POMED Notes: “Arab Spring: One Year On”
On Wednesday, the Hudson Institute’s Centre for Religious Freedom hosted a lecture offering an analysis of the potential implications of the Arab uprising in the short- and longer-term. The discussion panel raised questions on: the rise of the Islamists; the impact on religious minorities in the region; and general changes expected on geopolitics in the region.
Discussants on the panel included Walter Russell Mead, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of the American Interest, Samuel Tadros, Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Kurt Werthmuller, Ph.D. from University of California, Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Senior Fellow and Center Director Nina Shea moderated the discussion.
For full event notes, continue reading below. Or, click here for the PDF.
Walter Russell Mead started the discussion, inviting the audience to compare the Arab Spring with other revolutions. Main commonalities with past revolutions were in the how protest movements evolved into full-scale revolutions. Mead pointed out two drivers: the downfall of existing regimes (ossified system, corruption of an elite etc) and the rise of new actors along with new demands. He insisted that a revolution was a process and not only a moment. He noted that Arab revolutions are not only based on political issues but also on identity issues, which can be compared with the 19th century changes in Europe, where nationalist claims fragmented a few empires into many new states.
Islamic identity was at the core of the upheaval. Mead was concerned that the revolutions could lead to marginalization of minorities and the creation of new refugee issues. He believed that the revolutions are also a rejection of the attempt to modernize state administration based on a centralized Western model; in past centuries the Islamic world was used to a loose governance structure, based on a mix of clerics and local notables implementing traditional laws inspired by shari’a. Mead concluded that the attempt of modernization of state administration did not succeed and that the revolutions were driven by those failures.
Samuel Tadros introduced three conflicting images in Egypt. At the beginning of the uprising, Muslims and Christians were praying together on Tahrir Square but now violence against Copts has risen. Liberal youth started the revolution using new media, but now they have disappeared from the political scene. Finally, while Israel was not an issue in the protests, its Embassy in Cairo was attacked by protesters. Tadros continued that the Islamists did not spark the uprising, nor were they the majority in Egypt but they won 47 percent of the vote and the Salafis 20 percent. Tadros considered these results as a failure that can be explained by the lack of preparation in a democratic transition and that observers underestimated the capacity of the Islamists to shape the revolution. According to Tadros, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) will not be moderates, even now that they will govern. MB are not liberals and the fact that Salafis also received one-third of the vote reflected the views of their base. Moreover they fear that if they show any signs of openness to the West they will lose their base. Tadros expressed some doubts about the possibility of organizing pluralist and fair elections in the future as the Islamist parties share an “authoritarian ideology” and that they will “set the rules of the game”. The other institutions of the state like the army or the police, which could represent a counterbalancing power could be easily infiltrated by the Islamists. Tadros concluded that Islamism was an ideology occupying a significant place in the region that but that it “can be defeated” only if something else convincing is proposed.
Kurt Werthmuller focused on religious minorities in the region and their future after the revolutions. Werthmuller reminded us that there was a legal impunity under Mubarak for religious acts of violence. He continued that the Freedom and Justice Party (the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood) had a clear agenda of changing the country and it was just a question of time. The big issue would be the civil liberties of the Copts in the future. They do not need protections per se but equal rights with all other citizens. Werthmuller drew comparisons with the Syrian case, insisting that it was a particularly hard time for the minorities, suggesting a descent into a sectarian civil war. For decades, the Christians have been kept safe by their support in the Assad regime. They enjoyed religious freedom for much of this period. Now, they are caught in between supporting the pro-democratic movements and fear of Islamists.
The audience asked questions regarding the U.S.policies with the new political situation in Egypt, the influence of the Salafis and the outlook for minorities living in the region. Mead firstly recognized that the MB would be reluctant to cut links with the West notably because of the military aid that Egypt receives from the U.S. He contended that the Salafis are at the heart of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the Salafi movement is not well organized. In Egypt the Salafi sheikhs, the most influential actors in the Salafi movement, were reluctant to be involved in politics, but that may change in the future and the results would then become unpredictable.
Mead reminded us that Muslims and Copts had lived together for 13 centuries until the 20th century when tolerance declined. Nowadays the Coptic population is decreasing, with migration away from Egypt. Meanwhile, there could be a risk that they could become targets, being blamed for economic and political issues that would face Egypt. Samuel Tadros declared that for the U.S., what was happening in the Middle East was not “a beauty contest, where you can chose among the best;’’ there are no good options. Observers do not want Islamists, or an authoritarian regime, the aim is ‘’to stop the worst”. However Tadros pointed out that not all of the countries would follow the same scenario regarding the rise of the Islamists. InTunisia they won 40 percent of the vote (inEgypt 70 percent), and the population has different expectations, i.e. Tunisian are more educated and live in a more liberal society where the women have more freedoms.
