POMED Notes: The Syrian Crisis: Internal Dynamics and International Policy

On Monday, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted a discussion concerning the Syrian Crisis in light of the recent failure of the draft resolution by U.N. Security Council (UNSC). The panel featured Senior Fellow for Regional Security at IISS Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy Dana Allen, and Senior Fellow for Land Warfare Brigadier Ben Barry. The discussion was chaired by Adam Ward, Director of Studies at IISS.

For full event notes, continue reading below. Or, click here for the PDF

Emile Hokayem began the discussion stressing that the importance of diplomacy had decreased in the minds of the Syrian people due to the failure of the UNSC. Hokayem said that the West, Gulf States, and Turkey “did not have a back up plan” for the Russia/China veto; the watered-down version of the UNSC resolution supported by Turkish/Arab constituencies was expected to be enough for a Russian acceptance. Hokayem foresaw the creation of an international body, which he referred to as the “Friends of Syria Group”, as a way to preserve the Arab League initiative without limiting the initiative to solely Arab support.

In the short-term, Hokayem predicted that the Syrian regime under President Bashar al-Assad, given the new window of opportunity created by the failure of the draft resolution, would intensify the crackdown to fragment the opposition further and solidify its position within the country. He said that as the civil war intensifies, the threat of spillover becomes imminent. Also, the burden of responsibility for intervention has shifted from the international community to Turkey and the Gulf States. Hokayem noted that the Assad regime now knows that “Russia has its back” and has an opportunity to sway some opposition figures into dialogue. Although dialogue will not be popular among “activists” and will not be able to “control the street” or stop the violence, it gives the regime a chance to change the narrative.” Additionally, Hokayem noted that representatives from Moscow are visiting Damascus to “deliver a message” to Assad to say that he must “give them something they can tell the international community,” such as cosmetic reforms (constitutional changes, elections, new parties.) Russia has “lost credibility on the street” and thus Hokayem was doubtful that the Russians could broker a deal.

Hokayem also discussed the level of fragmentation amongst the opposition. He said the SNC‘s “failure on the international level” necessitates the party to endorse the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who although currently is gaining support, is “badly armed” and “badly organized.” Additionally, Hokayem said that both the Gulf States and the West will be pressed to consider funding and arming the FSA and by doing so risk being involved/seen in a proxy war aligned with Islamists. Failing to do so would be to risk having no control over the outcome. The failure of the draft resolution sent a message to the minorities in Syria that the West “cannot offer them much” and that “the Russians have a major say.” Minority populations loyal to Assad feel that the West “cannot offer them any guarantees” concerning their safety.

Dana Allen said that the failure to pass the resolution was a failure of diplomacy. Allen said that the Obama Administration, which sees itself as a non-interventionist champion of human rights, wants to remain true to its image by avoiding getting caught in a “stupid war” but still using U.S. military power to stop human rights abuses. From a broader perspective, Allen said the UNSC failure delegitimizes the international body “as a military intervention power.” It also injured the U.S. ability to work with international bodies and let others “take the lead.” However, Allen affirmed that the unilateral approach (the Bush approach) still remains unpopular in the minds of the American people. The Obama Administration views the “human rights discourse” coming from Arab leaders as positive effects of the “Arab Awakening.” The administration wants to continue raising the bar of expectation and is working to support the Arab initiative. Allen said that Turkish policy toward Syria is seen by the administration as a strategic asset, but also noted that the Turks “don’t have a better idea than anyone else” on how to solve the conflict. U.S. officials had talked to Allen and were unsure “if Assad was going to leave” and referenced Saddam Hussein as an example of a leader who was “under intense isolation,” “intervention” (no fly zones), and still “lasted quite a while” and “required the U.S. Army to remove him.”

Brig. Ben Barry said that mutual hatred and radicalization of Syrians is increasing at “a faster pace than war weariness,” increasing the probability of war crimes and atrocities on both sides. External actors want to see the success of particular parties. However, the situation in Syria is different from what was seen in Libya for a number of reasons, namely that the regime has a strategy: secure the loyalists, get rid of the opposition, keep a low profile to dissuade intervention, and divide the country strategically. He opined that while military intervention seems “pretty slim” escalating violence, large flight of refugees, and/or atrocities will necessitate prolonged military intervention. He provided alternative solutions to military intervention including the passing of a “united for peace resolution” by the General Assembly, supplying the FSA with communication, coordination, and strategy. Syrian military, said Barry, “is well armed…it will have contingency plans in responding to intervention.”

Hokayem said that the opposition knows that the situation is “past the point of no return.” He stressed that the opposition is fragmented due to lack of any type of coordination (communicate by cell phones,) government activity—“the notion that it is a nationwide movement is erroneous.” The FSA is gaining momentum as they have ability, although extremely limited, to defend the people. Allen added that Iranian support, although the FSA has alleged direct involvement of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, is more of an advisory role and believes that Iran, although highly unlikely, could have some influence in a post-Assad Syria. Barry said that “self-organizing” FSA would benefit from regional players enabling parties to communicate/coordinate on a greater level. Hokayem added that the FSA does not accept civilian volunteers and are trying very hard to maintain a military, not a militia, ethos. The situation is tremendously volatile filled with a large number of variable and contingencies to consider before making any moves. Hokayem ended the discussion saying that the next 2-3 phases include the disintegration of the Arab League, who has already lost their ability to deal with the situation, and an increase in the use of violence (including air strikes) by the Assad regime.