Afghanistan: More on the New Strategy
December 7th, 2009 by Jason
On the Sunday talk shows, the administration continued to clarify the new Afghan strategy with analysts weighing in from all sides. Secretary Gates affirmed the proposed July 2011 withdrawal date is “firm,” but the rate will be determined by conditions on the ground. General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry will testify before Congress this week to further elaborate on President Obama’s new Afghan strategy. Meanwhile, The New York Times provides interesting insight into the strategy review process that eventually led to President Obama’s decision to deploy 30,000 additional troops.
Fred Hiatt in the Washington Post explains the similarities between the Iraq and Afghan surges, contending that predictions of inevitable defeat can still yet be proven wrong. Also citing the surge in Iraq, Sean McLain at The National writes that it will “be a greater challenge in Afghanistan” to capitalize on any military success with political progress. But for any chance of success, Thomas Friedman contends Hamid Karzai must step up to the plate. Friedman elaborates: ”Without minimally decent government, Afghans will not take ownership. If they don’t take ownership, they won’t fight for it. And if they won’t fight for it on their own, whatever progress we make will not be self-sustaining.”
As Eliot Cohen explains, the theory of COIN calls for building a decent government through “competition for effective rule and legitimacy - local political outcomes that are enabled by, yet distressingly independent of, military success […] the key to success is building up your host’s forces and capacity for governance, not your own.” However, Cohen observes that this is easier said than done. Therefore, Doug Stanton outlines a more nuanced approach than a simple COIN strategy that seeks to win over Afghanistan “one village at a time.”
In an article generally supportive of the new Afghan strategy, Frederick Kagan and William Kristol contend that some NATO countries misconceived the mission as “supporting the Afghan government without addressing its endemic corruption and abuse of power.” However, Blake Hounshell expresses concern that “the deadline for initiating withdrawal may actually have the perverse effect of increasing corruption as “Karzai’s cronies want to maximize the amount of goodies they can stuff in their politics” before time runs out.
Tony Karon at Time outlines five questionable assumptions of the new Afghan strategy. Among them, Karon questions whether Karzai can be an effective partner, explaining “Karzai’s government is widely seen as corrupt, ineffective and a tool in the hands of a foreign invader, and Afghans are gloomy about the prospects for reforming it.” As such, John Metzler at the China Post suggests the U.S. may be willing to work around Karzai’s corruption and focus efforts on sub-national leaders. He also argues the surge is ultimately aimed to convince some Taliban to leave the insurgency and negotiate. In fact, Juan Cole reports that President Karzai has once again called for the U.S. to condone talks with the Taliban leadership. A former Taliban minister has recently suggested that if an agreement can be forged with Kabul, the Taliban would abandon its alliance with Al Qaeda. Cole also has posted a summary of Pakistani reactions to the new Afghan strategy, translated by the USG Open Source Center.
According to Claude Salhani in The Washington Times, President Obama should have spoken about the need for greater investment in education, more covert operations, and a greater role for the Afghan tribes in his West Point speech. Meanwhile, Jim Hoagland contends President Obama likely avoided the subject of the civilian surge during the speech “because there is not yet agreement among the president’s advisers or NATO members on how the present ineffective flow of financial aid and technical support from abroad for President Hamid Karzai’s government should be reorganized.”
Posted in Afghanistan, Democracy Promotion, Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Iraq, Military, Multilateralism, Reform, Taliban, Terrorism, US foreign policy, US politics, al-Qaeda |