POMED Notes: “Iran’s Hand in the Levant”

On Wednesday, December 14, 2011, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East co-hosted an event entitled “Iran’s Hand in the Levant.” The discussion was moderated by Michele Dunne, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council, and Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow at the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. The panel featured Randa Slim, a scholar at the Middle East Institute, Mona Yacoubian, Senior Advisor and Middle East Project Director at the Stimson Center, and Aram Nerguizian, Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

For full event notes continue reading, or click here for the pdf.

Randa Slim began by noting that in February 2011, things looked quite good from where Iran sat. By March, however, things took a turn for the worse. Unrest in Syria, a “linchpin” ally of Iran’s, reduces Tehran’s influence throughout the region, including in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories. Slim acknowledged that there have been reports (which she considers dubious) of Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces and Hezbollah combatants fighting in defense of Assad’s regime in Syria. Noting that Iran has started to reach out in small ways to the Syrian opposition, she contended that Iran is “hedging its bets” regarding the survival of the Assad government. She also commented on the role of Iraq in Syria, as well as the perception among top Iraqis that the unrest in Syria will end either through a negotiated settlement or a civil war. According to Slim, Iran’s best case scenario is one in which the Assad regime is weak and isolated, and thus depends heavily on Iran. She expressed skepticism, however, that the Syrian opposition is currently strong enough to bring down the regime.

In her remarks, Mona Yacoubian addressed the Lebanon-Iran-Syria relationship. Asserting that Hezbollah is the primary way that Iran projects influence in the region, she stated: “Next to Iran, Hezbollah stands the most to lose with the demise of the Assad regime.” Tactically, Assad’s fall would disrupt supply routes for Hezbollah, as well as deprive its members of important safe havens in Syria. Strategically, Assad’s fall would mean the loss of a key ally for Hezbollah. Regardless of how events play out in Syria, Yacoubian argued, Hezbollah will be worse off (at least in terms of regional influence) in the future. She also contended that the loss of Syria in the regional “axis of resistance” (comprised of Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah) would deprive the axis of a critical center of gravity. She also discussed Hezbollah’s image in Lebanon, which has substantially diminished in light of its leadership’s overt support for Assad. By standing by its support of Assad, Hezbollah is doing a lot of damage to its own resistance narrative. Nasrallah is “out of step with Arab publics,” and has quickly lost his credibility as a “champion of the oppressed.” Importantly, Yacoubian concluded, the fall of Assad would not mean the end of Hezbollah. In fact, his fall would likely mean a strengthened relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. Yacoubian predicted that Hezbollah’s leadership will now turn its attention inwards, focusing on a national agenda within domestic Lebanese politics.

Aram Nerguizian focused on US-Iranian competition, noting that events in Syria provide Washington with the opportunity to try to downgrade Syria’s influence in Levant politics. Iran, in contrast, is seeking the opposite. Nerguizian called this a competition for hegemony. He stated that the uncertainty that the Arab uprisings have brought to the region pose a big risk for Iran, and added that the sectarian tensions being stoked by the Assad regime in Syria are a “genie [that is] very hard to put…back in the bottle.” Given the realities of austerity and economic hardship in the US and Europe, Nerguizian posited that prospects for direct intervention by the international community are low.