Analysis: The Brotherhood & the SCAF

In an article for the Council on Foreign Relations, Ed Husain argues that the Muslim Brotherhood’s practice of offering free food and social services to Egyptians “smacks of bribery and corruption when used at election time to gain votes, undercut political opposition, and portray the Muslim Brotherhood as God’s good soldiers against the secular and liberal Egyptians. For as long as such practices continue, Egypt’s elections will not be fair and free—they will have been manipulated from the outset.” Whereas the MB has presented itself as the preferable option for pious Muslims in Egypt, Husain says the current monopolization of  the political debate that takes place inside mosques must be balanced by other political parties. If actors other than the MB do not tap into mosque campaigning, effectively allowing the MB to dominate the sphere, then  ”other political parties will have every right to claim foul play after the election, legitimately contest the outcome, and question its validity.”

Eric Trager details the increasingly contentious relationship between the MB and the SCAF, as the MB has threatened to hold “million man marches” if the SCAF does not announce a clear timeline for transition to civilian rule. The SCAF’s recent escalation, including a draft of supraconstitutional principles, effectively weakens the institution, which Trager contends in neither in the SCAF’s interests nor those of the U.S. He concludes, “For Washington, the Islamist-SCAF clash encapsulates the conundrum of the Arab Spring:” the U.S. “has no interest” in an Egyptian parliament dominated by Islamists, while an “indefinite military regime is not a formula for stability either.” Thus, Trager suggests that the U.S. administration encourage the SCAF to form a “pluralistic political framework in close consultation with civilian leaders” as part of a “negotiated transition.”

With regard to the emerging debate over whether the U.S. should continue its foreign aid to Egypt, Issandr El Amrani writes, “On Egypt, specifically, I tend to think the aid formula should be reworked bilaterally and with a simple condition attached: no transition to civilian rule, no military aid.”