POMED Notes: Syria Under Growing International Pressure
On Tuesday, the Middle East Institute Brookings Institution co-hosted an event entitled “Syria Under Growing International Pressure.” Speakers included Murhaf Jouejati of the Middle East Institute and the National Defense University, Andrew Tabler of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Omer Taspinar of the Brookings Institution. Saban Center Senior Fellow Michael Doran moderated the discussion, while Kate Seelye provided an introduction.
For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.
Seelye introduced the discussion by praising the surprising and courageous decisions by both the Arab League and Syria to join the US and European Union by imposing sanctions on the Assad regime. Doran provided background information on the speakers, noting that Jouejati would give insight from the Syrian opposition, while Taspinar would analyze Syria from a Turkish perspective, and Tabler would address US and European policies toward Syria.
Jouejati began by stating that in his recent interview with Barbara Walters, President Bashar al-Assad showed that he is not disconnected from reality; rather, he demonstrated that “he is a liar” who treats the Syrian people as his “cattle.” He listed two pressures facing al-Assad’s regime: economic sanctions and the “revolution itself,” which Joujeati says has become more unified and has expanded acts of civil disobedience. While this combination of factors has affected the regime, Jouejati argued that these efforts could take a long time to pressure al-Assad sufficiently. He also asserted that the fact that the United Nations Security Council is still “talking while an average of thirty to forty Syrians are killed every day for calling for freedom,” is “ridiculous.” Jouejati emphasized, “Make no mistake, the regime will fall,” as the divide between al-Assad’s family and the Syrian people has become too wide. He concluded his remarks with an urgent appeal to the international community to “save Syrian civilians from a brutal regime.”
Then, Taspinar analyzed Turkey’s policy toward Syria in the context of Turkey’s foreign policy writ large, which he said is motivated by three considerations: Turkish nationalism, a desire to be an independent actor, and mercantilism. He noted that he was “surprised” that “Turkey is as willing to go as far as it is to burn bridges with Damascus.” As Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan failed to compel al-Assad, it became apparent that Turkey does not exercise much leverage over Syria. Taspinar added that Turkey will not want to be seen as pursuing US policy in Syria, so it will be reluctant to adopt a unilateral approach. Taspinar suggested that securing the support of Russia and China would help Turkey act. He concluded by saying that “Turkey will follow more than it will lead on Syria.”
Tabler called the Obama administration’s policy on Syria “painstakingly slow.” The administration realized that as the crackdown continued, it would need to act to address the humanitarian crisis. Beginning with diplomatic pressure at the United Nations, executive orders were issued against Syrian human rights violators. The Syrian Accountability Act was implemented in full, and banking sanctions were expanded. Tabler noted that from the outset, the US has “reached out to the Syrian opposition,” a task which he said has been “very difficult,” given that the “brutalization” of the Syrian people has made it difficult for the opposition to come together in pursuit of common goals. Tabler stated that it was “understood” that “as long as Assad held on [to power], the more bloody and sectarian the conflict” would become. “We are at a crossroads,” currently in Syria, Tabler said, and two major themes drive concern: the humanitarian crisis and Iran. A group of international actors, including the US, France, the UK, Germany, and Turkey, has realized that it will have to take action rather than simply observe, either through implementing a human corridor or buffer zone. He added, “There ain’t no way that Assad is going to go easily.” He ended his remarks by saying that something must be done, and that the US and other actors are “looking for ideas.”
Doran began the question and answer session, noting that it seemed from the panel’s remarks that “we need Factor X,” in order to change the situation in Syria, and if Turkey is unwilling to play that part, then what can the US do to “actually make a difference?” Jouejati answered that there is “no absence of options,” and that the international community should “pick the best one very, very fast,” as the further militarization of the opposition plays into the regime’s goals. He added, “the longer we wait, the more complicated the situation will be.” Taspinar said that he would not advice President Obama to talk to Turkey about a human corridor; rather, he would suggest that the US devise a diplomatic strategy to secure consensus from Russia and China for multilateral action. He would “encourage the US to come up with its own policy: what would a post-Assad scenario look like?”
Tabler presented a three-prong approach to dealing with the crisis: maximize the pressure of the opposition, “chip away” Assad’s support structure (including the Sunni business class), and address the humanitarian situation. Jouejati emphasized the need to “move fast on the question of international intervention before the problems spread to the entire region.”
An attendee asked the panel about what it would suggest doing in light of the fact that western intervention often “delegitimizes what’s going on on the ground.” Tabler said that the US can lead, while Taspinar said Syria was looking for a regional leader. He added that there is a “fear in the region that there is a lack of a US grand strategy and international consensus.” Another attendee cautioned that a “sense of urgency tends to lead to making hasty decisions like militarization” of the opposition, and that “we have to do something sustainable” to address the crisis in Syria.