufis are regarded as heterodox Muslims and therefore “viewed with suspicion and disdain.” Choksy argued that hostile attitudes toward religious minorities ultimately derive from the fundamentalist ideals of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who once stated “every aspect of a non-Muslim is unclean.” To the regime therefore, challenges to theocracy are considered both an attack on the faith and a threat to security and the nation-state. Choksy contended that to address the rights of religious minorities it is pointless to focus on Ahmedenijad since he will soon be out of the picture; ultimately, the Ayatollah possesses more influence and prominence. Moreover, though religious freedom often takes a backseat to economic and security issues in negotiations between states, “the opportunity exists” to pressure the regime to honor its commitments and “reshape attitudes towards minorities.”

Stephen Schwartz noted that among Muslim-majority countries, Pakistan’s holds the record of most bloodshed of religious minorities, while Iran is most effective at legal repression. Moreover, as the civil war in Syria escalates, the Alawites’ systematic destruction of sacred Sunni sites in the country where Sunnism was founded “will not be forgotten” by the world’s Sunnis, ultimately galvanizing the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups. Listing dozens of holy sites destroyed in Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere, Schwartz contended “local resistance by moderate Muslims” is the only thing that works to protect these shrines. Moreover, Sufis in Iran need to defend themselves as no one else “is coming to their defense” since they reject the notion of valayat-i-faqih, which is fundamental to the state. Schwartz also pointed out that “real political change will mean the end of [established] Islamist regimes” in Saudi Arabia and Iran, where “people have had enough” and will not accept a more extreme system.

During the Q&A, Schwartz noted that Sufi-Christian relations are generally strong, although inter-religious dialogue “shouldn’t be a fake dialogue that tries to pretend there aren’t differences.” Choksy discussed how the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fixation on purity that ultimately defined his philosophy and attitude towards Sunni-majority states such as Saudi Arabia (and vice-versa). Choksy also pointed out that the widening of the Sunni-Shia divide is happening across the region, and there is more cause for concern than is noted in the press. Schwartz commented that this split is cemented by the destruction of Syria; extremists will attempt to “pay back the Shias in blood… Al Qaeda will have a one-word incontrovertible appeal for generations.” Choksy contended the spread of fundamentalism and the battle within Islam will “reshape everything from India-Pakistan to Morocco, and not for the better in terms of a pluralistic society.” Ispahi responded that the Sunni-Shia dynamic is not new, the fallout of which will be extremist destruction of the weakest segments of the Pakistani population first—non-Muslim religious minorities—since political parties are unified in their common anti-American, anti-minority, and pro-Taliban attitudes. Concluding on an optimistic note, Schwartz considered the reforms in Saudi Arabia are achieving positive change, leaving some room for optimism.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Mahmoud Hamad began the discussion by asserting that the political involvement of Egypt’s judiciary is unseen in judiciaries around the world and this involvement is counterproductive to Egypt’s political process. Many politically motivated decisions made by the courts create “judicial landmines” that can have real harm on the political process. The politicization of Egypt’s judiciary, Hamad continued, has led political factions to conclude that their disputes can be fought in a courtroom rather than at the ballot box.

Hamad argued that the “judicialization of politics” began when the National Democratic Party (NDP) was dissolved by the High Administrative Court, sixty-five days after Mubarak’s departure. While this ruling was enormously popular, it had no legal basis and was clearly political. The following criminal trials against former Mubarak regime personalities left much of the security apparatus intact, thus “facilitating the election of Morsi,” because people feared that a victory for Ahmed Shafiq, combined with the presence of old-guard security officials, would spell the end of the revolution.

Following the dissolution of the NDP, Hamad argued, the courts influenced the electoral process through several key decisions. First, they allowed all Egyptians living outside of Egypt to vote, an unprecedented decision. Second, “to the chagrin of many revolutionaries,” the courts ruled against a political exclusion law thus allowing former members of the NDP to run for office. Later, the courts “intervened in many occasions” to invalidate members of groups that were going to draft the new constitution.

When Morsi was elected, he tried to get the courts out of his way. Hamad predicted that this “struggle” will continue for the foreseeable future and that the courts will continue to be a force in Egypt’s political sphere. Despite this, Morsi is not void of political tools. Without reducing the retirement age, Morsi will appoint four justices to the eleven-member Supreme Constitutional Court. If he is elected to a second term, he will appoint four more.

Yussef Auf spoke after Hamad and focused on the reasons behind this “judicialization of politics.” He pointed out that there was a political vacuum after the revolution and the SCAF lacked the political will to fill it. Second, the SCAF had no public project for transitional justice. Specifically, their refusal to establish special revolutionary courts left the trial of Mubark personalities up to existing criminal courts. Third, the political factions failed to find agreements that would benefit the country in transition. Instead, they asked the courts to step in, thus leading to their inevitable politicization.

Auf pointed out that current judges feel “severe attacks” under Morsi’s administration, and that the absence of political actors or decision-makers in the transitional period forced the judges to step in.

During the Q&A, Michele Dunne observed that the judiciary has long had a political role in Egypt as they are charged with supervising elections. Mahmoud Hamad agreed with this assessment but reiterated Auf’s earlier point, that the inability and unwillingness of the SCAF to lead the post-Mubarak transition, forced the judiciary to increase their political involvement.

Hamad then pointed out that many in the judiciary see Islamists as “enemies.” Due to the Mubarak-era distrust of Islamists, if you had any affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood “you wouldn’t become a judge.” Hamad argued, however, that Morsi needs to show the judiciary respect. Specifically, many in Egypt view the proposed judicial retirement law as an attack on judicial independence. Hamad argued that if Egypt develops “a culture of not respecting judicial opinions… that will be very problematic.”

Responding to a question, Hamad predicted that the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) will uphold the Shura Council’s electoral law so that the Council will not be dissolved. He said that while the court dissolved the People’s Assembly on the same premise last year, they would not dissolve the Shura because they “don’t want to be more of [an] enemy to the Islamists,” and dissolution would mean all legislative power rests with Morsi.

In a response to a question about the judiciary’s stance on freedom of expression, Hamad stated, “The claim that the SCC has been a force of liberalism should be taken with a grain of salt.” Instead, he argued that the SCC will mostly defer to parliament. Hamad noted that the Muslim Brotherhood does not want to change the freedom of expression laws because they are “political tools in their pocket.” He pointed out that these “tools” were used this past weekend when opposition activist Ahmed Maher was arrested.

Hamad did note, however, that it was “harder for Morsi to control the judiciary” than it was for Mubarak. He pointed to new constitutional protections that secure a higher level of judicial independence and a law preventing judges from serving as a presidential advisor while on the bench, a tool used by Mubarak to pay sitting judges large sums of money. When asked about the use of civilian courts versus military courts in the new constitution, Hamad said the military fought for the ability to try civilians because it is a safeguard on their economic interest.

Responding to a final question about third party prosecutions, which occurs when a civilian rather than the state brings criminal charges against someone, Hamad said this was a tool developed and utilized by Mubarak but there is not much discussion of changing it because “everyone is using it.” He stated the tactic was a “tool of political prosecution in the legal profession.” A recent example of this tactic is when an independent lawyer charged satirist Bassem Youssef with “insulting the president.”

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Tunisian authorities over the weekend dispersed the public gathering of Salafists in a number of cities in an apparent push to tamp down on extremist groups in the country. Clashes erupted Saturday in southern Tunis after security forces, using tear gas, attempted to displace 200-300 people setting up tents for public preaching without permits. Protesters responded by throwing petrol bombs and rocks. Police similarly dispersed groups of Salafists in Medenine, Tataouine, Sfax and Sidi Bouzid in southern Tunisia, and the Tunisian government is accusing militant Islamists for a recent spat of violence on the border with Algeria where security forces are tracking a number of militants aligned with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

After largely neglecting to confront hard-line Muslims and members of a puritanical Salafi strain of Islam known as Ansar al-Sharia since the country’s revolution in 2011 the Tunisian government is now challenging the freewheeling activities of Salafists to perpetrate violence and preach strict interpretations of Islam. Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou warned  that he will bring to justice anyone inciting violence or hatred. “We’re not going to allow the raising of any flag other than the Tunisian,” he said, referencing the trademark black flag attributed to al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Seif Allah Hassine, also known as Abou Iyadh, the leader of Ansar al-Shaira, accused the Tunisian government Sunday of  ”calling for a war” and threatened to “bring the battle closer” to Tunisia if the government, led by the moderate Islamist party Ennahda, continued to intensify its hunt for jihadists.

Writing for The Atlantic, Steven A. Cook argues that Egypt, Turkey and Tunisia are all leaning toward greater institutionalized Islamism in civil and political life. He explains, “It is hard at this point to imagine anything other than a future in which religion plays a broad and decisive role in Egyptian, Turkish, and Tunisian societies…By grounding certain institutions in Islamic tenets, Islamist elites create an environment in which religion plays a greater role in society, including in areas that have not been directly Islamized.”

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The office of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced that the president suffered a small stroke, revealing the reason for the president being airlifted to a French military hospital outside of Paris on Saturday.  The public statement, a first from the normally secretive administration, especially in matters of health, attested to the president’s “good health” and reassured that he would be back in Algiers in “not more than seven days.”

Despite the statement of reassurance, many have begun to speculate as to the future of the Algerian presidency.  While the 76-year-old Bouteflika is now expected to run for a fourth term, the expected addition of a deputy president to serve alongside him is seen as a possible means of designating a successor.  The past few months have already seen intense political jockeying for the top spot as president-in-waiting, as well as widely apparent maneuvering by Algeria’s top generals and intelligence services trying to ensure a favorable transition.

President Bouteflika’s dual ruling parties (the National Liberation Front and the National Rally for Democracy) are not the only ones gearing up for the 2014 presidential elections and possible transition.  Algeria’s Islamist parties have been redoubling their efforts at forming a political union behind a single leader after having gained some traction on some domestic political fronts.  Yet the Islamists continue to tread cautiously, intent on avoiding the violent repression they suffered in the Algerian Civil War that followed their last electoral victory.

While the speculation has grown over what a transition would mean for Algeria, some Western policy advocates worry that were Bouteflika to depart, Algeria would turn inward in dealing with a transition. They fear this could result in the West losing a valuable ally and interlocutor in addressing instability in Mali and the wider counter-terrorism efforts in the region.

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In a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nathan Brown examines how the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis and religious institutions in Egypt are being reshaped in fundamental ways by becoming increasingly involved in state politics. “For Egypt, the question is not simply how Islam, Islamist forces, and Islamic institutions will shape postrevolutionary politics, but how the new politics is shaping them,” Brown notes, adding that Islamist forces are neither able to control nor unaware of the ways their role in politics is changing them. That the Muslim Brotherhood has shown an aptitude for running and winning elections, however, negates that it “was not built primarily for politics and certainly not for governing”  as it struggles to turn it’s ideological movement into a governing party, Brown asserts.   “There is little sign that the Brotherhood’s leadership has given much thought to how its fixed ideological vision can be sustained in such circumstances.”

Translating their “inward-looking movement” of charitable and social commitments into a comprehensive political and economic platform, Salafis are similarly challenged as they wade into political participation, Brown writes. “With the growing politicization of Salafism, tactical compromises might be necessary and will have to find some ideological or doctrinal justification for a movement that is founded on correct practice.” Electoral politics, he argues, may force Salafi scholars to settle differences not in close textual or doctrinal readings but at the ballot box instead.

Brown’s analysis also posits that rather than being transformed into independent arbiters, formerly state-dominated religious institutions such as al-Azhar may fall victim to their own enhanced legal position in the new Egypt.  Such institutions have achieved a more prominent role in Egyptian society since the 2011 revolution, yet as the institution assumes its new central role in public and political life, it risks moving away from autonomy while pressure from within and outside the institution increasingly make it an object of control.

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A U.S.-backed proposal to require the U.N.’s observer mission in occupied Western Sahara to monitor human rights abuses has been rescinded. U.S. diplomats dropped calls to enhance the U.N’.'s observer mission to the disputed territory after a review of the draft resolution by France, Spain, Britain and Russia and protests by the Moroccan government, which called the move “biased.” The territory was annexed by Morocco in 1976, and the U.N. observer mission there is the only U.N. mission in the world that is not authorized to monitor human rights abuses. Philippe Bolopion, a U.N. specialist for Human Rights Watch who lobbied for the additional human rights language in the resolution, said, ”This is a missed opportunity and it’s disappointing to see the U.S. retreat in the face of Moroccan overreaction.” The U.N. Security Council will vote Thursday on a resolution to extend the observer mission without the additional language.

Also in Morocco, the country’s main Islamist opposition group warned that a youth “explosion” will occur unless the government addresses dire social and economic issues. Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan (AWI), or Charity and Justice, seeks the establishment of an Islamist state through non-violent means and has been barred from politics for publicly criticizing the monarchy’s wealth and unchecked authority. AWI sopkesman Fathallah Arsalane said, “Society has changed, there are more graduates, people who are better educated but who have nothing to lose, because they have no work, no house and no future…If the youth explode, no one will be able to stop them, not the political parties, nor the state, nor our movement. And that is what we fear.” Arsalane called the coalition Islamist government that was elected after constitutional amendments in 2011 “toothless” and insisted that  democracy must guarantee freedom of expression and a redistribution of wealth that benefits the poorest segments of Moroccan society.

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Senator John McCain (R-AZ) visited Libya on Thursday for the fifth time since the country’s revolution. He met with Prime Minister Ali Zidane, the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, and Justice, and the president of Libya’s General National Congress. He also had a “great discussion” with civil society leaders and legislators from Benghazi. McCain said that while there are “real and serious challenges facing Libya,” he is “hopeful” due to the aspirations of the Libyan people. He categorically denied that foreign troops would be helping to improve security in Libya, but that the spread of al-Qaeda “requires the cooperation of all nations in the Maghreb.” McCain said the U.S. would provide training and equipment if requested, and that “our logistical help will grow equally with the development of the Libyan government.”

Robert Kaplan writes that “Libya has gone from being a tyrannical state to being barely a state at all,” and that its borders have become frontiers. He argues that Libya “is but a vague geographical expression” that required “suffocating forms of tyranny” to hold it together, so the fall of Gadhafi brought about dangerous consequences. Kaplan acknowledges the merits of intervention, but finds that its proponents fail to recognize that without using troops, the U.S.’s ability “to rebuild weakened or collapsed states is severely limited.” He concludes that Libya “will go on and on as a dangerous and weakly governed area between Tunisia and Egypt.”

Western diplomats and defense officials in Tunisia reported that the country has turned into “an Islamist militant haven” since the fall of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali‘s regime in early 2011. Some high profile militant leaders are known to be operating there while Ennahda debates how to deal with violent extremists. One official noted that many of al-Qaeda’s fighters in Mali were Tunisian,  and that they may now return and destabilize the country.

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Egypt’s Shura Council passed in principle a draft law further restricting protest rights. The law requires protesters to give official notice to the police three days prior to a demonstration. This notice must include details of the time, route, and demands of the demonstration. Protesters must also be 200 meters away from government, legislative, or judicial buildings. In February, Human Rights Watch said, “This law as drafted would severely restrict one of the key human rights that determines Egyptians’ ability to continue to call for bread, freedom and social justice.” Regarding the recent protests and controversial subsequent arrests, State Department Acting Deputy Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell said, “When there is violence, we urge the government to thoroughly and credibly and independently investigate all claims of violence and to bring perpetrators to justice in a way consistent with international standards for the rule of law.”

Meanwhile, an Egyptian court postponed its decision on the legality of the Muslim Brotherhood. Lawyers bringing the case argue that the Brotherhood is an illegal organization due to its dissolution in 1954 by Egypt’s military rulers. The postponement was an acquiescence to the Brotherhood’s request for additional time to present evidence in its defense. According to Reuters, analysts say the court’s decision is unlikely to remove the Brotherhood from its position of power. However, there could be a political impact, with a ruling of illegality exacerbating existing frustrations with the Islamists. Although the Brotherhood has dismissed the arguments in the case, the group registered as an NGO last week, changing its legal status.

President Mohamed Morsi also announced that the he expects parliamentary elections to occur in October and the parliament to be in place by the end of the year. The election was postponed when an administrative court stated that Morsi had not sent the new election law to the Supreme Constitutional Court for approval before ratifying it.

Photo Credit: REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi

In a piece for Foreign Policy, David Gartenstein-Ross urges the U.S. and the international community to press Tunisian officials to prosecute vigilantes responsible for acts of violence , obstruction of justice and threats to freedom of expression throughout the country. At the heart of the attacks, Gartenstein-Ross writes,  is the hard-line Salafi movement which is reportedly behind dozens of attacks against individuals they believe to have transgressed appropriate moral, Islamic standards. “Vigilantism has spread far and wide, affecting a broad spectrum of Tunisian society: artists, liberal clerics, Sufis, religious minorities, educators, secularists, foreigners, and civil society activists have all been its victims,” he said, adding, “alarmingly, there are several documented instances in which those who carried out the attacks were able to intimidate the security services, thus resulting in police inaction following acts of violence…” Fearful of challenging or capturing the ire of violent Islamist groups, or even consciously neglecting the attacks, Gartenstein-Ross faults the government for failing to maintain order and eroding citizens’ faith in authorities to do so. “If the government looks the other way, or if police are too intimidated to make arrests, then the extremists will have won an important battle in the struggle for Tunisia’s future.”

Also in Tunisia, General Carter Ham, the outgoing chief of the U.S. Africa Command, warned that al-Qaeda is attempting to establish a presence in Tunisia. Alongside U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Jacob Walles, Ham held meetings with Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh, Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces General Rachid Ammar to address the country’s security concerns. “Good governance, education, and economic development,” are the best ways to counter al-Qaeda’s influence in North Africa, he said. The Interior Minister later announced that Tunisia’s Supreme Security Council planned to establish “crisis cells” to monitor and combat terrorist activity in the country.