Post-BICI Bahrain: Between Reform and Stagnation
Nearly a year after the beginning of protests in Bahrain on February 14, and despite the Bahrain Independent Commission Inquiry (BICI)’s report released on November 23, the regime has not engaged in reforms to tackle the roots of the ongoing crisis, say Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and Elham Fakhro. Fakhro worked with the BICI during its mandate period.
Ulrichsen and Fakhro detail reforms implemented by the government of Bahrain, but note that the measures taken to date “have left unaddressed many of the roots of Bahrain’s political and economic equalities.” Further, the “emergence of radicalised splinter groups means it is no longer possible to speak of a ‘regime-opposition’ dichotomy.”
The government has taken some measures from the BICI report recommendations, including revoking the arrest powers of the National Security Apparatus, overturned “a civilian court of death sentences for two protesters,” “pledges to rebuild Shiite houses of worship” and the “reinstatement of workers dismissed on grounds of political expression and the dismissal of charges against 343 individuals accused of the same charges.”
However, the authors claimed these reforms do not “make deep reforms to structures of political and economic power.” Moreover the government’s “moves to re-engage the political opposition lack real meaning while many of its leaders…remain in prison” and al-Wefaq headquarters were recently attacked by security forces. The authors continue, “perhaps most damaging to efforts to build a strong middle ground is that, the culture of impunity within the security forces identified in the BICI report has yet to result in any high-level accountability.”
The authors warn about the radicalization of all parties in the conflict. On one hand, many pro-government groups have becoming increasingly radicalized, and are accusing the government of being too lenient with protesters. Reports have also surfaced of “armed civilian groups mobilising intermittently,” one of them led by Adel Fleifel, an infamous torturer from the 1990s uprising in Bahrain. On the other hand, the opposition also appears to be fragmenting with new videos emerging that suggest “elements of the opposition are resorting to more violent strategies as a means of challenging security agencies.”
The authors point out Al-Wefaq’s “insistence on the the government resignation’s as a pre-condition ultimately caused the collapse of the negotiations” last spring. Furthermore, “Al-Wefaq has also been unable to show meaningful results from its decisions to engage with the regime.” Meanwhile, the government has not build trust by its pursuit of “largely symbolic gestures…[as] continuous announcements of impending reforms have yet to translate into significant action…”
The authors contend that “elements of moderation do remain,” but Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa ”has been sidelined” by hard-line elements within the government. Ulrichsen and Fakhro conclude that the symbolic date of the anniversary of Bahrain’s February 14 uprising is “fraught with dangers” and can either “move toward deep and lasting changes to the balance of power between state and society, or the regime will have to rely on the use of force against an increasingly determined opposition.”
