POMED Notes: Egypt’s Military Custodianship
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel on Egypt’s military custodianship and their upcoming role in the civilian governmental transition to power. The speaker was Yezid Sayigh, a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. The panel was moderated by Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
For full event notes, continue reading below. Or, click here for the PDF
Sayigh opened the panel with two overarching questions, will the military return power to the civilian government, and if so, under what conditions. His initial answer was yes, the military will seek to give back power to the civilian government, but the conditions could range from unimpeded democratic governance to a military custodianship, where the military takes on a fatherly role and helps “guide” the country.
Sayigh stated that since the 1990′s the Egyptian officer class has increasingly insulated themselves from the political process. This transition was started, by former President Hosni Mubarak, aiming to stabilize the country by ensuring all high-ranking military officers received lucrative post-retirement positions within the civilian government. Such postings have now amalgamated into personal entitlements within the established military hierarchy – at least 27 governors hail from military positions – and civilian governmental structures are regularly staffed with former military officers.
Sayigh believes the military will return power to the civilian government but wants to maintain control of key aspects, such as: the decision to go to war with Israel, specific issues in foreign policy, and exclusive control of the military budget. Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi has also expressed a desire to have all current and retired military officers be tried only in military courts. This stipulation would in effect shield any military officer who participated in the recent crackdown on civilian demonstrations, or those involved in the cronyism associated with the Mubarak era. In each of these instances there would be a supra-constitutional principle above any constitution put forth by the Egyptian government.
Sayigh feels the newly-formed Egyptian government should not force the military into making abrupt concessions, in fear that the military will assert themselves as “custodians”, but hold firm for full democratic governance. The Freedom and Justice party has made such overtures towards the military by offering a “safe exit” and pledging not to prosecute military members. It is Sayigh’s position that the military, when push comes to shove, will return power back to the government.
In response to a question about what percent of the economy is held by the military, Sayigh felt that gauging the military involvement economically by a percentage underrepresented its true value, as the real value should include an assessment of landowning and related development contracts. The process of awarding such contracts is subject to corrupt practices and cronyism practices that prevailed under Mubarak. Sayigh concluded the Egyptian military has remained insular from the political process but wants to return to their previous role, while maintaining power on key issues.
