POMED Notes: The End of the Afghan War: Talking with the Taliban and What Comes Next.

On Tuesday, the Center for National Policy hosted a panel on U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and if the peace talks with the Taliban will be successful. The speakers were the Honorable Paul McHale, former assistant Secretary of Defense and member of Congress, Michael O’Hanlon, director of research and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project and correspondent for The Atlantic. The panel was moderated by Scott Bates, president of the Center for National Policy.

For full event notes, continue reading below. Or, click here for the PDF

Bates opened with an overview of U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The troop surge and timeline of military drawdown weigh heavily in the Afghan discussion. Bates admitted there have been some gains in Afghanistan, but not having a clear objective regarding this situation has been an ongoing hurdle. With Afghan President Hamid Karzai receiving $10 billion a year to fund the security apparatus – a continued military presence set for an undetermined time – “what is success in Afghanistan?”

O’Hanlon viewed the “aspirations of the surge disappointing.” While security on the ground is somewhat better than a year prior; the north and west, while still bad, have had relative improvements, the surge has “stanched the bleeding.” O’Hanlon felt the decline in violence was not dramatic enough given this surge represents the most amount of troops that will ever be in Afghanistan. A reasonable standard of success in Afghanistan would involve containing the violence. O’Hanlon believes focusing of containing the rural insurgency (eastern and southern provinces), limited the insurgent’s sanctuaries while providing constant harassment with drones, commando raids, and active HUMan INTelligence (HUMIT), and waiting for an effective leader to step in and successfully guide the country is the best outcome for Afghanistan. With U.S. dates set for troop departure U.S. efforts for lasting security should be focused on vigorously training Afghan police and army units.

Foust began that there is no strategy to end the need for U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and a U.S. “victory” will fail due to conditions for success not existing. Afghani culture revolves around striking deals, seeking bargains with different power brokers, and the U.S.’s position of not dealing with the Taliban limits the extent of future negotiations. Foust felt the legitimacy of the Afghani government is the biggest influencing factor facing ongoing security in Afghanistan. The inability to stymie the systematic corruption, regarding local government officials and police officers, influences the population’s decision whether supporting the government in Kabul or the Taliban. Foust referenced the campaign in Marja that destroyed a functioning Taliban government and imposed a corrupt system from Kabul. The people of Afghanistan have two choices with governmental systems “tyranny or chaos.”

While McHale was concerned with the poverty, illiteracy, and problems facing women’s right in Afghanistan he felt the biggest challenge involved providing personal security to the citizens. Not providing personal security undermines the public’s trust in government, and lends credibility to the Taliban. McHale is not confident with the Afghan police force’s ability to protect the population, and training a security force to maintain security in a “credible” way should be the upmost priority. McHale’s asserted that the Taliban will once again rise to power if the current Afghan government cannot provide security for its citizens by honest means.

During the question and answer session, Foust addressed the strategic issues facing the U.S. He believes the U.S. needs to respond to the Afghan people, also including the Taliban and Iran in future negotiations of Afghanistan. O’Hanlon said that supporting an autocrat is problematic, but creating a new Afghan government places Karzai in charge of re-organizing the government and writing the constitution. In turn, O’Hanlon urged the U.S. help develop other political parties that allow a legitimate process to replace Karzai. Foust related a common sentiment amongst Afghans that “Americans over-promised and under-delivered.”