POMED Notes: “Syria: The Battle for Democracy and Change”

On Friday, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted Andrew Tabler, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and via Skype, Ambassador Robert Ford, the current American ambassador to Syria. Robert Satloff, executive director at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, introduced the discussion. Both Tabler and Ford gave brief speeches and then spent the majority of the time taking questions from the audience.

For full event notes, continue reading. Or, click here for the PDF.

Ford was the first to speak and gave a brief introduction regarding the current situation in Syria, what was happening on the ground, and where he felt the conflict was going and what kind of American policy could be expected in response. In his view the vast majority of protests continue to be peaceful, that protests are still occurring almost daily but are perhaps not as large as they were during the spring and summer months. Ford stated that the protests continue to provoke a harsh government response in which either protests are broken up immediately or protests are allowed to occur so security forces can identify protesters and arrest them the following day. Ford stated that there is much violence –mostly government forces attacking protesters, but also some violence against the government either from protesters protecting themselves or from army deserters. He also noted that the violence has evolved and the American embassy has monitored attacks on buses, attacks on civilians, army officers and even the use of roadside bombs. Ford stated that his main concern was that people have stated that despite the increase in violence, they do not believe a civil war is possible and this is concerning to Ford because he heard the same refrain in Iraq in 2004 shortly before they had a small civil war.  Ford also expressed concern regarding some instances of sectarian violence, especially in Homs. Ford also expressed concern regarding the pushback the local coordinating committees are receiving from the “Syrian street” about moving towards are more militarized resistance. Ford stressed the need for the Syrian opposition to create a vision and a plan that could be convince more Syrians who are “still on the fence that peaceful change is possible and better for them in the long term.” That being said, Ford acknowledged that the Syrian government is making it hard for the opposition to coordinate and operate effectively. Ford also applauded the formation of the Syria National Council and said it was a step in the right direction. Finally, Ford reiterated his belief that for now, peaceful opposition is the best strategy.

Tabler spoke next, discussing what kind of role exactly ambassadors to Syria should play. Tabler stated that he was very pleased with the work of Amb. Ford and found him “very well equipped to deal with situation on the ground.” Tabler then gave a brief overview of American foreign policy toward Syria over the last ten years and some of the results of this foreign policy. Tabler discussed how for two year the Obama administration had tried to engage the Assad regime via peace talks with Israel while in the past Republicans had attempted to “punish them [the regime] and keep them at arms length,” of which, both approaches did not work. Tabler did note that, “Syria, like all globalizing regimes, needs the international community more than the international community needs Syria.” In this respect Tabler stated that President Bush’s administration “proved far less skillful in handling Assad’s maneuver’s” while the Obama administration has had no luck in engaging Assad due to his “Janis nature” or saying and promising one thing but doing another. Tabler also noted that it is also a “smart move using multilateral pressure since the Assad regime usually moves when confronted with multilateral pressure.” Finally, Tabler laid out a series of recommendation regarding how to deal with the current situation in Syria: 1) coordinated collective international pressure on the Assad regime; 2) work immediately with the Syrian opposition on civil resistance- notably general strikes; 3) Help the Syrian opposition develop a plan for a post-Assad era so they can convince the Aleppian and Damascene elite to switch sides; 4) prepare for the worst case scenario; finally, 5) The U.S. and other nations should not say that any options are “off the table” because there is a psychological dimension in crafting a message that puts pressure on the regime.

After both Tabler and Ford made their statements, the discussion was opened up to questions from the audience. Questions focused what kind of potential outcomes both speakers saw in terms of the revolution in Syria. Ford noted that when he arrived in January ninety percent of Syrian still expected and had hope that Bashar would be a reformer like he promised. Moving forward to October, very few people think this way anymore. Ford also noted that as the economy gets worse the regime will be pressured to find a way out of the current “debacle.” Ford also mentioned that “the longer this conflict drags on… and the strain on the military [grows], we will see other pillars of the regime who will rethink their position. That is why it is so important for the Syrian opposition to develop a real vision, which reassures all Syrians and develops a transition plan.” Tabler fielded a question regarding whether the SNC was ready to govern at this moment, to which his answer was no. Tabler further explained that the divisions inside the opposition do not help this perception; “The problem isn’t necessarily planning, but trying to get everyone to agree on those plans. The Syrian opposition is now agreeing on principles but in order to develop those plans, its key to get elites who have money to leave the regime.” Ford also noted that, “They [the SNC] have moved in the right direction. This has to be a Syrian [driven] process.”

Questions also focused on comparisons between the situation in Syria and the events in Libya and why the U.S. is not involved militarily in Syria. Ford stated that the comparison of the situation in Libya to Syria was dependent on numerous factors. He also stated that the opinion amongst the Syrian opposition and on the “Syrian street” varied; “with respect to the comparison with Syria and Libya it depends who you talk to. When I speak with younger folks, they do not understand why there was a no-fly zone in Libya but not in Syria. They ask me point blank this question. I have seen signs that say, where is NATO? But when I talk to the more politically oriented people… like the leaders of the LCCs…and the politically minded people…they are much less anxious, they do not want military intervention. They were very clear about international observers but not necessarily military intervention. There is a lot of pushback in the opposition, there is no regional support for military intervention.”

Finally, questions also focused on the role of minorities, Iran’s angle in the conflict and which segments of Syrian society were still supporting the regime. In discussing Iran, Ford called their role “very pernicious” and stated that Iran was indeed giving advice to the Syrian government as to the best methods for repressing protests and repressing social media activism, and of course, providing political support. With respect to minorities, Ford stated that Kurdish involvement has picked up since the assassination of Mashaal Tammo, a prominent Kurdish opposition leader; “I sense the Kurdish street is more stirred up more then before.” Regarding who supports the regime still –such as the business/merchant class- Ford noted that the economy was terrible and that high-ranking people within the merchant class “are now starting to find their names on sanction lists” which could have an impact on their decisions regarding their support for the regime. Ford also noted that the brutality of the Assad government and the way in which Syrian society is configured make it necessary for the Syrian opposition to be more savvy then say the opposition in Egypt or Tunisia, and as such, must really address the concerns of minority groups and the business community and offer them a future vision in which they feel comfortable with such a transition.