For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Mesut Özcan began his opening remarks by arguing that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East always starts with its economic ties with its neighbors, mentioning the free trade agreements Turkey has signed with Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan in recent years, as well as the deep energy and other economic ties it has established with Russia and Georgia. Throughout its tenure as Turkey’s ruling party, Turkey has made its primary goals to build these ties gradually and over time to meet EU ascension criteria. The Arab Spring, however, affected Turkish foreign policy in general “not evolutionary, but revolutionary.” As the protests unfolded, Turkey realized that it had to side with the movements toward democracy in whatever way it could. However, it also had to recognize that Turkey’s policy towards one country undergoing a democratic transition would inherently be different from others. Turkey understood that in the Arab Spring, people not only demanded greater participation in their governments, but “greater services.” Thus, Turkey decided to build relationships with these new regimes, such as the one in Egypt, and redesign Turkey’s financial support for those countries after that. 

Şaban Kardaş opened by arguing that Turkey’s goal for its increased engagement with the Middle East over the last decade has always been part of an attempt to build a “regional structure” with itself at the center. He denied the suggestion that Turkey was turning away from the West, and shrugged off suggestions that its foreign policy is one that strictly adheres to the typical labels people attribute, such as “zero problems with neighbors” or “neo-Ottomanism,” but the real point is just to establish itself as a regional power. In fact, Ahmet Davutoğlu used the term “central power” to describe this strategy when he was an academic, not one of these other terms. With respect to the Arab Spring, Kardaş argued that Turkey’s approach has been similar to that of the West, and that the AK Parti has always worked to build present itself as pro-democracy and pro-transformation in support of those movements. However, the Arab Spring has also forced Turkey to abandon somewhat its goal to become a “neutral regional player” for the Middle East because civil wars in places like Libya and Syria have forced Turkey to take sides.  Turkey also has to deal with the widening sectarian divide across the region as a result of the Arab Spring.

Kardaş also denied that Turkey is ceding its relationship with the West in favor of expanded relations with the Middle East, arguing that Turkey cannot exert its power in the region without its ties to the West, as shown by Turkey’s stance on intervention in Syria. Finally, Kardaş argued that Turkey’s support for democracy in the Arab World in the wake of the Arab Spring means that Turkey must reaffirm its commitment to advancing democracy at home.

Before opening up the panel to questions from the audience, Christian Ostermann asked the panel how the Arab Spring has impacted Turkey-Israel relations. Mesut Özcan argued that stability in Israel’s relationship with Egypt “died with Mubarak[‘s regime]” and thus required Turkey to play a greater role in mediating between the two countries. He also mentioned that the conflict in Syria also affects Turkey’s relationship with Israel overall.

In response to a question on how Turkey, being a Sunni-majority country, has affected its relations with its Shi’a neighbors, Bülent Aras argued that Turkey has worked to improve its relations with Iran and Iraq, in addition to its Sunni-majority partners like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, its efforts with Shi’a-majority countries have obviously been less successful. Aras argued that states can talk and build ties, but have less power in repairing sectarian relations “at a societal level.” Mesut Özcan conceded that when it comes to repairing sectarian ties in countries like Iraq, for example, Sunni Iraqis will say Turkey needs to do more to counter the greater Shi’a influence in the country and form Iran, whereas Shi’a Iraqis will probably say Turkey is doing too much to balance against Shi’a power in the country. Thus, Turkey “cannot please everyone.” However, Şaban Kardaş argued that Turkey is “not just going to give up on fixing sectarianism” in the Middle East. In response to a question on Turkey’s role in the widening rift between Iraq and its Kurdish Regional Government, Özcan argued that Turkey has sought to build a relationship with all of Iraq, but the soured personal relationship between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has naturally made this plan more difficult.

Following a question regarding the characterization of the AK Parti’s foreign policy as “neo-Ottoman,” Kardaş argued that not even Foreign Minister Davutoğlu would call Turkish foreign policy “neo-Ottoman, and Turkey’s attempt to embrace its neighbors’ cultures and build economic ties with them as a strategy of building “regional depth” is just “classic geopolitics.” Aras argued that Turkey’s activist foreign policy with its neighbors as a stepping stone to becoming a world power is no different from what Brazil has done in Latin America.

Finally, after a question from the audience regarding the implications of the emerging protests all over the country directed against the AK Parti and the Prime Minister, Aras argued that the protests have become an urgent issue for Erdoğan the way the Kurdish issue has. He also argued that they are, to an extent, “a rhetorical issue” that other countries will use against Turkey, as it is the only reality in Turkey that is broadcast eight to nine hours a day on American television. However, he ultimately thinks that Erdoğan will grant concessions to the protesters. Kardaş argued that the identities of the protesters are far more varied than most people understand: originally, most of the protesters were environmentalists dissatisfied with the plans to develop the park, and have since expanded to “fringe Marxists and Leninists” who have done “most of the vandalism” since the protests began, as well as to people who were already staging protests in Taksim, particularly those who feel isolated in Turkey’s political system and are looking to “engage their demands.”

Photo Credit: AFP

Approximately 31 people have been killed and at least 100 injured in Benghazi after a militia opened fire on protesters gathered outside its base on Saturday. Demonstrators reportedly rallied outside the headquarters of the Libya Shield brigade to demand it to disband and submit to the full authority of Libya’s security forces. Madia el-Fakhery, a doctor at Benghazi’s largest hospital, claimed the number of casualties was “overwhelming.” “We’re seeing gunshot wounds to the chest, head and abdomen”, she said, adding that she has had to do amputations. Details of the clash remain unclear, however, and an investigation is underway.

The Libya Shield is a group of militias with roots in the rebel groups that fought in the country’s 2011 civil war against Muammar Gaddafi who were tasked with maintaining security. In a statement issued on Sunday, Prime Minister Ali Zidan described the events as “sad and painful” and urged people to be cautious and exercise self-restraint. “We have to find a solution to the weapons in the hands of people so that such events would not happen again,” Zidan added.

The recent clash between protesters and the Libya Shield will likely escalate public backlash against militias, who have been accused of abusing citizens and enforcing their own agendas. Anger over the power of militias has increased in Libya after an Islamist militia was blamed for the killing of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens along with three other Americans last September.

Libya’s transitional period has seen a lack of security in Benghazi after Gaddafi wherein mysterious assassinations have occurred, police stations and other symbols of the government have been routinely attacked, and militias, including the Libya Shield, have recently shut down the Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministries in an effort to influence legislation.

Update: One of Libya’s highest military officers, Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Youssef al-Mangoush, resigned on Sunday citing the unusually high death toll after clashes left 31 people dead in Benghazi.

On Tuesday, June 5, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing titled “Obama’s Failed Syria Policy.” Mr. Tony Badran, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Dr. Jon Alterman, Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, testified. The committee’s chairman, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), presided.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

In her opening statement, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen said the delayed response from the Obama Administration to support the popular uprising in Syria at the onset and in calling for Bashar al-Assad’s removal allowed for extremist groups and Al-Qaeda affiliates to co-opt the movement “setting up the bloody conflict we see everyday.” She added that we need a political solution in Syria and must work with our allies in the region who fear the repercussions of a protracted conflict. Additionally, she argued that the U.S. must address the serious issue of Moscow continuing to arm the regime, which has escalated the conflict and propped up Assad, whereby she introduced H.R. 893, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act, that would address the issue head-on. Ros-Lehtinen was also opposed to arming the opposition claiming, “[they] are too fractured, too convoluted to be able to ensure that the arms don’t eventually end up in the wrong hands that may one day turn these weapons against us our allies, like Israel.” Lastly, Ros-Lehtinen rebuked Obama’s inaction in light of his “red line” statement  after evidence suggests that chemical weapons have been used, which she argues sends the wrong message to those “who seek to test our will.” During the opening statement by Ranking Member Rep. Ted Deutch (D-FL), he remarked that the hearing should be a productive discussion for progressing U.S. foreign policy on Syria, arguing that the U.S. should pursue a negotiated settlement. He further commented on Syria’s impact on the entire Middle East and argued that our assistance should be used as a tool to encourage the fractured opposition leadership to “get their act together.” He also claimed that there are real steps the U.S. can take to address the humanitarian crisis, including a humanitarian court order to provide aid to those in need as well as pushing international donors to fulfill their promises. He further commented that it is the U.S.’s duty to support opposition groups that share our goals and values and that the Obama Administration should use its leverage with Turkey and Qatar to prevent them from arming extremist groups.

Rep. Steve Chabot’s (R-OH) opening remarks primarily concerned the increased role Hezbollah has played in Syria, as well as over the stability of Jordan, which currently hosts over 160,000 refugees in the al-Zataari camp alone. In Rep. Gerry Connolly’s (D-VA) opening statement, he commented that there are four concerns to think about in regards to Syria. The first being “who do we support?;” the second is concern for the spread of the crisis regionally; third, Russia’s role in “blatantly re-arming the Assad regime;” and fourth, the possible use of chemical weapons.

Rep. Adam Kinzinger’s (R-IL) remarks were far more critical of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy in general, expressing his frustration with “America ceding its role of leadership around the world,” especially in the Middle East and in Syria in particular, as well as through strategies like “leading from behind.” He argued that the United States is looking for “the easy way out” when it comes from engagement in the region, and that when the United States retreats from the world, “chaos ensues.” By contrast, Rep. Brad Schneider (D-IL) was most concerned with Syria’s territorial integrity post-civil war, and expressed the strategic significance securing Syria’s weapons of mass destruction, helping regional allies like Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and the Gulf States build their own security in response to the conflict

Rep. Ted Yoho (R-FL) briefly remarked that he was interested in hearing feedback about how the U.S. can help fix the situation so that we “don’t repeat the errors of our foreign policies over the last 30 years.” Rep. Joe Kennedy (D-MA) echoed concerns over Assad’s support Iran, recent arms sales from Russia, and Hezbollah’s role in the crisis. He was curious to hear about the prospects for peace talks in Geneva and what the ramifications of a failed negotiation would be. Rep. Luke Messer (R-IN) commented that he was interested in hearing insights from the witnesses in order to determine what the appropriate policy for the U.S. is.

Rep. Grace Meng (D-NY) expressed her desire to discuss potential “new avenues” for resolving the conflict.  She then focused her remarks on two undiscussed aspects related to the Syrian conflict: the first was related to Hezbollah’s financing and how disrupting its efforts and flow of funds “might affect the organization.” Her second question related to Syria’s Kurdish population.  As she attested, “the Kurds are organized, well-financed, and relatively pro-American.” Kurds are not a panacea to the Syrian problem but I wonder whether we could be doing more with them, particularly in light of recently improved Turkish and Kurdish relations,” she added.

Rep. Brian Higgins (D-NY) stated, “It is not a question of beating the Assad regime and handing it over to the good guys,” adding that the opposition is made up of at least eight different groups and is highly fragmented. He remarked that we cannot get involved in another civil war in the Middle East; he argued the U.S. cannot always nation build in the Middle East and oftentimes they have to figure it out for themselves. Contrastingly, Rep. David Cicilline (D-RI) remarked that “one thing is clear: I believe the global community must respond.” He further added that he hopes to focus on a response that provides humanitarian aid, addresses the refugee crisis, incorporates a global strategy to end the violence and promotes stability in the Middle East.

Tony Badran gave the first opening testimony from the witness panel, opening that the war in Syria has “metastasized” along predictable lines. He also added that discussion of the conflict outside of Syria, especially in the United States, focuses mainly on whether or not foreign powers should intervene in the country and what that intervention would like. Mr. Badran suggested that if the fact that President Bashar al-Assad is the main problem, then the U.S. should do whatever is necessary to destroy him and his regime.  If Iran’s role is the key problem, the U.S. should focus on them, such as by targeting the channels they use to support the regime.  Mr. Badran identified Iran’s role as the key issue for the United States at the moment in Syria, and suggested that the U.S. target Syrian air fields to disrupt their ability to funnel arms into the country, as well as work through regional allies like Turkey and Jordan to aid the rebels in combating Iran’s presence.

Danielle Pletka argued in her opening testimony that the war is not just the rebels versus the regime, its a war that includes Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, Turkey, Jordan, the Gulf States, al-Qaeda, and other armed groups, however, that long list of factions still lacks the major western democracies. Pletka also commented that the United States’ inaction in Syria has hurt President Obama’s credibility. Pletka argued that mistakes like setting red lines and then not sticking to them harms the United States’ ability to project power and assert political influence overseas. She put forth four necessary courses of action: vetting and then arming rebels who embrace democratic norms, using stand-off weaponry to disable Syrian airfields and render inoperable their air force, consideration of imposing a no-fly zone with, and  imposing new sanctions on Hezbollah.

Jon Alterman opened by stating that Syria is strategically important because it is a hub state, with influence that reaches into the Levant, the Gulf and into the Caucasus and Central Asia. All five of Syria’s neighbors, he added, are important to the United States. In response to the Syrian crisis, Alterman proposed five courses of action: establishing safe havens to protect civilian populations on both sides of Syria’s borders, providing limited weapons for civilians own self-defense, engage in more aggressive diplomacy, work on intelligence sharing, and negotiate a settlement for the transfer of power. “We must pursue a policy that meets those needs for Syria while being attendant to the other demands placed on our military and our government,” he concluded.

Ros-Lehtinen commenced the discussion by asking two pointed questions, one regarding the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria and what the U.S.’s response should be, and the second regarding how to convince Russia to stop arming the regime. Ms. Pletka said the only way to contain the use of chemical weapons would be to put U.S. troops on the ground and secure them ourselves, which she notes that “none of us want to do.” Dr. Alterman briefly commented on the Russian issue claiming “Russians have a serious concern with terrorism and jihadism in the Caucasus, we might have things we can help them with.” He added that we should be negotiating with them better and appealing to their higher interests.

Rep. Deutch continued the discussion inquiring about what a resolution in Syria would look like and asking whether the borders would remain the same. Dr. Alterman responded saying de jure, the borders in Syria would remain intact but de facto, there will be some changes and there will be some diffusion of power. He argued, however, that we should not assume that the Geneva convention will have a solution, instead claiming “we’re going to have to work on a process of dealing with the issues in Syria.” Afterwards, Rep. Chabot asked a question regarding the role of Hezbollah in the conflict. Mr. Badran claimed they were leading on all political fronts but that they have suffered some losses. Ms. Pletka added that they are the “best armed, most sophisticated terrorist group in the world,” and we need to be worried about “de-fanging” them. Dr. Alterman finally argued that we should work on discrediting Hezbollah in Lebanon, which could help serve American interests.

Following Rep. Chabot’s question, Rep. Connolly expressed concern over Ms. Pletka’s argument to vet and arm the opposition using CIA intelligence. He rebutted that disaggregating between providing weapons to extremists and jihadists and those rebels who share American democratic values. Contrastingly, Rep. Kinzinger argued that the U.S. should get involved and that “a strong United States is a stabilizing force around the globe.” He later asked about what message the U.S.’s policy in Syria has sent to Iran. Ms. Pletka responded saying the message to Iran is very clear: the U.S. is not serious about our “red lines” or “imposing our will.” Dr. Alterman added that the greatest threat to our standing in the world is our inability to make decisions about our priorities and commitments.

Rep. Schneider asked the question about arming the rebels, and what would happen if those arms ended up in the hands of the wrong people. Mr. Badran responded claiming that there should be a two-pronged approach: we should work with Turkish intelligence in the North and Jordanian and Saudi Arabian intelligence in the South, as a conduit to set-up local forces and secondly, to administer specific tactical systems that can be used for specific tactical missions thereby mitigating unwanted outcomes. Dr. Alterman added that an unwanted outcome of arming the rebels will depend on what we arm them with. Rep. Cotton continued the discussion by asking whether Assad staying in power would be worse or an al-Nusra-lead front toppling the regime. Ms. Pletka argued that the worst scenario would be Assad remaining in power and that the power has tipped in his favor, which is worrisome. She added that a post-Assad Syria is what we should also be focusing on in order to avoid the “bad guys” taking over.

Rep. Weber simply asked each witness to state three things that the U.S. should do in Syria. Mr. Badran argued that we should (1) take out supply lines that Iran is using to supply the regime, (2) work with Turkish and Jordanian intelligence to start working with local groups and (3) stay open about the fact that the conflict will not end until Assad resigns. Ms. Pletka claimed that we should (1) pick a “winner” and vet them with CIA intelligence and (2) impose costs on those aiding the “bad guys.” Dr. Alterman argued that (1) We should focus on protecting our allies and making sure they do not undermine our efforts, (2) remain attendant on the Jihadist threat in Syria and (3) focus on Iran. With his time, Rep. Higgins argued that “there are limitations in what the U.S. can impose on people.” Thus the issue in Syria is not trying to figure out who are the “good guys” and “bad guys,” but understanding the extent to which the United States can engage Syria in the long term. He yielded the rest of his time to the chair.

Rep. Yoho remarked that the constitution does not advocate for interventionist policies, saying that they are “a dangerous thing.” He added that he was worried by Ms. Pletka’s willingness to establish a “fly-over,” inquiring whether it could guarantee not involving an all-out war with “Iran, Russia and maybe China.” Ms. Pletka assured him that a no-fly zone would not lead to a war with Iran, Russia and China. Dr. Alterman added that he believes intervention, at this point, is required. Rep. Cicilline asked whether arming the resistance is practical and if we have the capacity to vet “over a hundred armed forces” on the ground and to ensure that they prevail. Ms. Pletka responded that she trusts the CIA when they say they have the capability of vetting them and Mr. Badran reiterated his “two-pronged approach” that he mentioned earlier.

Congresswoman Lois Frankel (D-FL) asked to what extent the conflict could spill over and affect allies like Jordan and Turkey, thus putting more pressure “on the United States to intervene.” Mr. Bardan argued that the role Hezbollah has played in directing the conflict, Iran’s deployment of strategic weapons inside Syria, and Assad’s assets committing terrorist attacks within Turkey, the conflict is already a regional one where Turkey especially needs to defend its strategic interests. Dr. Alterman agreed, and argued that the spillovers and other wider consequences of the conflict in Syria are even more significant for “small countries [like} Lebanon and Jordan” simply because of their limited resources to deal with them. Rep. Rob DeSantis (R-FL) expressed his concerns over foreign Jihadist fighters fighting in Syria on both sides. Dr. Alterman echoed DeSantis’s concerns, citing France’s concerns over the 400 French nationals fighting in Syria. However, he also argued that the United States still has a stake in dictating the outcome of the conflict. Finally, Rep. Mark Meadows (R-NC) asked what would be the best way to identify and arm potential partners among the rebels. Mr. Badran argued that the U.S. already supplies some groups with non-lethal aid, so they should be trusted with tactical weapons. Allies like Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar can also help identify partners, and that there are Islamist elements in Syria that can help. Ms. Pletka agreed, saying that the U.S. often does arm actors that run counter to our democratic interests and that so called “secular” and “democratic-minded” militias are often not so.

With that, Rep. Chabot adjourned the hearing.

Photo Credit: Reuters/Esam Al-Fetori

Mohammed Magarief , the head of Libya’s national assembly, resigned on Tuesday, weeks after lawmakers passed a Political Isolation Law that would ban former Gaddafi officials from senior posts regardless of their role during Libya’s uprising. Many fear that this law would deprive the government of experienced leaders, complicating efforts to transition Libya into a democracy. The law will come into effect on June 5th. Guima Attaiga, Magarief’s first deputy, will serve as acting congress president until an election can be held to choose a successor.

The Political Isolation Law was passed as Libya struggles with growing security concerns. Heavily armed groups surrounded two ministries before the law’s passage. Members of the Tibu tribe blockaded and shut down the airport in Sabha, Tuesday, when the government failed to provide them with information surrounding the disappearance of a local brigade leader. The airport was later reopened.

Meanwhile, the General National Congress took steps towards an upcoming vote on a bill that would discourage corruption. The bill would establish national identification numbers that will trace payments and transfers to discourage bribery. The National Identification Numbers Project (NID) will also be used to disburse benefits to citizens. This move comes after several reports indicating that government payroll systems were inundated by duplicate and imaginary workers who are receiving multiple paychecks.

For full event notes continue reading or click here for the PDF.

Jakob Wichmann opened the meeting discussing some of the preliminary results of a current study he is conducting with Ellen Lust on the role of religion in Tunisian and Egyptian politics. He began discussing how popular support and electoral representation are mismatched in both Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, Islamists hold 75 percent of seats in parliament yet less than half of Egyptians describe themselves as Islamists. He emphasized that in both Egypt and Tunisia there was a greater polarization in political representation than in public opinion. In Tunisia, secularism had a much stronger presence than it did in Egypt. Wichmann also mentioned that in Egypt, there was not a strong correlation between religious behaviors and voting for Islamist while in Tunisia, religious behavior was a better indicator of political behavior. Citing the results of his current research he noted that 30 percent of Egyptians and Tunisians feel “that religion should play a significant role in the state.” He closed his presentation discussing the political strength that Islamist parties had won in rural areas.

Ellen Lust opened her presentation by discussing the political cleavages in both Egypt and Tunisia and how they relate to the political climate in each country. She then introduced two broad categories of political struggle seen during transitory periods. The first she described as a “universalist” in which groups perceive their membership as fluid and are therefore maybe subject to marginalization through either religious or political conversion. These types of struggles usually result in the suspension of freedoms in order to maintain the status quo. The second type of struggle she discussed was “particular” in which groups perceive themselves as concrete and therefore they are motivated by the distribution of resources among the different groups.

Lust began the second half of her lecture discussing the two different types of political parties found in Egypt and Tunisia. The first of these are social movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nahda. These groups developed constituencies through grass roots efforts and when the political system opened they formed political wings. “Rentier” parties on the other hand participated in government under authoritarian regimes as the opposition. They developed a reputation among the population and were given “a place at the table” by the regime in exchange for playing politics under the regime’s rules. These parties are better known by the politicians who represent them and are poorly organized and have little connection to the people or real constituency.  She emphasized that “historical experiences have shaped the way these parties act.” She closed her remarks arguing that the political cleavages in these countries are more complex than is often acknowledged, saying, “This isn’t just about Islamism or secularism.”

Fredrick Wehrey spoke last focusing on Libya and the struggle of the democratic transition there. He began by putting the Libyan transition in context saying, “I think that it is important to remember the tremendous weight of Gadhafi’s 40 years on Libya.” He pointed to how four decades with no political participation has shaped the Libyan people and left the state devoid of institutions and civil society networks. He went on to say that in this environment “there is a sense that the Gadhafi regime is reproducing itself.” Pointing to the gulf-funded political parties and their dismal performance in parliamentary elections, Wehrey emphasized how the lack of institutions and civil society has inhibited political organization and that Libyan political parties are still fairly inept. He followed that by stressing “it is a very different situation than in Egypt.” Politicians from the Gadhafi era are almost non-existent and political capital is bestowed on activists depending on how early they were involved in the revolution. Wehrey closed by asserting that “the idea of Libya still exists” and worries that it will become a failed state are overstated and that Libya is flirting with a sort of decentralized federalism.

During the Q&A, Ellen Lust pointed out that “democracy means different things to these people.” In Egypt especially democracy has less to do with rights and more to do with economic security. She said we should also not discount that there has been a tendency in the region for people to want to vote for winner in an effort to win support later. She closed saying that “clientalism and democracy are not quite as antithetical as we think.”

Jakob then addressed questions on why the political cleaves occurring in the Levant are not stronger in North Africa. He pointed out that North Africa is still relatively homogenous and there are only a handful of minorities in the region. He refuted the idea that national identity is weaker in the Levant saying, “notions of citizenship depend on our circumstances.” Wehrey addressed some questions in the context of Libya stating that the militias are serving many of the same functions that civil society would otherwise serve and that the Islamist currents have yet to delineate their position in regard to democracy. He ended on an upbeat note saying, “Libyans are beginning to remember that they had a constitution” emphasizing that there is a thirst for proper governance in the state.

Marwan Muasher ended the event stressing that “the right to be different is a fundamental pillar of democracy that has yet to take hold in the Middle East.” Middle Eastern democracy will not be realized until Middle Eastern peoples embrace this idea.

photo credit: Reuters

This weekend saw the end of the nearly two week siege of the foreign and justice ministries by armed militias in Tripoli.  The armed groups had besieged the ministries beginning in late April demanding the passage of a new political isolation law, which would ban any senior officials to have served during the over four decades of Muammar Gaddafi‘s rule.  The General National Congress passed the isolation law after the first week of the siege.  The law has been criticized by international observers as sweeping, unfair and could cripple the government.  The law’s passage under duress has led some to speculate that after seeing results, armed militias may resort to threats of violence and sieges to accomplish future goals.

Late Saturday, the militias withdrew from their positions surrounding the two ministries after having negotiated with a committee made up of government officials following widespread protests Friday denouncing the use of violence by militias.  Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced that there would be a cabinet reshuffle “in the coming days” in response to the crisis.  The ministries are now guarded by interior ministry forces.

Meanwhile, in light of “unsettled situation” in the capital as well as the recent congressional attention paid to diplomatic security in Libya, the U.S. government announced its withdrawal of “non-essential” personnel from its embassy in Tripoli and put a Marine quick-response team and a special operations unit on alert. The British embassy in Tripoli as well as the British Petroleum (BP) oil group, one of the largest foreign companies active in Libya, both withdrew some of their staff in response to the rising instability.

Photo Credit: REUTERS/Ismail Zitouny

The political stand-off in Libya’s capital continued after armed militias, who were demanding passage of a political isolation law, refused to leave their posts after the law was passed by parliament. Instead, after having their demands met, the militias formed an alliance and submitted new demands to Reuters on a printed note. The news agency reports, “The additional demands included [Prime Minister] Zeidan’s resignation, the freezing of a recently released state budget and the right to form a committee to take charge of the Foreign Ministry.” Despite the demand for his resignation, Zeidan defended the armed groups saying they have a right to express their views as they see fit. He added, “We don’t have militias in Libya, we have revolutionaries.”

After calling the militia’s siege of government ministries an “assault against the democracy I was sworn to protect,” Libyan Defense Minister Mohammed al-Barghathi resigned on Tuesday. He then rescinded his resignation hours later after a plea from the Prime Minister. A government spokeswoman said, “The prime minister asked the defense minister to change his mind and to consider the situation the country is in, and so he decided to change his mind.”

The U.S. government responded to the growing political tension in Libya with a statement yesterday that called on “all Libyans to refrain from armed protest and violence during this difficult time in the democratic transition.” The U.S. State Department said, “As Libya manages this challenging transition, it is vital that the country’s institutions operate free from armed intimidation,” adding, “The democratically elected representatives and leaders of the Libyan people must be able to carry out their duties and move forward with the constitution motivated by their responsibility to the Libyans who elected them rather than by the threat of force.” In other news, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing this week for the nomination of Deborah Kay Jones to be the next ambassador to Libya.

For full hearing notes, continue reading or click here for a PDF.

Senator Menendez reminded the committee of the increasing strategic importance of the Maghreb and Sahel to America’s long-term security interests, as well as expressing the hope for a balanced approach to embassy security and the need to engage with the people of Libya and Chad beyond the diplomatic missions. Eager to capitalize on the popularity the U.S. enjoys among the Libyan people, Menendez asked how “to harness that goodwill to help the Libyan people shape a safe, productive, and inclusive democracy that has a healthy relationship with the United States,” despite the challenges of disarming militias and unifying the government.

Senator Tom Udall (R-NM) read a brief statement acknowledging Ambassador Jones’ qualifications and recommending her for the post of ambassador to Libya.

In her statement, Ambassador Jones expressed optimism for the success of Libya’s democratic transition, asserting that limited U.S. assistance during its tenuous transitional period gives the U.S. “the best opportunity to help support and strengthen a Libyan government that can be a long-term partner of the United States.” Recognizing the need to address immediate security concerns, Jones also argued that U.S. engagement is key to realizing a stable Libyan government: “It is in our national interest, both strategic and ideological, as well as Libya’s, to see it fulfill its potential as a stable and prosperous democracy, with a fully-developed and active civil society and geographic areas, with respect for human rights and international norms.” She added, “Libya’s development of its full national capacity and sovereignty will enhance our own security and economic well-being through regional security and cooperation…” Similarly, she expressed confidence that Libyans’ successes since the revolution – national elections, renewed oil production, and a reconstituted government – and its “advantages compared to other Arab states recently affected by dramatic political transition” bode well for the country’s democratic future.

Ambassador James Knight pledged to address the strategic goals of the U.S. in supporting the Chadian government’s efforts to “counter the growing threats to regional security and to maintain and widen its regional engagement,” as well as support its pursuit of democratic reform. He praised the government’s cooperation in regional humanitarian assistance and serving as a key partner to the international community’s peacekeeping efforts in the region and Mali in particular.

Senator Menendez, reflecting on developments over the weekend involving militia intimidation of members of the Libyan parliament to pass the contentious Political Isolation Law, asked Ambassador Jones how democracy could succeed with imminent threats to the government from armed groups and how she would engage with civil society. Jones stated that the U.S. needed an ambassador in Libya after nearly nine months of high-level diplomatic absence and said she intended to focus on three elements of engagement: security (disarming and training militiamen); governance (rule of law and reconciliation); and civil society (engaging with the Libyan people across multiple platforms). Her first goal, she stated, was to take a “terrain walk” in Tripoli to acquaint herself with the country. She added that the problem of security had reached beyond Libya into Syria and the Sahel and that “more than ever, we recognize that working with these issues is not a bilateral issue, but a global issue. We must work with other countries with assets and interests in the region” to dismantle MANPADS and chemical weapons and to prevent the proliferation of weapons.

Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) stated that the U.S. had underestimated the challenges and security threats posed by Libya’s revolution despite America’s strategic interest in the country. “It’s really not a government: When you look at the militias, it’s remarkable the country is functioning.” He asked Ambassador Jones whether she would agree with his assessment. “Based on the briefs, I don’t know that we’ve underestimated,” she said, adding that the U.S. “has certainly had a setback” with not having an ambassador in the country since September. She reminded the committee that “progress after these transitions is unpredictable” and not “formulaic,” stressing that now was the time the U.S. needed to “double our efforts” in supporting the Libyan government’s democratic transition. “If we’re not there making efforts, we will certainly lose.” Asked by Senator Corker what her goals for the post are, Ambassador Jones indicated that her principle goal is to address the security and capacity vacuum experienced by the central government and that the approach must come from a number of arenas, including “getting civil society involved in supporting what they fought so hard to gain: democracy.” She added, “The Libyan people have more skin in this game than anyone.” In response to Senator Corker’s concern that militiamen would soon control cabinet posts, she expressed her determination to engage with anyone, including militiamen, who has “eschewed violence” and is committed to democratic transition. “All of these challenges are indicative of a people who want change. Authoritarian leaders do not develop civil societies, and we need to be prepared to step in and support civil society.”

Senator John McCain (R-AZ) echoed frustration that Libya’s democratic transition was “rough and incomplete” but expressed determination in supporting the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Referencing the Political Isolation Law that was passed by the Libyan parliament over the weekend, Senator McCain asked Ambassador Jones to assess what impact the law will have on the integrity of the Libyan government. She stated that she shared the senator’s view that “we owe Libyans our best in democratic transitions” and expressed her intent to address the new law with Libyan leaders in order to urge a rethinking of its application and conditions. “[I] hope I can influence that in terms of looking at the future of the country. I certainly believe the Libyan people fought too hard and want too badly a government of representation.” Charging that the administration has done very little to assist the Libyan government with security and military support since Qaddafi’s overthrow, Senator McCain urged Ambassador Jones to reach out to the administration in fulfilling her mission to assist Libya in becoming a functioning democracy.

Senator Menendez closed the hearing by stressing the importance of moving these nominations forward. “We can’t direct American assistance without an ambassador…[our] national interest and the ultimate outcome of Libya’s future can be helped, or we can allow it to be shaped…when American presence is absent.”

Photo Credit: Ismail Zitouny/Reuters

Libya’s parliament passed a law on Sunday that will ban a wide range of Gaddafi-era officials from positions in the new government, following demands from armed militias who surrounded government buildings in Tripoli last week. Following the vote, parliament spokesman Omar Hmaiden seemed unsure if the armed groups would leave: “We hope the siege of the ministries will stop now, but it is not in our hands,” he said. Al-Jazeera reports that “The decision to hold the vote under duress could embolden the armed groups to use force again to assert their will over parliament,” and The Associated Press said the vote is “likely to further stall the country’s already rocky transition to democracy by ousting elected lawmakers.” In a statement released a day before the vote, Human Rights Watch argued that Libya’s congress should vote down the measure because “the proposed law’s provisions and procedures for exclusion are too sweeping and vague.”

Writing for Al-Jazeera, Larbi Sadiki contends that democracy should be a priority over security in the Arab world. In Libya, Sadiki argues that “the absence of shared values and political rules of engagement aggravates security and prolongs the absence of the state as well is the incapacity of interim institutions to assume full authority.”

In an op-ed for The Washington Post, Charles Dunne, Stephen McInerney and Karim Mezran argue that the U.S. must reengage in Libya to help ensure a successful democratic transition. The authors describe many obstacles to Libya’s transition including major security concerns; state institutions that are “dilapidated, dysfunctional and strikingly weak;” and political problems including constitutional negotiations, attracting foreign investment, and job creation. In addition,  Libya’s transition is important to the international community because the U.S. has “important national security interests in North Africa” and “a successful transition in Libya would be a comforting and important model for democracies emerging elsewhere in the region.” Therefore, the authors argue, “The U.S. government should support broad reform efforts in the security and justice sectors,” and that “targeted funding for democracy and governance programs can… ensure the promotion of stability and the protection of human rights throughout the country.”

Photo Credit: AFP PHOTO / ADEM ALTAN

Freedom House released its annual report on freedom of the press around the world in 2012. The report identified a global decline, asserting that “the percentage of people worldwide who enjoy a free media environment fell to its lowest point in more than a decade.” The Middle East and North Africa had the lowest ratings in the world, with nearly three-fourths of the region’s countries designated “Not Free” and none considered “Free.” Continued political turmoil throughout 2012 created uneven conditions for press freedom in the region and contributed to a net decline in press freedom across the region.

Libya and Tunisia maintained their increased ratings from 2011 in spite of a lack of institutional and regulatory structures to protect press freedom. Egypt declined significantly, losing its previous gains due to constitutional provisions allowing limitations on the press on social, political, and cultural grounds and harassment and intimidation of journalists. Its classification changed from “Partly Free” to “Not Free.” Most Gulf states saw declines in their ratings due to widespread crackdowns on political dissent. Yemen was an exception to this pattern, with a rising score due to increased media diversity. Israel, typically supportive of a “free and diverse  press,” was downgraded from “Free” to “Partly Free” due to the prosecution of reporter Uri Blau for possessing state secrets and incidents of government interference in content and licensing at several media outlets.

Traditional media in the region continued to be restricted by emergency rule, state ownership, and laws prohibiting blasphemy or insults of political figures. Governments sought to impose similar constraints on new media, such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs, by expanding traditional mechanisms of restraint to include censorship and surveillance. Improvements were made in the legal and economic realms, but this progress was outweighed by declines in the political sphere.