How Successful Was The Surge?
July 29th, 2008 by Sarah
In a debate hosted by American Prospect, Stephen Biddle, Shawn Brimley, Juan Cole, Matthew Duss, Colin Kahl, Lawrence Korb, John Nagl, Michael O’Hanlon, Marina Ottaway, and Thomas E. Ricks all weigh in on the Surge in Iraq and address the factors that have contributed to Iraq’s recent stability.
Stephen Biddle argues that despite the Surge’s failure to bring about its promised political compromise, a completely different possibility arose. The “Anbar Model” or “bottom up” approach was “one that was neither planned nor anticipated nor intended when the surge was designed, but which has nevertheless become central to the prospects for stability in Iraq.”
Shawn Brimley argues that the Surge is only one of many factors that contributed to the relative stability in Iraq. “The decline in violence in 2007 had much more to do with a change in U.S. strategy than simply the additional troops. A change in strategy, plus the Sunni Awakening, the decision of Sadr to stand down his militia, and the use of concrete barriers in Baghdad to separate Sunni and Shia were all extremely important factors that, along with the additional troops, combined to help lower the violence.”
Juan Cole looks more to the various groups that received U.S. funding to fight jihadis, the success of the Badr Corps paramilitary of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq over Sadr’s movement, and the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis, which left few mixed neighborhoods.
Matthew Duss warns that the “Anbar strategy,” which resulted in deals between Sunni tribal militias and the U.S., instead of redirecting political authority to a centralized government, could breed larger problems later. “It’s true that security is a prerequisite for state-building, but if that security only comes at the expense of the legitimacy of the state we’re supposedly trying to build, then we have an entirely new problem on our hands.”
Posted in Democracy Promotion, Iraq, Military, Political Parties, Sectarianism, US foreign policy |