POMED Notes: Meet the Press At Brookings – The Egypt Revolution One Year On
On Wednesday, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion about the state of the Egyptian revolution. Panelists included Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Tamara Wittes, Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow Robin Wright, Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center Shadi Hamid, and Brookings Institution Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk. The moderator was David Gregory from NBC’s Meet the Press.
For full event notes, continue reading below. Or, click here for the PDF.
Martin Indyk said that Egypt had moved from the “tumultuous” “politics of the square” to the politics of political parties and the presidency. The uprising that began with a revolution and military coup produced a legitimately elected parliament, but one with unclear powers or responsibilities, and which will remain unclear until their codification in the new constitution. Much must be done before Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) leaves power: the selection of a constituent assembly, writing the constitution, a vote ratifying the constitution, and then presidential elections, and all the while demonstrations continue.
Robin Wright argued that Egypt’s transition could be divided into phases: the first phase was the revolution, which she called a “military coup.” The second lasted from October to December and saw increasing violence as protesters returned to the streets. The third phase was underway as activists and politicians challenge the authority of the SCAF. Egypt’s political forces will try to balance powers between the presidency and the parliament, as well as define the role of the military, which wants to preserve its control over a large share of the economy and the military budget.
Shadi Hamid called the SCAF the greatest threat to Egypt’s democracy, saying it thoroughly mismanaged the transition and did not fulfill its envisioned role as a “midwife” to Egypt’s democratic rebirth. The revolution and parliamentary elections showed that people wanted more religion in politics, demonstrated by Islamist candidates winning 70 percent of parliament. Islam will now be part of the political landscape, though Hamid admitted that Egyptians probably do not know exactly what that means practically. There is a division between Islamists, as far-right Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood candidates are not forming a coalition.
Tamara Wittes added that while Egyptians might not know what they do want, they know what they do not want, and that is the continuing military rule. The next phase of the revolution after the SCAF leaves power will be about defining what kind of Egypt the people want. When asked what the U.S. government should be doing, Wittes said that the U.S. could offer a vision of what a future U.S.-Egypt relationship could look like. The U.S. must respect the process of self-determination and show a willingness to engage with Islamists. Robin Wright added that Egypt wants less of a U.S. role than ever before, saying Egyptians think they do not need American aid and the dependence it brings. Efforts at democracy promotion may be seen as interference.
On the ongoing NGO crisis, Martin Indyk argued that the SCAF decided that it did not want to be pushed around when it heard the statement by President Barack Obama saying the military should leave power. Indyk said the NGO negotiations were “delicate”: the SCAF wants the U.S. to stay out of the matter while Islamists want the American aid because of Egypt’s poor economy. Relations with the U.S. would also give Islamists much sought-after legitimacy. Shadi Hamid agreed, saying the Brotherhood feared a decline in relations because there were no good alternatives to the relationship with the U.S. The Brotherhood is highly pragmatic, and Hamid predicted that they would take a pragmatic stance toward the NGO crisis.
Wittes said the U.S. could still play a positive role in Egypt’s transition because it remains a symbol of democracy, economic strength, technological development, and exceptional education. But finding a balance in the relationship with Egypt will be “tremendously difficult and important,” and officials must adjust how they engage with Egypt since domestic issues have become so much more important since the revolution. Indyk added that Egypt faces huge problems: declining tourism and foreign investment, a huge population with no housing, and a lack of jobs. Wright stressed that the democratic transition’s success hinges upon Egypt getting the balance of powers right.
Hamid said the goal of the Islamists was to first prove its legitimacy in its leadership by promoting economic recovery. While the Brotherhood does want to apply Islamic Law they also wish to avoid any too-quick changes that could frighten or draw the ire of regular Egyptians, and instead are playing the “long game.” The Turkish model might be informative for the economic and foreign policy of Egypt’s Islamists. Turkey strikes a balance of anti-Israeli rhetoric without damaging ties with the U.S. or E.U., and Egypt’s Islamist have used promising pro-free market language that leftists have criticized.
David Gregory asked what the U.S. administration could to make a “fundamental reorientation” toward the Middle East. Shadi Hamid said the U.S. should use its aid as leverage to push regimes to get serious about democratic reform. The SCAF thinks the U.S. is bluffing, so the aid must be frozen until the NGO crisis is resolved. Further aid to the region must include similar democratization benchmarks. On the question of what Hamas’ experience in power might inform Egypt’s Islamists, Robin Wright said that governing will be a “reality check” for both the Brotherhood and Salafis – both groups have said they will honor Egypt’s prior agreements (e.g. the peace treaty with Israel), but will probably push for changes in the Camp David agreement. Martin Indyk agreed, saying the Brotherhood and Salafis will be pragmatic in their approach, gaining power and legitimacy by meeting heads of state, and promoting stability and economic recovery.